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Prefa ce
From September 1971 to June 1972, I was a US Army infantry lieu-
tenant colonel assigned as a military adviser to the Army of South 
Vietnam. As one of the participants in the Battle of Kontum, I 
have tried to describe what we endured there and what we accom-
plished without indulging in too much of what my grandmother 
called “tooting your own horn.”
The North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam in the spring 
of 1972 was a major military campaign involving hundreds of thou-
sands of troops on both sides. The enemy attacked with the latest 
Soviet and Chinese tanks and artillery, and the South Vietnamese 
and their American allies were supported by their own tanks and 
artillery, thousands of helicopters, fi xed-wing gunships, and bomb-
ers—including B-52s that could drop more than 100 tons of bombs 
on a single three-plane mission. The battles along the Demilita-
rized Zone (DMZ) in the North, at Kontum in the Central High-
lands, and at An Loc in the South were large battles with massive 
violence and staggering losses on both sides. The survival of South 
Vietnam as an independent nation depended on the outcome of 
these battles. Although more than 30,000 books have been written 
about the Vietnam War, the history of what the Americans called 
the Easter Offensive is not as well known as that of the campaigns 
and battles involving American units and extensively covered by the 
American media during the years from 1965 to October 1971.
For example, in Stanley Karnow’s Pulitzer Prize–winning Viet-
nam: A History the only mention of the Battle of Kontum consists 
of 26 completely misleading words. He writes, “The Communists 
showed relative restraint in the Central Highlands, where they 
besieged the town of Kontum, even though a South Vietnamese 
division fl ed rather than fi ght.”1 We all make mistakes, but it is dis-
appointing to see a careless inaccuracy like this in what presumes 
to be a defi nitive history of the Vietnam War. What actually hap-
pened was quite different. Nearly three weeks before the attack 
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on Kontum City, part of the 22nd Army of the Republic of Viet-
nam (ARVN) Infantry Division broke and ran at Tan Canh and 
Dak To II northwest of Kontum City. In contrast, the 23rd ARVN 
Infantry Division stood, fought, and held at Kontum. They blocked 
the North Vietnamese army (NVA) from cutting South Vietnam 
in half. The North Vietnamese attack on Kontum—with two divi-
sions plus additional independent infantry, artillery, and tank regi-
ments—was not “restrained” from the viewpoint of those of us who 
fought there. Yet future students of the Vietnam War who read 
only Karnow’s history will have no inkling of what really happened 
at Kontum in the spring of 1972.
The Battle of Kontum was major drama on a big stage with 
many players on our side, and we would not have prevailed with-
out all of them. One man who stood out above all others in this 
struggle was Mr. John Paul Vann. He was a retired US Army lieu-
tenant colonel and a US Department of State Foreign Service offi -
cer serving with ambassador rank. His civilian rank was equivalent 
to a major general. Vann was the senior adviser to the II Corps 
commander, an ARVN lieutenant general who controlled an area 
larger than one-fourth of Vietnam. Although I was serving two lev-
els below Mr. Vann, he was the sort of man who might show up 
any place at any time, so I met him many times. While writing this 
book, I interviewed Vann’s military deputy, a man with whom I 
had more frequent contact: retired brigadier general George E. 
Wear. In Korea, when Wear was a major, he had known John Paul 
Vann, a captain at the time. As a result of this long acquaintance, 
Wear was the only man in II Corps who called him “John”; to every-
one else he was “Mr. Vann.”2
Almost all of my descriptions of John Paul Vann are confi ned 
to his actions leading up to and during the Easter Offensive. Neil 
Sheehan’s Pulitzer Prize–winning book A Bright Shining Lie: John 
Paul Vann and America in Vietnam describes him in full. It is a his-
tory of Vann’s part in the Vietnam War and a defi nitive biography 
with details about his military service, his civilian service in Viet-
nam, and his death.
In a review of Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie, General 
Bruce Palmer wrote,
I found that one of the most heartening and positive aspects 
was telling the story of our advisers, the unsung heroes of 
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Vietnam. Virtually all of the movies, TV programs, and 
fl ashy novels about Vietnam concern the trials of regular 
US combat units. Rarely if ever do we hear about the advis-
ers, often alone, or in very small groups, serving in a for-
eign, war-torn land, doing their job on their own with no US 
backup support nearby, and knowing that their very survival 
is not in their hands, but dependent on their South Vietnam-
ese friends. For telling this story in a compelling way, Shee-
han deserves our thanks and high praise.3
This book is intended to be a thorough description of the Battle 
of Kontum and the events leading up to it, but with only enough 
information about what was happening elsewhere in Vietnam to 
place Kontum in context. Dale Andradé offers an excellent history 
of the entire Easter Offensive in all of South Vietnam in Trial by 
Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive: America’s Last Vietnam Battle (revised 
as America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offen-
sive). Decisions made in Washington and Hanoi and at the Paris 
peace talks soon impacted those of us “on the tip of the spear” in 
the combat zone, so I have included brief descriptions of these offi -
cial meetings to provide necessary background information.
A battle is best described in chronological order, but doing so 
was diffi cult with respect to the actions leading up to and during 
the Battle of Kontum. Many contemporaneous accounts and pri-
mary sources are undated or not organized by the hour or even 
by the day. If various sources disagreed on when something hap-
pened, I used the most reliable source—when I could determine 
that. Vietnam is across the international dateline, so the date there 
is always a day later than in the United States. To deal with this 
difference, I used the local dates found on letters, logs, and other 
documents created in Vietnam and the US dates for events taking 
place in the United States. The Vietnam datelines on American 
newspaper articles were not always accurate but were seldom off by 
more than one day. News stories in the military newspaper Pacifi c 
Stars and Stripes were more accurately dated. Determining the time 
of day when something happened was especially diffi cult. Military 
messages between Saigon and Washington and the messages that 
Mr. Vann in Pleiku sent to General Creighton W. Abrams in Sai-
gon were in Zulu (Z) or Greenwich Mean time even though the US 
military in South Vietnam was operating on Hotel (H) time, which 
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was the same as the South Vietnamese time but an hour later than 
North Vietnam’s time. A further complication was that the NVA 
used North Vietnam’s time even in South Vietnam.
Some true war stories would be diffi cult to believe even if they 
were told in a work of fi ction. However, memories of traumatic 
events that occurred more than three decades ago are sometimes 
hazy, so whenever possible I have checked sources against each 
other, with experts in certain fi elds, and against the contemporary 
written accounts. In 1971–1972, while I was in Vietnam, I wrote 
letters to my parents and my wife, most of which they saved, and 
exchanged recorded cassette tapes with my wife. We had half-a-
dozen tapes in use but almost always recorded over the ones we 
received, so only two tapes recorded in Vietnam survived. My let-
ters and the two tapes were an invaluable source of information. 
They reminded me of names and incidents long forgotten and con-
fi rmed critical dates and events during the battles in 1972.
An unexpected benefi t of my research was reconnecting with 
men who served with me in Kontum. Many of them shared their 
own memories, maps, and photos with me. These materials pro-
vided signifi cant information and were invaluable primary sources.
To preserve the tenor of the times and military character of con-
versations or messages, I use the “14 May 1972” date format and the 
24-hour time system. The US Armed Forces, most foreign nations, 
and most airlines use the 24-hour system. It saves adding a colon 
and AM or PM to every time reference and avoids confusion when 
neither AM nor PM is inserted. So noon is 1200, 1:45 PM is 1345, 
and 1:45 AM is 0145. Some accounts add the word hours to the time, 
but it is unnecessary unless other numbers follow the time refer-
ence, as in “At 1350 hours 1,200 men attacked.” In most cases, I give 
yards and meters or miles and kilometers as they were used in the 
original sources. (For anyone unfamiliar with the metric system, a 
meter is 1,000 millimeters and only 3.37 inches longer than a yard, 
so considering meters and yards as equal is accurate enough for the 
lengths involved in this account [or, as we sometimes said in Viet-
nam, “Close enough for government work”]. A kilometer, 1,000 
meters, is 62.5 miles. To convert kilometers to miles, divide by two 
and then add a fourth of the result. Thus, 100 kilometers divided 
by two equals 50, and adding a fourth of that, or 12.5, produces a 
total of 62.5 miles.)
I have included a glossary to defi ne or explain the acronyms, 
McKenna Kontum book.indb   xiv 6/14/2011   10:17:13 AM
PREFACE • xv
organizations, and military jargon we used. There are now many 
printed and online sources for complete descriptions of the weap-
ons, aircraft, and vehicles used by both sides during the Vietnam 
War, so I give only minimal descriptions of them in this account. 
An exception is the enemy’s T-54 medium tank. It played an impor-
tant part in the Easter Offensive, so it must be described in enough 
detail to explain why just the sight of one could send ARVN sol-
diers fl eeing in terror. This tank was about 30 feet long, 11 feet 
wide, and 8 feet high, and it weighed 36 tons. It was powered by 
a 580-horsepower V-12 engine and could move as fast as 30 miles 
an hour—with a great deal of loud clanking, grinding, and roar-
ing. The main gun fi red a 100-mm shell that could penetrate up 
to 390 millimeters of armor a kilometer away. There was a 7.62-
mm coaxial machine gun beside the main gun, and above the tur-
ret a .51-caliber (12.7-mm) machine gun that could be fi red by the 
tank commander. The North Vietnamese had two versions of this 
tank: the Soviet-designed and produced T-54 and the Chinese-
made Type 59 (often called the “T-59”), which was almost an exact 
copy of the T-54. There were few external features to distinguish 
them. For example, the T-54 had an infrared searchlight, and the 
Type 59 did not. However, those distinguishing searchlights could 
be removed by the crew or shot off in combat. At the division and 
regimental level, we had no need to distinguish between the two 
types. The NVA employed both T-54s and Type 59s during their 
Easter Offensive and probably used both in the Central Highlands. 
What was most important to those of us being shot at by those tanks 
was that both of them carried a big 100-mm main gun.4
Vietnamese names have the family name (surname) fi rst and 
the given name last. For example, Colonel Ly Tong Ba’s surname is 
“Ly,” and his given name “Ba.” However, the Americans in Vietnam 
used the European and American form for Vietnamese names and 
knew Ly Tong Ba as “Colonel Ba,” so that usage is employed here.
When I could not determine an individual’s complete or cor-
rect name, I substituted a pseudonym in italics. Except for por-
tions deleted, anything written in the 1970s—including my own 
letters home—is quoted exactly as written. Spelling, punctuation, 
grammar, or factual errors are not corrected. Emails, letters, or 
statements that came to me in the course of writing this book are 
sometimes corrected for spelling, punctuation, and other small 
errors. Ellipses are used to indicate where something is omitted 
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from a quotation or transcription. Where conversations—including 
my own speech—are quoted, what was said is written as accurately 
as I can remember it. Even if the words are not the original words, 
the content is accurate.
Military units that were something other than infantry are iden-
tifi ed by type, such as “armored cavalry,” “artillery,” or “sapper.” So 
all units mentioned should be assumed to be infantry unless iden-
tifi ed as something else. Except for US Army aviation units, no US 
Army units of battalion or larger size were involved in fi ghting dur-
ing the Easter Offensive. I have added “ARVN” or “NVA” to unit 
names for clarifi cation when needed. The military units described 
here are, from largest to smallest: division, regiment, battalion (or 
squadron for cavalry), company (or troop for cavalry and battery 
for artillery), and platoon (the artillery did not have platoons).
The Viet Cong (VC), the South Vietnamese Communist insur-
gents, were almost wiped out during their Tet Offensive in 1968. 
Those VC losses and the continuing infi ltration of NVA soldiers 
into South Vietnam gradually increased the proportion of north-
erners in the enemy forces. During the Easter Offensive, it was 
estimated that the enemy combat and combat support units were 
approximately 80 percent North Vietnamese and 20 percent VC.5 
There were only a few instances where an independent VC unit 
could be identifi ed. So in this account, enemy forces identifi ed as 
“NVA” may have included some VC.
The acronym ARVN was often used to describe the South Viet-
namese army we were advising as well as groups of South Vietnam-
ese soldiers or even one individual, as in “The Arvins are moving 
out” or “An Arvin was killed in the ambush.” It was not good gram-
mar, but it was the way we often talked.
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Kontum: Now and Then
Isn’t it strange that a country can be so pastoral, yet so 
deadly?
—Dickey Chappell, war correspondent killed in 1965
If you were to visit Kontum today, you would probably fi nd a peace-
ful, bustling Central Highlands city of around 35,000. Most of 
the inhabitants would belong to the various ethnic minorities, the 
people the French called “Montagnards.” The main agricultural 
products would be coffee, tea, cassava, rubber, and lumber. This 
pleasant city has a gentle climate. It would be diffi cult to fi nd any 
evidence of—or even to imagine—the major battle that took place 
here long ago. During the last two weeks of May in 1972, Kontum 
was the scene of a violent struggle between the equivalent of three 
divisions of Communist North Vietnamese soldiers, who were 
attacking to seize the city, and the one South Vietnamese division 
defending it. At least 30,000 refugees were packed into Kontum. 
Communist artillery, rockets, and mortars were pounding the city, 
and many buildings were burning. The enemy held almost half 
of the town, and their troops and tanks were assaulting day and 
night to take the remainder of it. It was close, brutal, often toe-to-
toe combat. Helicopter and fi xed-wing gunships and aerial bomb-
ing both inside and outside Kontum aided the South Vietnamese 
troops. During just 25 days, B-52 bombers alone dropped about 
60 million pounds of bombs around Kontum.1 Tactical air fi ghter-
bombers dropped additional millions of pounds of bombs both 
inside and outside the city. Day after day during the battle, aircraft 
were being shot down in fl ames; soldiers on both sides were being 
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killed and wounded; and the air was fi lled with the smell of cordite, 
smoke, and rotting bodies.
In the spring of 1972, 12 Communist North Vietnamese divi-
sions plus many independent units—about 200,000 men in all—
supported by an estimated 1,000 tanks and the latest Soviet and 
Chinese artillery and anti-aircraft guns, invaded South Vietnam 
in what the Americans called the Easter Offensive. It was the big-
gest across-the-border invasion and the largest military offensive 
anywhere in the world since the Communist Chinese attacked 
across the Yalu River into Korea 22 years earlier in October 1950.2 
Although virtually no US Army ground combat units took part in 
the Easter Offensive—they were in the process of withdrawing from 
Vietnam—there were American advisers with the South Vietnamese 
army, marine, and air force units. Also, US Army aviation units, the 
US Air Force (USAF), the US Navy, and navy and marine aircraft 
crews were involved. Many Americans were wounded or killed dur-
ing this campaign.
No US Army or US Marine ground units returned to Vietnam 
to respond to the invasion, but the USAF response was swift and 
massive. From bases in the United States, Korea, and the Philip-
pines, waves of fi ghters, bombers, tankers, and cargo aircraft fl owed 
to Southeast Asia. Some of those aircraft crews were fl ying combat 
missions three days after they received orders to deploy. The US 
Navy responded by tripling the number of aircraft carriers off the 
Vietnamese coast from two to six, with almost 500 aircraft, plus 20 
cruisers and destroyers. It was the largest collection of naval power 
assembled since World War II.
The Easter Offensive was not like the attack on cities by the 
indigenous VC guerillas during Tet in 1968. In 1972, we were fi ght-
ing the NVA, and for the fi rst time in the Central Highlands the 
enemy had tanks. The Communists were not just testing; they were 
trying to conquer South Vietnam that spring. They made repeated, 
all-out attempts to seize the outposts, fi re-support bases (FSBs), 
and cities they wanted. Their goal was to defeat South Vietnam or 
at least to seize and hold enough key cities to relegate the United 
States to a weak bargaining position in the Paris peace talks.3 This 
offensive was a massive three-pronged invasion. In the North, the 
enemy attacked into the I Corps area with six divisions of about 
8,700 men each. Three Communist divisions attacked II Corps in 
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the Central Highlands, and another three attacked into III Corps 
north of Saigon, the South Vietnamese capital.4
A famous Vietnam War correspondent told me, “The main 
show was up north, Kontum was just a sideshow.” The invasion did 
start in the North—across the DMZ into I Corps—so the Americans, 
the South Vietnamese, and the media initially focused their atten-
tion on the North. Maybe most of the reporters remained there, 
but after the NVA attacked in force into two other areas of South 
Vietnam, all three fronts became equally important. If the Commu-
nists’ invasion from the North down Highway 1 had seized all the 
important coastal cities, they might have also seized Saigon. If An 
Loc in the South had fallen, they might have seized Saigon from 
that direction. If Kontum and the Central Highlands had fallen, 
South Vietnam would have been cut in half and defeated by the 
Communists. For those of us who were there, wherever we were 
fi ghting was the most important place in Vietnam.
McKenna Kontum book.indb   3 6/14/2011   10:17:14 AM
McKenna Kontum book.indb   4 6/14/2011   10:17:14 AM
1Autumn in
the Highlands, 1971
In the fi nal analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who 
have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them 
equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but 
they have to win it, the people of Vietnam.
—John F. Kennedy
I went to war in a fi rst-class seat on a chartered, civilian jumbo jet. 
It was September 1971, and I was an infantry lieutenant colonel 
going back to Vietnam for my second one-year tour there. The air-
plane was full of military personnel, and the offi cers were assigned 
seats in the fi rst-class section. Sitting next to me was an infantry col-
onel, an army aviator, who introduced himself as Robert S. Keller. 
He was going to be the senior adviser to the 23rd ARVN Infantry 
Division. I was going to be the G-3 (operations) adviser to that same 
division. Colonel Keller would be my commanding offi cer.
The 23rd ARVN Infantry Division was under II Corps in Pleiku, 
so after a couple days of personnel processing and orientations in 
Saigon I moved on to Pleiku for more processing and some brief-
ings by the II Corps advisers in the large American military com-
pound in Pleiku. Transient offi cers staying overnight were assigned 
to individual “hooches” in a row of identical small buildings. As I 
was walking across a big lawn, returning from dinner one beauti-
ful evening, someone’s radio was tuned to the Armed Forces Net-
work (AFN), and Joan Baez was singing “The Night They Drove 
Old Dixie Down.” Just as she sang “See there goes Robert E. Lee,” 
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there was the heavy CRUMP! CRUMP! CRUMP! of mortar rounds 
falling in the compound. A siren wailed, and I ran to the nearest 
bunker. Welcome back to Vietnam!
During my fi rst tour in Vietnam, I learned that when you live 
with intermittent incoming artillery or rocket fi re, you become 
somewhat used to it. To me, the US Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam (MACV) compound at Pleiku seemed less dangerous than 
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trying to cross a busy street in Saigon. However, Brigadier General 
George E. Wear, the II Corps deputy senior adviser, saw the reac-
tion of high-ranking visitors to II Corps headquarters:
The area containing the US Advisory compound [Pleiku Bar-
racks] [and] the II Corps headquarters building with adjoin-
ing ARVN living quarters was the prime target for 120-mm 
rockets. They didn’t do much damage unless a direct hit. 
We were rocketed on an average of about every two weeks or 
so during the 20 months I was there. Occasionally, a direct 
hit would produce US or ARVN casualties. We could tell 
when the fi rst rocket landed whether they were going to be 
a problem. Alarms were sounded, artillery fi red in the gen-
eral direction of the launch sites, and we went on about our 
business. If they started landing during dinner, we usually 
kept on eating.
I realized near the end of my tour up there that not a 
single [visiting] full colonel or higher ever spent a night [in 
Pleiku] in all the time I was there. Colonels and generals 
would show up during the day for some reason or another 
and then would quickly depart.1
By 1971, many of the American and South Vietnamese military 
and pacifi cation experts thought the war was won. However, the 
South Vietnamese had reached the limits of what they could do 
to defend themselves, and our government had reached the limits 
of what it would give them to do it. The North Vietnamese were 
unfortunately willing to intensify their struggle for fi nal victory, 
and massive aid from China and the Soviet Union would give them 
the means to do it.2
As we withdrew from Vietnam, our government’s attention was 
turning toward other places and other problems. Even the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) was paying less attention to Vietnam. It 
published a national intelligence estimate on Vietnam in April 1971 
and did not publish another one until October 1973, 18 months 
later.3 The media were also turning away from Vietnam. War news 
was disappearing from magazine covers, the front pages of newspa-
pers, and TV news programs.
At the peak of our involvement, there were 543,400 Americans 
in South Vietnam.4 We took over the war, and many of the South 
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Vietnamese military units were relegated to guarding government 
installations and hunting down local Communist forces while the 
Americans went into the jungle to seek big battles with the NVA.
The American people and Congress were increasingly opposed 
to continued involvement in Vietnam, and there was no chance 
this trend would be reversed.5 US troop strength there was now 
less than 100,000 and falling fast. Most of our allies’ forces were 
already withdrawn, and world opinion generally did not support 
our efforts in Vietnam. Some Western governments were even sup-
porting our enemies. In May 1971, Swedish foreign minister Tor-
sten Nilsson announced that Sweden was expanding its assistance 
to the VC with an initial donation of $550,000 worth of medical 
supplies and hospital equipment.6
President Richard M. Nixon’s claim that he had a plan to get us 
out of Vietnam was a major factor in his election in 1968. After his 
inauguration, he revealed the plan as “Vietnamization”—to turn the 
war over to the South Vietnamese. He started withdrawing Ameri-
can troops while building up the South Vietnamese government 
and armed forces. The North Vietnamese said the purpose of Viet-
namization was to change the color of the corpses.7
General William C. Westmoreland, the MACV commander, 
returned to Washington to become chief of staff of the army in 
July 1968. He was replaced by his deputy, General Creighton W. 
Abrams, who was given the responsibility of withdrawing his US 
ground forces while building up the South Vietnamese forces. 
When Nixon took offi ce, there were about 850,000 troops in South 
Vietnam’s armed forces. This number was soon increased to more 
than a million, and the Americans replaced the South Vietnam-
ese’s World War II–era weapons with the same weapons used by 
the US armed forces. More than a million M-16 rifl es, 12,000 M-60 
machine guns, 40,000 M-79 grenade launchers, and 2,000 artil-
lery pieces and mortars were given to the Vietnamese. They also 
received new tactical radios; 46,000 vehicles, ships, and boats; and 
1,100 helicopters and other aircraft.8
The Americans created ARVN in their own image as much as 
possible. The organizational structure, equipment, ranks, supply 
system, and personnel system were almost exact copies of those 
in the US Army. Starting with the smallest element, ARVN had 
infantry platoons of about 30–40 men and infantry companies of 
150–200 men in four platoons and a headquarters element. There 
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were three or four companies in a battalion, and three or four bat-
talions in a regiment. The confi guration varied by division, and the 
23rd ARVN Division had three companies per battalion and four 
battalions per regiment.
The ARVN artillery batteries, armor companies, and armored 
cavalry troops had fewer men than similar infantry units, but they 
were also organized in battalions—or squadrons for the cavalry. An 
ARVN infantry division also had an artillery regiment consisting 
of three artillery battalions with 105-mm howitzers. Each infan-
try regiment had two 81-mm mortars, and each infantry company 
had two 60-mm mortars. ARVN was plagued by desertions, so most 
units had fewer men present for duty than was authorized.
The South Vietnamese also had the Airborne Division and 
Ranger battalions in Ranger groups. They were moved around the 
country like chess pieces to block enemy threats or to plug holes in 
the defenses. In addition, Border Ranger battalions were manning 
static bases along the border. Most of the troops in Border Ranger 
battalions were from local ethnic groups, like the Montagnards, 
but most of their offi cers were Vietnamese. The Border Rangers 
did not receive the same training as the regular Ranger battalions, 
and they were not moved around the country to deal with military 
emergencies.
Regional Forces (RFs), or “Ruffs,” were recruited in each prov-
ince. The RFs were organized like ARVN units and were under 
the command of the province chiefs, most of whom were ARVN 
offi cers. They could be deployed anywhere in their home province 
but were seldom sent to other provinces. They were as well armed—
including their own artillery—and almost as well trained as the 
ARVN units. Popular Forces (PFs), or “Puffs,” were also recruited 
in each village. These forces had the same small arms as ARVN or 
the RF, but they stayed near their homes and guarded local bridges, 
government buildings, and their own villages.
The Ruff Puffs had more men under arms than all the regular 
forces combined. Under the upgrading program started by Gen-
eral Abrams, they had a higher priority than ARVN for new equip-
ment, such as M-16s. They were able to defend against the local VC 
and even launch limited operations against them, but they lacked 
the logistical support required to spend extended periods of time 
in the fi eld. They were not able to engage in lengthy battles with the 
NVA. Although the Ruff Puffs and civilian police guarded much 
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of the government infrastructure, some of ARVN’s manpower was 
also committed to guarding government installations—including 
its own camps—and to clearing roads of mines and ambushes.
Included in the change of direction under General Abrams 
was a campaign to retrain the South Vietnamese armed forces. 
More than 12,000 ARVN offi cers were sent to the United States 
for advanced training, and 350 fi ve-man teams of American advis-
ers were sent to train the RFs and PFs on their new weapons.9 
Because the Americans were withdrawing and the South Vietnam-
ese were being strengthened with new weapons and training, Gen-
eral Abrams considered the advisers essential to his effort to turn 
the war over to the Vietnamese, and he wanted to improve the qual-
ity of the offi cers selected for adviser assignments. In early 1970, 
Abrams told Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler that he was 
“actively shifting talent from U.S. units into the advisory thing. 
We’ve got to dig in there and get some blue chips out of the one 
bag and stick them in the other.”10
The advisers had varying degrees of rapport with and success 
in dealing with their Vietnamese counterparts. If the ARVN offi -
cer did not speak enough English or the American offi cer did not 
speak enough Vietnamese—and few did—then they had to com-
municate through an interpreter, which further complicated their 
relationship and ability to get anything accomplished. The basic 
technique was for the adviser to tell his counterpart what he recom-
mended and tell his American superior the same thing. The other 
American adviser would then tell his counterpart, who would tell 
his Vietnamese superior or subordinate. When that system worked 
well—and that did not always happen—the ARVN counterparts 
would receive orders from their superiors that paralleled their 
advisers’ recommendations.
The advisers and their counterparts often had a diffi cult rela-
tionship. In addition to the language and cultural differences, the 
advisers were often younger and sometimes lower in rank than their 
Vietnamese counterparts. In the early 1960s, the American cap-
tains and lieutenants advising ARVN battalions and companies in 
the fi eld were on their fi rst tour in Vietnam. Few of them were old 
enough to have experienced combat in Korea, but they were advis-
ing men with years of combat experience, sometimes going back to 
serving with the French against the Viet Minh ten years earlier. In 
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those circumstances, the advisers tended to concentrate on equip-
ment and logistical matters. However, after the mid-1960s, when 
US involvement surged, the advisers became their counterparts’ 
link to vital US helicopter airlift, artillery and tactical air support, 
and B-52 strikes. The relationship became much closer then. In 
December 1968, at the height of the war, 11,000 American advis-
ers were working with the South Vietnamese armed forces.11 By the 
time the last US advisers left Vietnam in early 1973, many ARVN 
offi cers had worked with as many as 20 to 30 different advisers.12
South Vietnam had its own air force, the South Vietnamese Air 
Force (VNAF). The performance of VNAF’s A-1 and A-37 fi ghter-
bomber pilots was excellent, and its AC-47 gunship and C-123 
cargo aircraft crews were almost as good. VNAF fi ghter-bomber 
pilots were more experienced than the Americans, and after years 
of bombing in their own country, they knew the territory. How-
ever, both the Americans and the South Vietnamese held VNAF 
helicopter crews in contempt. The only exception was the crews of 
VNAF helicopter gunships. ARVN had no helicopters of its own; 
they all belonged to VNAF, and VNAF was a separate service with 
its own chain of command. VNAF troop-lift helicopter units were 
seldom responsive to ARVN offi cers, and their support for ARVN 
was notoriously poor.
VNAF helicopter pilots sold rides to unauthorized civilians, 
charged refugees for evacuation fl ights, and sometimes sold their 
equipment on the black market. Whenever we were fl ying in a 
VNAF helicopter without seat belts or doors and with a VNAF 
“cowboy” pilot at the controls, I maintained a tight grip on some 
part of the interior frame and hoped for the best. How well the 
engines were being maintained was also a worry. If we informed 
our ARVN counterparts that our helicopter support for a mission 
was coming from VNAF rather than from a US unit, we could see 
disappointment and even fear in their eyes. ARVN soldiers could 
see the stark contrast between VNAF pilots and the US helicop-
ter pilots who risked their lives to resupply and evacuate advisers. 
VNAF helicopter pilots had a bad reputation for refusing to fl y 
medical evacuation (medevac), troop transport, or resupply mis-
sions if they might encounter hostile fi re.
VNAF medevac pilots sometimes refused to pick up ARVN 
casualties in the battle area. Their medevac pilots would even hover 
four or fi ve feet off the ground, ready for a fast getaway but so high 
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only the walking wounded could get onboard. The advisers were 
ordered not to call for a “dustoff” (an American helicopter mede-
vac mission) unless there was an American casualty because the 
USAF advisers with VNAF were trying to force ARVN command-
ers to put pressure on VNAF to do its job. We complied, but it was 
hard to tell a counterpart that we could not call for a dustoff to 
pick up his wounded men and that he would need to use his chain 
of command to complain about VNAF so they would be forced to 
do their job.
On paper, the South Vietnamese armed forces looked impres-
sive, but, as with many military organizations, the actual strength 
present for duty was usually less. The II Corps commander, Lieu-
tenant General Ngo Dzu, visited the 23rd Division one day and 
invited the division commander, Brigadier General Vo Vanh Canh, 
Colonel Keller, and me to join him for an informal lunch at a local 
restaurant. General Dzu told us that a few weeks earlier he and 
another ARVN general ate lunch in a civilian restaurant. When 
Dzu had asked their waiter, a young man of military age, why he 
was not in the army, the waiter told them that he was in the army, 
but that his company commander allowed him to work full-time as 
a waiter as long as he split his civilian wages with the commander. 
This practice was not uncommon. These “ghost” soldiers were typi-
cal of the graft and corruption that crippled ARVN.
ARVN’s American-style organization, training, and equipment 
were deceptive in some ways because the South Vietnamese armed 
forces and their government also operated in the traditional Orien-
tal way. The ARVN offi cers were infl uenced by ancient mandarin 
traditions and their experience under the French colonial system. 
The higher their rank, the greater the likelihood their promotions 
were based more on political infl uence than on military merit.13 
Personal alliances, social class, and graft often carried more weight 
than the abstract ideal of a nation to be built—or saved. After the 
1963 coup d’état in which South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh 
Diem was overthrown and murdered, his successors were always 
on their guard. So loyalty to the president rather than to profes-
sional competence was often the main criterion for promotion to 
the higher ranks and subsequent assignments. Too many ARVN 
offi cers, especially the higher-ranking ones, seized the opportu-
nity for immediate fi nancial gain from their positions even though 
doing so undermined continued American support and put their 
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own futures and their country’s future at risk. In the late 1960s, 
to be appointed as province chief of a wealthy province reputedly 
required a bribe of 10 million piasters, about $50,000. The payoff 
was sometimes made through the aspiring province chief’s wife, 
who would “lose” that amount to the wife of her husband’s patron 
during a game of mah-jongg.14
Both early military background and religion caused some rifts 
within ARVN. Most of the higher-ranking ARVN offi cers had 
received their earlier military training from the French, but the 
lower-ranking offi cers and many of the noncommissioned offi cers 
(NCOs, such as sergeants) received their training from the Ameri-
cans, so there were some differences in military culture, standards, 
and methods between the higher and lower ranks. ARVN was 69 
percent Buddhist, but most of the higher-ranking commanders 
were from the Catholic minority. In 1966, a US military study of 
the South Vietnamese offi cer corps revealed that only one fi eld-
grade ARVN offi cer had been wounded in action during the 12 
years since the war with the Communists had started in 1954.15
The Communist North Vietnamese referred to the war as the 
“American War” to distinguish it from their earlier “Japanese 
War,” in which they had fought the Japanese, who occupied Indo-
china during World War II, and the “French War,” in which they 
had fought the French, who had returned to Vietnam after World 
War II.
The NVA was organized and equipped like the Soviet and Com-
munist Chinese armies, which furnished their advisers and equip-
ment. The North Vietnamese offi cers tended to be professionals 
who were commissioned and promoted based on military merit.16 
Most NVA soldiers received 12 weeks of basic training. Specialists 
were trained for an additional two to nine months, depending on the 
specialty. During training, a three-man cell was formed, and unless 
there were casualties or transfers, it remained intact as long as the 
men were in the army. The cell members supported each other in 
combat, provided comradeship to prevent homesickness and low 
morale, and ensured that any wavering or loss of revolutionary zeal 
by one member would be detected and probably reported by the 
other two. Three cells composed a nine-man squad.17
A full-strength NVA infantry division was made up of three 
regiments of about 2,500 men each, plus organic artillery; anti-
aircraft, engineer, signal, and medical battalions; and a transport 
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company—all totaling around 9,600 men. Some divisions had a reg-
iment rather than a battalion of artillery. The infantry regiments 
had three infantry battalions of 600 men each.18 Tank battalions 
with about 38 tanks each were sometimes attached to the divisions. 
The number of tanks in an NVA tank unit could vary according to 
the mission or the tactical situation or availability of tanks.
South Vietnam was made up of four areas for administra-
tive and military purposes. In various contexts, they were called 
“corps,” “military regions,” or “regional assistance commands.” 
They were numbered from fi rst (I Corps) at the DMZ on the bor-
der with North Vietnam to fourth (IV Corps) in the Mekong Delta. 
Within each corps area, the corps commander, an ARVN major 
general or lieutenant general, was in command of all the South 
Vietnamese troops. A US Army major general or lieutenant gen-
eral was in command of all US troops in that area and served as 
the senior adviser to the ARVN corps commander. By late 1971, 
the American organization within each corps area was designated 
a “regional assistance command.” However, II Corps was differ-
ent because John Paul Vann, a US Foreign Service offi cer, was 
appointed as senior adviser to the Vietnamese II Corps commander 
and as “director” of the Second Regional Assistance Group (SRAG, 
the advisers to II Corps) in May 1971. Although Vann was a retired 
US Army lieutenant colonel, he was now a civilian and could not 
“command” the US Army troops, so a US Army brigadier general 
was appointed to serve under Vann as his deputy and to command 
the US troops in II Corps. A lengthy letter of instructions from 
General Abrams to Vann described Vann’s mission and the respon-
sibilities and relationships involved.19
Under both the French colonial administration and the South 
Vietnamese government, some Vietnamese considered the Central 
Highlands a place of exile where a civil servant or military offi cer 
was sent as punishment or just because he was considered below 
average in some way. Saigon or the coastal cities were considered 
more desirable postings. II Corps was a strategically important 
area, but Lieutenant General Ngo Dzu was in command there even 
though he was obviously not the best man for the job.20
Brigadier General Wear described how Lieutenant General Dzu 
operated:
General Dzu apparently came from a well-to-do Vietnamese 
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family. He graduated from the ARVN Military Academy with 
the fi rst class in about 1958 along with President [Nguyen 
Van] Thieu. He was in his early forties when I served with 
him and had attended our Command and General Staff Col-
lege. Spoke English very well. Had a wife and 10 or 12 kids 
in Saigon. He was more a politician than soldier and became 
heavily involved in black-market activities, if not drug run-
ning. We got along fi ne, although I had little admiration for 
him as a soldier.
General Dzu did not spend much time in Pleiku. He 
operated mostly out of Nha Trang or, for some reason, his 
ancestral home, Qui Nhon. The First Field Force, Vietnam 
headquarters, was in a French Hotel on the beach in Nha 
Trang. That was where Dzu’s main headquarters was. Also, 
where John Vann spent most of his time. [Vann] had a nice 
home near the headquarters where his signifi cant other, 
Julie, lived.
[Dzu’s] pattern soon became like this: On Sunday after-
noons, he would arrive at the corps headquarters building 
and stop by my offi ce. He liked our Scotch, so I would invite 
him over to the barracks, have a couple Scotches with him, 
invite him for dinner in our mess. He had a fairly nice house 
in the town of Pleiku. On Monday mornings, he would 
attend the morning briefi ng, harangue his staff for an hour 
or two (I never knew what about), and go up to his offi ce in 
the headquarters building directly above my offi ce. I would 
stay around and at about 10:00 he would come down to my 
offi ce accompanied by his chief of staff, Colonel Bien. He 
would say: “General Wear, I have many things to do down on 
the coast and must leave shortly. You take care of things in 
the Highlands. I tell Colonel Bien to tell the staff that you 
are in charge.” With that he would leave, and we wouldn’t 
see him until the following Sunday afternoon.21
Brigadier General Wear knew one reason why Dzu always followed 
Mr. Vann’s advice:
In September 1971, General [Frederick C.] Weyand [Abrams’s 
deputy] informed Vann that the US Criminal Investigation 
Department was convinced that Dzu was a ringleader in the 
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fl ow of drugs from Laos and Cambodia to the US troops in 
Vietnam. Vann accosted Dzu with this information, and Dzu 
denied the charge. [He] admitted to doing a little contra-
band smuggling with his brother, a VNAF pilot, but claimed 
that they were not involved with drugs. Vann believed him 
and intervened with Abrams and Weyand to save Dzu’s hide. 
That gave Vann a lot of control over Dzu.22
The ARVN troops in II Corps included the 22nd and 23rd 
Infantry Divisions and 11 Ranger battalions in Ranger groups. 
Other Ranger and airborne battalions from the strategic reserve 
were sometimes deployed there. II Corps was the largest but least 
populated of the four corps areas. It included 30,000 square 
miles—47 percent of South Vietnam’s total area—and was about 
the size of South Carolina. Its eastern boundary was 320 miles of 
irregular coastline along the South China Sea. About two-thirds 
of South Vietnam’s entire coast was in the 23rd Division’s area 
of operations.23 On the western side were a 175-mile border with 
Cambodia and a 65-mile border with Laos. The southern bound-
ary of II Corps was only 56 miles from Saigon. There were three 
distinct geographic regions in II Corps: the fertile coastal plain 
along the coast; the Highland Plateau, averaging 3,000 feet high; 
and the Annamite Mountains, with peaks up to 8,500 feet high 
in Kontum Province. Most of the population of II Corps lived on 
the fl at, narrow strip of coast along the South China Sea. High-
way 1, the French Foreign Legion’s “Street Without Joy,” connects 
all the major coastal cities. In peacetime, it is possible to drive on 
Highway 1 all the way from the Chinese border to Cau Mau at the 
southern tip of Vietnam. From October through February, when 
the northeastern monsoon rains fall on the coast, the Annam Cor-
dillera Mountain Range blocks them from falling in the highlands. 
Then, after a month or so of transition, the southeastern monsoon 
brings rain to the highlands while the coast remains dry.24
There are high, barren plateaus, dense jungle, and tall, jagged 
mountains in the Central Highlands. One of the best-known cities 
in the Highlands is Dalat, a mountain resort in a beautiful setting. 
To drive from Dalat to Ban Me Thuot in the early 1970s, it was nec-
essary to go down to the coast on Highway 11 (now 20), north on 
Highway 1, and then back up into the Highlands on Highway 21 
(now 26), driving over roughly three sides of a square. Pleiku is 203 
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kilometers north of Ban Me Thuot on the north–south Highway 
14, and Kontum is another 47 kilometers farther north. Highway 
21 connects Ban Me Thuot to the coast near Nha Trang, and High-
way 19 connects Pleiku to the coast at Qui Nhon. However, vehicle 
travel on any of these mountain roads was dangerous during the 
war. There could be mines buried in the road; you were always vul-
nerable to enemy ambushes; and VC or NVA forces were sometimes 
able to seize a narrow pass and block traffi c for weeks or months.
Three million people, about 18 percent of the total national 
population, lived in II Corps. Half a million people were scattered 
over the Central Highlands, and half of them were Montagnards.25 
There were few ethnic Vietnamese in the Central Highlands. More 
than 50 percent of Kontum Province’s population was composed 
of the ethnic minorities such as Bahnar, Jarai, Koho, Manong, 
Rhade Xo Dang, Ba Na, Gie Trieng, Brau, Gia Rai, Ra Rai, and Ro 
Mam. The French called them “Montagnards” (Mountain People), 
and some Vietnamese called them “Moi” (savages.) The Americans 
called them “Yards,” an affectionate rather than a derisive nick-
name. Most of us considered the Yards good people who made 
good soldiers. As many as 800,000 Montagnards died during the 
war.26
The headquarters of the 23rd ARVN Division was in Ban Me 
Thuot. It was a city of 70,000 but looked more like a small town 
of about 2,000. Trash was strewn in the streets, and mold crept up 
the trunks of trees and the sides of buildings. Red dust covered the 
lower several feet of trees and buildings. The streets were dirt, with 
many Jeep-jarring potholes. Government installations were sur-
rounded by barbed wire, protected by sandbags at critical points, 
and guarded by soldiers or national policemen. However, it was 
basically a nice place with beautiful pine trees and a wide variety 
of fl owers. There were giant poinsettia trees and other fl ora that 
reminded me of Hawaii. The climate was pleasant and cool during 
the dry-cold months and downright cold in January and February, 
when I slept under three blankets. During the hot, wet months, it 
rained a great deal, but neither the heat nor the humidity were as 
oppressive as they were in the Mekong Delta, where I spent my fi rst 
tour in Vietnam.27
We saw spectacular sunsets where the mountains met the sky 
out toward Cambodia, only 30 miles to the west. Double- or triple-
canopy jungle with giant trees covered much of the Central High-
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lands. In some areas, the tangle of tree limbs, leaves, and vines 
blocked the sunlight, and the jungle fl oor below them was dark and 
dank. The logs trucked through Ban Me Thuot were the largest 
I have ever seen. Flying over the jungle, we could see broad, fast-
fl owing rivers and high, dramatic waterfalls. Deer and big-game 
animals roamed the jungles of the Central Highlands. Former US 
president Theodore Roosevelt may have hunted around Ban Me 
Thuot in the early twentieth century. Just before dark one evening 
as some of us were fl ying back to Ban Me Thuot in a Huey, there 
were low-hanging clouds, so the pilot, Colonel Keller, was skim-
ming just above the treetops. The doors were open, and I saw an 
elephant running through the jungle below us. The 23rd Division 
commander, Brigadier General Vo Vanh Canh, told me he once 
saw a herd of 30 elephants below his helicopter.
In late 1971, a tiger skin was on sale for $150 in the Ban Me 
Thuot market. An American major I knew bought a stuffed tiger 
to take home. His wife may not have been so enthusiastic about 
that souvenir.28 A friend who was a US Navy doctor during the 
Vietnam War told me he operated on a marine who, while sitting 
in a night ambush position, was bitten by a tiger when he reached 
out to check on the man next to him. Another friend who served in 
Special Forces in the Highlands in 1964 told about a puzzling radio 
report they received from one of their teams at an outlying camp. 
The team radioed the coded number of friendlies (ARVN troops) 
killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action (WIA) but added 
one “EIA.” When asked what “EIA” meant, the outpost said one of 
their Yards had gone outside the perimeter wire at night to go to 
the toilet and was “eaten in action” by a tiger.
There had been 10,000 Americans in Ban Me Thuot only a few 
years earlier, and 3,000 were still there in early 1971. Now only 250 
of us remained. The advisers to the 23rd Division were in Advisory 
Team 33. An excellent and popular Vietnamese beer coincidentally 
had the team’s name, a big “33,” on the label. Our advisory team 
had been 180 strong in the spring of 1971 but was now down to 80 
and scheduled for reduction to 50 by the end of June 1972. Rumors 
said the schedule might be accelerated.
The withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, or “draw-
down,” started in late 1969. President Nixon gave MACV a total 
troop-strength ceiling to be reached by the end of each quarter. 
MACV then met those ceilings by selecting which units would be 
McKenna Kontum book.indb   18 6/14/2011   10:17:17 AM
AUTUMN IN THE HIGHLANDS, 1971 • 19
sent home and when they would depart. It was important to do 
this in an order that would still provide necessary support for the 
remaining units, but this support was not being maintained in the 
First Field Force, Vietnam, which included all the US units in II 
Corps. Brigadier General Wear describes how the problem was 
resolved:
The MACV staff was not letting me help decide which units 
should leave next. . . . In September or October, I mentioned 
the problem to Vann and pointed out how we were becom-
ing unable to support some of the remaining units. Vann 
contacted his mentor, Weyand, with the problem. Weyand 
told John that Abrams was personally handling that issue 
and that he would set up a meeting with Abrams for Vann 
and me. Weyand said that the best time to meet with Abrams 
was at breakfast with him in his quarters. Accordingly, the 
date was set, and Vann and I were at Abrams’s quarters at 
a few minutes prior to the seven o’clock breakfast meet-
ing. We were let in by a MSGT [master sergeant] aide and 
found ourselves in a room with a breakfast table set up for 
three people. At exactly 0700, Abrams came in, just grunted 
to us, and invited us to sit down with him. Over breakfast 
of eggs and bacon, etc., Vann and I outlined our problem 
and requested that we have a say in the II Corps withdrawal 
schedule. We covered some specifi cs of the problem. All dur-
ing breakfast, Abrams never uttered a word. When breakfast 
was over, Abrams stood up and said, “I’m not about to buy 
that pile of shit,” and left. As Vann and I exited the building, 
John said, “Well, George, I guess we didn’t do very well in 
there!” However, a day or two later the MACV G-3, Maj. Gen. 
John Carley, called me and said, “I don’t know what you and 
Vann discussed with Abrams, but at the morning briefi ng 
he directed me to clear all future withdrawals from IFFV [I 
(First) Field Force, Vietnam] with Wear.29
In November 1971, the US senior adviser to one of the prov-
inces down on the coast reported to Brigadier General Wear that 
the province chief, an ARVN colonel, was using a large portion of 
his regional forces to guard a US airbase left vacant as part of the 
US withdrawal. When the adviser asked his counterpart why he was 
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using his troops that way instead of for securing the population, 
the province commander told him that Lieutenant General Dzu 
had ordered him to guard the empty base. Wear asked Dzu about 
it and was told, “General Wear, things are going to get rough up 
here, and the United States will have to come back and use that air-
base.” Wear responded, “General, please listen to me carefully. For 
political reasons, the United States will not send troops, airplanes, 
etc., back into Vietnam, regardless of how bad the situation is.” 
Wear was not sure Dzu understood his point, but he did rescind the 
order to guard the empty base.30
When the 23rd Division command group traveled by heli-
copter, Colonel Keller would displace one of the command-and-
control (C&C) ship pilots to fl y the aircraft himself. I liked to have 
him at the controls because he was an excellent and experienced 
pilot. During the previous decade, most US Army pilots had served 
at least 2 one-year tours fl ying in Vietnam, and many were veterans 
of three or four tours. They had done their duty and gone home for 
good. So most of the American pilots supporting us in 1971–1972 
were warrant offi cers about 20 years old, just out of fl ight school, 
and with around 200 hours of total fl ying time. But they were still 
far better than VNAF Huey pilots we fl ew with. Colonel Keller had 
served in the 10th Mountain Division during World War II, and 
we respected him very much for that. However, he had no previous 
experience as an adviser and did not build the necessary relation-
ship with his counterpart. When Colonel Keller fl ew the helicop-
ter, the copilot occupied the other front seat. This left Keller’s own 
counterpart, the division commander, back in the passenger com-
partment with me and any other advisers or ARVN staff offi cers 
accompanying us that day. Most of the time I was the one who sat 
beside and talked with the division commander. We pointed out 
places on the map and on the ground and discussed past, present, 
and future operations.31
The Vietnam War was the fi rst helicopter war. While serving 
in Vietnam from May 1966 to March 1973, the 1st Aviation Bri-
gade had at least some degree of control over 4,000 rotary-wing 
and fi xed-wing aircraft and 24,000 troops.32 The workhorse heli-
copters were the UH-1H utility helicopters, the Hueys. Starting in 
1959, Bell Aircraft produced more than 16,000 Hueys.33 The ones 
armed with only an M-60 machine gun mounted in the door on 
each side were “slicks” because they had no weapons mounted on 
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the exterior. Slicks carried troops or served as C&C ships during 
operations. UH-1H Hueys with 7.62-mm miniguns in the doors 
and 2.75-inch rockets mounted externally were “gunships” or just 
“guns.” The guns always worked in pairs. Those external weapons 
on the Hueys caused drag and made the guns slower than the slicks 
they were escorting. In late 1971, the US aviation units supporting 
us were turning many of their helicopters over to VNAF and going 
home. All the Huey gunships were going to VNAF because in US 
units they were being replaced by the new AH-1G Cobra gunships, 
armed with a nose turret, which contained a combination 7.62-
mm multibarrel minigun and a 40-mm grenade launcher called a 
“thumper.” There was another minigun or a 20-mm cannon in a 
pod. On the “stub wings,” there were up to nineteen (depending 
on the launcher) 2.75-inch rockets. We called the Cobras “snakes.” 
VNAF never received Cobras.34
The troops or supplies we needed to support operations were 
sometimes carried on CH-47 helicopters fl own by US or VNAF 
pilots. The CH-47 was a big, twin-engine, tandem-rotor helicopter. 
It could carry a 10,000-pound payload, as opposed to the Huey’s 
4,600-pound payload. The actual weight carried depended on the 
altitude, weather, and capability of the individual aircraft. The 
offi cial name for the CH-47 was “Chinook,” but we usually called 
it a “Hook” because it had a hook in a bomb bay–type opening in 
the deck. A heavy load, such as a 105-mm howitzer suspended in a 
sling, could be carried beneath the aircraft. Some of the US CH-47 
crews referred to themselves as “Hookers.”
The LOH-6 “Cayuse” light observation helicopter, called a 
“Loach,” was used by the air cavalry scouts and carried only the 
pilot and an observer/gunner with a machine gun. Two snakes 
always fl ew cover for the Loach and brought death and destruction 
on any enemy that fi red at their “little bird.” In some places, the 
Loach could fl y between the trees while searching along a jungle 
trail. While doing this, a scout pilot could come face to face with 
the enemy. A Loach pilot told me he saw an enemy soldier step 
from behind a tree, wave at him, and then shoot at him. The round 
came through the Plexiglas bubble and hit his foot pedal. His gun-
ner shot the man who did it.35
Operation Jefferson Glenn, the last major ground operation for 
US ground forces, ended on 8 October 1971 with 2,026 enemy casu-
alties. On 12 November, President Nixon announced that hence-
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forth only the South Vietnamese would take offensive actions and 
that the US ground forces would play a defensive role only.36 In 
October 1971, Vo Van Sung, the Communist delegate general at the 
Paris peace talks, said the North Vietnamese would launch a new 
military offensive in 1972.37
McKenna Kontum book.indb   22 6/14/2011   10:17:18 AM
2Fighting in Phu Nhon
We don’t have 12 years experience in this country. We have 
one year’s experience 12 times.
—Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann
at the end of his 1962–1963 tour in Vietnam
A steady stream of NVA soldiers and equipment was fl owing 
toward us down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Staff Sergeant John L. 
Plaster was a Special Forces soldier in the Studies and Observa-
tions Group (SOG) running secret operations deep into Laos and 
Cambodia. In early October 1971, he was fl ying as a Covey rider (an 
airborne controller) with a forward air controller (FAC), Captain 
Glenn J. Wright, whose call sign was “Covey 593.” They were over 
Highway 110 E in Laos where that part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
ended at the triborder area—the place where the borders of Viet-
nam, Cambodia, and Laos meet. It was the NVA’s main route into 
the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. As Plaster and Wright 
fl ew over the highway, Plaster noticed long, parallel lines of bushes 
on either side of the road. They circled back for a closer look and 
saw some of the bushes move. They were camoufl aged enemy sol-
diers—many of them. Plaster noted the interval between “bushes” 
and the length of the two columns and calculated the force at about 
2,000 men, probably an entire enemy regiment. He radioed his 
SOG commander to request a B-52 strike on this target. A B-52 
strike was not approved, but they got something even better: prior-
ity for all US tactical air strikes in Southeast Asia.
Wave after wave of fi ghter-bombers arrived about ten minutes 
apart to bomb the NVA regiment with 500-pound bombs, cluster 
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bombs, and napalm. So many bombers were arriving that they had 
to split the target area with another Covey FAC and Covey rider 
from SOG so all the air assets could be used as effi ciently as possi-
ble. They bombed until dark and then returned at daylight to bomb 
some more. The more they bombed, the more hidden enemy vehi-
cles, camps, and supply dumps were exposed, and they, too, were 
bombed. As the enemy tried to reassemble his units dispersed by 
the earlier bombing, they were plastered again. Wiping out almost 
an entire NVA regiment with all its equipment and supplies was 
a major blow against the enemy infi ltrating into South Vietnam.1 
There would be many less—maybe thousands less—Communist sol-
diers available to attack us in the future.
In early November, we started an ARVN offensive named 
“Operation 23/7” in Phu Nhon, northwest of Ban Me Thuot near 
the Cambodian border. We used four infantry battalions, including 
those in the division’s 45th Infantry Regiment. The senior adviser 
to that regiment was Lieutenant Colonel John C. Grant and his 
deputy was Major George Dodge, a tall redhead with a great sense 
of humor. The 11th and 23rd Ranger Battalions were placed under 
our operational control, and we were supported by the US “Side-
kick” Cobra gunships, the 17th Air Cavalry (A Troop, 7th Squad-
ron), and CH-47 Hooks. We brought along 105-mm howitzers and 
lifted them into FSBs with the Hooks.
Our division forward command post was set up in a pyramid 
tent next to an old dirt airstrip high on a windy hill. We erected a 
small wall tent nearby for the advisers to live in and furnished it 
with some canvas cots. However, Colonel Keller fl ew most of the 
advisers back to Ban Me Thuot every evening, and then we would 
return with him to Phu Nhon every morning after breakfast. We 
always left a couple advisers in the Phu Nhon Division Tactical 
Operations Center (DTOC) to hold the fort overnight.
The typical soil in the Highlands is red, laterite clay, which 
turns to dust during the dry season. A strong wind we called “the 
Hawk” howled day and night and covered everything with fi ne, red 
dust. Helicopters landing and taking off sent clouds of dust swirl-
ing everywhere. It covered our clothes and equipment. It was in 
our hair and eyes and got down inside our sleeping bags. When I 
undressed back in Ban Me Thuot after even one day at Phu Nhon, 
there would be red dust inside my undershorts.2
Enemy activity and possibly base camps were reported just 
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across the border, so we put in air strikes on identifi ed targets and 
then used helicopters to insert troops to do bomb damage assess-
ments (BDAs), kill or capture any living enemy soldiers, and col-
lect enemy weapons. In mid-November, we used a three-plane B-52 
“Arc Light” strike to destroy a reported enemy base camp across the 
border in Cambodia. After the strike, one of our battalions swept 
the area and found a large cache of enemy weapons and ammuni-
tion. As the ARVN offi cers and troops searched the surrounding 
area, they found more and more weapons caches. They were over-
joyed about their success, and the commanding general wanted to 
see what they had captured and to congratulate them. So the lucky 
battalion cleared a landing zone and established a secure perim-
eter around it. Colonel Keller fl ew the command group, includ-
ing Lieutenant General Dzu, who was visiting the division that day, 
across the border to see the results. We landed in the strike zone 
and walked around. It was my fi rst time in Cambodia. The holes 
left by our 500-pound bombs were impressive. No bodies were visi-
ble, but plenty of evidence indicated that this zone was a base camp 
the enemy had vacated just before our bombs hit.3
We walked around the area where the captured booty was being 
collected in piles about 4 feet high and 15 feet in diameter. There 
were AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), a mortar, an anti-
aircraft gun, thousands of hand grenades, baskets full of Russian 
plastic explosives, an infl atable raft, and a great deal of ammuni-
tion—all made in Russia or China. It was a major coup to capture 
so many items the enemy could have used to kill us.
VNAF slicks started extracting the loot, and the two generals 
decided to go. We called for our orbiting helicopter to pick us up. 
Just as we cleared the trees, enemy mortar rounds started falling on 
our troops below. The enemy followed up his mortar barrage with a 
counterattack that got between two ARVN companies and overran 
the battalion headquarters. The ARVN regimental commander 
and his adviser barely escaped by running across a shallow river. 
All the captured weapons and explosives not already extracted were 
recaptured. What a loss!4
The captured weapons we extracted were displayed in Phu 
Nhon and later in Ban Me Thuot, where a high-ranking Ameri-
can civilian from the Department of Defense came to see them. He 
told me he had come to Vietnam recently with Secretary of Defense 
Melvin Laird and was left behind as a “spy” to get a better evalua-
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tion of the military situation. I asked if American government offi -
cials coming to Vietnam for only a week or so could get an accurate 
sense of what was going on. He sidestepped the question by saying 
there was an amazing difference between the optimism of Ameri-
cans in Saigon and the more pessimistic view in Pleiku. Those of 
us out in the fi eld knew there was a similar gap between Pleiku and 
where we were.5
One day I was alone in the pyramid tent we used for our forward 
CP at Phu Nhon when “Rogues Gallery”—our boss, Mr. John Paul 
Vann—called on the radio to inform us he was inbound and would 
arrive in ten minutes. I “rogered” the transmission and called for 
someone in our adjacent advisers’ tent to come mind the store 
while I went out to meet our visitor.
When Mr. Vann’s helicopter landed, I walked over to meet him, 
saluted, and reported to him. He demanded, “Why isn’t Colonel 
Keller here to meet me?” I told him Colonel Keller was fl ying his 
counterpart over the area where our operation was in progress and 
asked if he would like me to brief him. He remained rankled about 
not being met by the senior adviser himself but accompanied me 
into the pyramid tent, where I briefed him on what we were doing, 
why, how, and what results had been achieved so far. He asked some 
questions, including why almost all the advisers returned to Ban 
Me Thuot every evening. Vann seemed satisfi ed with my briefi ng 
but was obviously still dissatisfi ed with his reception party. Shortly 
after we fi nished, Colonel Keller radioed to say he was inbound. 
After he landed, Vann and Keller had a private conversation out 
on the airstrip. From then on, all the advisers involved in Operation 
23/7 lived and slept at Phu Nhon.
Mr. Vann’s service in Vietnam had started in 1962 when he was 
an army lieutenant colonel and senior adviser to the 7th ARVN 
Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta. He was not a large, physi-
cally impressive man, but he dominated whatever space he was in. 
His usual garb was cowboy boots, slacks, and a short-sleeved sport 
shirt—usually white and frequently worn with a necktie. He sel-
dom wore a fl ak jacket even when bullets were buzzing around and 
incoming artillery was throwing shrapnel his way. Although he had 
replaced a lieutenant general and his State Department rank was 
the civilian equivalent of a major general, he was no longer in the 
army and wore no rank insignia. As a result, strangers sometimes 
failed to accord him the recognition or deference he deserved—
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and demanded. When this happened, he promptly enlightened the 
offenders about the proper protocol where John Paul Vann was 
concerned. Someone told me a story about how on one occasion 
when Vann came aboard a US Navy ship in the South China Sea, 
he was not given the six side boys, full guard, and band due a per-
son of his rank. Vann was not one to overlook a slight like this, and 
he complained to his hosts about the lack of ceremony appropriate 
for his rank.
Vann followed the military maxim “Ride to the sound of the 
guns!” He was able to identify the time and place where he could 
best infl uence the outcome of an important phase of a battle. He 
seemed to be inexhaustible and had far more energy and drive 
than most men his age (58 in 1972). He stayed up late and got by 
on less sleep than most of us need. A busy man on a tight sched-
ule, he probably packed more travel, asking questions, and issuing 
orders into a day than any other American in Vietnam. John Paul 
Vann was arrogant, egotistical, and cocky. He could be abrasive, 
blunt, and opinionated. But he was also a hard-driving, hands-on, 
competitive commander who got results. His subordinates knew 
that he was interested in their welfare and that—if necessary—he 
would risk his own life to save theirs. This was why he was val-
ued by his superiors, respected by his peers, and supported by his 
subordinates.
Brigadier General Wear, who knew Mr. Vann better than any-
one else in Vietnam, described him:
John Vann’s title, since he wasn’t military, was director, US 
Advisory Command, Military Region II. John’s State Dept. 
rank was FSO1 [Foreign Service Offi cer 1]. The State Dept. 
also tacked on to his rank “Viet Nam Only.” I don’t think 
they wanted a John Vann with that rank serving anywhere 
else in the world.
John scooted about in an OH-58, which he fl ew most of 
the time although he had never taken the pilot training or 
received his wings. His offi cial pilot was [a] WO [warrant 
offi cer] who was a fi ne pilot and kept John alive when things 
got rough. John told me that weather had never stopped 
him. I reminded him that this was different than the Delta. 
Shortly after arriving, he and the WO got caught in very bad 
weather and had to land in the jungle and spend the night 
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there. That chopper didn’t have the instruments to fl y in 
rough weather like the Huey.
John lived mostly in Nha Trang. He had a room in Pleiku 
Barracks adjoining my suite. We had a door cut between 
them so we could get together and he could use the ame-
nities in my suite. John was a night man, while I am a day 
person. He wouldn’t get up until nine or so but stayed up 
until one or two in the morning. I was up for the six o’clock 
intelligence briefi ng, etc. but liked to go to bed by ten or so. 
I fi nally convinced him that midnight bull sessions weren’t 
my thing.
John would do crazy things. He would ride his motorcy-
cle all the way from Nha Trang to Pleiku at night! Arriving 
around daylight in Pleiku, he would grouse because [some] 
ARVN unit had stopped him and demanded identifi cation, 
etc. He would also drop in at a District HQ and order the 
senior adviser to do something that he had no authority to 
do. The adviser would call me, and I would talk to John, who 
would always relent. For some reason, John liked me and 
never once treated me other than [as] an equal. I was embar-
rassed when he returned from a trip to Hong Kong [with 
Julie] and brought me back several presents.
In about mid-November, John showed me an effi ciency 
report he had fi lled out on me. It was a special report for 
promotion to Maj. Gen. The report was exceptionally lauda-
tory. Abrams’s endorsement was, “Wear should be wearing 
two stars now.”6
As the Americans withdrew from Vietnam, they transferred 
much of their own equipment to the South Vietnamese, who also 
received some new equipment shipped directly from the United 
States. By the end of 1971, the Americans had provided ARVN 
with 1,202 artillery pieces, including 12 of our big 175-mm guns.7 
By early 1972, ARVN had the same M-16 rifl es and some of the 
M-48 medium tanks the American units were using. VNAF had 
F-5 fi ghter-bombers and other ground attack and transport air-
craft, both propeller driven and jet propelled. The South Vietnam-
ese now had the equipment they needed, but did they have the will? 
The Asian concern about “saving face” often inhibited command-
ers from taking risks that might turn out wrong or from making 
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attacks that might produce many casualties. This attitude also con-
tributed to their reluctance to admit and accurately report defeats 
and problems that higher headquarters needed to know about to 
access the situation accurately. There was a general lack of aggres-
siveness in the South Vietnamese commanders, which often mani-
fested itself in overreliance on air support.8 Using artillery and 
bombing to knock out bunkers and supporting weapons and to 
infl ict casualties on the enemy before attacking makes sense. How-
ever, there comes a time when it is necessary for the infantry to 
attack to gain or regain an objective or to follow up when the enemy 
is reeling from attacks by artillery or bombing. ARVN command-
ers were all too often not aggressive enough to achieve maximum 
results.
Some ARVN soldiers were psychologically intimidated by the 
North Vietnamese, whom they believed were better soldiers. The 
South Vietnamese troops were especially worried when they were 
near the border, out west in what the Americans referred to as 
“Indian Territory.” In April 1971, Lieutenant General Arthur S. 
Collins Jr. was the commanding general of the US Army’s First 
Field Force, Vietnam, and the adviser to the ARVN II Corps com-
mander. Collins persuaded the corps commander, Major General 
Lu Lan, to launch an ARVN operation in the Plei Trap area in 
northwest Kontum Province. After about a week, all but one bat-
talion was withdrawn. The remaining battalion was ordered to 
sweep north to end up at Ben Het, a Border Ranger camp near 
the border with Cambodia and Laos. About the second night of 
the sweep, the NVA blew bugles and hit the battalion with mor-
tar fi re. According to the last report from the two-man advisory 
team, the ARVN soldiers panicked, threw down their weapons, 
and ran off toward Ben Het. Only a few members of the battalion 
reached Ben Het, and the advisers were never heard from again. 
Experiences like this gave Collins a low opinion of ARVN sol-
diers in general and of the higher-ranking Vietnamese offi cers in 
particular.9
Operation 23/7 at Phu Nhon continued into late December 
with the II Corps commander and staff in charge. Seen from my 
level, that operation was achieving results, but it was apparently 
an exception for ARVN operations in the western Highlands near 
the border. Brigadier General Wear described Lieutenant General 
Collins’s frustration with ARVN’s performance:
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For the remainder of the time LTG Collins was there, he 
seemed to expect me to see that the ARVN performed effec-
tively, which they seldom did. He would call me by telephone 
(usually late at night) two or three times a week and point out 
how some ARVN unit did not perform very well (as if I didn’t 
know). General Collins understood how poorly the ARVN 
performed (primarily because of poor leadership) and con-
tinually whined about it. I understood that the folks in Saigon 
(Abrams, etc.) got tired of his continued pessimistic reports.10
The last week in November 1971 Mr. Vann and Brigadier Gen-
eral Wear fl ew to Saigon to attend the MACV Weekly Intelligence 
Briefi ng given by Major General William E. Potts, the MACV J-2, 
the highest MACV intelligence offi cer. Potts and Wear had attended 
the Armed Forces Staff College together. According to Wear,
the gist of the briefi ng was that an estimated 50,000 NVA 
troops, along with tanks and artillery pieces, were making 
their way down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and would be in posi-
tion to attack in the Highlands area by late January or early 
February. No one but me seemed to be surprised by this 
information. After the briefi ng, Abrams discussed the with-
drawal of troops program, and no one said anything about 
how we were going to meet the threat in the Highlands. 
Before leaving, I went over to Potts and asked him if he was 
sure that the NVA information was correct, and he assured 
me that he was sure and that he didn’t know what plans were 
being made to meet it.
On the way back to Pleiku on the plane, I asked John if he 
heard what I did. John said that those estimates were always 
overblown and that a large attack in our area would give us 
an opportunity to destroy lots of them [the enemy]. He also 
said he had been hearing about enemy tanks for years, but 
none had ever shown up. He also said that if ARVN troops 
became surrounded, they would have to fi ght. John then 
informed me that the State Department was ordering him 
to spend two months in the states as part of their program to 
ensure that their top people did not lose contact with things at 
home. He had been resisting this visit but could no longer put it 
off. He had been assured by Weyand that he would be recalled 
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after 30 days to meet the threat in the Highlands. John left in 
early December and returned about the middle of January.
During the month Vann was gone, Dzu hardly made an 
appearance in Pleiku. Nobody but me, my G-2 (Colonel Irv 
Paul), and my G-3 (Colonel Dillon Snell) seemed to be con-
cerned about the coming events. Also, the withdrawal of US 
forces continued, including the Air Force Recon Squadron 
based at the Pleiku Air Base. Their O-1 and O-2 fl ights over the 
Highlands area had been our eyes on enemy movements, etc.11
Although there were continuing intelligence reports about an 
impending enemy offensive, even the MACV headquarters could 
only guess at when it might start. Down at our level, the advisers 
who had rest and recreation (R&R) leave approved for specifi c 
dates were allowed to go as scheduled but were required to leave 
contact information so they could be recalled if needed.
When Major George Dodge, deputy senior adviser to the 45th 
Regiment, showed up in Ban Me Thuot on his way to R&R, I asked, 
“You were waiting until early next year to go on R&R. How come 
you’re leaving now?” He explained, “We were eating with the Yards, 
and they served cold, curdled duck’s blood soup. It had some veins 
and entrails in it, but if you squeezed lime juice on every spoon-
ful, it wasn’t bad. In fact, I ate three bowls of it. After that, Colonel 
Grant decided I’d been in the fi eld too long and really needed to 
go on R&R right away.”
Major Dodge’s description helped when a similar soup, maybe 
cold monkey’s blood, was served during a meal I ate with some 
Montagnards. It was served in a small, thick ceramic cup without 
a handle—the type some Chinese restaurants use for tea. So the 
portion was thankfully small. There was half a lime on the side, 
so I squeezed all of it over the soup until a clear layer of lime juice 
covered the entire surface. Then I drank it all, emptying the cup 
without stopping, while thinking only “lime juice, lime juice, lime 
juice” as it slithered down my throat. It was not considered impolite 
to decline a second serving.
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You always write it’s bombing, bombing, bombing. It’s not 
bombing! It’s air support!
—USAF colonel David H. E. Opfer
We resisted using tactical air strikes against any targets we could 
hit with our artillery. However, the ARVN artillery had some lim-
itations. During the briefi ngs that the high-ranking US offi cers 
visiting II Corps received, some of them complained about the 
ARVN artillery’s performance. These offi cers were invariably the 
ones who had served one or more previous tours in Vietnam with 
US units that had had an unlimited supply of 105-mm rounds for 
training and fi ring. In contrast to that unrestricted fl ow of ammu-
nition, by 1972 the ARVN artillery was limited to 20 rounds per 
tube (gun) per day,1 which severely restricted live-fi re training and 
even fi re support in combat.
The maximum range of the artillery pieces available was also 
important. All NVA artillery was designed by the Soviet Union and 
manufactured by either the Soviets or China. The Soviet D74 122-
mm fi eld gun had a range of 23,900 meters, and the Soviet M-46 
130-mm gun could hurl a shell 27,500 meters. All ARVN artillery 
came from the United States. The US M101 105-mm howitzer was 
the mainstay. It was fast to load and fi re, and a six-tube battery 
manned by experienced crews could hit an enemy target with 60 
rounds in one minute. It had a barrel life of about 20,000 rounds. 
However, it had a range of only 11,270 meters. That was nearly 
eight miles but not far enough to duel with the NVA.
The US M114 155-mm howitzer fi red a shell almost three times as 
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powerful as the 105 but threw it only slightly farther: 14,600 meters. 
The US 8-inch gun was the most accurate US artillery piece and 
had a maximum range of 16,800 meters. The 175-mm “Long Tom” 
could throw a 174-pound projectile 32,000 meters, but the pow-
der charge necessary to do this wore out the barrel after only 400 
rounds. Also, the 175 was notoriously inaccurate at extreme ranges. 
ARVN did not have many 175s, and the ones it did have were not 
part of the 23rd Division’s artillery and were never assigned to sup-
port us. When it came to long-range artillery duels, the NVA had 
us outgunned. So tactical air or B-52 strikes were usually required 
to knock out the enemy’s long-range guns.2
Other air support came from USAF fi xed-wing AC-130 gun-
ships with the radio call sign “Spectre.” These gunships were C-130 
troop and cargo carriers modifi ed into a fl ying, side-fi ring weap-
ons platform. Their armament included two 20-mm Vulcan auto-
matic guns, a 40-mm Bofors automatic gun, and a 105-mm gun 
capable of fi ring all types of 105-mm shells to hit targets as far as 
12,000 meters away. All those guns could be fi red at ground targets 
while circling thousands of feet above them. Extensive electronic 
target acquisition and tracking equipment enhanced the AC-130s’ 
capabilities. The ammunition fi red by miniguns included tracer 
rounds, which burned red, so they—and the troops on the ground—
could see where their fi re was hitting. Spectre gunships could carry 
tens of thousands of pounds of ammunition for their guns. They 
were able to spend hours on station, circling above the battlefi eld, 
dropping fl ares at night, and becoming familiar with the battlefi eld 
and the friendly voices from the ground. This time on station gave 
Spectre crews an airman’s knowledge of the battlefi eld that only an 
FAC could equal and that a fi ghter-bomber pilot in a “fast mover” 
jet could not acquire.
The USAF also fl ew old, twin-tail-boom C-119 “Flying Boxcars” 
as gunships with the call sign “Shadow.” They were converted to 
AC-119G side-fi ring weapons platforms with four 7.62-mm mini-
guns and a load of up to 50,000 rounds of ammo for them. They 
specialized in mowing down enemy troops attacking US or ARVN 
bases. The AC-119G Shadow crews carried calling cards saying, 
“When uninvited guests drop in . . . call for ‘THE SHADOW,’” and, 
following the theme of an old radio show, “Who knows what evil 
lurks below the jungle canopy? THE SHADOW KNOWS!” Other 
C-119s were converted into AC-119Ks. Their call sign was “Stinger,” 
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and they specialized in hunting down and destroying enemy trucks 
on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In addition to four 7.62-mm miniguns, 
they carried two 20-mm multibarreled Gattling cannons and 4,500 
rounds of ammunition for them.
VNAF’s fi xed-wing gunships were modifi ed World War II C-47 
“Gooney Birds” converted into AC-47 “Spooky” gunships with 
three 7.62-mm six-barreled miniguns mounted in the door, which 
was on the left. Each minigun could fi re up to 6,000 rounds per 
minute. The AC-47s were older than some of the “Spooky Squad-
ron” pilots who fl ew them. In late 1972, the USAF started turning 
its AC-119s over to VNAF.3
Tactical air strikes were most effective against bunkers, artillery 
pieces, and armored vehicles. However, a fi ghter-bomber has to 
make multiple passes over the target and has to locate it again before 
each successive pass, so the helicopter gunships and the fi xed-wing 
gunships were usually the most accurate and responsive close air 
support we had against groups of enemy soldiers. Enemy troops in 
the open were their ideal target. They could maintain eyeball con-
tact with the target while they orbited overhead during offensive 
or defensive operations and could maintain constant communica-
tion with the advisers or commanders on the ground. They could 
quickly pounce on a machine gun emplacement or even a single 
enemy soldier if we could identify the target for them.4
Troops in close contact with the enemy preferred their fi ghter-
bomber air support “low and slow” for accuracy, and VNAF’s pro-
peller-driven Skyraiders fl ew lower and slower than the jets. VNAF 
A-1 Skyraider pilots were also generally the most accurate because 
they were more experienced than the American fi ghter-bomber 
pilots. The US fi ghter-bombers providing our tactical air support 
could come from USAF bases or from US Navy or US Marine 
planes fl own off aircraft carriers in the South China Sea. The 
USAF aircraft fl own included the F-4 Phantom and the F-105. The 
navy and marines fl ew the Chance Vaught A-7 Corsair II and also 
the F-4.5 The fi ghter-bombers could carry napalm, rockets, or anti-
personnel cluster bomb units (CBUs) or bombs weighing 250, 500, 
750, or even 1,000 pounds. Some mixing of that ordnance was pos-
sible, depending on the aircraft type, but the FACs usually had to 
work with what the aircraft came with. If many missions were fl own 
against the same target—for example, a large bunker complex—the 
FAC could request specifi c ordnance on the follow-up missions.
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The USAF initially required FACs to be experienced jet fi ghter 
pilots so they would better understand the capabilities of the 
fi ghter-bombers they were working with. However, as the war pro-
gressed, this requirement had to be relaxed to fi nd enough pilots to 
fi ll all the FAC positions. Some pilots became FACs right after fl ight 
school and only two months in a FAC training course.6 The US 
Army advisers were an important link between the ARVN forces on 
the ground and the USAF FACs in the air. Without those advisers, 
the USAF could not strike so close to ARVN troops, and the strikes 
could not be adjusted to achieve maximum results.
Using the USAF’s B-52 Stratofortresses—long-range strategic 
bombers—in a tactical air support role was one of the most impor-
tant innovations of the Vietnam War. General William C. Westmo-
reland realized the B-52’s tactical bombing potential, so on 14 May 
1965 he sent a memorandum on the subject to his superior, Admi-
ral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, who was commander-in-chief Pacifi c. 
Westmoreland described a 15 April 1965 operation during which 
443 tactical air sorties dropped more than 900 tons of bombs in a 
12-square-kilometer area. The results were “magnifi cent” but still 
limited because the bombs hit scattered targets over many hours. 
He pointed out that if the same bombs had been evenly distrib-
uted, the results would have been better. There would also be a 
big advantage in dropping all the bombs at once, plus the surprise 
and shock gained through bombing from 30,000 feet, where the 
B-52s probably would not be seen or heard by the enemy on the 
ground. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) did not like the idea of 
diverting so many of its strategic nuclear bombers to tactical bomb-
ing missions in a regional confl ict. However, with Westmoreland, 
Sharp, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara all in favor of 
it, on 18 June 1965 the fi rst B-52 tactical strike hit a suspected VC 
base north of Saigon. The fi rst B-52 tactical strike in support of US 
ground forces was in November 1965. The B-52 missions in South 
Vietnam were code-named “Arc Light.”7
When Arc Lights were fi rst fl own, requests for them had to be 
approved by the commander-in-chief Pacifi c and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. Even later, despite their demonstrated effectiveness in 
South Vietnam, their use was controlled so tightly that White 
House approval was sometimes required. President Lyndon John-
son’s tight, personal control of which targets could be bombed 
produced protests that we could not have an effective bombing 
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campaign when the president of the United States had to person-
ally approve even a tactical air strike on a “monkey bridge,” one of 
the small, hand-made footbridges found in the jungle. Although 
this description was almost certainly an exaggeration, it was some-
times cited as an example of how we were fi ghting with one hand 
tied behind our back.8
The B-52 Stratofortress is affectionately known as the “Buff” 
(Big Ugly Fat Fellow). It was designed in 1948 and fi rst fl ew in 1954. 
This aircraft was developed as a strategic bomber to penetrate the 
enemy’s airspace at 500 miles an hour while fl ying at altitudes as 
low as 200 feet or as high as 50,000 feet. The B-52 has a 185-foot 
wingspan and carries more than 45,000 gallons of fuel internally—
enough to provide an average combat range of 8,800 miles. It can 
carry up to 70,000 pounds of bombs.9 The undersides of the SAC’s 
B-52s were a nuclear-blast-refl ective white, but that light color made 
them easier for North Vietnamese anti-aircraft crews to see against 
the blue sky in the daytime and against the black sky at night, so in 
Southeast Asia the B-52s’ undersides were painted black to make 
them more diffi cult for enemy gunners to locate.10
The B-52Ds were given a “Big Belly” upgrade, and starting 
in March 1966 Arc Light missions were fl own by B-52s carrying 
a total of 108 bombs per aircraft. Eighty-four 500- or 750-pound 
bombs were carried internally, and 24 more could be slung under 
the wings on external racks. On most missions, the B-52s carried a 
mix of 500- and 750-pound bombs.11 If each bomber carried 70,000 
pounds of bombs, then the three-plane formation could drop 
210,000 pounds of bombs—more than 100 tons of high explosives—
on the target. The aircraft crews were not always told what their 
target would be on Arc Light missions.
Arc Lights were planned to kill or destroy everything within a 
rectangular “box” one kilometer wide and three kilometers long 
by saturating it with 500- and 750-pound bombs. The bombs were 
usually dropped from at least 30,000 feet by three planes fl ying in 
echelon. The boxes could be reduced to one-by-two or even one-by-
one kilometer to concentrate the bombs, in which case the bomb-
ers fl ew in trail rather than in echelon. The smaller the box, the 
greater the destruction within it. The bombers never fl ew a pattern 
over or toward friendly troops because an early or late bomb release 
might result in friendly casualties.12
After SAC was ordered to fl y Arc Light missions, it developed 
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a system to bomb accurately from around 30,000 feet and even 
through cloud cover when the B-52s could not see the target. This 
also meant they could hit a target hidden under the jungle can-
opy. The ability to hit a target they could not see gave the B-52s 
an important all-weather capability fi ghter-bombers lacked. The 
USAF achieved this accuracy by modifying the Combat Sky Spot 
system they already had. A network of six or more ground radar 
sites was set up in South Vietnam. An air force crew in a van or 
building used their ground-based radar/computer unit to track the 
incoming B-52s, guide them to the target, and tell them when to 
release their bombs. Arc Light bomb runs in II Corps were con-
trolled by a USAF radar site with the call sign “Bongo” located on 
a hill in Pleiku.
The system was so accurate that enemy troops massed for an 
attack could be hit without hitting friendly troops who were less 
than a kilometer away. That minimum safe distance could be 
reduced to only 300 meters if the friendly troops were protected by 
bunkers or foxholes.13 However, although 300 meters might be safe 
in theory, BDAs indicated the overpressure from so many big explo-
sions so close could cause broken ear drums; bleeding eyes, ears, 
and noses; disorientation; and other injuries you would not want to 
infl ict on friendly troops.14
To provide an adequate margin of safety, Arc Lights were nor-
mally not placed closer than three kilometers from friendly troops, 
but in cases of emergency they could be brought in closer. Cap-
tain Christopher E. Scudder was air operations adviser at II Corps. 
When one of the FSBs was under siege, he brought the bombs in 
almost to their defensive wire, maybe as close as 100 meters from 
the friendly troops. Shortly after the bombs fell, the ARVN defend-
ers were forced to abandon this base. However, they held out long 
enough to force the attackers to form a lucrative target, and the 
Arc Light gave them a chance to withdraw without being overrun 
in the process.15 Bringing the bombs in that close to friendly troops 
was done only when those troops were in extreme danger of being 
overrun.
The B-52s could bomb from 29,000 to 38,000 feet, but most of 
the Arc Light missions were fl own at 32,000 to 34,000 feet. Before 
takeoff, the navigator was given the time to be at the initial point, 
and he was responsible to get them there on time. Even when fl y-
ing the six-hour trip from Guam, the B-52 crews rarely missed the 
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scheduled time on the target by more than three minutes. Using 
their own sources and information from the incoming aircraft, the 
USAF radar sites entered the temperature, the wind speed, the air-
craft’s altitude and speed, and the bomb load’s characteristics into 
their computer. The navigator punched a code into his transmitter-
receiver, and the ground radar team sent him a heading, altitude, 
and airspeed for his bomb run. As the aircraft neared the target, a 
countdown came from the ground, “ . . . fi ve, four, three, two, one,” 
and on “Hack!” the navigator hit the switch to release the bombs. 
The navigator had an eight-power periscope looking down, so he 
could see the bombs fall to impact. However, on most missions the 
Arc Light bombers dropped their bombs into the clouds and could 
not see them impact. There were no known friendly casualties from 
Arc Lights.
Americans who fl ew over a target area just after an Arc Light 
hit usually saw any enemy soldiers who were still alive wandering 
around in a daze with blood running out of their noses and ears. 
The helicopter crews often put them out of their misery. ARVN 
troops were sometimes sent in to collect prisoners of war (POWs) 
and equipment. On one such foray into an Arc Light target area, 
ARVN troops captured an NVA nurse and a pedal-operated Singer 
sewing machine.16 The intelligence-collection effort was focused on 
identifying new targets for more Arc Lights rather than doing BDAs 
after targets were hit. However, some BDAs were done by accident 
rather than by design. John Paul Vann’s pilot, Chief Warrant Offi -
cer (CWO) Robert Richards, described an impromptu BDA he and 
Vann performed. They were fl ying near where an Arc Light had 
just hit, so they fl ew low over the target box even before the dust 
had settled. In addition to the dead, numerous NVA soldiers were 
wandering around in a daze. Vann was not one to pass up a chance 
like that. He grabbed the CAR-15 he always carried in the helicop-
ter and fi red at the enemy soldiers until his ammo was gone.17
A semiannual Arc Light Operations Security Briefi ng at MACV 
revealed some weaknesses in safeguarding the information on when 
B-52s would be taking off from U Tapao in Thailand, from which 
half the B-52 missions were fl own. The USAF called the tower over 
an insecure phone line to give the bomber takeoff times up to 12 
hours in advance. The takeoff times were then posted in the tower, 
where Thai operators regularly worked. Adding two hours, plus 
or minus only ten minutes, to the takeoff time would predict fairly 
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accurately when the bombs would be falling in Vietnam. The bus 
schedule for transporting the bomber crews was phoned to the 
motor pool, where the dispatcher was a Thai. The NVA were very 
interested in knowing the time on target because if they knew some 
of their units had been detected and were probably targeted, they 
could move them to a new location before the bombs fell. There 
were also reports that Soviet Navy signal intelligence trawlers were 
positioned off Guam to report when B-52 fl ights departed from 
Anderson Air Force Base (AFB).18
The B-52s were John Paul Vann’s major weapon in this fi ght, and 
he was willing to break the Arc Light rules whenever he thought 
he could get away with it. He bragged to Captain Jack R. Finch, 
the Team 33 G-3 air adviser, about “stealing” Arc Light missions 
from Lieutenant General James F. Hollingsworth, the III Corps 
senior adviser, by diverting them in fl ight within a four-hour win-
dow during which changes could be made. This diversion gave II 
Corps additional Arc Lights at the expense of III Corps, which had 
planned and requested them and was counting on them as already 
allocated to III Corps. These diversions could also be risky. Shack-
ling the coordinates of the divert both accurately and quickly put 
pressure on Vann’s staff. If an aircraft or ARVN unit did not get 
the warning in time, they could be caught in the target box.
Sometimes we could see the B-52s fl ying high above us on their 
way to and from missions. When an Arc Light hit, the earth shook. 
Even many kilometers from the impact area, we could hear and 
feel the long drum roll of heavy explosions. They rippled along 
the ground, one after another for three kilometers. The target area 
disappeared in billowing smoke fi lled with fi re and shrapnel. At 
night, the rumble of the explosions and fl ashes of fi re reminded 
me of the thunder and heat lightning of summer evening storms 
along the horizon when I was a boy living out on the Great Plains 
in Norfolk, Nebraska.
Referring to the use of B-52 strategic bombers in a tactical bomb-
ing role, an air force offi cer commented tongue in cheek, “Frankly, 
that’s no longer an Air Force weapon. We fl y the airplanes, but the 
army puts in the target request; they handle the clearing, etc. The 
only thing we do is hand out the aircraft strike warning to our own 
aircraft, so they won’t have bombs dumped on them.”19
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4The Looming Threat
In order to fulfi ll the goals of Chairman Ho Chi Minh, all 
young men must fi ght. . . . A costly battle is ahead. Much 
sacrifi ce and heartache will precede our victory. . . . The 
armed forces must be increased. All youths, regardless of 
past deferments, must serve. . . . Victory is in sight.
—North Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap,
December 1971
The heavily armed NVA was moving into position to attack us.
During 1971, the Soviets sent 350 ships loaded with war mate-
rial — a million tons of it — to North Vietnam.1 By 1972, they had 
replaced all the equipment previously lost by the NVA and VC. The 
NVA now had more tanks and heavy artillery than ever before.2 An 
ARVN lieutenant general described the warning signs, the NVA’s 
plans, and the dire consequences if the enemy’s coming offensive 
succeeded:
Starting in the fall of 1971, intelligence reports began to 
stream into II Corps Headquarters revealing the enemy’s 
preparations for a major offensive campaign in the Central 
Highlands during the approaching dry season. Prisoner and 
returnee sources further disclosed that large enemy forces 
were moving into northern Kontum Province from base areas 
in Laos and Cambodia and [that] their effort would concen-
trate on uprooting border camps and fi re bases in northwest-
ern Kontum, and eventually, “liberating” such urban centers 
as Pleiku and Kontum. In conjunction with this effort, the 
reports indicated, other enemy forces in the coastal lowlands 
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were to increase activities aimed at destroying ARVN forces, 
particularly in northern Binh Dinh Province, where enemy 
domination had long been established. If these concerted 
efforts succeeded and joined forces, South Vietnam would 
run the risk of being sheared along Route QL-19 [Highway 
19] into two isolated halves.3
Captured enemy documents, defectors, and other intelligence 
sources confi rmed that the Communist B-3 Front would act as a 
corps headquarters to control all the units participating in the 
attack on II Corps. NVA lieutenant general Hoang Minh Thao 
would be in command. The B-3 Front’s subordinate units were 
identifi ed as the 2nd and 320th NVA Infantry Divisions plus the 
entire 203rd Tank Regiment4 from Hanoi High Command and 
other independent infantry and artillery units. VC main and local-
force units supplemented the NVA units. All those nondivisional 
units assigned to the B-3 Front equaled another division, so the 
equivalent of three enemy divisions would be attacking into the 
Central Highlands in II Corps. A captured document revealed 
that both 122-mm and 130-mm Soviet fi eld guns with ranges up to 
27,500 meters were being infi ltrated into the triborder area. This 
attack would be the enemy’s fi rst use of either armor or artillery in 
the Central Highlands. The main thrust of the offensive would be 
attacks on Tan Canh and Dak To II and the FSBs on Rocket Ridge, 
the American name for a large hill mass running northwest from 
Kontum that the enemy used to fi re rockets at Kontum. Next the 
NVA would attack the main population centers of Kontum City and 
Pleiku City. In Binh Dinh Province on the Coastal Lowlands, the 
NT-3 “Gold Star” NVA Division, augmented by VC units, would 
lead the attack.5
The 2nd NVA Infantry Division had entered South Vietnam 
in 1967. They had fought the Americans in Kontum and Darlac 
provinces and thereafter had remained in the Highlands. They 
were experienced soldiers who knew the territory. The 320th NVA 
Infantry Division was formed in 1951 and had participated in the 
French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. The 320th’s organic units were the 
48th, 52nd, and 64th Infantry Regiments and the 54th Artillery 
Regiment. The total strength of the division and its special bat-
talions was 10,400 men. However, information that the 2nd NVA 
Artillery Regiment and the 7th NVA Engineer Regiment were now 
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supporting the 320th indicated that an unusually big attack was 
coming. The 7th NVA Engineer Regiment was building a road four 
meters wide to be used by tanks moving to attack Kontum. It was to 
be completed by the end of March. Enemy sources said the attack 
would begin the fi rst week in April and the objectives would be 
ARVN outposts along Highway 14 northwest of Kontum City and 
then the city itself.6
At a Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update on 20 November 
1971, Major General William E. Potts, the MACV intelligence 
chief, said that by the end of the year about 16,000 enemy soldiers 
would have infi ltrated into South Vietnam to join the Communist 
B-3 Front—about four times as many infi ltrators as in the previous 
year.7 Forewarned of a major enemy attack, in late 1971 General 
Abrams requested through the commander-in-chief Pacifi c, Admi-
ral John S. McCain, advance authority to retaliate in specifi c ways 
not then authorized by higher headquarters. He asked for author-
ity to launch air attacks on the enemy’s MiG fi ghters on the ground 
at bases in North Vietnam, their active ground-control intercept 
radars, and occupied surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites within 
range of the DMZ. Washington responded that those actions were 
pending approval.8
Under pressure to hold down American casualties, in late 
1971 Mr. Vann told his advisers, “To achieve a reasonable balance 
between advisory credibility and combat risk for advisers, I desire 
that U.S. advisers limit their activities in combat to a level com-
mensurate with their counterparts.”9 In other words, as an adviser 
I should follow my counterpart’s example and not take any more 
risks than he does. A good and sensible policy, but we advisers 
would sometimes fi nd it impractical to comply.
Speaking at a MACV Special Intelligence Update conference in 
Saigon on 28 December 1971, Brigadier General George E. Wear 
said:
I wish I could be a lot more optimistic than I really am 
about the ARVN in II Corps. And I think this time last year 
I was. They can just about handle the local forces within the 
boundary. Our experience has been, as you well know, that 
when the NVA well-trained units come across the border, 
the ARVN just hasn’t stood up against them. They have just 
been able to keep the lid on to fi ll the gaps as the U.S. [units] 
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have moved out, helped by the fact that the VC and NVA 
south of our northern three provinces have apparently just 
not been getting the supplies to be able to do very much. Our 
war is now almost completely limited to Kontum, Pleiku, and 
Binh Dinh.
The two divisions [the ARVN 22nd and 23rd Infan-
try Divisions] I don’t think have really improved in the 17 
months I’ve watched them. Their strength runs about the 
same, 71 to 76 percent assigned to authorized. His battalions 
he puts in the fi eld are a little over 300, 320 or something like 
that. The leadership problem you know, which is the same. 
The airborne brigades were our real fi ghting force last year 
in both those battles. . . . The division commanders commit 
the corps ranger group, those three battalions, all the time 
to spare their own battalions. . . . But of course, when you 
look at what the enemy’s got, and what the ARVN’s got, we 
shouldn’t have any trouble up there.
General Dzu spent the whole Christmas holidays up 
there, visiting around with the troops. And he’s making it 
very clear that there isn’t anybody to help. And maybe that 
could have been one of the problems. We, as advisers, when-
ever one of their infantry elements was attacked, we brought 
in gunships and air and so forth. I have noticed that when a 
unit really got into it, and didn’t have a choice, they fought 
pretty well.10
One evening in Ban Me Thuot, some of the off-duty offi cers 
gathered in our small Offi cers Club for some serious drinking. 
After extended discussion, they decided the Team 33 motto should 
be “We Go Now.” One of them, the Catholic chaplain, translated it 
into Latin as “Nunc Imos” and had it painted on the Team 33 sign 
at the compound gate. At another time in another place, that motto 
would hold special signifi cance for some of those advisers.11
McKenna Kontum book.indb   43 6/14/2011   10:17:22 AM
5The Year of the Rat
Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars—and this is 
going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win 
in the end.
—North Vietnamese prime minister Phan Van Dong
New Year’s Day! It was now 1972, the Year of the Rat in the Asian 
calendar.
Around 140,000 American troops still remained in Vietnam, 
but only 20,000 of them were in combat units.1 In January, Pres-
ident Nixon announced the withdrawal of 70,000 more Ameri-
cans to reduce total strength to no more than 69,000 by 1 May.2 
Those cuts were soon translated into actions down at our level. 
The US military telephone switchboards closed on 3 January, and 
all circuits were transferred to ARVN. From now on, all military 
telephones, lines, and switchboards would be operated and main-
tained by ARVN. This change was unwelcome for the remaining 
Americans. To ensure there was some backup for communications 
between the US elements, a single sideband radio net was set up. 
The radios used were civilian shortwave radios. Based on plans to 
phase out the Regimental Combat Assistant Teams (RCATs), our 
G-4 adviser, Major Richard C. Gudat, started transferring the regi-
mental adviser buildings back to ARVN.
The strength of the South Vietnamese armed forces was now:3
120 infantry battalions in 11 infantry divisions
58 artillery battalions
19 armored battalions
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Engineer, signal, and other supporting arms and services
A national reserve consisting of a marine division, an airborne 
division, and 21 Ranger battalions
37 Border Ranger defense battalions in bases along the 
border
Territorial forces consisting of 1,679 RF companies and 8,356 
PF platoons for a total of 550,000 soldiers stationed in their 
home provinces.
116,000 offi cers in the National Police
An air force with more than 1,000 aircraft
A navy with 1,680 craft of various types
More than 4 million men in the People’s Self-Defense Forces, 
a part-time hamlet militia
However, ARVN was losing the equivalent of a division a year 
through desertions (approximately 5,000–6,000). This rate of 
desertion meant that more and more men had to be drafted. The 
deserters and even the dead were sometimes maintained on the 
rolls so their commanders could continue to draw and steal their 
pay. The strength an ARVN infantry battalion actually had in the 
fi eld was sometimes barely half of its authorized strength.
Many optimists expected this year to be one of continued prog-
ress in South Vietnam. A South Vietnamese presidential election 
was held in October 1971 without disruption by the VC, which 
was still trying to recover from its disastrous losses during the Tet 
Offensive in 1968. VC infl uence in the rural areas was now the low-
est in many years. ARVN troops were receiving a continuing fl ow of 
American equipment, and they were operating in the enemy’s base 
areas.4 However, something ominous was present for the pessimists 
to point to: the continuing buildup of NVA forces compared to the 
continuing withdrawal of American forces. If the enemy attacked 
before the South Vietnamese were completely ready to defend 
themselves—and the available intelligence indicated an attack was 
imminent—1972 could end in disaster. The North Vietnamese 
Political Bureau resolved that 1972 would be the year of “decisive 
victory.” It defi ned victory as forcing the United States “to end the 
war by negotiating from a position of defeat.”5
The North Vietnamese were sending nearly their entire army 
south. On 10 January 1972, MACV headquarters estimated 39,000 
enemy troops had already infi ltrated into South Vietnam since the 
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start of the new year, compared to 27,400 during the same period 
in 1971. Many of them would arrive in the B-3 Front’s area during 
January and February. Equally important, the NVA was now bring-
ing in big T-54 main battle tanks, which were much more threat-
ening than the lighter P-76 tanks the NVA had previously used on 
a limited basis in the South. It also increased its artillery strength 
and deployed at least 52 anti-aircraft artillery battalions in Laos. 
Some of these battalions were equipped with 100-mm guns, an 
extremely potent anti-aircraft weapon.6
During late 1971 and early 1972, reconnaissance missions 
detected large numbers of NVA supplies, troops, and tanks coming 
down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, moving toward Kontum Province. This 
was the fi rst time tanks were found coming so far down the trail.7 In 
early January, the commander of the USAF reconnaissance squad-
ron called Brigadier General Wear and asked him to take a fl ight 
with him to see some new developments. Wear described what he 
saw: “As we low-leveled over the area just north of Ben Het, it was 
very obvious that heavy vehicles had crossed the river. The brush 
was torn down along the banks, the tall elephant grass was matted 
down, etc. A few days later O-1 pilots from that squadron reported 
seeing camoufl aged tanks in the area just east of where we saw the 
crossing. I fl ew over the area a few days after that in my Huey, did 
not see tanks, [but] started to receive heavy ground fi re. I stayed 
out of that area after that. [No more] tank sightings were reported 
until [tanks] rolled into Tan Canh.”8
On 25 January 1972, a pair of Cobra pilots from the 361st Aerial 
Weapons Company, the Pink Panthers, attacked two enemy tanks 
in the Plei Trap Valley in Kontum Province just east of the Com-
munists’ Base Area 609 on the border. It was the fi rst time enemy 
tanks were sighted that far into Kontum Province. The pilots saw 
four other tanks under trees, and another Cobra team reported six 
sets of tank tracks. These discoveries indicated that at least one NVA 
tank company was in the area. There were more tank sightings on 
30 January and others on subsequent days. However, because none 
of those tank sightings was confi rmed by ARVN ground reconnais-
sance, most of the II Corps advisers—including John Paul Vann—
refused to believe there were enemy tanks in II Corps.9 In the early 
1970s, the US Army did not have a good fi eld manual on enemy 
armor, its vulnerability, and how to destroy it.10
During the fi rst 20 days of January 1968—before the Tet attacks—
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enemy infi ltration had been 26,000. On 20 January 1972, MACV 
intelligence estimated that enemy infi ltration for the month was 
already 50,000. General Abrams thought President Nixon should 
know this, and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker volunteered to send 
the information fl agged so the president would see it.11
John Paul Vann commented at a 22 January 1972 Commanders 
Weekly Intelligence Evaluation Update, “I have one observation. 
It’s beautiful what the enemy is planning to do, because it appears 
in II Corps that he’s going to make the same basic tactical error 
that he made in Tet ’68, and that is fragment his forces in so many 
dif ferent directions that he will not put a real weight of effort on 
any one attack. And that loans [sic] itself very well to the way our 
forces are already deployed. We are making some adjustments of 
the forces in line with the most likely scenario so as to require a 
minimum of movement once the attack starts.”12
US reconnaissance also detected a massive NVA buildup just 
north of the DMZ, but we did not launch preemptive strikes against 
those lucrative targets because of a November 1968 agreement with 
the North that required the United States to halt bombing north 
of the DMZ in exchange for the Communists’ pledge that they 
would participate in meaningful negations in Paris and would not 
violate the DMZ or shell South Vietnamese cities.13 Although we 
did not bomb north of the DMZ, when General Abrams requested 
more Arc Lights in January, the number of Arc Light sorties autho-
rized per month across South Vietnam was increased from 1,000 to 
1,200.14
Toward the end of January, Colonel Keller offered me the oppor-
tunity to exchange assignments with Lieutenant Colonel Ralph A. 
Matthews, the senior adviser to the 44th Infantry Regiment. This 
exchange struck me as a good chance to gain some different experi-
ence, so I jumped at it. However, Lieutenant Colonel Mathews was 
not exactly enthusiastic about the swap. He apparently worked out 
a transfer to a different assignment because I was actually replaced 
by Lieutenant Colonel James W. “Bill” Bricker. The time between 
my old and new assignments seemed like a good opportunity to 
take much-needed R&R. Everyone serving in Vietnam was allowed 
to go on 2 one-week R&Rs, which were not deducted from our 
annual leave allowance. I chose to go to Bangkok, Thailand, and 
departed Ban Me Thuot on 28 January.
Colonel Ly Tong Ba took command of the 23rd Infantry Division 
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in February 1972. Ba had spent a year in the United States training 
at the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and had returned to 
Vietnam in 1959. Unlike many of the higher-ranking ARVN offi -
cers, he had a reputation for being honest rather than corrupt. His 
wife came from one of the richest families in Bac Lieu Province. 
Her family had once owned around 4,000 hectares (almost 10,000 
acres) of rice fi elds.15 Ba was also related to the wife of General Cao 
Van Vien, the chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Vien claimed he never favored Colonel Ba because he was a 
relative.16 There was also a “family” relationship between Colonel 
Ba and John Paul Vann. Ba’s mother and the mother of Vann’s 
fi ancée, Julie, were sisters.17 Colonel Ba’s selection to command the 
division would prove to be a wise and fortunate choice.
Master Sergeant Lowell W. Stevens was a Special Forces sol-
dier who spent a total of six and a half years in Vietnam. He also 
served in MACV SOG, running operations across the border into 
Laos and Cambodia. Stevens had nothing but respect for the NVA 
because they were disciplined soldiers. He killed them when he 
had to, but he respected them as good fi ghters. In early 1972, Ste-
vens spent most of his time as a “Covey rider,” fl ying out of Kon-
tum airfi eld in an OV-10 with the Covey FACs. He fi rst found new 
roads extending through the jungle to the southeast from the bor-
der with Laos while fl ying with a Covey FAC in February 1972. The 
NVA were using bulldozers and other heavy equipment to build 
roads at night. In the past, they had concealed their new roads with 
vines and limbs before daylight, but now they were brazenly leav-
ing them uncovered and plainly visible from the air. One road was 
extended 600 meters just overnight. The enemy tanks and other 
vehicles would be able to use these roads to move into position for 
attacks against Dak To II, Tan Canh, and the ARVN bases farther 
south. By early May, there was a new road clearly headed toward 
Polei Kleng, a Border Ranger camp 22 kilometers west–northwest 
of Kontum. Master Sergeant Stevens reported all this road build-
ing to the Kontum Province senior adviser, Colonel Stephen W. 
Bachinski, and used his map to show him where it was located. 
However, Bachinski scoffed at Stevens’s eyewitness reports of NVA 
road building in the jungle and made no mention of it in his 
monthly reports to MACV.18
I arrived back in Ban Me Thuot from R&R on 4 February, 
picked up my mail, and packed my few possessions, and the next 
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day a Huey fl ew me down to the extreme south of the II Corps area 
to become senior adviser to the 44th Infantry Regiment. The regi-
ment’s headquarters was in Song Mao, Binh Thuan Province, just 
inland from Highway 1 and between Phan Rang and Phan Thiet.
My new counterpart was Lieutenant Colonel Tran Quang Tien. 
He was a capable, extremely thin, middle-aged offi cer. He had 
assumed command in the fall of 1971, so he was also fairly new to 
the regiment. He spoke passable English and had learned French 
while serving in the army under the French. I spoke some French, 
so we could communicate in two languages without an interpreter. 
Colonel Tien and I established a good working relationship that 
lasted throughout my tour in Vietnam.
An ARVN infantry regiment had an authorized strength of 
3,650 men.19 Many of the 44th Regiment’s soldiers were Nungs, 
an ethnic minority in Vietnam, considered by many ARVN and 
American offi cers to be the best and most loyal soldiers.20 The 44th 
Regiment was reputed to be one of the best in ARVN. After a bat-
tle in the fall of 1971, a US Army brigadier general suggested that 
the 44th be recommended for the US Valorous Unit Award (equal 
to an individual Silver Star), but Lieutenant Colonel Matthews, the 
regimental senior adviser at the time, did not want to push it, and 
Colonel Keller thought the battle was won by the US air cavalry, so 
the recommendation died for lack of support.21
Only a few years earlier, there had been 65 to 70 Americans in 
an RCAT assigned to advise an ARVN regiment. There had been 
advisers with each battalion and company and with each of the 
principal regimental staff offi cers. Now only two of us were with 
each regiment: a lieutenant colonel senior adviser and a major or 
captain as deputy senior adviser. In many ways, we were more liai-
son offi cers between the regimental commander and the Ameri-
can supply system and air support than we were advisers on how to 
fi ght the war. Our fi rst big cohort of advisers had come to Vietnam 
in 1962, so it was time for this change.
My deputy was Major Tony Swachek, and the temporary third 
member of my team was Captain Jack A. Martin. My ARVN inter-
preter was Sergeant Hao, a good interpreter and a good, reliable 
soldier. There were eight Americans in Song Mao when I arrived, 
but the drawdown would soon leave only three or four of us. Small 
MACV teams like mine did not have an American medic with 
them. Every American soldier carried the standard wound packet 
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in a pouch on his pistol belt, but other than that advisers were sent 
into the jungle with only some Band-Aids and a tube of Bacitracin 
as our medical kit. What we did have was “dustoff,” the helicop-
ter medevac system. We had confi dence that if we were wounded, 
we would be extracted by helicopter and whisked away to excellent 
medical care. Not only the pilots whose job was medevac but also 
any American helicopter pilot available would risk his own life to 
save a fellow American on the ground.
After about a week in Song Mao, Lieutenant Colonel Tien 
informed me that the regiment was moving to An Khe to replace 
a unit that had allowed sappers (combat engineers) to get into the 
ammo dump and blow it up. An Khe was a town on Highway 19, 
the winding, mountain road between Pleiku and Qui Nhon on the 
coast. A couple days later we moved out in a vehicle convoy to make 
the two-day, 500-kilometer drive to An Khe. We drove north along 
the coast on Highway 1 and then up into the Highlands on High-
way 19.
When we arrived in An Khe, the results of the sapper attack were 
still visible in the form of destroyed defensive bunkers and blasted 
areas where the enemy sappers’ explosive charges had set off the 
ARVN ammunition dump. Colonel Tien went to work rebuilding 
the defenses and deploying his troops to secure the area.
The NVA’s sappers were more like an elite force than suicide 
bombers. They were essentially assault engineers who were good, 
basic infantrymen with additional training and experience to qual-
ify them as demolition experts. One US unit’s published “Lessons 
Learned” described how the enemy sappers operated:
Sapper attacks have been preceded by detailed, [clandes-
tine] reconnaissance to include identifying anti-intrusion 
devices and determining the extent of protective wire. This 
task may take place three to seven days prior to the attack 
and is followed by attack rehearsals. The night of the sapper 
attack the enemy will neutralize obstacles by tying down trip 
fl ares, mines, etc, and will approach to within a few hundred 
meters of the position. Then they will slowly work their way 
through the wire using the least likely avenues of approach 
along low ground. Sapper attacks usually take place between 
2400 and 0200 hours. They may be preceded by mortar fi re 
to get US personnel to move inside bunkers. Once launched, 
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the sapper attack will be rapidly executed with one or two 
squads heading for specifi cally predetermined targets such 
as ammo storage, POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants] stor-
age, artillery positions, and CPs. Half of the sappers will be 
armed with 7 to 14 CHICOM [Chinese Communist] gre-
nades and 20 kilograms of TNT. The remaining sappers will 
have AK-47s.22
The US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) had been stationed at 
An Khe since 1965, when it had fi rst arrived in Vietnam, until most 
of its units left Vietnam. The US Army engineers built a large base 
and a 6,200-foot paved runway for the “Cav” just north of the town 
of An Khe. When the US Army departed and turned the base over 
to the Vietnamese, everything not secured by ARVN for its own 
offi cial use was quickly taken for personal use. Except for the con-
crete fl oors, every part of every American-built building was gone 
by the time we arrived there in February 1972.
While the 1st Cavalry Division was based outside An Khe, a local 
Vietnamese entrepreneur opened an establishment in the town 
named the “The Million Fingers Massage Parlor, Laundry, and 
Tank Wash.” The American division commander was concerned 
about the massage parlor’s potential impact on his troops’ health 
and morals and threatened to close it down. The owner quickly 
responded to these new market conditions by changing his sign to 
“No More Whorehouse, Only Laundry.”23
I decided my RCAT would live with some other Americans in 
an 1871 two-story French colonial mansion at the south end of the 
runway. There were 13 rooms and four fi replaces. It must have been 
a grand place a hundred years ago, but it had been occupied by the 
Japanese army from 1941 to 1945, by the French from 1945 to 1954, 
by the Vietnamese from 1954 to 1965, and by the Americans since 
then. The 1st Cavalry Division used the building for various pur-
poses. They built an airfi eld control tower on the roof and painted 
the entire exterior of the building light green. From then on, it 
was known as the Green House. Fortunately, it was inside our regi-
ment’s security cordon. The Green House had sleeping rooms with 
steel army cots, running water, and even intermittent electricity. 
There was also a wet bar and a refrigerator to keep our beer cold. 
We were living in the lap of luxury compared to most of the other 
advisers out in the fi eld with ARVN combat units. Another boost to 
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our morale came when an AFN FM radio station resumed broad-
casting from Pleiku.
In early February 1972, MACV intelligence estimated Commu-
nist troop infi ltration down the Ho Chi Minh Trail was 65,700 since 
the beginning of the year, with 26,200 of them going to the B-3 
Front in II Corps. They were headed our way. Over the past four 
years, MACV’s end-of-the-year reevaluation of infi ltration esti-
mates confi rmed that those estimates were never off by more than 
one percent.24
Brigadier General Wear had recommended a series of strong 
blocking positions on the avenues of approach to Kontum. Each 
position would be formidable enough to force the NVA to assem-
ble a signifi cant force to assault it, which would create a “target-
rich” environment for Arc Lights and tactical air strikes. When the 
ARVN defenders were fi nally forced to withdraw from each suc-
cessive blocking position, they could fall back to the next one, and 
the process would start over again. Repeatedly going through this 
process would wear down the NVA forces before they could attack 
Kontum. However, Mr. Vann did not follow this recommendation 
and instead set up a strong forward defense with ARVN forces con-
centrated in the Tan Canh/Dak To II area.
Brigadier General Wear remained concerned about the deploy-
ment of ARVN forces in the Highlands:
Gen. Abrams came up to Pleiku in about February 1972 for a 
briefi ng on the situation. . . . When that was over, Vann said 
to Abrams, “Gen. Wear has a different proposal for the units 
at Tan Canh.” Abrams’s answer, with just the three of us 
(including Dzu) there: “Tell Gen. Wear to have faith.” I still 
don’t know exactly what he meant.
As the three of us came on downstairs, I asked Abrams if 
I could talk to him in my offi ce. After the two of us were in 
my offi ce, I said something like the following: “Sir, I know 
what I am supposed to say. That our plan is great, etc. But I 
can tell you from my seventeen months experience up here, 
and visiting the troops in the Dak To area almost every day, 
that their morale is terrible, that Dzu has no confi dence in 
the success of it, and that he is cowardly and doesn’t have the 
stomach for a fi ght. I am sure the entire force up there will 
collapse when the fi rst major attack comes. Sir, we are facing 
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a disaster unless we pull the majority of the forces deployed 
around the Dak To/Tan Canh area out and place them in 
blocking positions along the highway to Kontum.” Abrams 
sat there a minute, and then said, “Thank you,” and left.25
With a major enemy attack expected during Tet, the three-day 
celebration of the lunar New Year starting on 15 February, the 2nd 
Airborne Brigade, part of the South Vietnamese strategic reserve, 
was sent to strengthen the defenses in Kontum Province in Feb-
ruary. Their headquarters was set up near Vo Dinh, a small town 
about 16 kilometers north of Kontum City on Highway 14, and 
their units occupied FSBs on the southern end of Rocket Ridge.26 
Lieutenant General Dzu then defi ned the command structure. 
The 22nd ARVN Division commander was placed in command of 
the Dak To area, which would include Tan Canh and the Border 
Ranger camps at Ben Het, Dak Mot, Dak Pek, and Dak Seang as 
well as the troops on FSBs 5 and 6. Colonel Nguyen Ba Thinh, the 
Kontum Province chief, was responsible for Kontum City, and Col-
onel Tuong (full name not known), the II Corps deputy for opera-
tions, was given command in Pleiku.27
In addition to the increase in B-52 sorties from 1,000 to 1,200 a 
month, General Abrams received authority to surge to 1,500 sorties 
at his discretion. The Communist uprising and offensive in 1968 
had started during Tet, so many observers believed the offensive we 
were expecting would also begin then. To disrupt any such plans, 
the Americans struck fi rst with a massive air assault. At 0500 on 
12 February, a 48-hour maximum air effort began against the B-3 
Front. During that period, virtually all available tactical air, gun-
ship, and B-52 strikes were deployed to disrupt the NVA’s attack 
preparations.28 During the fi rst three weeks of February, more than 
80 B-52 missions were fl own in the Tan Canh area alone. The Arc 
Light and tactical air strikes near the western border disrupted the 
NVA’s movement of its logistics units into forward attack positions 
and bought valuable time for the defenders to prepare.29
Highway 19 is a steep, winding, two-lane asphalt road between 
Pleiku in the Highlands and Qui Nhon on the coast, 90 road miles 
away. It makes many sharp turns and goes through narrow passes with 
high mountains on either side. Some areas are heavily forested on 
both sides. In the 1960s, the US Army had cleared away the jungle and 
the tall elephant grass where enemy ambushes could hide near the 
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road. However, in this struggle between man and jungle, by 1972 the 
jungle was winning. My “pucker factor” always redlined while driving 
through the narrow passes, especially the place where 1,200 French-
men were killed or wounded when Groupe Mobile 100 was ambushed 
in 1954. We put sandbags under our Jeep’s seats and covered the fl oor 
with more sandbags to dampen the blast (we hoped) if we drove over 
a mine. Nevertheless, driving down Highway 19 was risky.
Mr. Vann and Brigadier General Wear held periodic meet-
ings for the advisers in Qui Nhon down on the coast. On 4 March, 
I drove my Jeep down Highway 19 to one of those meetings and 
came into the city on a straight two-lane road with French plane 
trees on either side. I saw motorbikes leaning against or chained to 
some of the trees and then a sudden burst of fl ame about 100 yards 
ahead. From a distance, it looked like a motorbike gas tank fi re, 
but it turned out to be a Buddhist monk who had doused himself 
with gasoline and then lit a match. Self-immolation was an act the 
bonzes (Buddhist monks) used to protest against persecution by the 
Saigon government.
Lieutenant Colonel Tien, my counterpart, impressed me as an 
energetic, demanding offi cer who was willing to take the war to the 
enemy. He planned a battalion-size operation out of An Khe for 7 
March. VNAF helicopters were requested and approved to lift the 
troops to a position near their objective. However, on the morning 
of the operation VNAF claimed that its helicopters were unavail-
able—not an unusual occurrence. Many ARVN commanders would 
have cancelled or at least rescheduled the operation. However, 
Tien ordered his troops to walk into the area of operations.30
For years, VNAF’s undependable and inadequate helicopter 
support for ARVN had often been augmented or replaced by US 
Army helicopter units. Now the US Army aviation units were dis-
banding, but VNAF—despite the hundreds of helicopters being 
transferred to it—was not assuming greater responsibility. A bad, 
basic mistake had been made years earlier when South Vietnam’s 
troop-lift and gunship helicopters were placed in VNAF with USAF 
advisers rather than in ARVN with US Army advisers who were 
experienced in using helicopters to support ground troops.
As the number of NVA troops in the Highlands increased, and 
as they drew closer to the ARVN defenders, more enemy soldiers 
either were captured or deserted the Communist army rather than 
die in the coming battles. Nguyen Trong Huy was an NVA Hoi 
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Chanh who rallied to ARVN troops 19 kilometers north of Kontum 
on 14 March. When interrogated, a Hoi Chanh—a North Vietnam-
ese who had deserted his own army—was more likely to be coopera-
tive and truthful than a POW. Huy claimed to be a master sergeant, 
a squad leader of the 4th Squad, 2nd Platoon, C-25th Transporta-
tion Company, 64th Regiment, 320th NVA Infantry Division. The 
64th NVA Regiment, designated the “Tay Ninh Group,” was com-
manded by Colonel Khuat Duy Tien, and the 320th Division com-
mander was Colonel Kim Tuan. The division commander and his 
staff departed North Vietnam in October 1971 to “prepare the 
battlefi eld in the Highlands.” The 64th NVA Regiment departed 
the North on 8 November 1971 and arrived at Base Area 609 on 
the border between Cambodia and Kontum Province shortly after-
ward. Huy told the ARVN interrogators that the 64th Regiment 
had three infantry battalions (the K-7, K-8, and K-9) of 300 men 
each and eight specialized companies for reconnaissance, anti-
aircraft, 75-mm recoilless rifl e, 82-mm mortar, engineer, signal, 
medical, and transportation. The K-7 Battalion was hit by an air 
strike on 12 March and suffered heavy casualties. The next day the 
battalion lost another 65 men in a fi ght with ARVN troops. Ser-
geant Huy had heard that the next campaign would be “violent and 
great” and would involve the 64th Regiment and the D-19 Sapper 
Battalion supported by tanks in an attack against Kontum City.31
Starting in mid-March, more frequent encounters with battal-
ion-size NVA units occurred. The enemy was showing a new will-
ingness to engage in battle. A Hoi Chanh and several POWs were 
taken during a fi ght near Rocket Ridge. They revealed that the 
320th NVA Infantry Division would join the B-3 Front in a major 
offensive from April to September. They also confi rmed that there 
were many tanks in the base areas and that those tank units would 
participate in the coming attacks.32
On 24 March, the ARVN 23rd Ranger Battalion was inserted 
into a rugged, mountainous area 30 kilometers north of Kontum 
to do a BDA after an Arc Light strike. The battalion became heavi-
ly engaged with an enemy force and then was quickly surrounded. 
The Rangers held out for four days of repeated ground attacks and 
attacks by fi re, and they suffered more than 100 casualties. The 
11th Ranger Battalion was able to link up with them, but much 
artillery support and many tactical air strikes and B-52 strikes were 
required before the Rangers could break out and withdraw from 
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the battlefi eld.33 Another engagement started when the 95th Bor-
der Ranger Battalion from Ben Het was operating north of its camp 
and tangled with the 141st NVA Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division.
At the end of March, elements of the 47th ARVN Regiment 
and the 2nd ARVN Airborne Brigade were in heavy fi ghting along 
Rocket Ridge. Then, during the fi rst week in April the 48th and 
52nd NVA Regiments of the 320th NVA Division made human-
wave assaults against the ARVN bases on Rocket Ridge. In all those 
engagements, the attacking NVA forces suffered heavy casualties 
during the fi ghting and from Arc Lights as well as US and VNAF 
tactical air strikes. A prisoner taken on Rocket Ridge said the 
pounding they received during their attacks rendered four or fi ve 
NVA battalions combat ineffective. However, he also said replace-
ments were streaming in from the North.34
On 23 March, the US delegation announced that the Paris peace 
talks would be suspended until the Communists agreed in advance 
on the issues to be discussed and then would enter into serious dis-
cussions about them.35
In the last week of March 1972, POWs said the 2nd NVA Infan-
try Division was also operating in the area. Its subordinate units 
included the 1st and 141st NVA Infantry Regiments, the D10 Sap-
per Battalion, the 14th NVA Artillery Battalion, and the 12th NVA 
Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion. Two battalions of the indepen-
dent 28th NVA Infantry Regiment and two battalions of the 40th 
NVA Artillery Regiment were soon identifi ed as operating east of 
Highway 14 north of Kontum City. All these newly identifi ed enemy 
units meant that the equivalent of three rather than two divisions 
would be attacking Kontum.36
While the NVA was assembling for a major attack, the US Army 
was disassembling units that would play a major part in the coming 
battle. The 17th Aviation Group was closing four of its bases, reduc-
ing its aviation companies from 27 to 9, and inactivating four of its 
fi ve aviation battalions.37 By early April, the 361st Aerial Weapons 
Company, the Pink Panthers, was the only Cobra gunship company 
still operational in II Corps, and it was scheduled to stand down on 
7 April. John Paul Vann knew this company would be an essential 
asset in the coming battle, and he did not want to lose it. He con-
vinced MACV to keep the 361st around through the coming battle. 
He also requested additional antitank assets.
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6The North Vietnamese 
Invasion
One thing Hanoi cannot do in the remaining months of this 
dry season: it cannot launch a nationwide military offensive 
on anything approaching the scale of Tet 1968.
—CIA intelligence estimate, January 1972
When the Communists would be able to launch their invasion de-
pended in part on the weather. Enemy activity in the Highlands 
usually peaked from February to April because that was a period of 
good, dry weather not seriously affected by either monsoon cycle. 
The monsoon rains started in May, and they would make moving 
supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and maneuvering in the jun-
gle much more diffi cult.
At the Communist Party’s Nineteenth Plenum in Hanoi late in 
1970, there was discussion about whether to give priority to invad-
ing the South or to rebuilding the North. A year later the arguments 
for invasion were the strongest. The Vietnamization program in the 
South appeared to be succeeding, and more of the population was 
progressively being brought under government control. The ARVN 
was growing stronger and was acquiring more modern arms from 
the Americans. Both of those developments were reasons to attack 
sooner rather than later. Despite the ARVN’s increased size and 
modern weapons, however, when it launched Operation Lam Son 719 
into Laos in early 1971—without its US advisers or US air support—
its performance against the NVA was poor. That result encouraged 
a sense of military superiority on the part of the North Vietnam-
ese and some sense of military inferiority on the part of the South 
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Vietnamese. The US Armed Forces were being withdrawn, and US 
public opinion was unlikely to allow Nixon to send any American 
ground units back to Vietnam. Moreover, the American presiden-
tial campaign would start with the New Hampshire primaries in the 
spring of 1972, and the Communists hoped a victory for them in the 
spring would mean a defeat for Nixon in the fall.1 The principal pro-
ponents of invasion in 1972 were General Vo Nguyen Giap and First 
Secretary Le Duan of the Communist Party. Giap hoped the Easter 
Offensive would lead to fi nal victory over the South and perhaps 
even trap the tens of thousands of Americans still there.2 The Com-
munists decided they should attack in early 1972.
When the enemy had launched attacks all over South Vietnam 
during Tet in 1968, they had assumed that the people would rise 
up to support them and that the Communists could seize and con-
trol enough of the cities and population to force the South Viet-
namese government to accept a coalition government including 
Communists, who could then take over the Saigon government. 
However, the vast majority of the populace had not supported the 
Communists, the VC had been driven back with heavy losses, and—
after having revealed themselves—most of the VC leaders had been 
killed and their infrastructure destroyed. There was no prospect 
of launching a similar uprising anytime in the near future. So the 
Communists’ only alternative for total victory within the next few 
years was to use their army to launch a conventional invasion into 
South Vietnam. Another negative factor for them was that Nixon 
was improving relations with both China and Russia, which may 
have caused the North Vietnamese to worry that Nixon might con-
vince their two biggest arms suppliers to stop supporting them.
Time magazine summed up why the North Vietnamese might attack 
in the spring of 1972 rather than wait for all the Americans to leave:
A more important question is why the Communists would 
want to attack in 1972, instead of waiting a year for U.S. 
withdrawal to run its course. An offensive timed to the Presi-
dent’s Peking visit would clearly be a signal from Hanoi that 
it will not tolerate any possible deal on Viet Nam cooked 
up by the U.S. and China. Beyond that, some Pentagon offi -
cials are convinced that the Communists want the psycho-
logical benefi t of a “visible victory.” According to this theory, 
Hanoi and the Viet Cong have decided not to settle for a uni-
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lateral American withdrawal, which the world might inter-
pret as simply a political decision made by the White House. 
Instead, the Communists want a tangible triumph, à la Dien 
Bien Phu, which they can hold up as their own.3
If the North Vietnamese succeeded in taking over South Viet-
nam in 1972, it would be a humiliating defeat for the United States. 
Our remaining troops would be forced to fl ee under enemy pres-
sure rather than being gradually withdrawn in an orderly manner. 
Many of us there would probably be killed or captured. Defeat by 
the Communists would mean prison camps or death for many of 
the 17 million South Vietnamese. A North Vietnamese military vic-
tory over the United States could have far-reaching effects around 
the world and especially in Southeast Asia, which might be desta-
bilized. Communist prestige would soar and ours decline in Korea, 
the Philippines, and Indonesia. Even Japan might loosen its ties to 
the United States and be receptive to Communist overtures.
Their leaders told the NVA soldiers who invaded South Vietnam 
that they must achieve victories, seize territory, and control large 
populations to maximize their country’s position at the bargaining 
table. Then President Nixon would be forced to accept conditions 
favorable to North Vietnam.4 President Nixon revealed how much 
he—and America—had riding on the outcome of the Communist 
invasion when he said at a press conference, “The South Vietnam-
ese lines may bend [but] not break. If this proves to be the case, 
it will be the fi nal proof that Vietnamization has succeeded.”5 Of 
course, the opposite was also true. If the South Vietnamese lines did 
break, then Nixon’s critics could claim Vietnamization had failed.
Before launching an invasion of the South, the North Vietnam-
ese needed to raise tens of thousands of men to fi ll their 15 divi-
sions and to provide replacements for combat losses. To accomplish 
this goal, they lowered the draft age from 17 to 16 and raised the 
upper age from 30 to 35. They also lowered the physical standards 
and drafted previously exempt classes of young men, including 
skilled workers, technicians, university students, and even those 
who showed promise of becoming future government and Commu-
nist Party leaders. Perhaps most signifi cantly, they now drafted the 
sixth and seventh sons of families who had already sent fi ve sons to 
war. Draft teams were sent into the countryside to fi nd the neces-
sary men, and POWs captured later in the South said those teams 
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stripped entire districts of all men between ages 14 and 45. A Hanoi 
government newspaper exhorted, “The Fatherland is calling, the 
front lines are waiting.” NVA personnel strength was increased 
overall from about 390,000 in 1968 to 430,000 by the end of 1971.6
Speculation about exactly when the attack would come naturally 
focused on the Tet holidays starting on 15 February, but there were 
also reasons to argue for the week of 21–28 February, when Presi-
dent Nixon planned to visit China, or as late as the US presiden-
tial elections in the fall. In the end, it was none of these signifi cant 
dates: the attack occurred when the NVA decided they were ready 
to attack. They launched their offensive on 30 March. The Ameri-
cans called the North Vietnamese invasion in the spring of 1972 the 
“Easter Offensive” because it started at the beginning of the Eas-
ter holidays. However, the North Vietnamese called it the “Nguyen 
Hue Offensive,” named for a legendary Vietnamese national hero 
who had led his army hundreds of miles through the jungle and 
mountains from central Vietnam to the outskirts of Hanoi, where 
he surprised and defeated the invading Chinese in the spring of 
1789. He later became Emperor Quang Trung.7
Unlike the Communist attacks during Tet 1968, an uprising in 
which the lightly armed VC led the charge, for the Easter Offen-
sive of early 1972 the North Vietnamese had 15 combat divisions, 
including 2 VC divisions manned mainly by North Vietnamese. 
They would leave only one division in North Vietnam to defend 
the North and to serve as a reserve. The other 14 divisions would 
be committed outside the country. Two were already in Laos and 
Cambodia, and the other 12 divisions totaling 150,000 men were 
available to attack South Vietnam.8 This would be the largest mil-
itary offensive and across-the-border invasion anywhere in the 
world since the fall of 1950, when the Communist Chinese Peoples 
Liberation Army attacked across the Yalu River into South Korea.9
This was General Vo Nguyen Giap’s offensive. The battle at 
Khe Sanh and the failed Tet Offensive in 1968 had cost him about 
100,000 casualties, but by 1972 he was ready to try again for a knock-
out blow. This time he had a different approach. Giap rebuilt the 
NVA into a Soviet-style force capable of launching a conventional 
attack with the newest tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons 
from Russia and China. During the Battle of the Bulge in Decem-
ber 1944, the German Wehrmacht’s 19 divisions and 950 tanks had 
sent the Americans reeling backward with heavy losses. Giap’s 
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force was almost as formidable. He attacked with 14 divisions plus 
many independent units and an estimated 1,000 tanks.10
General Giap possessed the most technically advanced, mobile, 
anti-aircraft defenses ever deployed with a fi eld army in combat up 
until this offensive. One of his most deadly weapons was the Soviet-
made “Strella,” code-named the “SA-7 Grail” by the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization. This handheld, heat-seeking SAM could 
destroy aircraft fl ying at altitudes up to 10,000 feet. A two-man 
team, loader and gunner, could shoulder-fi re it and bring down 
an aircraft all by themselves. The fi rst reported kill was on 2 May 
when a Strella destroyed a US Army helicopter fl ying a rescue mis-
sion in I Corps. An AC-130 was destroyed about the same date. 
Despite the missile’s subsonic speed, the Strella destroyed at least 
one jet fi ghter-bomber. For a heavier punch, the NVA had large 
Russian-made SAMs, which could bring down B-52s. They also had 
.51-caliber machine guns; 23-mm, 37-mm, 57-mm, 85-mm, and 100-
mm anti-aircraft guns—some with tracking radar for fi re control; 
ZSU 23-4 (four-barreled) 23-mm and twin-barreled 37-mm auto-
matic guns; plus some ZSU-24s that fi red anti-aircraft rockets. A 
few of these anti-aircraft weapons were mounted on self-propelled 
armored chassis. One of the most lethal was the S-60 57-mm gun 
with a maximum effective altitude (range) of 28,000 feet. When 
mounted on a T-55 tank chassis, it was designated the ZSU-57-2. 
The NVA used a network of aircraft spotters who reported incom-
ing aircraft so the gun crews could be alerted and ready to fi re 
when US or VNAF aircraft came within range. The Americans 
responded by attacking the enemy anti-aircraft gun emplacements 
with B-52 strikes.11
Some signifi cant enemy weapons would be used in South Viet-
nam for the fi rst time during the Easter Offensive. Lighter PT-76 
amphibious tanks had previously been employed in the South, but 
now many hundreds of Russian T-54 and Chinese Type-59 medium 
tanks accompanied the Communist troops. The NVA’s new 130-mm 
artillery piece could shoot farther than any enemy gun previously 
used in South Vietnam. Another unpleasant surprise was the AT-3 
Sagger wire-guided missile, which could destroy ARVN tanks, bun-
kers, and other structures from a distance with deadly accuracy.12
An NVA record says it deployed the following forces to the Cen-
tral Highlands battlefi eld: two infantry divisions (minus), four sepa-
rate infantry regiments, four battalions of sappers, two regiments 
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of artillery with 76 guns, one tank battalion, six anti-aircraft bat-
talions with 72 guns, and two regiments of engineers.13 This claim 
that only one NVA tank battalion was deployed in the Central High-
lands may be true because only one, the 297th, was positively iden-
tifi ed by ARVN and US sources. However, one separate company 
of PT-76 amphibious tanks was also positively identifi ed in the 
Highlands.
At the height of the US involvement in 1969, there were 550,000 
US troops on the ground in South Vietnam plus signifi cant US air 
and naval forces outside the country. When the North Vietnam-
ese invaded South Vietnam on 30 March, about 95,000 US mili-
tary personnel were still in Vietnam, but only 6,000 of them were 
combat troops. Seven US Army divisions and two US Marine divi-
sions had already departed. The only US combat units remaining 
in Vietnam were the 3rd Brigade (Separate) of the 1st Cavalry Divi-
sion (Airmobile) and two battalions of the 196th Light Infantry Bri-
gade. They were scheduled to depart within the next few months.14 
The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, was the last American 
armored unit in Vietnam, and it left in April 1972.15 Two-thirds of 
the air and naval forces were gone. Only a few USAF fi ghter squad-
rons remained to support the remaining American units and their 
South Vietnamese allies.16
Except for a few small units providing security for other Ameri-
can units, no US Army infantry units participated in active com-
bat during the Easter Offensive.17 The small size of our fi ghting 
force and the political pressure to avoid more American casualties 
meant the South Vietnamese would have to bear the brunt of all 
ground combat.18 This would be the fi rst time they would defend 
their country against a major enemy offensive without signifi cant 
American help on the ground. Other than the advisers, virtually 
the entire US contribution would come from the air. B-52 and tacti-
cal air strikes, fi xed-wing gunships, the tactical airlift of the C-130s, 
helicopter gunships, and air cavalry reconnaissance would play 
important roles in the battle.
When the invasion started, the South Vietnamese forces were 
deployed throughout the country, and even part of the general 
reserve—the marine and airborne divisions—was already commit-
ted in the I and II Corps areas.19 The CIA in Saigon estimated 
the total enemy strength in South Vietnam was 180,000 to 190,000, 
including the VC. The South Vietnamese had 1.2 million men 
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under arms in their armed forces, but only 421,263 of them were in 
ARVN. The hundreds of thousands in the RFs and PFs were not as 
well trained and unlikely to be committed outside their own prov-
inces or even outside their own villages.
Nhan Dan, an authoritative Hanoi newspaper, proclaimed in 
late March that a return to full-scale warfare using large units 
was necessary to defeat the Nguyen Van Thieu government and 
its US allies. MACV intelligence predicted an impending, large-
scale attack, yet when the offensive started on Thursday, 30 March, 
both General Abrams and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker were out-
side of Vietnam. Abrams was spending an extended Easter week-
end with his wife in Thailand, and Bunker was visiting his wife, 
who was ambassador to Nepal. Back in Washington, Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird was about to depart for a golfi ng vacation 
in Puerto Rico. The entire US defense and foreign-affairs estab-
lishments had to scramble to cope with the crisis, which the North 
cited as proof that the invasion caught the Americans by surprise.20
However, the Easter Offensive and even its timing did not come 
as a complete surprise to the South Vietnamese and their Ameri-
can advisers. In fact, as the Communist buildup progressed, MACV 
intelligence predicted the offensive would start on 1 April. They 
were off by only two days. However, it was surprising when the ini-
tial attack came across the DMZ rather than from farther south into 
II or III Corps. The DMZ route had the advantage of quick access 
to the coastal Highway 1 and was convenient to the NVA’s POL 
pipeline. This was a major consideration now that the NVA was 
using the tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and trucks of 
a conventional army.21
The Easter Offensive began at 0200 on 30 March when a mas-
sive artillery bombardment pounded the South Vietnamese forces 
in northern I Corps. Then more than 200 T-54 tanks and 40,000 
enemy soldiers in six NVA divisions and two independent regiments 
attacked into the DMZ from the north across the Ben Hai River and 
from Laos in the west. The ARVN 3rd Infantry Division and the 
two marine brigades defending the border were hit hard.22 In the 
fi rst 24 hours of the attack, more than 5,000 artillery and rocket 
rounds struck the 12 major ARVN bases along the DMZ. Almost all 
of the ARVN forward artillery batteries were wiped out.23
The 3rd ARVN Division troops on the DMZ were trained and 
experienced in counterguerilla warfare but were not trained to 
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stand up against an enemy equipped with tanks and heavy artil-
lery. The division’s own lack of aggressiveness worked against it. 
After the invasion started, if the division had patrolled out beyond 
its own lines to learn where the enemy was and what he was doing, 
it could have learned when the NVA troops were resting, resupply-
ing, and regrouping, and the ARVN troops could have done the 
same. With no idea about when the enemy would attack again, all 
of the defenders had to remain on full alert all the time. That wore 
them down, so they were already exhausted when the enemy fi nally 
did attack.24
Brigadier General Vu Van Giai, the 3rd ARVN Infantry Divi-
sion commander, was one of the best ARVN generals, but his divi-
sion was probably the worst ARVN division. It had been created 
only six months earlier by taking one regiment from the 1st Divi-
sion and forming two new regiments from the castoffs other units 
sent when ordered to provide troops. Brigadier General Giai was 
not given authority over the ARVN tank units and the marine bri-
gade operating in his area of responsibility. This lack of unity of 
command was a fatal fl aw in the defense of I Corps.25 The I Corps 
commander, Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, ordered the 
3rd ARVN Division to counterattack, but the counterattack failed, 
the ARVN casualties were high, and a great deal of equipment was 
lost.26 When Brigadier General Giai sensed he was losing control 
of the situation and asked Lieutenant General Lam for advice and 
assistance, he was offered the solution of shooting any insubordi-
nate commanders on the spot.27 When the defenses along the DMZ 
collapsed, the marine brigade made a tactical withdrawal into the 
mountainous jungle, but the 3rd ARVN Division’s withdrawal dis-
integrated into a rout as it was pushed back by fast-charging enemy 
tanks and successive waves of NVA infantry. As the division fell 
apart, the American advisers were extracted by helicopter, which 
further deepened the defenders’ sense of impending doom.
On 31 March, an Airborne Division CP and the 3rd Airborne 
Battalion were airlifted from Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon 
to Kontum. To accomplish this airlift, all in-country aircraft were 
fl own around the clock to their maximum capability. During this 
36-hour effort, eight C-130s transported 425 tons of troops and 
equipment to the Central Highlands. Their ground time at Tan Son 
Nhut averaged an hour, and at Kontum each aircraft was unloaded 
in 15 minutes. Many of the return fl ights carried refugees. VNAF 
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C-123s assisted in the effort. In the Highlands, the paratroopers 
assumed responsibility for the defense of Kontum City and the 
southern part of Kontum Province.28
In the fi rst ten days of the offensive, the NVA captured eighty-
one 105-mm howitzers, thirty-two 155-mm howitzers, and four 
175-mm guns. These weapons were then turned against the South 
Vietnamese. Most of those lost artillery pieces were in isolated 
FSBs, to which they had been brought by helicopter and from 
which they could be extracted only by helicopter. When the time 
came to evacuate the heavy artillery pieces, enemy anti-aircraft fi re 
made it impossible to lift them out by helicopter.29
The Americans were stunned to learn that almost an entire 
ARVN regiment surrendered to the enemy at Camp Carroll just 
south of the DMZ. On 2 April, after the 56th ARVN Infantry Regi-
ment of the 3rd Division had been shelled and attacked for three 
days, Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van Dinh, its commander, betrayed 
his country. He ran up a white fl ag and surrendered his men—
about 1,800 of them—and fi ve artillery batteries to the enemy. The 
NVA was handed 22 American-made 105-mm, 155-mm, and 175-
mm artillery pieces, which were then used against ARVN. Lieuten-
ant Colonel William Camper, Dinh’s US Army adviser, described 
what happened: “Colonel Dinh . . . told us he was going to surren-
der Camp Carroll. . . . [He] offered me the choice of surrender-
ing. I said I would not surrender, that we would fi nd some other 
way to get out. He said that we (myself and Major Brown) could 
hide among his troops when they went out the gate to surrender 
to the North Vietnamese and once we were outside the perimeter, 
we could fall down in the grass and crawl away. I dismissed this as 
ridiculous.”30
The 3rd Division advisers were fortunately able to divert a big 
Chinook helicopter to pick up the two 56th Regiment advisers. With 
a pair of snakes fl ying cover, the courageous Hook pilot extracted 
the Americans only minutes before the surrender.31
The next day, the traitorous former commander of the 56th Reg-
iment made a propaganda broadcast over Radio Hanoi calling on 
ARVN soldiers to surrender to the National Liberation Front (NLF, 
the Communist shadow government in South Vietnam): “Find 
out how to get in touch with the NLF in order for you to return 
quickly to the people. Your action will effectively assist in ending 
the war quickly and also save your life. . . . My personal feeling is 
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that the NLF is going to win the war. The NLF is ready all the time 
to welcome you back. The NLF is expecting you to return very 
soon.”32
From the beginning of US involvement in South Vietnam, 
American participants had speculated about how hard ARVN 
would fi ght when the chips were down. Dinh’s craven surrender 
made us wonder about how steadfast our own counterparts would 
be if they decided the NVA might win a battle we were fi ghting—or 
the war. However, during the entire course of the Vietnam War, 
the 56th ARVN Infantry Regiment was the only ARVN unit to sur-
render en masse.33
Brigadier General Wear described the months from February 
to April 1972:
During the February to April time frame, Vann continued 
to spend most of his time in Nha Trang. Dzu would spend a 
day or two in the Corps Headquarters in Pleiku, constantly 
on the telephone to his commanders or whomever. Every-
one seemed to be waiting for the enemy to attack. I visited 
Tan Canh almost every day. Colonel Kaplan was always very 
upbeat and seemed to have faith that the troops in the area 
would put up a good fi ght. I attended the intelligence brief-
ings each morning at a secure Special Forces or CIA offi ce 
in Pleiku Barracks. The reports indicated a large buildup of 
enemy forces in the Dak To area.
I will always remember 4 April 1972. On that day, every-
thing seemed to be falling apart. Among other things, I fl ew 
up to the old US Firebase English in Binh Dinh Province, 
which was being attacked. The US Lt. Col. adviser . . . was 
trying to hold the place together. When it was overrun a few 
days later, the [adviser] was wounded but [was] picked up 
by a very brave helicopter pilot. Visiting him in Pleiku hos-
pital, he was shocked that his ARVN troops had bugged out 
so quickly. Coming back from that visit on the 4th, I stopped 
by the Korean unit . . . [in] An Khe Pass. They had just 
had a popular captain killed and were not in a happy mood. 
Also, on that day one of my key staff offi cers, Colonel Snell, 
completed his year and left for home. When I landed at our 
pad near the Corps Headquarters, I realized that I was really 
beat and shouldn’t be fl ying a helicopter. I decided at that 
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moment, landing at Pleiku on 4 April, to ground myself, and 
I never fl ew a chopper after that.34
By 4 April 1972, MACV headquarters was claiming 52 enemy 
tanks destroyed in all corps areas since the NVA offensive had 
started fi ve days earlier.35 The South Vietnamese marines west of 
Dong Ha proved that the T-54 tanks were not invincible by kill-
ing 40 of them with M-72 light antitank weapons (LAWs).36 Indi-
vidual ARVN soldiers fi ring M-72s were also taking a toll on the 
T-54s. They knocked out 33 tanks in nine days. In ARVN armor 
units equipped with the newly issued M-48 medium tanks, good 
crews using good tactics, performed well against the T-54s, in part 
because the M-48’s fi re-control optics were superior. VNAF’s First 
Air Division, supported by Air Squadron 518, demolished 15 tanks 
in the fi rst three days of April. Then they demolished 75 tanks of 
the 203rd NVA Tank Regiment in three days.37
The population of Quang Tri fl ed south on Highway 1 to escape 
the NVA artillery bombardment, but the NVA followed them down 
the highway. The enemy artillery observers intentionally adjusted 
their fi re onto the refugee columns. On 9 May, President Thieu 
denounced this butchery, which killed or wounded 25,000 inno-
cent civilians.38 Thieu’s announcement was probably necessary to 
recognize the South’s loss and to tell the world about this atrocity, 
but it was bad for the morale of other civilians who were fl eeing the 
enemy invasion and contributed to some of the subsequent scenes 
of panic.
Giap’s next thrust was into III Corps, almost 600 kilometers 
south of the fi ghting in I Corps. On 5 April, more than 20,000 
NVA troops in three divisions supported by tanks and artillery 
attacked the district town of Loc Ninh, only 100 kilometers from 
Saigon. Loc Ninh fell two days later. The invaders rapidly rolled 
on to assault An Loc, the provincial capital. An Loc was a tougher 
nut to crack. Even after it was attacked in force on 13 April, the 
defenses did not crumble. When the NVA’s initial attempt to take 
An Loc was repulsed, it could have spread panic across South Viet-
nam by bypassing this provincial capital and charging on toward 
Saigon. Instead, its forces were committed to a prolonged siege 
of An Loc. Most of the city was destroyed, and the outcome was 
often in doubt. However, with considerable help from the USAF 
and VNAF, the defenders held the city, and the enemy was eventu-
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ally forced to withdraw after suffering staggering losses of men and 
equipment.39
Before the Vietnam War, the US Army had last fought a coun-
terinsurgency war against indigenous guerillas during the Philip-
pine Insurrection from 1899 to 1902. American offi cers and NCOs 
who were trained to defeat the Russians in big battles on the plains 
of central Europe led the army we took to Vietnam. Many of them 
were veterans of World War II or the Korean War or both, which we 
considered “conventional” wars. We knew what our bombers, tanks, 
and artillery could do against an enemy who massed his forces for 
large-scale attacks. For ten years, we grumbled about fi ghting a 
Communist Vietnamese enemy who seldom massed his forces or 
even stood and fought long enough to make a good target for us. 
So when the NVA launched the Easter Offensive—a conventional 
attack with many divisions supported by tanks and artillery—it did 
present an opportunity of sorts. Major John D. Howard, an adviser 
in An Loc, said, “This was the war we came to fi ght.”40
The North Vietnamese knew they could cut South Vietnam 
in half along the east–west Highway 19 by seizing and control-
ling Qui Nhon on the coast and the Highland cities of Pleiku and 
Kontum. So General Giap, with his attacks in I Corps to the north 
and in III Corps to the south under way, opened a third front in 
II Corps. On 9 April, his Gold Star Division attacked to the south 
in coastal Binh Dinh Province. Then on 12 April, the 320th NVA 
Division attacked the two ARVN airborne brigades defending 
Rocket Ridge in the Central Highlands.41 The North Vietnamese 
apparently reasoned that making major attacks into three widely 
separated areas of South Vietnam would confuse the Saigon gov-
ernment as to where the main threat was and where it should send 
its national reserves. Any one of the NVA’s attacks could succeed 
so spectacularly that South Vietnam would collapse. However, 
there were fatal fl aws in the strategy of launching three separate 
attacks. The attacks were so widely separated that they were not 
mutually supporting, and spreading its forces across three attacks 
did not leave the NVA with adequate reserves to exploit successes 
and allow any one of the attacks to overwhelm the South Vietnam-
ese defenders. Also, the 600 kilometers between the NVA forces 
in I Corps and those in III Corps must have been a command 
and control problem for Giap. Our air superiority prevented him 
from fl ying between these areas to exercise any personal control or 
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to confer with his subordinate commanders as the top ARVN and 
American generals could.
By early April, all 12 of the 23rd ARVN Division’s infantry bat-
talions were in the northern part of II Corps. The four battalions 
of the 44th Regiment were at An Khe, the 45th Regiment was in 
Pleiku, and the 53rd Regiment was defending Kontum City.42 Some 
of the ARVN units in II Corps were already involved in heavy com-
bat. On 1 April, the 22nd Division’s 47th Regiment at Dak To II 
repulsed a sapper attack supported by indirect fi re. For the next 
fi ve days, the regiment fought a tenacious enemy force only 300 
meters north of their CP. More than 10,000 rounds of artillery, 70 
tactical air sorties, and four Arc Lights were required to repel the 
attackers.43
The North Vietnamese correctly sized up President Nixon when 
they assumed he would not return American ground forces to Viet-
nam. However, they badly underestimated his resolve and his will-
ingness to increase US airpower in the region. Nixon’s response to 
the NVA invasion was a terrible, swift sword in the form of renewed 
and heavier than ever bombing of the North. The USAF response 
was fast and overwhelming as a vast air armada surged toward 
Southeast Asia:
The 45 days following the start of the Easter Offensive saw 
the Air Force demonstrate global mobility and power on a 
massive scale. From bases in Korea, the Philippines, and the 
United States, additional fi ghters, bombers, gunships, elec-
tronic warfare planes, search and rescue units, transports, 
and tankers moved in a swift, smooth fl ow to Southeast Asia. 
In some instances, units were in combat just three days after 
they received orders to move. The strike forces built up rap-
idly: Fighters doubled to almost 400, B-52 bomber strength 
increased to 171, and the number of tankers rose to 168. . . .
B-52 sorties in South Vietnam built from 689 in March to 
2,223 in May. Fighter sorties of all branches (including the 
South Vietnamese air force) rose from 4,237 in March to 
18,444 in May.44
By 31 March 1972, our MACV Advisory Team 33 was down to 
26 offi cers and 14 enlisted men.45 On 20 April, President Nixon 
announced a reduction in US troop strength from 69,000 to 49,000 
McKenna Kontum book.indb   69 6/14/2011   10:17:27 AM
70 • KONTUM
to be reached by 1 July. President Thieu was informed of this latest 
cut while he was struggling to stop a major invasion by the NVA, 
now equipped with Soviet and Chinese tanks and artillery.46 How-
ever, the number of Americans involved in the war was actually 
increasing. “Withdrawing” air force units were moved from Viet-
nam to Thailand, and some fl ew bombing missions en route to 
Takhli Air Base in Thailand. USAF troop strength in Thailand 
increased from 32,000 to 45,000 during April and May. Fifty more 
B-52s were moved to U Tapao Air Base in Thailand, and the num-
ber of USAF personnel on Guam tripled from 4,000 to 12,000. 
Naval personnel strength doubled from the beginning of the year 
to 39,000. So the reduction of 20,000 Americans in Vietnam was 
more than offset by the increase of 40,500 Americans added to the 
forces engaged in the confl ict but stationed outside Vietnam.47
On 3 April, a forward base for the smaller, slower FAC aircraft 
was established at Pleiku. USAF fi ghter-bomber missions contin-
ued to be fl own from bases around Saigon or from Thailand, but 
a facility set up at Bien Hoa enabled F-4s from Thailand to refuel 
and rearm for another strike in Vietnam before returning to their 
base.48 After so many years of war, some VNAF pilots were credited 
with more than 3,000 combat missions. The South Vietnamese gov-
ernment found a hero in one 25-year-old A-1 pilot, Captain Tran 
The Vinh, who knocked out 21 NVA tanks during the Easter Offen-
sive. A photo of him giving the jaunty thumbs-up sign was made 
into posters, which were widely distributed. He died on 9 April 
when his Skyraider was fi nally shot down.49
Around 10 April, John Paul Vann knocked on the door of Brig-
adier General Wear’s bedroom suite early in the morning. This was 
unusual because Vann seldom got up before nine or ten. He was 
excited about a plan to entice a large group of VC to defect. The 
go-between would be a double agent named “John” who was in 
contact with the group somewhere in the mountains south of Ban 
Me Thuot. The agent told Vann this group would defect only if 
Vann would personally meet with them and guarantee they would 
be treated fairly by the US and ARVN forces. Vann removed his 
ID card and other identifi cation documents from his wallet and 
put them in the safe he shared with Wear. He said he planned to 
have his WO pilot fl y him and the double agent to a clearing on a 
mountain.
Brigadier General Wear was dumbfounded and reminded Mr. 
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Vann that the action in Kontum Province would soon explode and 
that he was the big boss in the area. He needed to be available to 
deal with Dzu and all the crises certain to arise. Vann responded 
with something like, “George, you are beginning to sound like all 
the other generals I have worked with over here.” He went on to say 
that they badly needed a success story coming out of the Highlands 
and this could be it.
Wear pointed out that Vann was leaving him as the fi nal author-
ity in the entire corps area. He reluctantly agreed to cover for 
Vann for 72 hours but warned that if Vann was still absent without 
leave (AWOL) after three days, then Wear would have to report his 
absence to General Weyand. Vann agreed to this stipulation and 
fl ew away in his OH-58. Wear did not hear from him or the pilot 
until the morning of the second day, when Vann returned, bleary 
eyed from lack of sleep and with a two-day growth of beard. He told 
Wear, “That bastard John lost his nerve.” Wear was too busy from 
then on to ask the pilot what happened, so he never learned more 
about the incident.50
The bizarre disorganization of our on-again, off-again bombing 
campaign against strategic targets in North Vietnam was an obsta-
cle to be overcome before that campaign could achieve maximum 
results. Back in November 1968, we had agreed to stop bombing 
the North if the Communists would stop shelling and attacking cit-
ies in the South. They never kept their part of the agreement. So, 
fi nally, on 6 April 1972 US fi ghter-bombers fl ew deep into the North 
to strike Communist targets 100 kilometers north of the DMZ. On 
15, 16, and 17 April, B-52s bombed North Vietnam for the fi rst 
time since 1969. Nixon could not be certain how the Russians and 
Chinese would react to this bombing, but he was certain the North 
Vietnamese invasion was intended to destroy South Vietnam.51 On 
29 and 30 April, B-52s fl ew 700 missions over North Vietnam. By 
9 May, US bombing of North Vietnam equaled the previous high 
level of 1967–1968.52
When the NVA invasion started, the number of C-130s stationed 
at Tan Son Nhut was quickly increased to 44, the maximum that 
could be accommodated there. Without those aircraft and their 
crews, it might have been impossible to stop and repel the Com-
munist onslaught.53
An article in Air Force magazine later summarized the USAF’s 
contribution to the defense: “Cargo aircraft weaved their way 
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through smoke, fl ak, and the dangerous Strella missiles to land 
when they could or drop when they could not. Gunships fl ew pro-
tective sorties around embattled garrisons, laying down a curtain 
of fi re to suppress enemy attacks. Amidst the carnage, FACs fl ew 
calmly, calling out targets and monitoring enemy movements. 
And through it all, the search and rescue units worked to recover 
downed airmen.”54
When the Easter Offensive started, the US Navy had two air-
craft carriers with a total of 170 aircraft in the Gulf of Tonkin. Six 
weeks later there were six aircraft carriers with almost 500 aircraft 
plus 20 cruisers and destroyers off the Vietnamese coast. This naval 
task force was the largest assembled since World War II.55 Nixon 
ordered a blockade of North Vietnam, and the navy mined the 
approaches and harbors so effectively that no major ship entered or 
left any of those ports for the remainder of the war.56
President Thieu issued an order to hold Kontum, Quang Tri, 
and An Loc at all costs. He feared that if the North Vietnamese 
seized and held them, the psychological and political repercussions 
would lead to the collapse of South Vietnam. The highest-ranking 
offi cer in the South Vietnamese armed forces, General Cao Van 
Vien, considered An Loc the most important because it was so close 
to the capital. However, he also thought if Kontum were lost, it 
would be impossible to defend Pleiku, and the enemy would drive 
to the coast and cut his country in half. South Vietnam would not 
survive if that happened.57
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger described the challenges fac-
ing General Abrams:
For four years General Abrams had performed, with dignity, 
one of the most thankless jobs ever assigned to an American 
general. He took over a force of 540,000 men in 1968 but 
was immediately shackled by mounting restrictions. He was 
continually given assignments that made no military sense. 
Starting in the middle of 1969, he was asked to dismantle 
his command at an ever-accelerating rate while maintain-
ing the security of South Vietnam and putting the South 
Vietnamese forces into a position from which they could 
undertake their own defense. He succeeded to a remarkable 
degree. By the time Hanoi struck in 1972, more of the coun-
tryside than ever before was under Saigon’s control; most of 
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the South Vietnamese units had vastly improved. Still, deep 
down, General Abrams knew that he was engaged in a hold-
ing action in a battle for which even a small strategic reserve 
of American ground forces would almost surely have been 
decisive. For three years his com mand had been turned into 
a withdrawal headquarters. Now he was urged to win the 
crucial fi nal battle.58
McKenna Kontum book.indb   73 6/14/2011   10:17:28 AM
7Attacking in An Khe Pass
Nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at without 
result.
—Winston Churchill
Highway 14, the vital main supply route between Pleiku and Kon-
tum, went through the Chu Pao Pass, a place the Americans called 
“Kontum Pass,” north of Pleiku and about ten kilometers south 
of Kontum. Chu Pao Mountain dominated the pass, and it was a 
natural fortress full of caves, making it easy to defend and diffi cult 
to assault. The Americans called it the “Rock Pile.” In early April, 
the 95B NVA Regiment seized the pass and concentrated its new, 
heavy anti-aircraft artillery around its positions on the Rock Pile. 
The anti-aircraft fi re at this location was so intense it limited aerial 
observation and air support in the pass. On 4 April, an ARVN heli-
copter assault using VNAF helicopters was launched to retake the 
pass and reopen the road to Kontum. USAF tactical air bombed the 
landing zone to prepare it for the helicopter assault, but because 
of poor coordination between ARVN and VNAF the assault was 
four hours late.1 The long delay allowed the enemy to regroup and 
move to meet the assaulting force with enough fi repower to defeat 
it. ARVN attempts to eliminate the Communist roadblock and 
reopen the road to Kontum would go on for several months. There 
were many ARVN failures, and any ARVN successes were quickly 
followed by the NVA’s retaking the Rock Pile and again blocking 
the road.
At An Khe, the North Vietnamese invasion seemed far away 
from us because most of the action was up north in I Corps, and 
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neither the Stars and Stripes nor AFN was saying much about it. On 
11 April, the invasion suddenly hit home when the Communists 
seized An Khe Pass and blocked Highway 19 between Pleiku in the 
Highlands and Qui Nhon on the coast.
In early April, POWs revealed that the VC K2 Battalion of Gia Lai 
Province and several VC local-force sapper companies were deployed 
along Highway 19 with the mission of interdicting it between the 
Mang Yang and An Khe passes.2 The NVA forces involved were the 
12th Regiment, 3rd Division, supported by the NVA 200th AA Bat-
talion. Early on 11 April, one of the VC sapper units attacked the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) Capital “Tiger” Infantry Division com-
pound on a hilltop overlooking Highway 19, and other Communist 
units seized control of the highway.3 The Koreans were responsible 
for securing this part of Highway 19. However, the ROK battalion 
stationed near An Khe Pass was not able to clear it, so the 44th 
ARVN Regiment was ordered to drive out the Communists.4
Captain Patrick O’Neil, the adviser to an ARVN armored cav-
alry unit, and I took Sergeant Hao in my Jeep and followed Lieu-
tenant Colonel Tran Quang Tien and his troops down Highway 19 
to the east until the 44th Regiment soldiers in front of us ran into 
enemy fi re. The regimental commander began maneuvering his 
troops and engaged the enemy to push them back. On the Ameri-
can tactical radio net, we heard a report about two Americans and 
an Englishman—all civilians—being caught in an ambush farther 
down Highway 19. Both Americans were killed.5
Mortar rounds were hitting a Korean outpost on top of a nearby 
hill, and one would occasionally come close to us. We could see 
enemy troops milling around down in the valley south of the high-
way and fi ring mortars at the outpost on the hilltop. I radioed for 
air support, and before long my radio came to life with, “This is 
Covey Five-Zero-Seven. You have a target for me?” I gave Covey 507 
the coordinates and description of the target and told him I was 
in a Jeep just off the south side of the highway. He said, “Covey 
Five-Zero-Seven. OK. Fast Draw Six, I’ve got your target. See some 
trucks down there, too. But I can’t fi nd you along the south side 
of the highway.” We both wanted to be certain the bombers diving 
from thousands of feet above could identify and avoid my Jeep. I 
unrolled one of the orange panels used to mark the friendly lines 
and drop zones or to point toward the enemy and radioed the FAC 
when the panel was laid across our Jeep hood.
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Covey 507 said, “Still don’t see you. . . . OK! Got you.” About fi ve 
minutes later, the FAC called back to say, “I’ve got F-4s at 16,000. 
I’m going to mark the target, and then they’ll take care of those 
mortars for you.”
It amazed me how fi ghter-bomber pilots, fl ying hundreds of 
miles an hour, could dive from so high they were out of sight and 
then hit a pinpoint target with a bomb. They often fl ew into heavy 
anti-aircraft fi re and then fl ew through it again and again on mul-
tiple passes to drop their bombs and use their machine guns to 
destroy the target. And they did it all without fl ying into each other 
or the FAC or a mountain.
We watched for the fi ghters, and they soon appeared—one, two, 
three of them, rolling in to bomb the target one after another. 
Looking through my big fi eld glasses, I could see the enemy troops 
and mortars disappear in balls of fi re and clouds of smoke. Then 
each F-4 made several more passes to strafe the target area. The 
mortar fi re stopped.
It would be impossible for me to choose between the crews 
of the US Army helicopters; the B-52s; the AC-130 gunships; the 
C-130 cargo aircraft; the fi ghter-bomber pilots from the USAF, 
US Marine Corps, and US Navy; or the FACs to say which I most 
admired and appreciated for the many times they saved those of us 
on the ground. But the FACs carried the extra burden of having to 
keep several balls in the air at the same time. The FACs were not 
only our link to the air support we needed; they were an American 
voice reassuring us when we felt we were alone and in danger. They 
had a bird’s-eye view of the action and could see both the friendly 
and enemy forces during an attack. A FAC could call for and adjust 
artillery fi re and bring an overpowering array of aerial fi repower 
to help us.
The 44th Regiment’s troops were moving against stiff opposi-
tion from an enemy fi ghting from prepared positions. Neverthe-
less, with the help of Cobra gunships and air strikes, they were 
making progress. At the end of the fi rst day, Lieutenant Colonel 
Tien told me they counted at least 50 enemy bodies—a big victory 
for our side. During Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
in mid-April, Secretary of State William P. Rogers stated, “We have 
no Americans in ground combat today.”6
The next day, as our troops moved down the highway to the 
east, clearing out the enemy, we followed at a distance in our Jeep. 
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Mortar rounds were falling around us again, and Captain O’Neil, 
Sergeant Hao, and I jumped out of the Jeep and dove for cover 
in a ditch beside the road. We were scrunched down, hugging 
the ground, when I heard a helicopter approach from our rear. I 
turned my head and watched while an OH-58 landed on the road, 
and Mr. Vann got out. He came striding toward us through inter-
mittent mortar fi re and occasional rifl e shots cracking overhead. 
He was not wearing a helmet or fl ak jacket. Common sense told me 
it was still risky to stand up, but I had to stop cowering in the ditch 
and report to him. I told O’Neil and Hao to stay where they were, 
stood up, and trotted down the road to report to John Paul Vann.
After I briefed him on the situation, he asked if the ROK com-
manders had contacted me. I told him we had no contact with them 
but could use their help. Mr. Vann said he was going to fl y down to 
Qui Nhon to tell the ROK commanders they needed to get into the 
fi ght immediately because security for An Khe Pass and this part 
of Highway 19 was their responsibility. After Vann’s helicopter left, 
the mortar fi re died down.
About an hour later, a Huey landed on the road, and two men 
got out. One of them was a big man, and I recognized the insignia 
of a Korean full colonel. The other man was the colonel’s inter-
preter, an ARVN sergeant who spoke Vietnamese and Korean. I 
walked over to meet the colonel, saluted, and introduced myself. 
He shook my hand in a perfunctory way, and I started to brief him 
on the situation. He held up his hand, turned, and said something 
in Korean to his interpreter, who asked me—in broken English—if 
we had a Vietnamese interpreter. I waved to Sergeant Hao to join 
us. After a brief exchange between the two Vietnamese, I was aston-
ished to learn that the ROK colonel wanted me to speak English 
to my interpreter, who would then relay in Vietnamese what I said 
to the other interpreter, who would then relay it in Korean to the 
ROK colonel. He would respond or ask me questions through the 
same process.
In 1959–1960, I had served a year in Korea and so knew that all 
the higher-ranking Korean offi cers could speak excellent English. 
Many of them were graduates of US Army schools. Out of extreme 
arrogance, this Korean offi cer would not speak directly with me 
because he was a full colonel and I was only a lieutenant colonel. 
Here we were in the middle of a battle, ROK and ARVN troops 
were being killed, we could be killed while standing there, and 
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he insisted on playing out a senseless charade. I shook my head 
in disbelief but decided to go along with his silly game to get the 
Koreans into the fi ght. Looking directly at the Korean colonel, I 
spoke in English and then waited while my words were translated 
into Vietnamese, then from Vietnamese to Korean, and fi nally the 
colonel’s comments or questions came back by the same circu-
itous route. All the while, occasional mortar rounds were landing 
nearby, and now and then we heard the sharp CRACK of bullets 
passing by.
The Korean soldiers had a reputation as fi erce fi ghters. Shortly 
after they arrived in Vietnam, a Korean unit had suffered some 
casualties when they were fi red on from a village, so they had wiped 
out the village.7 However, the ROK “Tiger” Division, which had 
responsibility for securing An Khe Pass, had engaged in virtually 
no fi ghting during the previous three years.8 A US government 
report said the Koreans were under orders from their government 
to avoid combat to minimize casualties, so it took a special effort 
on our part to get them to agree to clear the enemy out of An Khe 
Pass. This “special effort” was probably Mr. Vann’s threatening to 
cut off their post exchange store privileges.9
Later that day the Koreans fi nally joined the fi ght. They brought 
a signifi cant additional weapon—a fl ame-throwing APC. It was an 
M-132, a standard M-113 with the .50-caliber machine gun cupola 
replaced with an M-8 cupola containing a fl amethrower. It could 
shoot a stream of fl ame up to 200 meters for half a minute.10 When 
the Koreans located an NVA position, the M-132 would pull forward 
to where it had a clear shot at the enemy. Then it would fi re a series 
of short bursts of fi re with a WHOOSH, WHOOSH, WHOOSH 
like a giant blowtorch. We were impressed, and the NVA must have 
been terrifi ed. Captain O’Neil joked that every time it shot fl ame, it 
was proclaiming, “I am the king of the valley!” The Koreans moved 
slowly down the road, burning and shooting as they cleaned out the 
NVA. When they fi nally joined the fi ght, they fought like “tigers” 
should.
Overall, the Koreans were valuable allies in Vietnam, where 
their total casualties were 4,407 KIA and nearly 10,000 WIA. They 
infl icted many times more casualties on the Communists.11
A continuing fl ow of truck convoys from Qui Nhon was required 
to resupply Pleiku and the troops beyond it in Kontum as well as 
the outposts still farther west. With the An Khe Pass closed, no 
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supplies were arriving in Pleiku overland from the coast, and by 
16 April John Paul Vann said there was only a three-day supply 
of some items in Pleiku. C-130s started fl ying in supplies, includ-
ing fuel. Some C-130s carried 4,500 gallons of fuel in large blad-
ders. C-141s joined the effort. On the return fl ight, the cargo planes 
often carried refugees, many of them military dependents. Viet-
namese are smaller than Americans, and because their situation 
was desperate, the aircraft were packed with far more than the nor-
mal number of passengers. One C-141 brought out 394 refugees—
four times the normal passenger load. People who saw it arrive at 
Tan Son Nhut were amazed at the continuing stream of refugees 
pouring out of this one airplane.12
After the Koreans were coerced into doing their duty in the 
An Khe Pass, they eventually cleared out the NVA. They declared 
Highway 19 reopened on 26 April, more than two weeks after it 
was fi rst closed. They then relapsed into inactivity. Several days 
of road repair were required before trucks could travel from Qui 
Nhon to Pleiku.13 The 44th Regiment’s area of responsibility was 
then expanded to include the An Khe Pass.14 The Koreans claimed 
they killed 705 NVA soldiers during the fi ghting and said their own 
casualties were 51 killed and 115 wounded. However, later reports 
said 110 Koreans were killed, and 384 wounded. Most of their casu-
alties occurred when they attacked fortifi ed enemy positions on 
Hill 638, which dominates An Khe Pass.15
With the NVA still controlling Highway 14 both north and south 
of the city, Kontum was cut off and surrounded. Having the main 
supply route from Pleiku held by the enemy increased the sense of 
isolation that the defenders of Kontum already felt. However, NVA 
control of Highway 14 also meant the troops defending Kontum 
could not escape down this highway, knowledge of which helped to 
strengthen their resolve to stand and fi ght. One adviser remarked 
that the NVA might have made a mistake when they denied ARVN 
that escape route.16
The NVA employed .51-caliber (12.7-mm), 14.5-mm, 23-mm, 
37-mm, and 57-mm anti-aircraft weapons in the An Khe Pass, in 
the Kontum Pass between Pleiku and Kontum, around Rocket 
Ridge northeast of Kontum, and around their base areas. Accurate 
.51-caliber fi re was reported at altitudes of 2,500 feet above ground 
level, and 37-mm fi re with airbursts was reported at up to 6,000 
feet above ground level. Crew-served and individual weapons aug-
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mented the anti-aircraft guns. The enemy usually employed two or 
three weapons fi ring from different directions. Their targets, the 
pilots of American and VNAF aircraft, rated the effi ciency of the 
NVA’s anti-aircraft fi re to be excellent and their accuracy deadly. 
When US or VNAF aircraft were fl ying at a low level or inserting 
troops, the NVA sometimes fi red RPGs and even mortars at them.17
When Brigadier General Wear returned from a visit to Tan 
Canh in mid-April, he briefed Mr. Vann on the deteriorating situ-
ation there and again advised him to pull some troops from the 
Tan Canh/Dak To area and use them to create blocking positions. 
Vann seemed to agree and set up a meeting for Wear, as the senior 
US Army offi cer in II Corps, to tell General Frederick C. Weyand, 
General Abrams’s deputy, about his concerns. Wear describes the 
meeting:
I took my G-2, Colonel Irv Paul, with me. When we arrived 
at Weyand’s offi ce, he was not alone. Abrams, [with] whom I 
had previously had this same discussion, was also there. I felt 
that I was probably being set up by someone—Weyand, Vann, 
or whoever. Neither Abrams nor Weyand said a word. I told 
them that I wanted to be sure that we were reading off the 
same sheet of music and that they saw the picture as I did, 
or was I missing something? Colonel Paul gave a rundown 
on the enemy situation as we knew it, and then I reviewed 
the ARVN deployments. I then pointed out the morale of 
the ARVN forces, the problems they had the previous year 
against only small enemy forces, and recommended that we 
adopt my blocking-position plan in Kontum Province, etc. 
Neither of them said a word.
When I was fi nished, Abrams said something like, “We 
know all that shit, what else do you have?” I . . . asked Col. 
Paul to step out and then told them that Dzu was cowardly 
and did not have the stomach for a fi ght; I also pointed out 
the weaknesses and poor morale of the ARVN troops in the 
Highlands. I told them that I was quite sure that the troops 
in the Dak To/Tan Canh area would not fi ght, just as they 
had demonstrated in the Plei Trap and Fire Base 6 battles. I 
told them that we were facing a catastrophe if we didn’t get 
reinforcements or, at least, redeploy the forces now in that 
area.
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Weyand said something like, “Wear, we are not going to 
let that happen.” Abrams asked me if that was all. When I 
said yes, he said, “Thank you,” and I left. Col. Paul was wait-
ing for me outside the offi ce. It was almost noon, but nobody 
invited us to lunch, . . . [so we] fl ew back to Pleiku.18
Weeks before the fi ghting in An Khe Pass, I had applied for my 
second and last R&R to meet my wife in Hong Kong. The inter-
national airfares were so low that my wife could fl y roundtrip from 
Los Angeles to Hong Kong for $368. Much to my surprise, con-
sidering the increased action in our area, the R&R was approved, 
and on 24 April I went to Camp Alpha at Tan Son Nhut to leave 
on R&R.
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The requirement to defend all will probably mean we will 
lose much.
—Warning that Mr. Vann deleted
from a II Corps message to MACV
Although the advisers were supposed to just advise and in fact had 
no command authority over the ARVN forces, John Paul Vann, 
a civilian US State Department Foreign Service offi cer, exempted 
himself from that rule and essentially assumed command of all 
the South Vietnamese forces in II Corps during the Easter Offen-
sive. Lieutenant Colonel Stanislaus J. Fuesel, the II Corps artillery 
adviser, said, “If I had attempted to do what Vann did, he would 
have fi red me.” Indeed, although Vann tried to give the appearance 
of only advising—or at least working through—Lieutenant General 
Dzu, it was clear who was really in charge. Some of the ARVN offi -
cers on the II Corps staff referred to Dzu as “Mr. Vann’s man.”1
Vann’s biographer, journalist Neil Sheehan, explained Vann’s 
approach to defending Kontum City and ultimately the Central 
Highlands:
John Vann planned to defeat his enemy as he had seen Wal-
ton Walker defeat the North Koreans in the Pusan Perime-
ter. He would not throw away infantry as Westmoreland had 
done in sending men against fortifi ed positions in the wil-
derness. The roles had been reversed. To win the war, the 
Vietnamese Communists had to come to him, and when they 
advanced out of the mountains, he would break them on his 
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strongpoint. The apparent objective of the NVA offensive in 
II Corps was Kontum, a garrison and trading center with a 
population of about 25,000, the capital of the province of 
the same name and the northernmost town of substance in 
the Highlands. Kontum was guarded to the north by the 
regimental base at Tan Canh on a plateau near the district 
headquarters of Dak To twenty-fi ve miles up the ascending 
asphalt ribbon of Route 14. Just below Tan Canh and to the 
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west of it, a series of ridgelines ran in a north–south direc-
tion, parallel to Route 14 and back down toward Kontum. 
These were known collectively as Rocket Ridge. . . . The U.S. 
Army had built a string of fortifi ed artillery positions, called 
fi re support bases or fi re bases for short, down Rocket Ridge 
to shield the road and the northwest approaches to Kontum 
and had bequeathed these to the ARVN. Before the Viet-
namese Communists could attack Kontum, they fi rst had to 
overrun Tan Canh or crack the fi rebase line along Rocket 
Ridge.2
The chain of FSBs along Rocket Ridge dominated the val-
leys and highways on either side of it. Those FSBs and the Bor-
der Ranger camps along the border were positioned to control the 
surrounding area with their own artillery fi re and by tactical air 
strikes.
Almost 50 kilometers north of Kontum City on Highway 14, 
there was a district town named Dak To. Five kilometers south of it 
was an airfi eld named Dak To I. Adjoining Dak To I on the south 
was a big ARVN base named Tan Canh, and four kilometers west of 
it was another airfi eld named Dak To II. Lieutenant General Dzu 
was worried his forces in the Tan Canh/Dak To area would not be 
able to withstand an attack by the large enemy force headed his way. 
He proposed to reinforce his forward defenses by moving the two 
regiments of the 22nd ARVN Division in Binh Dinh Province on 
the coast to Kontum Province in the Highlands. Mr. Vann strongly 
opposed this move because it would leave Binh Dinh Province with-
out any regular ARVN troops and defended by only its own prov-
ince forces. Vann convinced Dzu to leave the two 22nd Division 
regiments in Binh Dinh and to free up 22nd Division forces to rein-
force Tan Canh and Dak To by extending the 23rd Division’s area 
of responsibility north to include part of Kontum. The II Corps 
order of battle in the Highlands then included the 22nd Division’s 
controlling its own 42nd and 47th Infantry Regiments and three 
Border Ranger battalions, plus scout companies, some armored 
cavalry, and province forces—all supported by 50 tubes of 105- and 
155-mm artillery. The Airborne Division controlled six airborne 
battalions and one Border Ranger battalion and was supported by 
16 tubes of 105-mm artillery. The forces in Kontum City were two 
Ranger battalions and the Kontum Province RF and PF units. The 
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14th and 19th Cavalry Regiments (actually battalion size) had 50 
M-41 light tanks, but the tanks were strung out between Pleiku and 
Ben Het.3
This force seemed formidable, but it was spread over a large 
area in rugged terrain with a limited road network. Resupply was a 
problem because the main supply route was the two-lane Highway 
14 north from Kontum. Moreover, some of those ARVN units were 
on isolated FSBs and could be resupplied only by helicopter. Scat-
tering rather than massing the tanks ignored one of the main prin-
ciples of employing armor. A large force of tanks attacking together 
can terrify, overwhelm, and defeat the enemy, but the same number 
of tanks attacking a few at a time can be destroyed a few at a time. 
Another serious problem was the lack of unity of command. In the 
Tan Canh/Dak To II area, the commanding general of the 22nd 
Division commanded his own troops and other forces northeast of 
Kontum City, including the Border Ranger camps at Ben Het, Dak 
Mot, Dak Pek, and Dak Seang, plus FSBs 5 and 6. But all the Ruff 
Puffs belonged to the Kontum Province chief, Colonel Long, who 
commanded in Kontum City. The II Corps deputy chief of staff for 
operations was in command in Pleiku. The Airborne Division was 
ultimately under the control of Saigon and could be withdrawn at 
any time.4 As if to emphasize that last point, during 20–24 April the 
3rd Airborne Brigade, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Airborne 
Battalions, was pulled out of II Corps and sent to help defend Hue 
in I Corps.5
At the same time that the NVA invaded I Corps, it increased its 
pressure on the Border Ranger camps and the FSBs along Rocket 
Ridge. The 48th and 52nd NVA Infantry Regiments of the 320th 
NVA Infantry Division were soon in contact with the ARVN units 
along Rocket Ridge. The friendly forces were pounded with 20-mm 
and 82-mm mortars, 122-mm rockets, and 105-mm artillery. Anal-
ysis of shell fragments positively identifi ed the 105-mm shells as 
both American and Chinese made.6
On 31 March, while attempting to resupply FSB Delta on Rocket 
Ridge, a “Big Windy” Chinook from the 180th Assault Support Heli-
copter Company (ASHC) was shot down east of the FSB. The crew 
managed to get into Delta, but over the next few days all attempts 
to extract them were unsuccessful. Determined to rescue the crew, a 
force of fi ve Hueys from the 57th Assault Helicopter Company and 
six snakes from the 361st Aerial Weapons Company arrived to try 
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again at fi rst light on the morning of 3 April. They were surprised 
to catch enemy troops in the open launching an assault on the base. 
It was the 52nd Regiment, 320th NVA Division, making the ene-
my’s fi rst major ground assault in the area. The regiment overran 
part of the FSB, but the defenders, supported by the helicopters 
and tactical air strikes, drove it out with heavy losses, including 353 
KIA. The Chinook crew was extracted the next day.7
Enemy activity around Dak To II was increasing, and by early 
April MACV had an accurate count of the NVA units in the area. At 
0430 on 3 April, the D-10 Sapper Battalion of the 2nd NVA Division 
attacked the Dak To II airfi eld with explosive charges and RPGs. 
The airfi eld was under continuing attacks by fi re through the day, 
and aircraft reported receiving heavy anti-aircraft fi re from north 
of the airfi eld. While operating only a kilometer northeast of the 
airfi eld, two ARVN M-41 tanks were destroyed by recoilless rifl e 
fi re. The ARVN defenders captured three prisoners, who revealed 
that the 1st and 141st regiments of the 2nd NVA Division were in a 
staging area on the mountain north of Dak To II and would attack 
Tan Canh and Dak To II at 0100 on 4 April. They said the NVA 
17th Signal, 18th and 19th Transportation, 20th Medical, 12th Anti-
Aircraft, and 14th Heavy Weapons Battalions were also in the vicin-
ity. The enemy was clearly ready to launch a major attack against 
ARVN installations in this area. The airfi eld at Dak To II was the 
main terminal from which the FSBs on Rocket Ridge were resup-
plied. Moreover, enemy control of Tan Canh and Dak To II would 
threaten FSBs 5 and 6 and open the door to an NVA advance down 
Highway 14 or through the valley west of Rocket Ridge.8
Base Area 609, a large Communist supply depot, was located in 
the area where the borders of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos meet. 
It was only 15 kilometers west of Dak To II and Highway 14, which 
runs southeast to Kontum, so the NVA units in western Kontum 
Province would be supplied from the stockpiles in Base Area 609, 
and Highway 14 would be their main supply route.9
The NVA described its buildup:
The three-border area became alive as if infused with fresh 
vitality: once again, it was crowded with troops. Many new 
encampments sprang up; every night, from the strategic cor-
ridor, a continuous stream of tanks, artillery prime movers, 
and trucks poured into the theater.
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. . . The High Command reinforced the Highlands with 
the 2nd Division (under strength), the 320A Division, the 
24B Infantry Regiment, the 2 OB Sapper Battalion, and a 
large number of armed branch, specialized, and technical 
units. For the fi rst time, the Highlands main-force group 
had made a big leap forward in both quality and quantity.
Seeing that we were feverishly preparing the battlefi eld 
and moving large forces, the enemy predicted that our main 
strategic offensive and principal direction of attack in the 
entire South Vietnam was the Highlands. Therefore, since 
the beginning of 1972 he sent in the 47th Regiment to join 
the 42nd Regiment in beefi ng up the defense of the Tan 
Canh area. At the same time, he stepped up probing activi-
ties and sent aircraft to attack our depots and transport lines. 
On the average, Routes 128, 70, 60, and 50K were attacked by 
15 to 29 aircraft sorties daily. Within the space of fi ve days—
from 9 to 13 February—alone, thousands of U.S. aircraft of 
all types carried out bombing strikes in the Highlands.10
By early April, only two US air cavalry troops were left in the 
II Corps area, but they, the FACs, and other pilots reported some 
tank sightings. However, there were no cases where a second pilot 
could confi rm seeing those same tanks. Neither the ARVN offi -
cers nor their advisers at Tan Canh and Dak To II were receiv-
ing the US pilots’ reports on tank sightings. In early April, some 
ARVN long-range reconnaissance patrols reported seeing enemy 
tanks but could not provide accurate descriptions, so their reports 
were discounted, and it was assumed they actually saw only trucks. 
At II Corps, most of the senior ARVN offi cers and their advis-
ers thought there could not be any large concentrations of enemy 
tanks in the Highlands because none had been both detected and 
confi rmed.11
To counter the threat of heat-seeking, ground-to-air missiles 
being used by the NVA, all Hueys were modifi ed to thrust their 
engine heat upward rather than to the rear. The Huey door gun-
ners were generally relaxed when fl ying high, but now, faced with 
the danger of being blown out of the sky, the door gunners were 
alert and ready to pop and throw thermite grenades to divert any 
heat-seeking missiles.12 The “seeker” on the Strella would home in 
on the grenade, which was hotter than the helicopter exhaust.
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When a scout or C&C helicopter pilot marked a target with 
smoke, he could usually count on the NVA’s opening fi re on him. 
Some “Lessons Learned” published by the 17th Aviation Group 
described techniques developed to avoid being shot down. Rather 
than turning quickly to mark the target immediately after it was 
discovered, the Loaches would mark with smoke during a high-
speed run from a different direction, while covered from above by 
the guns. The Hueys would drop smoke from above small-arms 
range. The “Lessons Learned” also pointed out that units request-
ing reconnaissance by the air cavalry tended to think of early morn-
ing as the best time to fi nd out if the enemy had moved during the 
night or would pop up in an unexpected place. However, the slant-
ing rays of the early morning and late afternoon sun made it dif-
fi cult to see because of shadows and limited light in wooded areas. 
Also, fl ying into the rising or setting sun could cause a “whiteout” 
in which a scout pilot would have limited visibility to his front, and 
the gunships would have diffi culty seeing the scout aircraft. Little 
or no information was gathered under those conditions.13
However, air cavalry scout pilot Captain Jim Stein—call sign 
“Scalp Hunter Lead”—who was shot down ten times during two 
tours in Vietnam, said,
I never heard of or . . . remember having diffi culties seeing. 
. . . Most little birds [OH-6s] had one or two rotor blades 
painted white, so the lead gunship front seater, who was 
responsible to watch the little bird at all times, could ID us. 
We fl ew with Willie P [white phosphorus] and smoke gre-
nades to identify targets. A Willie P would be attached to the 
observer’s M-60, and if we came under fi re, his fi rst move 
was to pop the Willie P as the pilot would make the call. This 
was done to get a quick mark on the target, alerting the guns 
that we were in contact and receiving fi re. Also, if the pilot 
was hit and couldn’t make the call, it alerted the guns and 
C&C of contact and the possibility a little bird was going 
down. . . . During this period of the battle, we were not fl ying 
missions to fi nd the enemy and insert troops. Our mission 
[in the spring of 1972] was to fi nd the enemy and two days 
later fl y into the area and see which direction they were mov-
ing. Most of the time . . . the enemy . . . would see us fi rst and 
fi re at us, but sometimes we lucked out and saw them fi rst. 
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They gave themselves away more than we found them. We 
knew they were near, but they could hide.14
An air cavalry squadron had a headquarters, a headquarters 
company, and three lettered troops, A, B, and C. Each cavalry troop 
consisted of a headquarters, a scout platoon with eight OH-6 light 
observation helicopters, a gun platoon with eight Cobra gunships, 
a lift platoon with eight UH-1H Hueys, and an infantry platoon 
that could be inserted by the lift helicopters. For a typical mission, 
the troop would employ a C&C ship, three gunships, three scouts, 
and four lift ships. The minimum force they used on a mission was 
a C&C ship, two gunships, and two scouts. Most of their aircraft 
could carry enough fuel for close to two and a half hours of fl ying 
time.
In February, the 7th US Squadron of the 17th Air Cavalry Regi-
ment ceased tactical operations to prepare its men and equipment 
to depart Vietnam. The squadron was scattered at various bases. 
US units still in Vietnam were experiencing signifi cant racial ten-
sions, drug use among the lower-ranking enlisted men, and alco-
holism among the NCOs. So it was even more diffi cult to cope with 
those morale and discipline problems in a unit that was not intact, 
had ceased tactical operations, and was preparing to go home, but 
the squadron commander managed to hold it all together.
Captain Martin S. Kleiner was the operations offi cer of C Troop, 
7th Squadron. Elements of C Troop were at An Khe, Tuy Hoa, and 
An Son. The troop was scheduled to depart Vietnam on 6 April, 
but that plan was suddenly changed when the North Vietnamese 
launched their invasion on 30 March. On 2 April, the squadron 
commander was ordered to reconstitute C Troop. He directed Cap-
tain Kleiner to take the operating elements forward to Camp Hol-
loway at Pleiku and begin conducting reconnaissance and attack 
missions in the triborder area. A Troop was already in the United 
States, but B Troop was still operating out of Camp Holloway. 
The reconstituted C Troop fl ew to Camp Holloway, where it was 
placed under operational control of the II Corps G-3 adviser. It was 
assigned reconnaissance missions, usually along the border north-
west of Pleiku. After returning from a reconnaissance mission, C 
Troop was debriefed by the II Corps G-2 and G-3 advisers. The old 
military maxim of “fi nd ’em, fi x ’em (hold them in place), and fi ght 
’em” had to be modifi ed to eliminate most of the “fi ght ’em” part 
McKenna Kontum book.indb   89 6/14/2011   10:17:31 AM
90 • KONTUM
because the air cavalry was now operating in many areas no longer 
covered by US or even ARVN artillery fi re support. Also, to hold 
down casualties, C Troop was prohibited from employing its own 
US infantry platoon, which was still with it, and had to rely on Viet-
namese troops when it was necessary to put boots on the ground. 
Even the ARVN infantry platoon was seldom used unless there was 
a downed aircraft. After one staff briefi ng, Brigadier General Wear 
pulled Captain Kleiner aside and told him, “Your mission is to not 
get another American killed.”
Unfortunately, some more Americans assigned to C Troop were 
killed. When C Troop was reconstituted, it was necessary to reas-
sign some of the pilots. One junior lieutenant, who was one of the 
least aggressive pilots in the troop, was a qualifi ed OH-6 pilot but 
had been serving as supply offi cer and fl ying Hueys. When Cap-
tain Kleiner told him he would be fl ying as an OH-6 scout pilot, 
the lieutenant responded he really did not want to be a scout pilot. 
Kleiner, then 24 years old, explained in a fatherly way that the lieu-
tenant was wearing pilot’s wings, was trained as scout pilot, was 
needed to fl y reconnaissance missions, and so was obligated to do 
so. The lieutenant said he understood. He was soon taking a check-
out ride in an OH-6 with the troop’s most aggressive pilot fl ying 
the Loach. The pilot made a risky third pass over an NVA platoon 
near Kontum, and they were shot down. It was three days before 
their bodies could be recovered. C Troop soon lost two more scout 
aircraft near Pleiku, and three more Americans were killed.
Troop B of the 7th Squadron was working in Kontum Province 
and providing valuable information on the enemy until 27 April, 
when it stood down (ceased operations) to prepare for redeploy-
ment to the United States.15 The 7th Squadron of the 17th Air Cav-
alry Regiment was offi cially redeployed to the United States that 
spring. Stars and Stripes reported the redeployment as part of the 
continuing withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. The unit 
guidon and a personnel roster with a zero balance were sent home 
with a lieutenant who was not a pilot, but the personnel and air-
craft unoffi cially remained in Vietnam and their duty extended 
indefi nitely.16
Some of the pilots who returned to the United States with A 
Troop of the 17th Air Cavalry in February were assigned to Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina, where they were fl ying old C Model Hueys 
with the XM 26 ENTAC wire-guided antitank missiles mounted 
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on them. One and a half months after arriving at Fort Bragg, they 
were redeployed back to Vietnam with their ENTAC fi ring helicop-
ters to help stem the tide of North Vietnamese tanks attacking into 
I Corps.17
By mid-April 1972, there were increasing clashes between ARVN 
troops in the Tan Canh/Dak To II area and instances of the enemy 
probing the South’s defenses. The 2nd and 3rd Airborne Brigades 
on Rocket Ridge were repeatedly attacked by fi re, and on 14 April 
the 11th Airborne Battalion on FSB Charlie, 30 kilometers north-
west of Kontum at the northern end of Rocket Ridge, was hit by 
more than 300 rounds of 105-mm artillery and 75-mm recoilless 
rifl e fi re. Then the 48th Regiment, 320th NVA Division, attacked 
them in force. Tactical air strikes and Cobra gunships infl icted 
heavy casualties on the attackers, and the paratroopers put up a 
good fi ght. However, at 2230 that night the 11th Airborne Battalion 
was forced to withdraw. Major John J. Duffy, the battalion senior 
adviser, was the last to leave, and he withdrew under covering fi re 
from the snakes. Duffy estimated that fi ve of the nine NVA anti-
aircraft guns around the base were destroyed and that a thousand 
Communist bodies were piled up on the perimeter wire.18
The ARVN troops at FSB Delta on Rocket Ridge were overrun 
and pushed off their base at 1850 on 21 April. The defenders, an 
airborne company and a company from the 2nd Ranger Group, 
held out as long as they could but were forced to withdraw when 
the NVA infantry attacked with three tanks. A marine F-4 con-
trolled by Covey 546 swooped in to hit the enemy with three bombs 
as they came through the perimeter wire on one side of Delta while 
the ARVNs withdrew on the opposite side of the base. The fact that 
tanks participated in the enemy attack was noted in the II Corps 
adviser’s Daily Staff Journal.19
We did not know it at the time down at the regimental level, but 
a new American antitank weapon was coming to Vietnam. It was a 
tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile called TOW 
and was mounted on both helicopters and Jeeps.
Brigadier General Wear’s last visit to Tan Canh and Dak To II 
was on 21 April. At Tan Canh, he found Colonel Phillip Kaplan 
and his counterpart, Colonel Le Duc Dat, in the DTOC bunker, 
busy plotting positions and sending messages. Kaplan briefed Wear 
on what was going on, and Wear got the locations of the ARVN 
units so he could plan B-52 strikes as closely as possible. In that 
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period, II Corps was able to get three or four Arc Lights during 
each 24-hour period. Wear then fl ew to Dak To II, where he talked 
to Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Brownlee, senior adviser to the 
47th ARVN Regiment. Wear got the locations of the regiment’s 
battalions, which were generally positioned around the airstrip, for 
his Arc Light planning. Brownlee pointed to a man slouching in a 
chair in the corner and said, “That’s Colonel Minh, the regimental 
commander. He’s been drunk now for several days.”
Brigadier General Wear could feel the gloom in this bunker. As 
they waited in the doorway for Wear’s helicopter to return, Brown-
lee asked, “General, what do you expect me to do?” Wear was the 
main advocate for pulling most of the troops in that area back to 
successive blocking positions, and he was also the most realistic 
about the probability of a debacle if it was not done. So he wanted 
in the worst way to take Brownlee and his deputy with him when he 
left. However, his answer was, “Colonel, just do the best you can to 
hold this regiment together.” His chopper landed, and Wear left. 
A few days later Dak To II was overrun, and the 47th Regiment 
quickly dissolved.20
By 22 April, MACV was estimating that a total of 127,000 enemy 
troops had infi ltrated into South Vietnam since the beginning of 
the year.21 After South Vietnamese units in I Corps disintegrated 
and fl ed in disorder, the US personnel in Pleiku conducted defen-
sive drills to practice defending their own compounds. They could 
feel the threat coming closer and closer.
Brigadier General Wear became so sick he could not remember 
where he put a B-52 strike. At this point, Vann, a somewhat dra-
matic man, got down on his knees and begged his old friend to go 
to Clark AFB, where he could get better medical treatment. Wear 
reluctantly agreed and left for the Philippines on 22 April. The day 
after Wear arrived at Clark, Vann’s chief of staff, Colonel Joseph 
J. Pizzi, called to tell him that Tan Canh was under attack. Wear 
immediately fl ew back to Vietnam, but General Weyand met him at 
Tan Son Nhut and told him to return to Clark because his replace-
ment, another brigadier general, was already in II Corps to sign 
off on B-52 strikes. On his return to Clark AFB, Wear was diag-
nosed with tropical sprue, an extremely debilitating fungus infec-
tion of the stomach.22 Brigadier General John G. Hill Jr., an army 
pilot who had graduated from fl ight school in July 1970, replaced 
Brigadier General Wear. He served as commanding general of US 
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Armed Forces and as the deputy senior adviser in II Corps until 
June 1972.23
The North Vietnamese made no attempt to win the hearts and 
minds of the South Vietnamese civilians. Perhaps the NVA was 
punishing them because they failed to rise up to support the VC 
attacks during Tet in 1968. Whatever the reason, the enemy had a 
callous disregard for the plight of the civilians fl eeing from them 
and intentionally shelled the columns of refugees walking on the 
roads. Some ARVN soldiers were mixed in with the refugees, but 
their presence could not justify the wanton killing of so many inno-
cent civilians. The NVA wanted to terrorize the populace and to 
force them into the defended cities such as Kontum, where they 
would become a burden for the ARVN defenders. Sanitation con-
ditions in the cities left much to be desired even in peacetime, and 
with tens of thousands of refugees essentially “camped out” in a 
city there was a signifi cant danger of disease spreading through 
them and to the ARVN defenders. Having so many refugees in 
town also interfered with military operations, and every aircraft 
bringing in food and medical supplies for refugees meant one less 
load of food, ammunition, and other supplies for the defending 
soldiers. In addition, the NVA infi ltrated spies and even sappers 
into the cities with the refugees, which created a serious security 
problem.
By 23 April, 4 of the 19 FSBs north and west of Kontum were 
held by the Communists. FSB Charlie fell on 14 April, Delta on 21 
April, and FSBs 5 and 6 were evacuated on 23 April by order of the 
corps commander because they were considered untenable.
The North’s offi cial history provides the Communists’ version 
of these events:
The 2nd Infantry Division (minus) conducted deception 
operations to attract the enemy’s attention to the area north 
of Dak To. This enabled the 66th Infantry Regiment to com-
plete preparations to attack the headquarters of the puppet 
22nd Division and the 42nd Regiment at Tan Canh. Cadre 
and soldiers of the 66th Regiment secretly built a new road 
over 100 kilometers long, bringing rice and ammunition all 
the way up to the assault assembly areas. . . . Front engineer-
ing troops built roads to a point only fi ve or six kilometers 
from enemy positions to ensure that our tanks and artillery 
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could move forward to carry out the planned attack against 
the enemy’s rear.
On 30 March 1972 . . . Division 320A attacked the 2nd 
Airborne Brigade’s defensive line west of the Po Co [Poko] 
River, destroying or crippling two enemy battalions and 
clearing the route of advance to Kontum city. The defensive 
positions held by the puppet 42nd and 47th Regiments at 
Dak To and Tan Canh were now isolated.24
A draft of the 20 April 1972 “Daily Commanders Evaluation,” 
prepared for Mr. Vann’s approval before dispatch to General 
Abrams at MACV headquarters, described a bad situation:
The ARVN battalion[s] in the Highlands have been in con-
tact almost daily for three weeks, and have suffered severe 
casualties, and for the most part are maldeployed for a mid 
intensity war. To properly deploy them would involve giv-
ing up district headquarters and population centers. The 
requirement to defend all will probably mean we will loose 
[sic] much. Replacements are not coming in to fi ll losses. 
Lieutenant General Dzu is reaping the results of sustained 
poor leadership throughout the chain of command and fail-
ure to insist on high standards of performance in training, 
target acquisition and operations. ARVN failure to insist 
VNAF perform adequately has led to acceptance of VNAF’s 
substandard performance especially in the vital VR [visual 
reconnaissance] program and fl exibility to respond to many 
missions.
On the original draft of this message, a handwritten marginal 
note next to this paragraph says, “Deleted by JP Vann, who wrote, 
‘We don’t need to tell them what they already know.’” The next 
paragraph sent to General Abrams reported, “A thin line of advis-
ers, FACs, and two air cav troops are holding the corps efforts 
together. I hope that this U.S. effort will continue to sustain the 
corps in the forthcoming defensive fi ght.”25
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It is inconceivable that the South can’t hold out against 
the North Vietnamese. They are just too good and well-
equipped an army for that—unless the North Vietnamese are 
all Prussians and the South Vietnamese are all Italians. . . . 
There is always that possibility, of course.
—A Rand Corporation senior analyst
The ARVN 22nd Infantry Division was a large division with four 
rather than the usual three regiments and four rather than the 
usual three battalions in each regiment. In February 1972, the divi-
sion commander was Major General Le Ngoc Trien, an offi cer who 
was tired, burned out, and actively lobbying for a new assignment. 
His deputy, Colonel Le Duc Dat, who was stationed in Kontum, 
wanted to be the division commander and had enough political 
infl uence to get the job despite John Paul Vann’s lobbying for 
another candidate. Vann had known Dat when he was a province 
chief in III Corps and considered him incompetent and corrupt. 
Colonel Dat’s adviser was Colonel Phillip Kaplan, who became 
the commanding offi cer of MACV Advisory Team 22 and senior 
adviser to the ARVN 22nd Division in August 1971. Kaplan had 
graduated from Offi cer Candidate School in 1949 and had served 
as a platoon leader in Korea, so he was an experienced combat 
leader.1 After Dat took command, Kaplan established a reasonably 
good relationship with him but thought several of the regimental 
commanders should be fi red.2
While Brigadier General Wear continued to advocate a series of 
blocking positions on the enemy’s avenue of approach to Kontum, 
President Thieu was admonishing his generals not to give up any 
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more territory. So Vann’s strategy was to establish a stronger for-
ward defense to hold the territory northwest of Kontum. He con-
vinced Lieutenant General Dzu that this tactic was necessary, and 
on 27 January Dzu ordered Colonel Dat to set up a 22nd Division 
forward CP at Tan Canh. This placed the division headquarters 
closer to the units it would be controlling during the NVA offen-
sive. Dat’s 42nd Regiment was already at Tan Canh, and his 47th 
Regiment would be moved from Pleiku to Dak To II,3 about fi ve 
kilometers west of Tan Canh.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Brownlee Jr., senior adviser to 
the 47th Regiment, was quoted in Time magazine about the NVA’s 
probable intentions in the Highlands: “The enemy’s got a new god-
damn division and three good regiments across the border in this 
area, and Tet is coming and Nixon’s going to Peking. If I were a 
Communist political commander I’d say screw the casualties and 
hit ’em.”4 The 9th Airborne Battalion was also at Dak To II and 
had one company deployed on a ridge farther north. The Ben Het 
Border Ranger Camp was fi ve kilometers west of Dak To II. The 
40th and 41st Regiments, half of the 22nd Division, would remain 
on the coast to defend Binh Dinh Province.5 Binh Dinh was an 
important province of a million people as well as being the inter-
section of coastal Highway 1 and Highway 19 that connected Pleiku 
and the Highlands with the coast.6
Elements of the 19th ARVN Cavalry Regiment were sent to Tan 
Canh to reinforce the 22nd Division’s own organic 14th Cavalry 
Regiment. Although these ARVN tank units were called regiments, 
they were more equal to a US tank battalion in numbers of men 
and tanks. Colonel Dat sent this additional armor to Ben Het Bor-
der Ranger Camp because he thought any NVA tank attacks would 
come from that direction. However, the II Corps senior armor offi -
cer, Lieutenant Colonel Tuong, argued against this disposition 
because he thought the tanks should be uncommitted and free to 
use in counterattacks rather than in fi xed positions inside Ben Het.7
Colonel Dat was one of those South Vietnamese who believed 
the northerners made better soldiers. He thought the NVA was 
superior in just about every way and was probably invincible. This 
view was ironic because Dat was from the North himself. When 
Kaplan admonished him about things he failed to do, Dat would 
sometimes say, “We’ve been fi ghting this war a long time.” Kaplan’s 
response would be, “That’s the trouble!” Dat once sent Mr. Vann a 
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gift, a statue of a Greek warrior with the inscription, “From one 
warrior to another.” Around mid-April, Vann was in the 22nd 
Division DTOC ticking off for Dat all the basic actions he needed 
to take, such as “Get out there on the high ground in front of 
you,” “Make contact with the enemy as soon and as far out as 
possible,” and “Bring maximum fi repower to bear on him.” At 
one point, Vann said bluntly, “Colonel Dat, you are going to be 
the fi rst division commander to lose your division because you 
are going to be overrun!” It was a prophetic statement, but Dat’s 
response was, “Oh, that won’t happen.” As Vann left Tan Canh, he 
told Kaplan, “I’ll send you a postcard in the POW camp.” Kaplan 
responded, “Not to me, you won’t, because I won’t be in one.” If 
the 22nd Division were overrun, he intended either to escape or 
to die trying.8
The 22nd ARVN Division compound at Tan Canh was 300 to 
400 yards long and about as deep. In addition to the 22nd Division 
headquarters and three battalions of the 42nd Regiment, some 
engineers were stationed there, for a total of about 1,200 ARVN 
troops. Logistics units and other support troops were in a nearby 
compound, for a total of about 4,000 ARVN soldiers in the imme-
diate area.9
Most of the M-41 tanks available to the 22nd Division were at 
Ben Het on Colonel Dat’s order. The 42nd Regiment’s CP; its 1st, 
2nd, and 4th Battalions; its scout company; and its reconnaissance 
platoon were at Tan Canh. Most of its 3rd Battalion was eight road 
miles southeast at Dien Binh on Highway 14, but one company of 
the 3rd Battalion was on FSB 5, and one of its platoons was on FSB 
6.10 The 42nd ARVN Regiment—the linchpin of Vann’s forward 
defense strategy—ominously had a bad reputation.11 General Cao 
Van Vien had seen the 42nd Regiment run from the enemy several 
times and considered it the worst regiment in his army.12
Colonel Dat and his regimental commanders knew the NVA was 
out there someplace, building up for an attack, and moving toward 
them. Yet they failed to patrol aggressively or to operate far enough 
from their bases to learn the size, type, and location of the enemy 
units. Kaplan, Wear, and Vann pressured Dat to be more aggres-
sive and to locate targets to hit with Arc Lights, but to no avail. 
The 22nd Division did equip small reconnaissance teams with Star-
light night-vision scopes and radios and sent them out to fi nd the 
NVA, but the teams made no contact. The patrols would only go 
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two to three kilometers beyond their perimeter, not far enough to 
fi nd the enemy units. Only the 9th Airborne Battalion at Dak To 
II ventured far enough to make contact with the enemy. It was the 
fi rst to capture a POW, a 17-year-old from the 320th NVA Infantry 
Division. When the teenage soldier got out of the helicopter at Tan 
Canh, he asked, “Is this Saigon?”13
In early April, prisoners taken during combat northeast of Dak 
To said the mission of the 2nd NVA Division and the independent 
66th NVA Regiment of the B-3 Front was to take Dak To II and 
Tan Canh. The 1st and 141st NVA Regiments and the D10 Sapper 
Battalion, all part of the 2nd NVA Infantry Division, were staging 
north of Dak To airfi eld and would lead the assault. The prison-
ers said that T-54 tanks from a battalion of the 203rd NVA Tank 
Regiment would join in the attack. The enemy had already recon-
noitered the Tan Canh compound four times, and their attack 
preparations were in the fi nal stages.14
In an effort to disrupt the enemy’s timetable and to kill as many 
of the NVA soldiers as possible, more than 100 Arc Lights were 
used in the 22nd Division’s area in the Highlands during a 60-day 
period ending in early April.15 Operating outside the perimeters of 
Tan Canh and Dak To on 19 April, the 1st Battalion of the 42nd 
Regiment was cut off and surrounded by an estimated two enemy 
battalions. Not surprisingly, Colonel Dat’s relief efforts were inef-
fective. The isolated troops were not resupplied, so they eventually 
ran out of ammunition. Two days later only 63 men from the origi-
nal 360 made it back to their regimental compound.16
Mr. Vann’s original strategy for a forward defense that would 
position the 22nd Division forward CP and the 42nd Regiment at 
Tan Canh and the 47th Regiment at Dak To II was based on his 
belief that if ARVN troops were surrounded, they would have to 
stand and fi ght regardless of the odds against them. If the ARVN 
troops at Tan Canh could hold out, they would control the approach 
down Highway 14 to Kontum. However, if the enemy attacked with 
tanks, that would be a different ball game, and the ARVN troops 
might not hold out. Despite repeated reports of tank sounds and 
tank tracks, Vann still did not believe there were any NVA tanks in 
II Corps. But now, with the enemy attack imminent, he decided to 
modify his strategy. Perhaps he also decided that Wear’s blocking-
position strategy was best after all. Whatever his reasons for this 
change, a major consideration was that John Paul Vann no longer 
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had any confi dence in Colonel Le Duc Dat. Referring to Dat, he 
said, “I’ll shoot the little bastard myself if he runs.”17
Every day during this period, Colonel Phillip Kaplan either saw 
John Paul Vann in person or talked to him on the radio.18 Only 
a day or two before the main enemy attack, Vann and Dzu came 
to Tan Canh and told Kaplan and Dat, “We ought to start plan-
ning and thinking about pulling some forces back toward Kon-
tum. We’ve got too much up here.” They were concerned that the 
NVA would cut the roads and any ARVN tanks, trucks, and artil-
lery unable to withdraw overland would be lost. The division had 
twenty-two 105-mm and 155-mm artillery pieces in the area, and 
more artillery was with the airborne battalion there. Vann and Dzu 
were now willing to give up the Tan Canh and Dak To area by pull-
ing the division headquarters and the 42nd and 47th Infantry regi-
ments back to Kontum.
Dat and Kaplan understood they were to start planning the 
withdrawal, but not to execute it until they received orders to do 
so. Executing a withdrawal when the enemy is already probing and 
likely to attack at any time is an extremely diffi cult and danger-
ous maneuver. Kaplan went over the withdrawal process with Dat. 
Units would be displaced half a battalion at a time, and strict disci-
pline would be maintained to control the movement. Dat did order 
ten artillery pieces to be moved south to Binh Dinh on Highway 14, 
but only four were actually moved. The other crews were too scared 
to drive through the intermittent artillery and mortar fi re on the 
highway.19
Incoming indirect fi re on the 22nd Division DTOC at Tan Canh 
averaged 50 rounds a day from 5 April until midmonth, when 
it gradually increased to 200–300 rounds a day. It continued to 
increase until more than 1,000 rounds a day were hitting the DTOC 
area. On Saturday, 22 April, one battalion of the 42nd Regiment 
was operating outside the compound when enemy artillery and 
rockets began falling on Tan Canh at the rate of several rounds a 
minute. One rocket hit a 105-mm howitzer position, and more than 
900 rounds of artillery ammo in the position exploded.20
Captain John B. Keller was an adviser in Dak To District about 
fi ve kilometers north of Tan Canh on Highway 14. At 2330 Saturday 
night, 22 April, he reported to the II Corps operations center that 
enemy vehicles were moving to his west–northwest. He requested 
a Stinger gunship and said the district artillery was fi ring on the 
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vehicles while they waited for the gunship to arrive. Next to an 
entry about his report typed into the II Corps adviser’s DTOC jour-
nal, the note “TRUCKS” was hand printed. This note may indicate 
that, despite the NVA tanks used in the attack on FSB Delta, the II 
Corps adviser staff still assumed any enemy vehicle sounds were 
more likely to be coming from trucks rather than from tanks.21
Contacts with large NVA units increased over a two-week period, 
and by Sunday, 23 April, hostile forces surrounded the entire Tan 
Canh/Dak To area. The enemy held key terrain overlooking Tan 
Canh, from which they were able to place observed fi re on the 
ARVN compound. The attacks by fi re were not only intensifying, 
but also becoming much more accurate.
Around 0900 on Sunday, Captain Raymond H. Dobbins, the 
acting senior adviser to the 42nd ARVN Regiment, was lying in 
an exposed position on top of a bunker directing US air strikes on 
targets that his counterpart, the regimental commander, gave him. 
One battalion of the 42nd, supported by four M-41 tanks, was try-
ing to clear the enemy out of an area near its perimeter. One of the 
tanks, from the ARVN 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry, was returning 
through the main gate at Tan Canh with a wounded crewman when 
the tank was suddenly destroyed with a FLASH! BANG!22 The 
ARVNs assumed the tank was hit by an RPG and reported that to 
Dobbins, who radioed it to Major Jon R. Wise in the 22nd Division 
DTOC. Wise discussed it with the senior adviser, Colonel Kaplan, 
and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Terrence McClain. The RPG’s 
maximum effective range was about 300 meters, but the nearest 
enemy was more than 500 meters from the tank, so they doubted an 
RPG had knocked it out. Kaplan, McClain, and Major George W. 
Carter, senior adviser to the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, left 
the bunker to see for themselves. As they walked toward the stricken 
tank, they heard a strange, high-pitched, warbling sound and saw a 
streak as another missile knocked out another M-41 near the main 
gate about 150 meters north of them. McClain noticed copper wire 
trailing from the missile and gathered up 30 to 40 meters of it as 
he ran toward the second tank. There was a hole about the size of a 
silver dollar in the armor on the front of the tank, and lying on the 
ground were the tail assembly and part of the motor from the mis-
sile. Two more missiles were quickly fi red from high ground in the 
vicinity of a Buddhist pagoda. The three advisers returned to the 
DTOC to examine the parts McClain had collected.
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The 22nd Division DTOC at Tan Canh was in a large bunker 
about 100 by 40 by 30 feet and rising 6 to 8 feet above ground level. 
There were windows between the ground and the roof, which was 
covered with sandbags and timbers treated with creosote to provide 
overhead cover. When Colonel Kaplan was inside the bunker, he 
did what most of us did when we were going to be in a relatively 
safe place for a while. He removed his helmet and his web gear—
heavy with a pistol, ammo, and full canteen—and hung them on a 
wall peg. The advisers examined the missile tail assembly, which 
was about three inches in diameter and had two bobbins of wire 
and two jet nozzles attached to it. This missile was a sophisticated 
new weapon being employed against them, and they all agreed 
its use might signal the start of the enemy’s main offensive in the 
Highlands.
At 1031 on Sunday, the 22nd Division DTOC suddenly exploded 
in fi re, smoke, and fl ying shrapnel as another missile came in 
through a window. Everyone inside was knocked down, several 
walls were knocked out, and equipment was strewn around. Twenty 
ARVN soldiers were dead, and more were seriously wounded. 
No Americans were killed, but Kaplan had a bleeding shrapnel 
wound on top of his head, and several of the other advisers were 
even more seriously injured. Kaplan’s interpreter lost part of his 
ear. The explosion ignited the creosote on the dry timbers, which 
started burning and fi lled the bunker with acrid smoke. Kaplan 
quickly moved to put out the fi re. He grabbed a fi ve-gallon con-
tainer of water they used to make coffee and started to throw it 
on the fl ames. Then he realized the fi re was already out of control 
and thought, “This is ridiculous. It’s like pissing on a forest fi re.” 
He turned around and said, “Get everybody out of here!” An hour 
later the DTOC bunker collapsed into a smoldering ruin.23
Major Julius G. Warmath and Captain David Stewart, the divi-
sion signal adviser, started working to reestablish vital communica-
tions. The advisers had their own much smaller bunker constructed 
partially above ground, the same as the division DTOC bunker. 
They used it only for protection from artillery and rocket attacks 
and for storing rations, LAWs, and other supplies. However, com-
munications equipment was already set up there and functioning, 
so they moved into it. A few minutes after the Americans left the 
DTOC bunker, Dat and his staff fi nally came out of the burning, 
collapsing bunker. The Vietnamese asked if they could also use 
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the advisers’ bunker, and Kaplan agreed. Shortly after noon, they 
again had a functioning DTOC.24
Colonel Kaplan called for a medevac of the seriously wounded 
Americans and about 40 wounded Vietnamese. Major Warmath 
assisted Lieutenant Colonel McClain with evacuating all the 
wounded. They talked the medevac helicopters in through the 
incoming artillery and rocket fi re and helped carry litter patients 
to the aircraft. Other advisers were busy directing tactical air strikes 
on enemy targets near the compound. At 1100, John Paul Vann 
landed through heavy enemy fi re to check on the deteriorating sit-
uation. He remarked on the absence of any ARVN counter bat-
tery fi re. Vann directed his pilot to evacuate some of the wounded 
in his own OH-58, and he, the senior adviser to the corps com-
mander, stayed at the helipad for several hours helping to organize 
the wounded for loading and even loading some of them himself—
all while under heavy artillery and rocket fi re. He pointed out 
that some of the ARVN casualties were being evacuated by Ameri-
can helicopters rather than by VNAF, whose job it was to evacu-
ate ARVN soldiers to ARVN hospitals. Vann’s visits usually lasted 
about 20 minutes, but he may have stayed longer on this particu-
lar day to help evacuate the wounded and to determine if Kaplan 
was really able to carry on as the division adviser. Kaplan’s head 
wound was not deep, but it bled profusely, so he was covered with 
blood. Before Vann left, he and Kaplan discussed extraction plans 
in case the advisers needed to be rescued from Tan Canh. There 
was one US Army infantry company in Pleiku for security at the II 
Corps headquarters, and it could be used to secure an extraction of 
the advisers. When Vann left, he took with him several Vietnamese 
civilians who were employed by the advisers.25
This attack was the fi rst time the Soviet AT-3 Sagger antitank 
missile was used in Vietnam, and on this same day it was used both 
at Tan Canh in II Corps and against ARVN M48A3 medium tanks 
in I Corps. Eight Sagger attacks on the M48A3s caused the targeted 
tanks to explode and burn immediately—something not good for 
tanker morale. The Soviet AT-3 Sagger was eventually used in all 
four corps areas. It was a wire-guided, antitank missile 700 millime-
ters (2.3 feet) long and 120 millimeters (4.72 inches) in diameter. It 
had a range of 2,500 meters (2,735 yards) and could penetrate 400 
millimeters (15.75 inches) of armor—the equivalent of 16 sandbags. 
However, it did have some vulnerabilities. The wire might break, 
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and the missile could not be fi red at night or in heavy vegetation 
because the gunner had to maintain constant visual contact with 
both the missile and the target to have constant control of the mis-
sile. Because the gunner was exposed while guiding the missile, 
the ARVN troops were instructed to fi re at his suspected location.26
The South Vietnamese developed an interesting and appar-
ently effective tactic to defend against the Sagger. An operator con-
trolled the Sagger with a joystick connected to the launcher by a 
15-meter control wire. When a puff of smoke from the launcher 
warned ARVN tanks that a Sagger had been fi red, all ARVN tanks 
other than the targeted vehicle would fi re all over the area 15 
meters around the plume of smoke emitted at the launcher, with 
the intent to kill or at least disrupt the operator. The target tank 
counted to fi ve and then made a sudden move in any direction—an 
evasive maneuver requiring strong nerves and quick reaction by the 
targeted tank crew.27
At Tan Canh, the Sagger missile explosion in the bunker not 
only destroyed the DTOC but also had a devastating effect on Colo-
nel Dat and greatly reduced his troops’ morale and confi dence in 
their ability to defend Tan Canh. By noon, Saggers had destroyed 
all fi ve M-41 tanks in the compound and several more bunkers. 
McClain and Warmath worked constantly through the afternoon to 
complete the evacuation of all ARVN wounded. The bombardment 
of Tan Canh continued in the normal pattern until 1900, when a 
new type of indirect fi re was used. The enemy lined up ten RPGs on 
the high ground near the airstrip. While a heavy artillery barrage 
held down the ARVN troops, the NVA fi red rockets into the ammu-
nition dump. A direct hit started a fi re that destroyed hundreds of 
thousands of rounds of small-arms ammunition, mortar rounds, 
and M-72s—all munitions the ARVN troops would need to defend 
Tan Canh. The advisers’ billets nearby were severely damaged.
At 2100 Sunday evening, Captain Richard Cassidy, the senior 
adviser in Dak To District, told the 22nd Division TOC that his 
counterpart, the district chief, had said tanks were moving through 
Dak Brung hamlet and toward the Dak To District headquar-
ters. Cassidy requested a Spec tre C-130 gunship. His request was 
approved, and at 2300 a Spectre arrived over Dak Brung and 
scanned the area with its infrared and television tracking systems. 
After 15 minutes of searching, the gunship located a column of 
18 tanks moving from the east toward Dak To District headquar-
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ters. Spectre reported this movement and attacked the tanks with 
its 105-mm gun.28 Next, the 9th Airborne Battalion north of Dak 
To II reported to Colonel Kaplan that it not only heard tanks but 
also could see their headlights. Kaplan relayed those reports to II 
Corps and requested a Spectre gunship. When the Spectre arrived, 
it confi rmed 11 tanks and soon spotted 10 more. Despite weeks of 
reports about tank tracks, there had been no positive confi rmation 
by a US observer who actually saw an NVA tank in the corps area, 
so John Paul Vann still doubted that there were enemy tanks in 
the Highlands. When Kaplan reported Spectre’s sightings, Vann 
was skeptical and said, “Well, if there are tanks, congratulations, 
because these are the fi rst positive tanks that anybody has found 
in MR II.”29 Kaplan thought that “congratulations” was not exactly 
the best thing to say to a man with a couple dozen enemy tanks 
headed his way.
Spectre was fi ring 105-mm high-explosive (HE) rounds, which 
normally would not kill a tank. HE rounds were effective against 
troops, trucks, and bunkers but could not penetrate a tank’s armor. 
A lucky hit from above on a T-54’s rear deck, where the engine and 
fuel were located, might knock out the tank, but the most it could 
accomplish normally would be to stun and terrify the crew—maybe 
enough so they would abandon their tank. Spectre reported three 
tanks knocked out near Dak Brung, and the local Ruff Puffs found 
a T-54 abandoned but apparently undamaged. Some NVA sappers 
came down the road, scared off the Ruff Puffs, and reclaimed the 
tank, which they drove away.30
Around midnight, the NVA tank column turned south toward 
Tan Canh. Colonel Kaplan pushed the ARVN artillery commander 
to fi re on the tanks before they could reach his defensive line, and 
a battery of four 105s fi red one volley toward the tanks. Spectre 
reported that one round hit a POL truck and another landed within 
fi ve feet of a tank. Kaplan congratulated the artillery commander, 
but before the ARVN artillerymen could fi re again, Communist 
counter battery fi re drove them into their bunkers. There was no 
more ARVN artillery fi re against the oncoming tanks.
The FSBs on Rocket Ridge were on hilltops and located close 
enough to be mutually supporting with artillery fi re. But Tan Canh 
was on a small hill in a relatively fl at area and not within support-
ing artillery range of the nearest FSBs or Border Ranger camps. 
Tan Canh and Dak To II were within 105-mm artillery range of 
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each other. However, Dak To II was under extremely heavy attacks 
by fi re at the same time Tan Canh was being attacked, so it did not 
fi re in support of Tan Canh that morning.
The enemy armored column crossed two bridges over unford-
able streams to reach Tan Canh. Both bridges should have been 
rigged for demolition, and ARVN engineers should have been 
standing by to destroy them if necessary. This action required reli-
able communications back to the DTOC so the engineers could 
receive an order to blow the bridges. However, the bridges were not 
prepared for demolition and were defended by only a platoon of 
local forces with no antitank weapons. As might be expected, the 
lightly armed Ruff Puff defenders fl ed when confronted by NVA 
tanks. This lack of coordination between the regular forces and the 
territorial forces as well as ARVN’s failure to seize this opportunity 
to block the NVA advance allowed the enemy tanks to continue roll-
ing toward Tan Canh. On the outskirts of Tan Canh Village, some 
of the tanks stopped, and others drove back toward Dak To. Spec-
tre requested permission to fi re on the tanks in Tan Canh Village, 
but it was denied because there were ARVN dependents in the vil-
lage.31 With enemy tanks closing in, Colonel Kaplan checked with 
his advisers to be certain they understood the escape and evasion 
plan.
The NVA was still probing and bombarding FSBs 5, 6, and 
Yankee; Dak To District headquarters; and Dak To II. However, 
it was employing a tactic the North Vietnamese called “striking at 
the head of the snake.” In this case, the head of the snake was the 
22nd ARVN Division CP at Tan Canh, and destroying it was most 
likely the NVA attack’s main objective. On Sunday night, Dat said 
to Kaplan, “We will be overrun tomorrow. Maybe six o’clock.” He 
had already lost the battle psychologically.32
Kaplan now realized that without new leadership, the troops at 
Tan Canh would most likely not hold against a big attack. Colonel 
Dat was physically unharmed but mentally incapacitated. He would 
not respond to Kaplan’s recommendations or take any command 
action. Sunday evening Kaplan and Vann made plans to replace 
Colonel Dat. Radio contact between Tan Canh and Pleiku required 
relays and was intermittent at best. Also, Kaplan had diffi culty dis-
cussing such a delicate matter on the radio without ARVN offi cers 
overhearing him. Removing Dat without a replacement already in 
Tan Canh might give the impression that Dat was being extracted 
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to save him from capture or death, and just a rumor of that might 
start a panic. Lieutenant General Dzu fi nally agreed to send up 
Colonel Tuong from corps headquarters “to be in charge while 
Dat was called to Pleiku to discuss the planned withdrawal of his 
forces.” After that personnel exchange took place, the change of 
command would be announced. This plan fell apart when Tuong 
declined the honor of commanding the 22nd Division.33
A long, sleepless night was ahead for Kaplan. Three successive 
Spectre gunships worked the area until dawn. Although their 105-
mm guns were able to slow or temporarily stop the T-54s, they were 
unable to knock them out because they had only HE rounds rather 
than high-explosive antitank (HEAT) ammunition, which could 
penetrate a tank’s armor plating. After this NVA tank attack, the 
AC-130s supporting us in II Corps started carrying HEAT rounds. 
The 22nd Division’s troops had a 106-mm recoilless rifl e with 
armor-piercing ammunition covering the road the enemy tanks 
were using, but it never fi red a shot. Hundreds of LAWs had pre-
viously been distributed throughout the division, and the ARVN 
soldiers were trained to use them. Captain Dobbins persuaded his 
counterpart, Lieutenant Colonel Thong, to break down one com-
pany of his regiment into small hunter-killer teams and send them 
out to destroy the oncoming enemy tanks. That effort was rewarded 
when the hunter-killer teams reported they knocked out two T-54s 
west of the town.34
At 0326 on Monday, Spectre reported that ten of the enemy 
tanks were moving to the high ground north of the compound near 
the airstrip. The remaining armor was proceeding south of Tan 
Canh Village and then west toward the ARVN com pound. This 
Spectre returned to Pleiku to refuel and rearm and was replaced 
by another Spectre gunship armed only with two 20-mm and two 
40-mm cannons, neither of which could stop, let alone destroy, a 
T-54.35
The news that a column of tanks was headed toward Tan Canh 
created a fl urry of activity there. The 42nd Regiment commander, 
Lieutenant Colonel Thong, sent his deputy to an abandoned water 
tower on the perimeter to direct air strikes on the tanks. The depu-
ty’s adviser, 24-year-old Captain Kenneth J. Yonan, grabbed a radio 
and went with his counterpart so he could communicate with US 
aircraft and the other advisers. However, when the enemy tanks 
reached Tan Canh, they unknowingly occupied positions that pre-
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vented the two observers in the water tower from leaving. Yonan 
was able to direct some of Spectre’s fi re on enemy troops, but he 
and his counterpart were trapped in the tower, and his radio even-
tually went silent.
The attack started at dawn when a long line of tanks attack-
ing abreast charged out of the morning mist with guns blazing, 
engines roaring, headlights on. The tanks and an infantry assault 
force hit the southern perimeter. The enemy infantry were from 
the 1st Regiment, 2nd NVA Division, and the tanks were from the 
297th NVA Tank Battalion.36 Unlike some enemy attacks in other 
places, this tank and infantry assault was well coordinated. The 
ten tanks that Spectre had reported moving to the high ground 
north of the Tan Canh compound were now fi ring their main guns 
into the compound in support of an infantry attack on the north-
ern perimeter, which the 42nd Regiment’s reconnaissance com-
pany was defending. The regiment repulsed the fi rst battalion-size 
attack but was eventually overwhelmed by successive waves of yell-
ing Communist soldiers.37
Both friendly and enemy accounts claim someone popped tear 
gas during the battle. The NVA version is that “the enemy used 
toxic chemical dispensers to fi re asphyxiating and tear gases in a 
bid to stop our advance. Well prepared in advance, combatants 
poured water from their canteens onto the towels and gauze masks 
they carried and used them to cover their mouths and noses, then 
continued to fi ght.”38
A year earlier Tan Canh had been attacked by infantry and sap-
pers who penetrated the minefi eld, where around 100 of them had 
been killed inside the wire. The ARVN soldiers had held fast on 
this occasion, and Kaplan thought they should be able to hold fast 
now. However, this time was different because the NVA attacked 
with tanks, and the big T-54s had a devastating effect on the ARVN 
defenders. Kaplan observed, “The tanks just froze our leadership.” 
Almost all of the eight South Vietnamese tanks had been knocked 
out before the NVA tanks attacked, and the crews of the remaining 
ARVN tanks abandoned their light M-41 tanks and ran when they 
saw the big T-54s coming.39 The intense bombardment, the attack-
ing waves of Communist infantry, and above all the tanks were too 
much for the ARVN support troops. About a thousand of them fl ed 
in terror.
Captain James T. Vaughan was on duty in the II Corps Tacti-
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cal Operations Center in Pleiku the night of 23–24 April when Tan 
Canh fell. Listening on the radio, the two captains on duty followed 
the action as the defenses unraveled at 22nd Division headquar-
ters. Reports of large-caliber artillery rounds, including 130-mm, 
falling on the defenders were followed by reports of tanks attack-
ing with their lights on. As the situation grew worse, more and 
higher-ranking Americans joined the two duty offi cers to listen to 
radio exchanges between FACs, helicopters, and the advisers at Tan 
Canh. It was chaos. Vaughan thought, “The night seemed like it 
would just never end.”40
At fi rst light on Monday, around 0600, there was a direct hit on 
the new DTOC in the advisers’ bunker. Colonel Kaplan went to the 
exit and saw that some sandbags had dropped into the doorway. 
He started to throw them out of the way and then thought, “We’re 
doing absolutely nothing in this bunker. We can’t see anything. We 
don’t know what’s going on. The reports we get, I don’t know if 
they’re accurate or any good. This is no place to be if you have to 
fi ght.”41 Colonel Dat was just sitting, staring, and not exercising any 
leadership. He would not implement any of Kaplan’s recommen-
dations. At this point, Kaplan realized he was no longer an effec-
tive adviser to an ARVN division commander but just the squad 
leader of nine Americans. He assembled the advisers, said, “Let’s 
go, guys,” and led them out of the bunker.42 Kaplan refl ected later, 
“It’s better to die on your feet shooting than to suffocate or burn to 
death in a bunker.”43
Colonel Kaplan had lost everything but the clothes on his back 
in the DTOC bunker fi re but had managed to come up with a fl ak 
vest and an M-16. Incoming artillery rounds and rockets were now 
falling at the rate of about four a minute and the entire defensive 
perimeter was under assault by enemy infantry and tanks. Kaplan 
sent a message, “Get ahold of John Vann and tell him that I want 
him up here.”44 Vann understood what that meant and was soon 
in the air, inbound in his OH-58 with CWO Robert Richards fl y-
ing and Captain Dolph A. Todd following them in another OH-58. 
They decided the advisers at Tan Canh should move west to a road 
between the adviser buildings and the minefi eld around the com-
pound, where they could be picked up by the helicopters.45
The advisers reached the road, and about 20 minutes later Dat 
and some of his offi cers came out of the bunker and stood around 
it, only 30 yards from the Americans. One of the advisers yelled at 
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them to get down because they would attract the enemy’s attention. 
They went back into the bunker, and Kaplan never saw Dat again. 
One report said Dat was last seen walking across the airstrip at Tan 
Canh when the enemy shot at him and he fell. The NVA claimed 
that both Dat and Kaplan died on the battlefi eld.46
The fi rst T-54 tank Kaplan saw in Vietnam suddenly broke 
through the defenses and came roaring down the road toward 
them. The advisers crouched behind some buildings to hide from 
the tank. Lieutenant Johnny M. Jones had an M-72 LAW, and 
Kaplan asked, “Jones, do you know how to use that thing?” Jones 
responded “You betcha!” So Kaplan told him, “Well, my friend, 
get yourself a tank. We’ll cover you.” Jones knew the best place to 
hit a tank is in the rear where it has the least armor and where the 
engine is located. As soon as the tank passed, he stepped out, aimed 
at the engine, and pulled the trigger. The LAW misfi red, and the 
tank disappeared around a corner. Another T-54 came down the 
same road, so the advisers hid again. As soon as the second tank 
passed, Lieutenant Colonel McClain tried to kill it with another 
M-72, but it also misfi red, and the second tank disappeared around 
the corner.47
NVA tanks were already inside the compound at Tan Canh, the 
rescue helicopters were inbound, and the advisers needed to move 
fast. The road they had originally selected was no longer a safe 
place for the extraction. They decided part of an old road in the 
minefi eld appeared to be the next best place, so they crossed the 
road to the edge of the minefi eld. Their next hurdle was to get 
through the minefi eld without being blown up. One of the advis-
ers, Staff Sergeant Walter H. Ward, saw the route some ARVN sol-
diers had taken through the minefi eld, so the other advisers lined 
up behind him, and he led them safely to their pickup point. Some 
of the ARVN soldiers took other routes and were blown to pieces 
when they stepped on mines. The nine advisers found whatever 
cover they could and used their radio to talk in the two OH-58s. 
Three advisers, about the maximum load, got into each helicop-
ter. Kaplan, McClain, and Stewart, the communications offi cer, 
remained behind with a radio. As the two small helicopters took 
off, some panicked ARVN soldiers grabbed on to the skids and 
dangled below while the OH-58s struggled to gain altitude and 
escape the increasingly heavy enemy fi re.48
With ARVN soldiers dangling below the rescue helicopters and 
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three advisers still in extreme danger while they waited to be res-
cued from Tan Canh, Vann decided the OH-58s should land at Dak 
To II rather than risk the long trip back to Pleiku. The six advisers 
and the hanging Vietnamese were dropped at Dak To II. As Vann’s 
helicopter took off again, it was severely damaged by enemy fi re 
and barely made it back to Pleiku. Captain Todd returned to Tan 
Canh in the other OH-58, extracted Kaplan, McClain, and Stewart, 
and fl ew them to Pleiku.
As soon as Kaplan was in the air, he used the OH-58’s radio 
to contact an inbound Huey, the C&C ship he normally received 
around 0800 every morning. This day it was Gladiator 715 from the 
57th Assault Helicopter Company. Kaplan diverted it to pick up the 
six advisers left at Dak To II. Gladiator 715 picked up the advisers 
and took off from Dak To II but was quickly shot down in fl ames 
and crashed on a sandbar in the Dak Poko River. An explosion 
was heard, and smoke from the fi re could be seen from Dak To II. 
Because of the many people who saw it go down and the nature of 
the crash, it was assumed there were no survivors. However, with-
out any immediate way to confi rm this assumption, the crew and 
passengers were reported MIA.49
Colonel Kaplan, Lieutenant Colonel McClain, and Captain 
Stewart arrived in Pleiku at 0830 that morning. At the II Corps 
TOC, Vann and several of the other senior leaders debriefed 
Kaplan. Captain Vaughan later described the senior adviser to the 
22nd Division: “He was pretty muddy and tired, as I recall. How-
ever, he had his head up and acted the part of the leader. I was 
always very impressed with Colonel Kaplan—thought he was a real 
soldier.”50 Lieutenant General Dzu asked Kaplan, “Where’s Colo-
nel Dat? Why didn’t he come out with you?” Dzu said they should 
not have had so much of their force outside Tan Canh, but Kaplan 
thought the opposite. Contradicting his own point about concen-
trating their forces in Tan Canh, Dzu then asked why they had not 
moved more elements to the south. Kaplan had the impression the 
corps commander was looking for a scapegoat.51
During a telephone conversation with Mr. Vann, Charles Mohr, 
the New York Times Saigon bureau chief, obtained Vann’s own 
description of how he extracted some of his advisers under enemy 
fi re. The day Tan Canh was overrun Vann made eight trips into 
the area to extract American advisers who were escaping and evad-
ing (E&E) the enemy. His helicopter was hit by ground fi re on all 
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of his fi rst four trips. On his second trip, the chopper was shot up 
so badly it was unfl yable, and a replacement was sent to pick up 
the stranded passengers and crew. On his third trip, Vann’s OH-58 
was hit going in and going out. The OH-58 was built to carry four 
passengers, but most of that day it was carrying fi ve inside and 
another three hanging outside on the skids. As he landed at Dak 
To II to extract the advisers, his helicopter took more hits but was 
still fl yable. However, as the Americans were climbing aboard, 15 
to 20 panicked ARVN soldiers tried to get into—or at least hang 
on to—the helicopter. The pilot had his hands full trying to take 
off, so Vann, sitting in the left-hand seat, literally had to beat off 
the ARVNs with his rifl e butt. As the chopper lifted off, the heavy 
exterior weight on the right side tipped it until the rotor blades 
hit the ground. The chopper fl ipped over twice and broke into 
fi ve pieces. All passengers, including Vann, were injured to some 
degree. Those in the backseat were hurt the worst. The ARVNs 
who caused the crash then fl ed on foot, leaving Vann and another 
injured American to use their rifl es to fi ght off two squads of attack-
ing NVA. Ground fi re was so intense that Cobras had to be called in 
to suppress it before a slick (Huey) could land to extract them. The 
slick got in and took all the Americans out, but it received nine hits 
in the process.52
The two 42nd Regiment advisers at Tan Canh, Captain Dobbins 
and Captain Yonan, were in the meantime separated from the divi-
sion advisers and from each other. Captain Dobbins managed to 
E&E to a prearranged point, where he was picked up later. Captain 
Yonan sent his last radio transmission from the water tower where 
he was directing air support. Aerial searches for missing advisers 
failed to fi nd him, and he was reported as MIA. In a press confer-
ence in Pleiku on 24 April, the day Tan Canh fell, John Paul Vann 
said he thought four enemy tank battalions were involved in the 
attack and that “we were expecting armor to be employed for the 
last two months.”53
Although NVA often wildly exaggerated its own accomplish-
ments, the following enemy account of the attack on Tan Canh is 
generally accurate:
Amid thick smoke, the 66th Regiment and the 37th Battalion 
moved close to the fences of the enemy base. From its secret 
staging position at the Lower Po Co underwater bridge, the 
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7th Tank Company went into attack. Our nine T-54 tanks 
roared down Route 14 like fi erce tigers, zipped past the district 
capital of Dak To, and dashed toward Base 42 (Tan Canh).
At 0510 on 24 April, three color fl ares shot up in the sky, 
tracing dimly lit curves in the morning mist. From vari-
ous directions, our troops charged simultaneously. When 
the man in front fell, the one behind him took his place: 
in this manner, the 7th Battalion went into attack to seize 
a bridgehead. Our tanks violently fi red on both fl anks of 
the counterattacking enemy, creating favorable conditions 
for ground troops to charge toward the interior of the base. 
One after another, enemy bunkers were collapsed by our 
tank fi re, B-40 [RPG] rockets, and infantry hand held explo-
sives. Several gun nests that put up resistance were crushed 
by our tank tracks. 7th Battalion commander Pham Van 
Vuong—with a style of command marked by close contact 
with his men—was very active and courageous. Always pres-
ent at the fi ercest fi ghting to resourcefully and promptly 
resolve all diffi cult situations, he led his battalion and the 
tanks in quickly making a deep thrust into the enemy’s com-
mand center. Pham Van Vuong was later honored by the 
party and the government with the title of Hero of the Peo-
ple’s Armed Forces.54
The NVA’s offi cial history provides another Communist version:
On 24 April the 66th Infantry Regiment, with tank and artil-
lery support and in coordination with 1st Regiment, 2nd Divi-
sion, attacked the Dak To–Tan Canh defensive line, infl icting 
heavy casualties on the enemy’s 22nd Division (minus), 4th 
Tank Regiment, and two enemy artillery battalions. One 
enemy troop ele ment that broke and ran was caught in a loose 
net established by the 28th Infantry Regiment and captured 
en masse. Colonel Le Duc Dat, commander of the puppet 
22nd Division, died on the battlefi eld, and Deputy Division 
Commander Colonel Vi Van Binh and the entire headquar-
ters staff of the 22nd Division were captured.
An area of northern Kontum with a population of more 
than 25,000 people was liber ated. For the fi rst time in the 
history of the Central Highlands, our forces had destroyed 
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an enemy divisional base camp located behind a fortifi ed 
line of defenses.55
After dark Tuesday night, 25 April, reports of enemy tanks con-
tinued to fl ow into the II Corps headquarters—three tanks here, 
fi ve there, nine more in another place. A few were spotted west of 
Dak To II and others 28 kilometers south near Polei Kleng. The 
enemy was clearly on the move all night. Some of the NVA tanks 
and trucks were brazenly driving with their headlights on. Spectre 
and Stinger gunships and tactical air strikes were called in, and 
they destroyed dozens of NVA tanks, trucks, and guns. Spectre 
alone hit 30 to 50 trucks.56
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A Debacle at Dak To
Under the command of Platoon Leader Nguyen Nhan Trien, 
tank number 377 plunged into a group of enemy [ARVN] 
tanks and destroyed them one after another. [His] combat 
team set a record knocking out fi ve tanks in one battle in the 
Highlands theater.
—History of the Central Highlands People’s Armed Forces
in the Anti-U.S. War of Resistance for National Salvation
The ARVN base at Dak To II was fi ve kilometers due west of Tan 
Canh. There was a small airstrip on slightly higher ground to the 
north and a steep mountain north of the airfi eld. The 22nd ARVN 
Division’s 47th Regiment defended this base. Lieutenant Colonel 
Robert W. Brownlee Jr. was the regimental senior adviser. His dep-
uty was Captain Charles H. Carden. The regimental CP, most of 
the regiment’s 1st Battalion, and part of the 9th Airborne Battal-
ion were at Dak To II. C Company of the regiment’s 1st Battalion 
was well to the south, and the remainder of the airborne battalion 
was to the north–northeast. The 47th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion was 
north–northwest of Dak To II. Nine kilometers to the west–south-
west of Dak To II was FSB 6, manned by the 1st Company of the 
72nd Ranger Battalion and one platoon from the 1st Company, 
3rd Battalion, 42nd Regiment, the regiment whose headquarters 
and other battalions were at Tanh Canh. Seven kilometers almost 
due south of Dak To II was FSB 5, manned by the remainder of 
the 72nd Ranger Battalion and one company of the 3rd Battalion, 
42nd Regiment. The remainder of the 3rd Battalion was 13 road 
kilometers away at Dien Binh on Highway 14.
As at Tan Canh, this hodgepodge of intermixed units at widely 
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separated locations violated the principle of unity of command, 
and the many small outlying positions were more vulnerable than 
fewer, larger troop concentrations would be. However, there may 
have been other considerations for this confi guration. For example, 
after spending years at the same base, the troops there would know 
the territory, and something would be lost by moving them to con-
solidate units. The airborne battalion could be withdrawn at any 
time, so it was better to spread the paratroops among the various 
locations. Also, the airborne troops were more likely than the other 
ARVN soldiers to aggressively patrol out from their bases, and by 
doing so they might stiffen the other defenders’ spines. Neverthe-
less, the best that can be said for such a complex disposition of 
troops is that it might confuse the NVA intelligence offi cers trying 
to determine where the various ARVN units were located.1
Toward the end of March, there were several unsuccessful sap-
per attacks against Dak To II. In early April, the NVA established a 
position north of the airstrip with about 200 men, recoilless rifl es, 
and .51-caliber anti-aircraft guns—all dug in. They scored 11 hits 
on a VNAF chopper carrying Colonel Kaplan, Colonel Dat, and 
some of the Vietnamese staff. One .51-caliber round blew the door 
gunner’s head to pieces. The NVA was issuing a challenge with this 
move, but the 22nd Division’s response was ineffectual. For fi ve 
days, the 47th Regiment tried to drive out the NVA troops in this 
position by using three battalions of infantry, tanks, and 10,000 
rounds of artillery fi re. All that harassment fi nally wore down the 
NVA, so they packed up and left. The 47th should have wiped out 
that much smaller enemy force in a day. Kaplan considered the 
regimental commander, Colonel Minh, totally inept at using his 
14
512D a k To  II
C o lo n e l B ro w n e e  la s t se e n  h e re
K o n tu m  3 0 km
Ta n  C a n h
The battles at Tan Canh and Dak To II.
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available fi repower and called this encounter, “the worst example of 
leadership I have ever seen anyplace.” Both Dat and Kaplan thought 
Colonel Minh incompetent, and they fi nally managed to get him 
relieved a few days before the main NVA attack.2
A POW from the 400th NVA Sapper Regiment, who was cap-
tured on 6 April, said two of his regiment’s battalions, K3 and K37, 
were operating in the Tan Canh/Dak To area. He also revealed that 
four or fi ve of the 320th NVA Infantry Division’s battalions had suf-
fered so many losses from ground combat and Arc Lights that they 
were combat ineffective. He added, however, that a steady stream 
of replacements was arriving in the Communist B-3 Front, so those 
units would soon be back to full strength and combat ready.3
The Airborne Division was part of the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment’s strategic reserve. Perceiving a greater need somewhere 
else, the Joint General Staff shifted the Airborne Division’s light 
command post and one airborne brigade of three battalions out 
of II Corps on 20 April. To compensate for this troop loss, the 6th 
Ranger Group would be transferred from Hue to II Corps. The 
23rd ARVN Division assigned its own 53rd Regiment to assume 
responsibility for the paratroopers’ former area of operations.4
Our concerns about our own troops’ will to fi ght were increased by 
the reports about how ARVN was responding elsewhere. A 22 April 
Pacifi c Stars and Stripes article headlined “Scared S. Viets Refused to 
Fight at Hoai An—Adviser” quoted an extracted, wounded adviser 
who said the Communists were able to capture the district capital 
because both ARVN and the local militia men refused to fi ght the 
NVA and abandoned the town without a fi ght. The militia forces 
guarding the town “neatly stacked arms, changed into civilian 
clothes and joined the local population.” ARVN soldiers refused to 
leave the safety of their bunkers in their camps. Speaking from his 
hospital bed, the adviser said, “They were good at hunting down 
the Viet Cong but were scared of the North Vietnamese.”5
The enemy attacks on Tan Canh and Dak To II were planned 
as a one-two punch—two successive phases of one big attack—on 
Monday, 24 April. While attacking Tan Canh, the NVA continued to 
soften up Dak To II with heavy artillery and rocket bombardments. 
As soon as its assault on Tan Canh overwhelmed the ARVN defend-
ers and sent them reeling south, the NVA turned to Dak To II. The 
attacks by fi re increased as the enemy probed the base’s defenses.
It was the 2nd NVA Division supported by attached units that 
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attacked Tan Canh and then Dak To II. However, there is some 
discrepancy among the NVA, ARVN, and US accounts as to which 
NVA units participated in each attack. The units attacking Tan 
Canh were probably the 66th NVA Infantry Regiment, the 37th 
NVA Sapper Battalion, artillery from the 40th and 675th NVA 
Artillery Regiments, and the 7th Tank Company of the 297th NVA 
Tank Battalion. The units attacking Dak To II were probably the 
1st Regiment, 2nd NVA Division, reinforced with the 10th Sapper 
Battalion. They were supported by four tanks diverted from Tan 
Canh, which were probably from the 7th NVA Tank Company.6
In preparation for their attack on Dak To II, the Communists 
built a road 200 kilometers long over a high mountain and through 
dense forests to bring ammunition and supplies to their staging 
area. At night, they carried logs from two or three kilometers away 
to bury them close to the ARVN perimeter barbed wire, where they 
would be available for building underground shelters when the 
fi ghting broke out.7 If the 22nd Division troops had aggressively 
patrolled well beyond their own lines, they could have detected 
those preparations.
Captain Carden, the deputy senior adviser, saw two T-54s move 
onto the airfi eld. One positioned itself at the west end to cover the 
road from Ben Het, the Border Ranger Camp where Colonel Dat 
had foolishly sent most of his armor. The other T-54 stopped in 
the center of the airstrip, turned its 100-mm gun on the 47th Regi-
ment’s CP bunkers, and systematically destroyed all of them one by 
one. The defenders’ last two operating M-41 light tanks managed 
to move to a position on the fl ank of the T-54 and 800 meters away. 
They boldly fi red three rounds each at the T-54, but the M-41s’ 
76-mm guns were no match for the T-54’s heavy armor. The NVA 
tank quickly recovered, spun its turret around, and used its 100-mm 
main gun to destroy one M-41 with a fi rst-round hit and the other 
M-41 with a second-round hit.8 Cobra gunship pilot Pete Peterson 
spotted an enemy tank on the runway at Dak To and fi red one of 
his 2.75-inch rockets at it. He hit the tank, but the tank ignored it. 
Peterson tried again with a second rocket. Still no results. The type 
of rockets his Cobra was armed with could not knock out a T-54.9 
It was lucky that the TOW helicopters were on the way.
About this time, a relief column of 12 M-41 light tanks from 
the 2nd Armored Brigade and a platoon of infantry left Ben Het 
to counterattack the enemy at Dak To II. They crossed the bridge 
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at Dak Mot and were barely one kilometer along the fi ve-kilometer 
drive to Dak To II when they were ambushed. A large NVA force 
was waiting for them on the adjacent high ground. The enemy 
scattered the ARVN infantry and used recoilless rifl es, RPGs, and 
possibly Sagger missiles to destroy 9 of the 12 ARVN tanks. The 
3 surviving M-41s scurried back to Ben Het. Even if the M-41s 
had reached Dak To II, all 12 of them probably would have been 
destroyed by the two T-54s lying in wait on the airfi eld.10 This push 
was the last ARVN attempt to counterattack during the battles for 
Tan Canh and Dak To II.
Things were falling apart fast at Dak To II. After dealing with 
the evacuation of the advisers from Tan Canh, Lieutenant Colo-
nel Brownlee and Captain Carden had reported the crash of the 
Huey carrying six of them and then turned their attention to their 
own situation. Brownlee and Carden tried to locate their counter-
parts, but the regimental TOC was deserted, and none of 47th Reg-
iment’s offi cers could be found. Those offi cers apparently decided 
the battle was already lost and deserted their troops. Without offi -
cers to control them, the troops abandoned their posts and fl ed Dak 
To II en masse. Brownlee and Carden no longer had counterparts 
to advise, and the compound was rapidly being overrun. It was time 
for them to leave. They burned some documents, grabbed their 
radio and a few supplies, and went out over the defensive perimeter 
to the southeast.11
Moving cautiously through small arms and mortar fi re, the two 
American advisers managed to reach the Dak Poko River. There 
was a footbridge, but the river around it was already clogged with 
wounded and dead ARVN soldiers who had been mowed down by 
the NVA as they tried to cross the bridge. Brownlee and Carden 
moved about 700 meters west along the north bank of the river 
until they reached a spot where they could cross. It was a wide river, 
approximately 50 meters across, but they made it to the south side—
where they found the bank was about 20 meters high. Captain 
Carden climbed to the top and looked back at Colonel Brownlee, 
who motioned to him to continue going south. Brownlee was ill, 
had a cold, and needed to catch his breath. Carden went about 100 
meters beyond the river to get out of a mortar barrage and found 
Sergeant Cao Ky Chi, their interpreter. They called out to Colonel 
Brownlee and started to go back to search for him but were driven 
out of the area by intense small-arms fi re. Carden and Chi evaded 
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some NVA soldiers and made their way to FSB 5, where they were 
extracted with the troops manning that base. When Carden last 
saw him, Brownlee had his helmet and web equipment, a compass, 
a .45-caliber pistol, an M-16, and a Claymore mine bag full of M-16 
clips. Carden thought Brownlee had a good chance of surviving 
if he made it to the top of the riverbank. For the next few days, 
an air cavalry troop and several advisers, including Mr. Vann, fl ew 
over the entire area looking for Brownlee and Captain Kenneth 
J. Yonan, who had been last seen in the water tower at Tan Canh. 
They were never found.12
I knew Lieutenant Colonel Brownlee because we both had 
attended the adviser meetings in Qui Nhon. He was 42 —almost 
exactly a year older than I—and a large man. At An Khe, we heard 
how the two 47th Regiment advisers at Dak To II escaped over the 
defensive perimeter at the south side of the compound as enemy 
tanks smashed into the north side. Knowing Brownlee and know-
ing what had happened to him could happen to any regimental 
adviser made his loss more personal to me. We decided to get into 
better shape in case we had to make a similar escape and evasion. 
We did not want to need a rest stop if enemy soldiers were in hot 
pursuit. Every evening before dinner we did some calisthenics and 
then ran from the Green House to the end of the 6,200-foot run-
way built by the US Army engineers for the 1st Cavalry Division 
and back to the Green House. The main purpose of that two-and-
a-third-mile run was to help us survive if we ever needed to E&E, 
as Brownlee and Carden did—but we also worked up a good appe-
tite for dinner.
An NVA history described the attack on Dak To II:
Our artillery shifted its bombardment to the Dak To 2 Base. 
At 0800, when it had become obvious that Base 42 [Tan 
Canh] could be annihilated, the Front’s Command advo-
cated a quick and bold attack on the Dak To 2 Base.
The 1st Regiment (2nd NVA Division), reinforced with 
the 10th (Sapper) Battalion, carrying out the task of inter-
dicting the enemy between Dak To and Tan Canh, was 
ordered to strike directly at the den of the (ARVN) 47th Reg-
iment at the Dak To 2 Base. Four T-54 tanks and one self-
propelled 57-mm AA gun were also ordered to leave Base 42 
[Tan Canh] to join the fi ght. Under the command of Platoon 
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Leader Nguyen Nhan Trien, tank number 377 plunged into a 
group of enemy tanks and destroyed them one after another. 
Nguyen Nhan Trien’s combat team set a record knocking 
out fi ve tanks in one battle in the Highlands theater. Enemy 
resistance was swiftly crushed. Our troops were in complete 
control of the Dak To 2 Base.13
By 25 April, ARVN equipment losses already reported in II 
Corps included twenty-three 105-mm howitzers, seven 155-mm 
howitzers, and ten M-41 tanks. On the morning of 25 April, the 
NVA was preparing to tow away three American-made 105-mm 
howitzers abandoned by ARVN at Dak To II when a fl ight of F-4s 
used laser-guided 2,000-pound bombs to destroy them.14
The US Army’s artillery crews have a strong tradition of never 
abandoning or surrendering their guns in working order. If they 
cannot take their guns with them, they destroy them and all remain-
ing ammunition. The US advisers tried to instill this ethic in the 
ARVN artillery offi cers, many of whom were sent to the US Army’s 
Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where they should have 
learned it fi rsthand. Yet in numerous instances ARVN allowed the 
NVA to capture 105-mm and 155-mm artillery pieces in good work-
ing order and with large stocks of ammunition. The NVA formed 
new artillery units to use the captured American artillery pieces to 
fi re the captured American artillery rounds at us.15
The remnants of the 22nd Division fl ed Tan Canh and Dak To 
II in terror. A few ARVN stragglers reached Vo Dinh on Highway 
14. The 300 to 400 soldiers of the 47th Regiment who reached 
Ben Het were airlifted from there to Kontum City.16 In addition 
to the fl eeing ARVN soldiers trying to evade combat or capture, a 
growing stream of civilian refugees was moving south down High-
way 14 toward Kontum City. A FAC covering the area northeast of 
Kontum reported, “There were three busloads of refugees com-
ing down the road. The North Vietnamese opened up on them 
with RPGs—blowing hell out of those buses. People began fl ying 
all over.”17
When Tan Canh was overrun, one of the ARVN soldiers man-
ning a radio monitoring station escaped by taking a dead NVA sol-
dier’s uniform and wearing it over his own ARVN uniform. As he 
worked his way back toward Kontum, he saw enemy tanks on High-
way 14 run over the bodies of civilians killed by the enemy artillery. 
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When he got close to friendly lines, he removed the NVA uniform 
and made contact with an ARVN unit.18
After being involved in heavy combat in the Hue area, the 6th 
Ranger Group was transferred to II Corps to replace the Airborne 
Division troops who were pulled out on orders from Saigon. The 
Rangers initially went to FSB Bravo north of Vo Dinh on High-
way 14. Their senior adviser, Major James Givens, and his deputy, 
Captain William H. J. Vannie, followed the action on their radio as 
Tan Canh and Dak To II were overrun. They later watched as the 
remnants of the 22nd Division straggled past them in groups of 5 
to 15. The retreating ARVN soldiers were carrying very few small 
arms and no crew-served weapons. Many of them had discarded 
their web gear and steel helmets. They were completely disorga-
nized but displayed no panic. It was if they were out for a Sunday 
afternoon stroll.19
Immediately after the disasters at Tan Canh and Dak To II, 
Brigadier General Hill sent out three helicopters on search-and-
rescue missions to fi nd any advisers who were trying to evade cap-
ture. Lieutenant Colonel Stanislaus J. Fuesel, the II Corps artillery 
adviser, fl ew in one of those helicopters on three successive days. 
On 25 April, he rescued two US advisers fl eeing Tan Canh and later 
picked up seven ARVN soldiers. On the fi rst of these three days, 
John Paul Vann saw ARVN soldiers on one of the threatened FSBs 
still fi ring a 105-mm howitzer, and he ordered Fuesel to get the 
fi ring pin from that gun so it would not be immediately usable if 
the NVA captured it. There was a US artillery captain aboard Fue-
sel’s helicopter, so Fuesel set him down on the FSB with a radio. 
The captain managed to take the fi ring pin, but extracting him was 
diffi cult because panicked ARVN soldiers mobbed the helicopter 
when it landed and then hung on to the skids as it took off.20
Following the loss of Dak To II, Tan Canh, and so many FSBs, 
a meeting was held in the ARVN conference room at II Corps to 
assess the situation. Lieutenant General Dzu wanted to use B-52s 
to bomb all the lost bases and even friendly villages. He called for 
“bombs, bombs, bombs!”21 Mr. Vann attributed part of the 22nd 
Division’s collapse to “years of very incompetent leadership and 
the defeatist attitude, particularly of General Trien [ Major General 
Le Ngoc Trien], the former 22nd ARVN Division commander, who 
for two and a half years had made it one of his major objectives to 
convince all of his subordinates they could not defeat the NVA.”22
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ARVN FSBs 5 and 6 were the last remaining FSBs on Rocket 
Ridge. Lieutenant General Dzu now considered them untenable, 
and on 25 April he ordered them evacuated. The NVA soon occu-
pied them and could then control Highway 14 by fi re. They could 
also fi re on the remaining ARVN-held FSBs to the south to hasten 
ARVN withdrawal from those bases.23 There was no longer any sig-
nifi cant ARVN force between the NVA and Kontum.
With the NVA threat to the FSBs and Border Ranger camps 
northwest of Kontum growing daily, Mr. Vann called for volunteers 
to augment the adviser teams in the threatened area. Americans 
serving in safer areas volunteered to go into isolated ARVN camps 
or FSBs and to stay there despite the danger because they knew that 
if the base were overrun, John Paul Vann would rescue them. They 
had that much confi dence in him.24
Captain John E. “Jed” Peters was an artillery adviser in Binh 
Dinh Province when he volunteered to go as an adviser to the 72nd 
Border Ranger Battalion on FSB 5. The other American on FSB 
5 was First Lieutenant James “Mack” Cloninger, who had been 
an adviser in Binh Dinh Province when he volunteered in Febru-
ary to go to the Highlands, where the action was. About 260 men 
from a variety of ethnic groups were on FSB 5. One entire com-
pany consisted of Khmer soldiers. Peters arrived in early April. 
Although the base never faced an NVA ground assault, it was sub-
jected to sporadic artillery and rocket fi re. With only one PRC-25 
radio and tenuous contact with higher headquarters or aircraft, 
Peters put in air strikes and directed AC-130 gunships against the 
NVA. However, the ARVN artillery never fi red a shot all the time 
he was there—probably because they did not have forward observers 
deployed who could identify targets and adjust fi re.
FSB 5 was a good defensive position because the slopes on all 
sides were so steep that an infantry assault against it would be espe-
cially diffi cult. However, it was not an easy place to resupply. It was 
dangerous to fl y into, out of, or even over because the NVA sur-
rounded it with anti-aircraft weapons. This FSB could probably 
hold out as long as its ammo, food, and water held out, but if the 
NVA could cut it off and prevent resupply for long enough, the 
troops there would eventually be lost. When the order came to evac-
uate FSB 5, a chopper came for Peters, Cloninger, and some of the 
Yards. The others walked out.25
Although there was no time pressure, the FSB evacuation was 
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not well organized or methodical. Captain Peters was ordered to 
take the breechblocks from the six 105-mm artillery pieces on the 
FSB so the guns could not be fi red if the NVA captured them. He 
told the artillery battery commander what he had to do, and the 
ARVN offi cer agreed somewhat reluctantly to give him the breech-
blocks. Just as the battery commander was handing him a heavy 
canvas bag, a helicopter landed to extract Peters, and he had no 
chance to check the contents of the bag before they landed in 
Pleiku. He found six M-12 panoramic telescope sights in the bag, 
but no breechblocks. He fl ew back to FSB 5 and told the battery 
commander he must have the breechblocks, all six of them. The 
ARVN offi cers and troops were resentful that the Americans were 
departing without them, and some of the troops were panicked 
with fear that they would be captured by the NVA. However, the 
battery commander fi nally gave Peters the six breechblocks, and 
Peters took them to Kontum.26 Hooks (Chinooks) successfully 
extracted three of the six 105-mm howitzers on FSB 5, and late 
on the afternoon of 26 April US tactical air strikes destroyed the 
remaining three howitzers as well as two that had been abandoned 
to the enemy at Dak To District Town.27
As the South Vietnamese forces manning the FSBs on Rocket 
Ridge abandoned their positions or were driven off, in some cases 
they were ambushed near the base of the mountain. Most of the 
withdrawals were not well planned and executed, and after an 
ambush they degenerated into individuals or small groups trying 
to E&E the enemy. The paratroopers withdrew in better order, and 
most of them made it to Highway 14, where they were picked up 
and brought to Kontum.28
Thousands of Montagnard refugees fl ed southward from the 
fi ghting around Tan Canh and Dak To and made their way to Kon-
tum City.29 When the undisciplined 22nd ARVN Division soldiers 
fl eeing Tan Canh and Dak To II and the troops from the aban-
doned or overrun FSBs arrived in Kontum, they were collected in 
the MACV compound. Master Sergeant Stevens said they defecated 
in the sinks, threw feces on the walls, and generally trashed the 
place.30
After the fall of Tan Canh and Dak To II, the 22nd Division units 
in Kontum Province were pulled back to Pleiku and later moved to 
Binh Dinh Province. The division was reorganized in Binh Dinh 
with replacements, 12 new battalion commanders, all new regimen-
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tal commanders, and a new division commander, Colonel Phan 
Dinh Niem. Colonel Kaplan, his adviser, considered Niem a good 
offi cer. He was promoted to major general and remained in com-
mand of the 22nd Division until the end of the war.31
The loss of Tan Canh and Dak To II was an enormous setback 
for John Paul Vann.32 When the ARVN defenders at Tan Canh 
and then Dak To were overrun and routed by the enemy’s tank-led 
attacks, it seemed like a rerun of what had happened in I Corps. 
The II Corps headquarters “fell into a blue fl unk.” Morale sank, 
and a sense of defeatism set in. Then Captain Vaughan saw Mr. 
Vann quickly turn around the sense of impending doom. Vann 
assembled all the II Corps staff and advisers at the Daily Update 
briefi ng the next morning and “lit into them.” He told them in no 
uncertain terms that, far from being overrun by the enemy, they 
were going to use Arc Lights and tactical air strikes to destroy three 
North Vietnamese divisions. He was like a football coach talking 
tough to his losing team at halftime. Vaughan thought it was the 
greatest pep talk he had ever heard and an outstanding example of 
Vann’s strong personality and dynamic leadership.33
At An Khe, as we talked about the collapse of ARVN units in I 
Corps and the rout of the 22nd ARVN Division at Tan Canh and 
Dak To II, we wondered whether our own 44th Infantry Regiment 
troops would run or stand and fi ght if they were attacked by tanks. 
We were not encouraged by descriptions of how the 22nd Division 
troops threw down their weapons, abandoned their defensive posi-
tions, and fl ed in terror from the attacking Communist tanks. I 
knew exactly how my grandmother, the daughter of a Civil War sol-
dier, would describe their conduct: “They skedaddled!”
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A New Team
for the Defense
Anytime the wind is blowing from the north where B-52 
strikes are turning the terrain into moonscape, you can tell 
from the battlefi eld stench that the strikes are effective.
—John Paul Vann speaking about the B-52 strikes
around Kontum in May 1972
Tan Canh and Dak To II were now held by the enemy, and the 71st 
and 95th Border Ranger Defense Battalions at Ben Het, the 90th at 
Dak Seang, and the 88th at Dak Pek were suddenly behind enemy 
lines. They could be resupplied only by air.1
Brigadier General John G. Hill Jr., Brigadier General Wear’s 
replacement, had graduated from West Point in 1946 and had 
earned the Distinguished Service Cross and the Silver Star in Korea. 
He was an experienced fi ghter, and Vann would need a fi ghter in 
the battle ahead. Hill was also a qualifi ed army aviator. General 
Abrams told Hill he would be in command of the US troops, but 
Vann would be in charge of II Corps. Hill and Vann had known 
each other for years but were not close friends. They both had been 
on the staff of a Reserve Offi cers’ Training Corps summer camp, 
in the same US Army headquarters in Germany, and in III Corps 
as advisers to ARVN divisions in 1964–1965. At the beginning of 
his current tour, Hill had served as deputy commanding general 
of the 101st Airborne Division, and when the 101st went home, he 
had been assigned to close down the big American base at Cam 
Ranh Bay. Hill had that last job virtually running on autopilot by 
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the time Vann asked to have him assigned as his deputy. If Vann 
had asked Hill if he wanted to work for him, Hill would have said 
no. But he was not asked, and there was an important battle to be 
fought and won.2
Brigadier General Hill considered John Paul Vann abrasive and 
self-centered and saw him run roughshod over people. However, 
during the six weeks he spent with Vann he realized what a good 
fi ghting man he was. Vann never asked his subordinates to do any-
thing he would not do himself, and Hill never knew any offi cer 
who got so much loyalty from his troops. Hill had more military 
experience than Vann but could not equal Vann’s infl uence with 
the Vietnamese. Vann was the one American who came, stayed for 
a decade, and showed the Vietnamese he cared. This feeling and 
his good rapport with the Vietnamese enabled him to look them in 
the eye and say things like, “You really screwed that one up!”3
Hill arrived in Pleiku the day after Tan Canh and Dak To II fell. 
Vann, using his own helicopter, took his new deputy on a guided 
tour of the battlefi eld but gave him no specifi c instructions. During 
that initial tour and later, there was never any question about their 
ability to hold Kontum. Hill knew he could not inspire the Viet-
namese the way Vann did, but he could get the battle organized. 
He moved quickly to accomplish three things. His fi rst priority was 
to get the fi re support organized and coordinated. His second pri-
ority was to cut the number of men in the DTOC. The G-3 and 
deputy senior adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Bricker, was a key 
man, and Hill considered him a “battlewise guy.” However, there 
were so many excess men in the DTOC that it was diffi cult for the 
essential staff members and their advisers to get at their own maps 
to do their jobs. He cleared the unnecessary staff out of the DTOC. 
Third and most urgent, Hill needed to develop a system to control 
all the aircraft already fi lling the airspace above Kontum.4
The US Army’s Cobra gunships were providing fi re support; US 
Army Hooks were transporting supplies into Kontum and taking 
refugees out; and slicks were providing C&C ships and tactical air-
lift for ARVN troops. The USAF FACs were in the air controlling air 
strikes by USAF, US Navy, and US Marine Corps fi ghter-bombers.
USAF AC-130 Spectre gunships were attacking targets, and USAF 
C-130s were landing with supplies. VNAF C-123s were landing 
with supplies and taking out refugees; VNAF A-1s were making 
tactical air strikes; and VNAF fi xed-wing “Spooky” gunships were 
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attacking targets. ARVN L-19s were fl ying overhead to direct artil-
lery fi re. The sky was already crowded, and Brigadier General Hill 
knew it would get worse when the battle for Kontum started. He set 
up an “air boss,” usually a lieutenant colonel or major, who would 
fl y overhead in an OH-58 to serve as the “traffi c cop” for all army, 
USAF, and VNAF aircraft coming into the area. Hill asked for and 
got Colonel John A. Todd, deputy commander of the 1st Aviation 
Brigade, to organize the US air cavalry and other US Army air 
assets. At the height of the Battle of Kontum, as many as 250 tac-
tical air strikes and 50 B-52 strikes were made in one day, so Hill 
asked the USAF to provide an offi cer to help coordinate them, and 
he eventually obtained the services of Colonel Donald B. Swenholt, 
whom he considered an especially good offi cer.5
Vann and Hill also thinned out the US presence in the High-
lands. The third-echelon aircraft maintenance was moved from 
Pleiku to Cam Ranh Bay. In a worse-case scenario, if Kontum 
was lost and the remaining ARVN troops and their advisers were 
defending Ban Me Thuot, at least they would still have helicopter 
maintenance available outside the battle area.6 Brigadier General 
Hill’s attitude toward aircraft maintenance was, “If the pilot breaks 
it today, I want the maintenance offi cer to fi x it tonight so the pilot 
can break it again tomorrow.”7 Company D (a rifl e company) from 
the US Army’s 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, was placed under the 
operational control of the 17th Aviation Group to provide an imme-
diate reaction force to defend the Pleiku area.8
There was never a strong bond or even a smooth and effective 
working relationship between Colonel Ly Tong Ba and his adviser. 
Colonel Keller did not hesitate to criticize Ba in public, which cre-
ated ill will between them. Mr. Vann considered replacing Ba, but 
Brigadier General Hill pointed out that the 23rd Division com-
mander had not been given an adequate chance to prove himself 
and that the possible replacements, including the other ARVN col-
onels still in Kontum, might not be any better. Hill thought the air-
borne commander especially was all talk and no fi ght. However, he 
told Vann that Keller had to go, and Vann agreed.9
After relieving Colonel Keller—and with a major battle about 
to start—Mr. Vann needed to fi nd a replacement fast. Colonel R. 
M. Rhotenberry was scheduled to replace Keller at the end of the 
summer. However, when Vann asked to have him sent to Vietnam 
immediately, he learned that Rhotenberry was recovering from a 
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medical problem and could not come for a month or two. As an 
interim replacement for Keller, Vann selected Colonel John O. 
Truby, the senior military adviser for Civil Operations and Revo-
lutionary Development Support (CORDS) in II Corps. Truby was 
stationed in Nha Trang, where he served under Thomas Barnes, 
a State Department civilian who was in charge of CORDS in the 
corps area. As Barnes’s military deputy, Colonel Truby had trav-
eled all over II Corps, so he knew all the higher-ranking ARVN 
offi cers and their counterparts and was abreast of the current mili-
tary situation. He also knew the territory. Truby had come to Viet-
nam in 1962 as part of the fi rst large cohort of advisers ordered 
there on short notice by President John F. Kennedy. During that 
one-year tour, he had been the G-3 operations adviser at II Corps, 
so he was familiar with the II Corps area. Truby also knew what 
the NVA was trying to do and understood Vann’s strategy. Vann 
needed Truby in his CORDS assignment, but he needed him more 
urgently in Kontum.10
John Paul Vann notifi ed Colonel Truby about his new assign-
ment and personally fl ew to Nha Trang to pick him up. During 
their fl ight into Kontum, Vann outlined the existing problems and 
gave Truby his mission. His fi rst priority was to keep the airfi eld 
open. With the highways interdicted by the NVA, the airfi eld was 
going to be Kontum’s lifeline. Vann insisted the B-52 strike plan-
ning must be done by the Americans alone and that the map show-
ing where those strikes were planned must be kept covered and not 
shown to anyone else. He also wanted the other US air assets tightly 
controlled because they gave him leverage with the Vietnamese. 
One of the things Vann wanted to improve was information shar-
ing with the ARVN staff, and he knew the status of Arc Lights was 
good trading material to get better information and coordination 
from the ARVN offi cers. Truby also understood that it was neces-
sary for him to establish a good working relationship with Colonel 
Ba.11
Colonel Truby arrived in Kontum on 28 April and found the 
situation chaotic. As was the case with most ARVN divisions, from 
the time the 23rd Division’s regiments had been formed, they had 
been deployed independently to cover wide areas of the division’s 
area of operations. They had never been assembled so that all the 
regiments and support units would operate together as a complete 
division. And of course they had never conducted a division-size 
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perimeter defense. A different problem for Truby was the large 
number of US Army NCOs who were the remnants of logistical 
units with no further mission in Kontum. The NCOs wanted to 
stay, but they all had logistics rather than combat arms experience. 
To retrain and organize them would take too long, so Truby sent 
them all to Pleiku. Colonel Truby inherited a good adviser staff 
in Kontum. They were effi cient and reliable. His deputy and G-3 
adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Bricker, was a mainstay who helped 
him a great deal. Bricker knew Vann and spent time encouraging 
him because Vann was edgy about how things were going.12
Colonel Truby’s selection as the division’s adviser at this criti-
cal time was fortunate for another reason. When he was selected 
to attend the Command and General Staff Course at Fort Leav-
enworth, Kansas, in 1956, he had been transferred there several 
months before his classes started. Truby’s interim assignment was 
to write an academic exercise to teach how an infantry division 
should conduct a perimeter defense. Now, with the chips down and 
the stakes high in Kontum, he would have a chance to put that 
knowledge to good use.13
To start, Colonel Truby invited his South Vietnamese counter-
part to walk the entire perimeter with him. They talked about coor-
dinating the limiting points between units and how important it 
was to be certain adjacent units were tied in to form a tight perim-
eter so the enemy could not penetrate between them. Truby also 
emphasized the need to have the defensive fi re coordinated to 
make it mutually supporting. Colonel Ba understood all this. The 
troops’ foxholes were only 6 to 12 inches deep, so Truby explained 
why they should dig deeper to make their foxholes 4 to 5 feet 
deep so they could let a tank roll over them and then pop up to 
hit it from behind. As Ba visited his soldiers’ positions, he would 
explain this on the spot to them while their offi cers took notes. 
Colonel Truby had a positive feeling about Colonel Ba and liked 
him. He thought that he was a good commander and that together 
“they could pull it off.” Ba knew his soldiers lived in terrible con-
ditions—constantly out in the fi eld, always dog tired, and with only 
ten days’ leave every year. Ban Me Thuot, the home of the 23rd 
Division, where most of the soldiers’ families lived, was 250 kilo-
meters south of Kontum on Highway 14. Seeing their families so 
seldom was bad for morale, so Ba emphasized the importance of 
winning the coming battle.14
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Troops, ammunition, and supplies transported by truck from 
Qui Nhon farther down on the coast traveled 180 kilometers up 
Highway 19 to Pleiku, and those going on to Kontum traveled 
another 45 kilometers north on Highway 14 to Kontum. Much of 
this 225-kilometer route was steep and winding, and all of it was 
vulnerable to road mines and enemy ambushes. Before the NVA 
invasion started, the population of Kontum had been about 25,000, 
but tens of thousands of refugees passed through the city during 
the Easter Offensive. The Communists still blocked Highway 14 
between Pleiku and Kontum, so the only way to resupply the city or 
evacuate refugees was by air. Anti-aircraft fi re threatened the trans-
ports fl ying in and out of Kontum, and enemy artillery and rockets 
hitting the airfi eld made the transports’ ground time hazardous. 
The 374th Tactical Airlift Wing stationed in Taiwan maintained 24 
C-130Es at Tan Son Nhut for missions in Vietnam and Thailand.15 
Starting in late April, 15 C-130s landed at Kontum every day: 7 
carried ammunition, 3 brought fuel, and 5 were loaded with rice. 
VNAF also made 15 landings a day.16 On 24 April, the C-130 blad-
der birds of the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing brought 24,000 gallons 
of fuel into Kontum.17
Dien Binh, a village eight road miles southeast of Tan Canh 
on Highway 14, was the ARVN outpost to which a few of the 22nd 
ARVN Division’s artillery pieces had been sent just before Tan 
Canh fell. ARVN airborne troops occupied the base there until 26 
April, when they abruptly withdrew without a fi ght. The 141st NVA 
Infantry Regiment promptly occupied it.18
Even while the NVA was still consolidating its gains at Tan Canh 
and Dak To II as well as along Rocket Ridge and Highway 14, it was 
moving more artillery into position around Kontum for its attack 
on the city. Kontum airfi eld was under direct observation by NVA 
artillery forward observers, and various NVA weapons were regis-
tered on potential targets in and around the city, so fl ying in and 
out of Kontum was a risky mission.
On 26 April, Lieutenant Colonel Reed C. Mulkey fl ew a 374th 
Tactical Airlift Wing C-130, number 865, into Kontum. Here is 
what happened at the airfi eld, according to Mulkey:
We descended through the clouds and picked up the fi eld 
and landed. After I rolled out, [I] turned around on the run-
way to taxi back to the refueling pits. When we were about 
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halfway down the runway, a rocket exploded a thousand feet 
ahead of us. The tower called and told us the fi eld was under 
attack and to get the hell out of there. There was not suf-
fi cient runway in front of us to even start to make a take 
off. Kontum is 2,000 feet above sea level, and it was a good 
90 degrees outside, and my takeoff roll was 3,200 feet. The 
runway there is only 3,600 feet long. So I taxied back to the 
end and started my turn around to take off when we felt a 
bump. At this point, things start to run together.
The tower told us we had been hit and to abandon the air-
plane and run for the bunker straight ahead of us. I applied 
full power and started my takeoff roll. But number three 
engine, instead of going to full power, was dying. The engi-
neer said we couldn’t get off the ground on three engines. I 
knew that. I headed the airplane off the runway, across a 
taxiway, and onto an apron. I feathered all four engines, the 
engineer cut the battery, and within fi fteen seconds (or fi f-
teen years) the entire crew was out of the airplane and run-
ning for the bunkers that were at the side of the parking 
apron.19
The army picked them up later, and Mulkey called his unit on 
the high-frequency radio in the airfi eld tower. The additional 200 
feet of hose needed to offl oad the fuel was brought in on an army 
CH-47. Mulkey, the loadmaster, the engineer, and two refueling 
specialists made the hose connections and offl oaded the fuel. They 
were under sporadic mortar fi re during the entire process, and the 
fi ve of them were awarded the Bronze Star with “V” device (for 
valor) for that action.20
The crew fl ew out on another aircraft, and a replacement 
engine and maintenance crew were fl own in two days later. The 
rocket attacks continued while the repair was under way, and a 
VNAF C-123 parked nearby was hit and caught fi re. The USAF 
maintenance crew put out the fi re and moved the C-123 a safe dis-
tance away from their own aircraft. Five days later the new engine 
was installed in number 865, and it was ready to fl y again. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Mulkey and a volunteer crew, including loadmas-
ter Richard “Rick” Ivars, were fl own into Kontum from Tan Son 
Nhut to take back the repaired aircraft. However, the new engine 
would not start. Artillery and mortar fi re started falling on the air-
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fi eld again. Rather than risk both the aircraft and the crew on the 
ground, Mulkey feathered that prop, taxied out, and took off on 
three engines. They made it out of Kontum and landed in Pleiku. 
It was a long time before this C-130 fl ew again. All four engines and 
both wings had to be replaced.21
There was one piece of good news. The ROK headquarters 
reported that An Khe Pass was fi nally cleared of the enemy, and 
Highway 19 was opened to traffi c on the morning of 26 April.22
In a speech to the American people on the evening of 26 April, 
President Nixon said,
Let us look at what the stakes are—not just for South Viet-
nam, but for the United States and for the cause of peace 
in the world. lf one country, armed with the most modem 
weapons by major powers, can invade another nation and 
succeed in conquering it, other countries will be encouraged 
to do exactly the same thing—in the Mideast, in Europe, 
and in other international danger spots. If the Communists 
win militarily in Vietnam, the risk of war in other parts of 
the world would be enormously increased. But if, on the 
other hand, Communist aggression fails in Vietnam, it will 
be discouraged elsewhere, and the chance for peace will be 
increased. We are not trying to conquer North Vietnam or 
any other country in this world. We want no territory. We 
seek no bases. We have offered the most generous peace 
terms: peace with honor for both sides, with South Vietnam 
and North Vietnam each respecting the other’s indepen-
dence. But we will not be defeated. And we will never sur-
render our friends to Communist aggression.23
Newspapers and magazines were now publishing war maps with 
big enemy attack arrows pointed at Kontum. On 26 April, during 
my R&R in Hong Kong, the English-language newspaper China 
Mail reported under a banner headline on the front-page:
VIETNAM CRISIS—U.S. QUITS KEY CITY. American 
Army chiefs in the South Vietnamese town of Kontum have 
begun destroying secret documents as Communist forces 
close in. The Americans are preparing to evacuate Kontum 
and other bases in the Central Highlands.
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Colonel Ba was having diffi culty taking command of the defense 
of Kontum and getting it organized. The 53rd ARVN Regiment 
was the only unit from his own division and the only unit in Kon-
tum whose commander would take orders from him. The 2nd Air-
borne Brigade, the 2nd and 6th Ranger Groups, and the Kontum 
Province RFs and PFs were ostensibly available for the defense of 
Kontum City, but the independent airborne and Ranger units had 
their own chain of command, and most of their superiors were not 
even in Kontum. The province chief, Colonel Long, continually 
tried to undermine Ba, and the commanders of the other nondi-
visional units would not cooperate with him or even attend vital 
planning meetings.24 If Colonel Ba was going to defend Kontum 
successfully, he needed subordinates who would follow his orders.
The 6th Ranger Group was involved in heavy fi ghting in Hue 
before it was transferred to II Corps to replace the airborne troops 
departing on orders from Saigon. When the 6th arrived on 24 
April, its CP as well as the 34th and 35th Battalions were posi-
tioned on FSB Lam Son, blocking Highway 14 north of Kontum. 
(The American name for Lam Son was probably “Lima.”) They 
received sporadic enemy artillery and rocket fi re over the next two 
days but sustained only light casualties. Nevertheless, on 27 April 
the group commander, Lieutenant Colonel De, used VNAF Hueys 
to move his CP south to FSB November four kilometers northwest 
of Kontum City. He left the two battalions—a major part of the 
group—to defend Lam Son. For a while after the CP moved, De 
had no contact with the troops he had left behind. The NVA con-
tinued to attack Lam Son by fi re and with ground probes. During 
an attack on 1 May, the crews of four defending M-41s abandoned 
their tanks and fl ed. The NVA promptly appropriated those vehi-
cles, but VNAF tactical air strikes and USAF Stinger gunships 
destroyed them. The 6th Group commander then pulled out his 
two battalions. The artillery crew, with no infantry or armor left to 
defend them on this FSB, were forced to join the withdrawal. The 
NVA quickly occupied Lam Son. On 4 May, Lieutenant General 
Dzu relieved the group commander for disobedience and disre-
garding orders.25
After the loss of FSB Lam Son, Lieutenant General Dzu revealed 
he planned to relieve Colonel Ba and replace him with a general 
because Ba was a colonel, and Dzu did not believe the colonels 
commanding the airborne, Ranger, and province forces would ever 
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take orders from another colonel. Mr. Vann interceded to retain Ba 
as division commander, but this decision did not settle the question 
of who would be in overall command of the diverse units defend-
ing Kontum.26 Vann wanted Dzu’s deputy, Brigadier General Tran 
Than Phong, for that assignment. However, Phong’s sister-in-law, 
the wife of the South Vietnamese prime minister, General Tran 
Thien Khiem, derailed the assignment. She considered Kontum 
too dangerous for her brother-in-law. This opening left Colonel Ly 
Tong Ba as the logical choice to be in overall command but also left 
unresolved the problem of achieving unity of command.
Mr. Vann and subsequently Lieutenant General Dzu became 
convinced that the best way to achieve unity of command in Kon-
tum and to ensure that all the unit commanders would follow Col-
onel Ba’s orders would be to replace the airborne brigade and the 
two Ranger groups with the 23rd Division’s own 44th and 45th 
Regiments. The exchange would not result in any net loss of fi ght-
ing strength. The 45th Regiment was ordered to move by convoy 
up Highway 14 from Pleiku to replace the 6th Ranger Group. The 
44th Regiment at An Khe would be moved to Kontum by either 
vehicle or airlift.27 The 44th’s performance during the fi ghting in 
An Khe Pass had earned some well-deserved praise, and Mr. Vann 
said he told General Abrams that the 44th Regiment was the best 
regiment in II Corps.28 After only a few months as the 44th’s adviser, 
I could not claim much credit for that good reputation. The credit 
belonged to the Americans who had preceded me as advisers to the 
44th and especially to Lieutenant Colonel Tran Quang Tien, an 
excellent offi cer who concentrated on fi ghting the war.29
General Cao Van Vien confi rmed the importance of placing 
Brigadier General Ba in overall command in Kontum and of replac-
ing the Ranger and airborne troops with Ba’s own regiments: “The 
deployment of the 23d Division Headquarters to Kontum City and 
the replacement of the division commander was [sic] accomplished 
at the right moment. But the defense of Kontum could have fal-
tered if the 23d Division organic forces had not replaced the hetero-
geneous defense units in time. This gave the division commander 
unity of command, absolute discipline authority, and morale cohe-
siveness which were the very ele ments of success at Kontum.”30
When Colonel Ba assumed command of all ARVN forces in 
Kontum Province, he repositioned some units. The 22nd Ranger 
Battalion was sent to Polei Kleng to reinforce the Border Ranger 
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battalion there. Blocking positions manned by four battalions of 
rangers were established at Vo Dinh and farther south along the 
Dak Poko River. A fi nal blocking position was manned by the 2nd 
ARVN Ranger Group at FSB November on Highway 14, four kilo-
meters in front of Kontum’s main defensive line. The 53rd Regi-
ment, reinforced by more Rangers, was responsible for Kontum 
City. Four 155-mm and forty-four 105-mm howitzers would provide 
fi re support for the city’s defense. Vann received priority on Arc 
Lights and used some to pound the abandoned bases on Rocket 
Ridge. However, that bombing campaign was somewhat hampered 
by the streams of refugees headed south, the 22nd Division sol-
diers still straggling toward Kontum, and the fact that some advis-
ers were MIA. To avoid endangering those groups with Arc Lights 
but at the same time to hit identifi ed NVA targets, more tactical air 
strikes by fi ghter-bombers were used. There were 180 tactical air 
strikes over the three days from 24 April to 26 April.31
With the entire 23rd ARVN Division assembling in Kontum 
and its commander, Colonel Ba, in overall command of the city’s 
defense, it was necessary to send the division’s support elements 
plus more staff offi cers, advisers, and equipment from division 
headquarters in Ban Me Thuot to establish a forward CP in Kon-
tum. Most of the 23rd Division advisers traveled from Ban Me 
Thuot to Pleiku in an ARVN military convoy and were then air-
lifted into Kontum around the third week in April. However, some 
23rd Division headquarters elements traveling by vehicle up High-
way 14 from Pleiku to Kontum on 22 April were ambushed. The 
resulting loss of personnel and equipment made it diffi cult to get 
the DTOC in Kontum fully operational as soon as possible.32
Doctor (Captain) Giap Phuc Hai, who took command of the 
ARVN 230th Medical Company in Ban Me Thuot in March 1972, 
described his experience:
Around 23 April, elements of the 23rd Division moved north 
on QL 14 to Kontum. At 2:00 P.M. my company was cut off 
from the main convoy as we were ambushed [and] shelled 
and could not move forward because of destroyed trucks 
all over the road. Our company lost an ambulance carrying 
medical supplies along with the company typewriter and 
seal. It was hit by a direct 75-mm shell. My Jeep also was hit 
with shrapnel and 30-mm bullets. But it was drivable. My 
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driver had to change a front tire. Other ambulance drivers 
had to do the same to their trucks under intense shelling 
coming from Chu Pao pass. It was terribly hot and at times 
wet by shower. Incredibly, there was no air cover with the 
exception of an L-19 circling above.
I had a PRC-25 radio, but I could not communicate with 
my boss. Then I heard a voice asking to talk to the ground 
commanding offi cer. There was no answer after repeat 
inquiries. I then picked up the handle and identifi ed myself 
in Vietnamese as Delta Hotel (Doctor Hai). I did not know 
who was up in the sky, but he asked me to lead the troops 
back to Pleiku. The time was around 5:00 P.M. As we made 
the U-turn, I ordered all my drivers and medics to collect 
all the wounded along the road. At the same time I gave 
the hand signal to “follow me” to a very long convoy of Sig-
nals, Artillery, Engineers, MP [military police], and other 
support units. I took all the wounded to the Military Hospi-
tal in Pleiku. There I asked my friend, pharmacist Lieuten-
ant Nguyen Tien Hoai, the CO [commanding offi cer] of the 
722nd Pharmaco-Medical Supply Depot Annex, to allow the 
23rd Medical Battalion (minus our CO) to bivouac inside his 
base for the night. Later that night, I was able to communi-
cate with my boss, who safely made it to Kontum with his 
driver. He ordered me to take the next morning helicopter 
to Kontum.
The 2nd Field Hospital was completely empty, its staff 
gone. The next day, we moved to an old US Special Force 
camp (B5). I was assigned a very small, completely detached 
two-room “house” next to the tents of the 23rd Recon Co. 
Then, as the road was cleared, the troops came up, and we 
were able to build an underground bunker, with a “roof 
able to sustain 122-mm rockets” (according to my CO, also a 
self-proclaimed bunker expert from his days with the Viet-
namese airborne). As we anticipated lots of casualties, we 
asked the artillery people to give us the wooden boxes to 
build “fi eld hospital beds,” and we right away befriended the 
Vietnamese air force liaison offi cer (which later on brought 
big dividends). Our company had the triage section, the 
ambulance section, the fi eld hospital unit, and other sup-
port personnel. We had plenty of medical supplies, rice, 
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water, and electricity from the Signal unit generator. My CO 
collected empty 155 shell canisters, and had them fi lled with 
water (just in case). We only temporarily were going to run 
out of gasoline once, but we received the gasoline “buffalo” 
container right away. We never ran out of blood, medications, 
IVs, or antibiotics. Staff at Ban Me Thuot base regularly sent 
me newspaper[s], coffee, and my salary whenever I asked. I 
also could call my wife directly from my bunker at night.
Civilians were fl own out by Chinook helicopters. It was a 
mess at the city soccer fi eld. I met the province public-health 
chief; he was the only civilian doctor in town, and as a brother 
and senior medical graduate, he was very kind to me. He 
offered us all the chicken[s] we could eat. But we could not 
take him up on his offer as we did not have the means to cook 
them.33
The fi rst night in Kontum the leaders on the perimeter had 
trouble keeping their troops awake and ready to fi ght at night. 
When a Claymore antipersonnel mine set out for security was 
tripped in the dark, everyone assumed it was an enemy attack and 
fi red toward it. The next morning they found the dead “enemy” 
was an Indo-Chinese tiger so big it took four men to carry it away 
on a pole. There were no more problems with the troops falling 
asleep when they were supposed to be on alert.34
The DTOC in Kontum was set up in a basement with a row of 
55-gallon drums fi lled with dirt and covered with sand bags as a 
“roof.” Despite all that overhead protection, when a 130-mm shell 
scored a direct hit on the DTOC, it killed the ARVN operations 
sergeant. The DTOC was then moved to a better basement closer to 
the northern front lines in the old 5th Special Forces Group B-24 
Compound, where Highway 14 turned to the northwest. This site 
was about halfway between the vital airfi eld on the north side of 
town and the northwest defensive perimeter and thus closer to the 
NVA’s likely avenues of approach. It would be closer to where the 
action was going to be.35 To provide an offset to detonate any 130-
mm shells or 122-mm rockets before they penetrated into the base-
ment, timber and sandbags were placed on top of empty 55-gallon 
drums on the fi rst fl oor of the building.36
As the NVA troops assembled to attack, they became a better 
target for air strikes. More than 3,400 American and VNAF sorties 
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were fl own against targets in II Corps during April. On 30 April, 
B-52s fl ew 28 Arc Light missions, more than were fl own on any 
previous day during the Vietnam War. Half of those missions hit 
targets around Kontum. The North’s infrastructure was also being 
bombed regularly. On 29 and 30 April, B-52s fl ew 700 missions over 
North Vietnam. By late April, US bombers were hitting targets in 
North and South Vietnam with 3,000 tons of munitions every day. 
That ordnance alone was costing at least $7 million a day.37
Colonel Stephen W. Bachinski, the Kontum Province senior 
adviser, summed up the local situation in his report for the period 
ending 30 April, noting that except for the Ben Het and Dak Sang 
(Seang) Border Ranger camps,
effective control was lost with all the hamlets and military 
installations from Tri Do/Vo Dinh to the north. . . . The 
road from Kontum City to Pleiku has been cut effectively 
by the 95B Regiment since the beginning of the month.
. . . Kontum City itself remains as an island in a NVA sea. 
Our present situation—as seen by the people—is one of mis-
ery, confusion, and pessimism; the poor performance by the 
22nd ARVN Regiment at Tan Canh did anything but spark 
confi dence; wild stories by the hundreds of stragglers from 
these units is causing a grave morale problem among the 
civilian population and the combined territorial and ARVN 
forces assigned to the defense of Kontum City.
The NVA forces were successful beyond their wildest 
dreams. They are now repositioning themselves for their 
main attack on Kontum City. Hopefully, B-52 strikes on tar-
gets developed by these few units who will stand and fi ght 
and our B/17 Cav will cut down the total size of the forces 
to be used by the enemy. No artillery or heavy mortars have 
been used on the city as yet[;] however, daily doses of rockets 
have been used to minimize the amount of air traffi c at our 
airfi eld.
Soldiers accompanying families are reluctant to do any-
thing until their families are evacuated from the city. . . . 
Civil servants charged with the handling of refugees . . . have 
been trying to get out themselves—and most have succeeded; 
the PDF (Popular Self-Defense Force) . . . has been halved 
due to departures; medical service has all but stopped, due 
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to the loss of doctors and staff personnel who left on chop-
pers earmarked for the wounded. . . . A prolonged period of 
siege may result in serious outbreaks of disease due to inade-
quate sanitation . . . among the refugee population, number-
ing now about 8,000 on the offi cial roll and an equal number 
being cared for by relatives or friends in the city.
Stories of VC atrocities continue to pour in from those 
Highland tribesmen who survived the long trek through 
the jungle from Dak To and points south: clergy murdered; 
village offi cials with throats slit; families of US employees 
killed and slogans posted over their homes; young boys and 
girls separated from their families and taken into the jungle; 
and refugees being held forcefully by the NVA in obvious 
ambush positions in order to avoid B-52 strikes. The situa-
tion in the city is critical but not hopeless. . . . The people 
are paying a heavy price for their government’s tolerance of 
inept commanders. . . . When we match the NVA in motiva-
tion, discipline, and leadership, the war will end. . . . Our 
severe losses in this province can be attributed to a failure of 
leadership at all levels—especially at the top.38
Some of the ARVN regimental and division commanders in I 
and II Corps personally collapsed under the NVA attacks. They 
either ran or simply gave up. In contrast, Colonel Ba said he would 
stay and do his best to defend Kontum.
Colonel Ba believed that going after the enemy in the jungle and 
fi ghting on ground the enemy had chosen and prepared was like 
going into another man’s house in the dark when the man is waiting 
for you with a gun. He wanted to let the enemy come to him. Then he 
could kill around 10 percent with tactical air strikes, another 10 per-
cent with artillery, and—if he could target them—another 30 percent 
with B-52 strikes. Colonel Ba told a reporter, “First we had to orga-
nize our defen sive posture completely. Now, we will move out and try 
to strike the enemy. We want to counterattack, get the enemy to come 
into our artillery fan and strike him before he comes to Kontum.”39
During my R&R in Hong Kong, I had bought a paperback copy 
of Barbara W. Tuchman’s new book Stillwell and the American Expe-
rience in China, 1911–1945. It would be my reading material during 
the trip back to An Khe. General Joseph W. Stillwell was so blunt, 
caustic, and critical that his nickname was “Vinegar Joe.” He spoke 
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fl uent Chinese and liked the Chinese people and China. However, 
during World War II he was extremely critical of his Chinese coun-
terpart, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the president of Nation-
alist China. In correspondence with his military superiors and 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Stillwell repeatedly complained 
there was no quid pro quo in the US relationship with China. The 
United States gave them vast amounts of cash, war materiel, and 
other aid but did not demand specifi c accomplishments from the 
Chinese in return. The same shortcoming existed in our relation-
ship with South Vietnam.
As far as I knew when I returned from R&R on 10 May, the 
44th Regiment was still at An Khe and would probably remain there 
indefi nitely. I caught a fl ight from Saigon to Pleiku and signed up for 
a fl ight to An Khe. Some USAF pilots in the operations building at 
Pleiku airfi eld were talking about a new ground-to-air heat-seeking
missile the enemy was using. They were justifi ably concerned but 
continuing to fl y their assigned missions. Just before dawn on the 
second day, I walked around outside to take a break from Stillwell 
and get some fresh air. Captain Diem, one of the company com-
manders in the 44th Regiment, walked up to me with a big grin. 
We shook hands, and I asked, “What are you doing here, Captain 
Diem?” He waved toward hundreds of ARVN troops sitting and lying 
on the ground nearby and said, “I go Kontum! Whole regiment go 
Kontum! You go Kontum, too!” So I was going to the embattled city 
currently featured in newspapers and magazines—the city with the 
big enemy attack arrows pointed at it. I cancelled my request for a 
fl ight to An Khe and arranged to fl y to Kontum with the 44th Regi-
ment troops waiting outside. My interpreter, Sergeant Hao, and my 
Jeep were there and would go to Kontum with me.
On the coast, II Corps was also being attacked where the 22nd 
ARVN Division’s two regiments were stationed in Binh Dinh Prov-
ince. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, I Corps commander, 
later described the situation there:
While the enemy was gaining ground in the Central High-
lands and preparing to push toward Kontum, in the coastal 
lowlands of Binh Dinh Province, the NVA 3d Division and 
VC local forces cut off Route QL-1 at Bong Son Pass and 
attacked the three isolated northern districts, Hoai An, Hoai 
Nhon and Tarn Quan. This forced the 40th and 41st Reg-
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iments of the 22nd ARVN Division to abandon their two 
major bases, Landing Zones English and Bong Son, and 
other strong points in the area. Enemy attacks then spread 
out rapidly northward along Route QL-1 and southwest-
ward along the Kirn Son River, engulfi ng the district towns 
of Tarn Quan and Hoai An in the process. In the face of 
the enemy’s momentum, all defenses in the area crumbled 
rapidly.40
After fi ve days of assaults, the Communists seized Quang Tri in 
I Corps on May Day. It was the fi rst provincial capital to fall to the 
enemy. NVA tanks were now 27 miles south of the DMZ and driv-
ing for the old imperial capital of Hue, only 24 miles farther south. 
In addition to the enemy’s rapid advances in the North and in the 
Central Highlands, they seized Loc Ninh and were besieging An 
Loc in the south.
Across South Vietnam, 350,000 refugees were on the move, 
mostly by road, desperately fl eeing the Communist onslaught. 
Civilians fl eeing Hue were offering $50 for the one-hour car trip to 
Danang. Some South Vietnamese offi cers were moving their own 
families and belongings south in well-polished Jeeps. An estimated 
10,000 people, including military men, were evacuated from Kon-
tum on the last two days of April.41
Kontum City was obviously the next major objective for the 
North Vietnamese invaders, and they would be counting on their 
tanks to achieve a swift and overwhelming victory. Terrifi ed ARVN 
troops had fl ed from Tan Canh, Dak To II, and some of the Cen-
tral Highlands FSBs when tanks attacked them, which did not bode 
well for Kontum. We needed something to tip the balance back in 
our favor.
The US Army ordered an experimental aerial antitank system 
deployed to Vietnam. At Fort Lewis, Washington, a team was eval-
uating the TOW antitank missile system: tube launched, optically 
tracked, and wire guided. The helicopter-mounted TOW system 
and its capabilities were described in detail in a March 1972 article 
published in the US Army Aviation Digest, so the Russians, Chinese, 
and North Vietnamese knew it existed and might be employed 
against Communist tanks in South Vietnam. The XM-26 TOW sys-
tem carried three 50-pound missiles in a launch pod on each side 
of a UH-1B helicopter. The copilot/gunner used an inertial guid-
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ance–stabilized telescope sight to acquire the target. After he fi red 
the missile, it appeared in the sight, and the gunner guided it by 
holding the crosshairs of the sight on the target until impact. Vis-
ibility had to be good enough for the gunner to acquire the target 
and keep it in sight until the missile hit. The two guidance wires 
were unreeled behind it in fl ight. Missiles were usually fi red from 
an altitude of about 3,000 feet and slant range of 3,000 feet from 
the target. A TOW missile could travel the 3,000 feet in less than 
fi ve seconds. In 1972, each missile cost $2,600, and each helicopter 
carried six missiles.42
Despite the testing already done, no American soldier had ever 
fi red a TOW missile from a helicopter.43 Sending the experimen-
tal TOWs to Vietnam would test this new weapons system against 
enemy tanks in combat—moving tanks that could shoot back and 
were often protected by heavy anti-aircraft fi re. This test would be 
the toughest anyone could devise. However, with NVA tanks charg-
ing across South Vietnam, there was an urgent need for an airborne 
weapons system capable of stopping tanks dead in their tracks.
The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team, Vietnam, arrived at Tan Son 
Nhut on 24 April. The two helicopters were reassembled; the TOW 
systems were mounted on them; and on 26 April they were sent 
to Long Binh, where they were placed under operational control 
of the 1st Aviation Brigade. As the team’s name implied, this was 
the fi rst time the US Army had deployed a TOW system mounted 
on aircraft in combat against enemy tanks. The team was assigned 
the radio call sign “Hawk’s Claw.” The army aviators received a 
cram course on the system, went through missile-tracking drills, 
and checked out cockpit procedures. Then each of them fi red two 
missiles from their helicopters. This was the fi rst time any of them 
had ever fi red a live TOW missile.
Tan Canh and Dak To II fell the day the team arrived in Viet-
nam, and enemy tanks were moving toward Kontum, so on 28 April 
the TOW Team fl ew north to be stationed in Pleiku. The II Corps 
area was chosen in part because enemy anti-aircraft fi re there was 
considered to be less intense and less accurate than in the I and III 
Corps areas. The TOW Team would have a better chance of surviv-
ing in II Corps. Also, it was obvious ARVN’s next big test would 
be the impending NVA attack against Kontum.44 Whether the city 
would hold or be overrun might depend on how many enemy tanks 
could be knocked out.
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The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team was fi rst employed in combat 
on 2 May. It destroyed four M-41 tanks, a 105-mm artillery piece, 
and a 2.5-ton truck—all American-made equipment that ARVN 
had abandoned to the enemy at FSB Lam Son (Lima) the previous 
day. When WO Carroll W. Lain knocked out the fi rst of those four 
M-41 tanks, he became the fi rst American soldier to fi re an Ameri-
can-made guided missile in combat.45
Aerial reconnaissance reported NVA troop and equipment 
movements from northwest to southeast on trails parallel to High-
way 14. Throughout late April and early May, all FSBs and out-
posts in the Highlands came under increasingly heavy attacks by 
fi re. The enemy moved closer to them and made probing attacks to 
test their defenses. Some isolated positions could be supplied only 
by parachute, and many of those bundles fell into enemy hands 
because VNAF fl ew too high for accurate delivery.
Except for Kontum City and a handful of isolated outposts, the 
Communists now controlled all of Kontum Province. Strong enemy 
forces controlled Highway 14 both north and south of Kontum 
City. The NVA also controlled the territory to the east and west of 
the city. Kontum was surrounded, and the enemy was going to hit 
it with everything he had.
In 1954, North Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap had 
achieved his greatest victory by surrounding the French forces at 
Dien Bien Phu, capturing the stronghold, and thus ending the 
French occupation of Vietnam. First, he had cut the French sup-
ply lines and surrounded Dien Bien Phu. Then he had blocked 
aerial resupply or reinforcement by pounding their airfi eld with 
artillery fi re from US 105-mm howitzers that had either been given 
to China during World War II or been captured by the Chinese in 
Korea. Giap’s troops had dug caves in the hillsides so his artillery 
pieces could be rolled out to fi re and then withdrawn into the caves 
to avoid French counter-battery fi re. All the while, his infantry had 
dug their trenches closer and closer to the French lines, slowly but 
surely tightening the noose around Dien Bien Phu. Giap was now 
using some of the same tactics—and tightening the noose around 
Kontum.
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Closing in on Kontum
The poor display of will to fi ght by the 22nd Division at Tan 
Canh is discouraging and makes the defense of Kontum City 
diffi cult to foretell. . . . In light of this there is no basis for 
confi dence that Hue or Kontum will be held.
—General Creighton W. Abrams
to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
After Tan Canh and the outposts fell, John Paul Vann thought his 
reputation and his career were on the line. He had to win in Kon-
tum or be sacked. That sort of pressure might have crushed a lesser 
man, but Vann rose to the challenge. It brought out his strengths as 
a commander, and he used his energy, drive, and personal involve-
ment to ensure that Kontum would not fall.
During daylight, when an Arc Light struck north of Kontum, 
the rising smoke and dust could be seen, the deep rumbling of 
the explosions could be heard, and the vibrations could be felt in 
the city. The bombs dropped by US and VNAF fi ghter-bombers 
were less spectacular, but when the F-4s came streaking in to drop 
napalm, the surging fi reballs and black smoke were impressive to 
watch. In Kontum City, a few of the remaining Honda owners rode 
out to the northern perimeter, and some advisers and reporters 
gathered on a veranda to watch the show while enjoying a cold 
beer. They were wise to enjoy it while they could.1
M-72 LAWs were issued to the 23rd Division’s units. Then sev-
eral old tank hulls were set up as targets in open areas so they could 
practice fi ring the M-72 and see the results on a tank’s armor. Pic-
tures from An Loc and Quang Tri showing ARVN soldiers beside 
the T-54 tanks they had knocked out with M-72s were used to con-
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vince our troops that a single ARVN soldier really could destroy 
one of the dreaded monsters.2 Colonel Ba also showed his troops 
some captured NVA soldiers to prove they were not supermen but 
just frightened teenagers.3
On 29 April, a high-level “troika” of American advisers was 
formed in Pleiku. They included John Paul Vann, the corps senior 
adviser; Brigadier General John G. Hill, Vann’s deputy; and Col-
onel John A. Todd, the deputy commander of the 1st Aviation 
Brigade. Todd’s inclusion acknowledged the important roll antici-
pated for US Army air assets. This group, in conjunction with the 
corps commander, Lieutenant General Ngo Dzu, would make the 
major decisions about defending the II Corps area.4 This arrange-
ment allowed Vann to spend more of his own time overseeing the 
use of Arc Lights and conferring with the ARVN offi cers.
Under the headline “Red Tanks, Troops Near Kontum,” Stars 
and Stripes reported from Kontum, “This city is in danger of extinc-
tion. North Vietnamese tanks and troops are drawing closer from 
the north and south. Many of the city’s 30,000 residents are pack-
ing to leave . . . as soon as the highway to Pleiku is opened.”5
Air reconnaissance in early May discovered new NVA supply 
dumps and pioneer roads north of Kontum in the vicinity of Vo 
Dinh.6 On the eve of the assault on Kontum, ARVN reported that 
the enemy forces closing in on Kontum consisted of the B-3 Front 
Headquarters with the 2nd and 320th Infantry Division headquar-
ters commanding a total of 8 infantry regiments with a total of 29 
infantry battalions, all supported by 2 tank battalions and an artil-
lery regiment with 13 artillery battalions—a total of 19,900 men.7 
President Thieu sent a letter to the ARVN Corps commanders 
directing them to hold Quang Tri, Hue, and Kontum at all cost and 
to clear the enemy from An Loc and Highway 13 by 2 May.8
Summarizing the situation for Secretary Laird, General Abrams 
said,
In MR2, the poor display of will to fi ght by the 22nd Divi-
sion at Tan Canh is discouraging and makes the defense of 
Kontum City diffi cult to foretell. . . . I must report that as 
the pressure has mounted and the battle has become bru-
tal, the senior military leadership has begun to bend and in 
some cases to break. In adversity it is losing its will and can-
not be depended on to take the measures necessary to stand 
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and fi ght. The known exceptions to this are General Phu, 
1st Division and General Truong, IV Corps commander. In 
light of this there is no basis for confi dence that Hue or Kon-
tum will be held.9
General Abrams also reported that the troop dispositions north-
west of Kontum were two Border Ranger battalions at Ben Het, 
one at Dak Pek, and one at Dak Seang. The other friendly forces in 
the area consisted of 6 Ranger battalions, 4 infantry battalions, 2 
airborne battalions, 48 tubes of artillery, and 18 tanks—all prepar-
ing to defend Kontum City. Abrams noted there was evidence of 
dissention among unit commanders “that may cause this sizeable 
combined force to cave-in in the early stages of any heavy enemy 
pressure.” He added, “Enemy staying power is his most effective 
battlefi eld characteristic. It is based fi rst on his complete disregard 
for the expenditure of resources, both men and materiel, and sec-
ond on discipline through fear, intimidation, and brutality. An 
enemy decision to attack carries an inherent acceptance that the 
forces involved may be expended totally.”10
In early May, General Abrams told Secretary of State Kissinger, 
“ARVN may have lost their will to fi ght and ‘the whole thing may 
be lost.’”11 About the same time, Nixon sent Kissinger a memoran-
dum emphasizing his own determination:
We have the power to destroy his war-making capacity. The 
only question is whether we have the will to use that power. 
What distinguishes me from Johnson is that I have the will in 
spades. If we now fail it will be because the bureaucrats and 
the bureaucracy and particularly those in the Defense Depart-
ment, who will of course be vigorously assisted by their allies 
in State, will fi nd ways to erode the strong, decisive action 
that I have indicated we are going to take. For once, I want 
the military and I want the NSC [National Security Council] 
staff to come up with some ideas on their own which will rec-
ommend action which is very strong, threatening, and effective.12
Increased bombing of the North would have to be done with 
air assets diverted from the South, though, and General Abrams 
resisted sending the bombers, his only US reserve, “away hunting 
rabbits while the backyard was fi lled with lions.”13 By 1 May, the 
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United States had withdrawn from Southeast Asia: 95 percent of 
its infantry and armor battalions, 97 percent of its artillery battal-
ions, and—important to those of us remaining in Vietnam—91 per-
cent of its attack aircraft squadrons.14
The Americans wanted to prevent ARVN commanders from 
abandoning their posts, at least on US aircraft. General Abrams 
encouraged the Vietnamese commanders to stand and fi ght by issu-
ing an order to all American commanders that said, “Effective imme-
diately no Vietnamese commander will be airlifted out of a unit 
defensive position by US fi xed-wing aircraft or helicopter unless 
such evacuation is directed personally by the RVNAF [Republic of 
Vietnam Armed Forces] corps commander. Inform your counter-
part.”15 Some South Vietnamese offi cers, who realized American 
support was the key to their survival, threatened to prevent forcibly 
any evacuation of the American advisers from Kontum.16
On 2 May, enemy mortar and artillery fi re on Kontum airfi eld 
damaged two C-130s.17 The same day a collision with a helicopter 
on the congested airfi eld took several feet off the end of a C-130’s 
wing. On 3 May, rockets damaged another bladder bird. Although 
Highway 14 from Pleiku was still closed, daylight fi xed-wing air-
craft landings at Kontum airfi eld were ended.18
According to an American newspaper report, by the end of May 
the US Command admitted to less than half-a-dozen aircraft lost 
to Strella missiles, but unoffi cial reports indicated many more had 
been destroyed. The South Vietnamese refused to discuss the sub-
ject. Most of the crewmen in planes hit by Strellas died instantly. 
One eyewitness said a Strella went right up the tailpipe of a heli-
copter and blew the aircraft to pieces. A US Army helicopter pilot 
said, “Once it gets on your tail, you’re through.” Two of the missiles 
were captured in I Corps and sent to experts for study. They said 
that the operator needed to hold a bead on the aircraft for seven 
and a half seconds before fi ring, that the missile traveled at 450 
miles an hour, and that it had an extraordinary turning capability 
so it could pursue an aircraft trying to dodge it.19
In a personal meeting with President Thieu, General Abrams 
listened to Thieu’s “big arrow” description of how the coming bat-
tle should be fought.
[Then I] described for him my conviction that the real prob-
lem for South Vietnam was the effectiveness of his fi eld 
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commanders. I described in some detail the ineffectiveness 
of individual commanders by name in northern MR1 [I 
Corps], the B-3 Front [II Corps] and MR3 [III Corps]. I told 
the president that it was my conviction that all that had been 
accomplished over the last four years was now at stake, and, 
at this stage, it was the effectiveness of his fi eld command-
ers that would determine the outcome—either winning all or 
losing all. At this point President Thieu talked to his execu-
tive and directed that all corps commanders be called to the 
palace today. President Thieu then continued, advancing the 
view that if Hue and Kontum held for four days they would 
have won the battle. I told the president that no one should 
think in any less terms than six weeks more of heavy, bloody 
fi ghting and maybe more. This is a battle to the death, the 
Communists have planned it that way and will not quit until 
they have been totally exhausted. It was a very candid meet-
ing, but at no time did President Thieu show either irrita-
tion, impatience, or disagreement.20
On 3 May, Mr. Vann reported to General Abrams, “Of the 24 bat-
talions assigned to the 22nd and 23rd Divisions and MR II Ranger 
Command, 10 are rated ineffective: This includes the complete 
40th and 42nd Regiments [of the 22nd Division in Binh Dinh]. 14 
are rated as marginal. Several battalions have less than 200 soldiers. 
ARVN has lost 54 artillery pieces and 30 tanks. . . . There is a severe 
shortage of major items of equipment.”21
MACV estimated enemy strength in South Vietnam at 236,000, 
with 80 percent of it in combat units. General Abrams summed up 
the fi ght and the importance of air power:
This government [of South Vietnam] would now have fallen, 
and this country would now be gone, and we wouldn’t be 
meeting here today, if it hadn’t been for the B-52s and the 
tac air. There’s absolutely no question about it. . . . What 
you’ve got here, in my opinion, is a go-for-broke thing by the 
North Vietnamese. And they’ve thrown everything they’ve 
got in it. . . . It’s just an all-out onslaught, and the losses on 
both sides—I mean, he’s losing tanks like he didn’t care about 
having any more, and people, and artillery, and equipment. 
The level of violence, and the level of brutality, in this whole 
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thing right now is [sic] on a scale not before achieved in the 
war in Vietnam.22
In another attempt to clear the Kontum Pass and reopen High-
way 14, the ARVN 45th Regiment moved north from Pleiku, and 
elements of the 2nd Ranger Group moved south from Kontum. H 
Troop of the 10th Air Cavalry Squadron provided reconnaissance 
and screening. On 5 May, both units got through the pass.23 How-
ever, the day after a government spokesman declared Highway 14 
south of Kontum open—after only one convoy had passed through 
from Pleiku to Kontum—the NVA closed it again. At the end of a 
day of heavy fi ghting, ARVN infantrymen were driven off Chu Pao 
Mountain, which dominates and thus controls the highway.24
A total of 350,000 South Vietnamese refugees fl ed their homes 
nationwide between the 30 March start of the Easter Offensive and 
1 May.25 Most of the refugees who arrived in Kontum said they 
had fl ed mainly to escape the American bombing rather than the 
NVA. One woman from Dak To said, “The Viet Cong come so the 
airplanes shoot and bomb and so we leave.” Kontum’s population 
of 27,000 was expected to double in another week unless an NVA 
attack stopped the refugee fl ow. With Highway 14 to Pleiku blocked 
by the NVA, there was no way out of Kontum for refugees except 
by air, and there were far too few fl ights to remove all of them. The 
Catholic bishop said, “Even those who do not completely recog-
nize how Kontum is going to be destroyed know they are trapped. 
Even Asian resignation to fate does not offset this.” A rice trucker, 
trapped in the town, said, “The North Vietnamese are like an ocean 
tide and will sweep over Kontum. The [South Vietnamese] army 
will not be able to stop them.”26
A New York Times headline read “Thousands Flee Kontum in 
Panic as Enemy Nears.” The article reported that 10,000 people 
were evacuated by plane or helicopter from Kontum, “a key city 
in the Central Highlands encircled by North Vietnamese forces. 
. . . Nuns, priests, military dependents, offi cials and many mili-
tary men, including deserters, were among those leaving. All but 
a dozen Americans were evacuated. Reliable sources in Kontum 
said in reports telephoned to Saigon that residents were bribing 
South Vietnamese helicopter pilots the equivalent of $240 a person 
to make the 20 minute trip to Pleiku.”27
A steady stream of refugees was fl owing down Highway 14 and 
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into Kontum 24 hours a day. They were evacuated to Pleiku on 
VNAF Hueys and US Chinooks. The Chinooks, carrying 60 to 70 
Vietnamese at a time, were making continuous, dawn-to-dusk fl ights 
loaded with refugees. Thirty percent of the 30,000 Montagnards 
in Kontum were evacuated by 4 May.28 After Kontum airfi eld was 
closed, Master Sergeant Lowell W. Stevens was unable to fl y with the 
Covey FACs, so he helped with the evacuation. The civilians were 
panicked and diffi cult to control. Stevens would organize them into 
groups of safe load size, but when the Chinook’s loading ramp came 
down, the civilians mobbed the helicopter in a desperate effort to 
get out on that fl ight. Stevens fi nally had to arm his 14 US soldiers 
with baseball bats to beat them away and maintain order.29
As the evacuation progressed, Stevens noticed some of the 
VNAF helicopters were taking off with Honda motorcycles tied to 
the skids. At fi rst, he thought VNAF must be taking out the refu-
gees’ vehicles for them. But he was tipped off to what was really hap-
pening when some refugees boarding a US CH-47 tried to pay the 
crew. Stevens questioned them and learned that VNAF was charg-
ing for the evacuation fl ights. Other refugees said VNAF would 
not evacuate them because they had no money or Hondas to pay 
for their passage. Stevens went over to the VNAF loading area with 
an interpreter and verifi ed that VNAF pilots were indeed demand-
ing money or motorcycles from their passengers. Here were VNAF 
pilots, trained by the Americans, fl ying helicopters given to their 
government by the Americans, fl ying with fuel obtained free from 
the Americans, and they were illegally charging Vietnamese civil-
ian refugees to fl y them out of extreme danger. Stevens was angry 
and disgusted to see the VNAF pilots take such unfair advantage of 
their own people. His reaction was, “For me, that was the straw that 
broke my back about Vietnam.”30
When Gladiator 715 was shot down in fl ames and crashed after 
taking off from Dak To II on 24 April, it was assumed there were 
no survivors because the helicopter had reportedly exploded on 
impact. Three of the six advisers, including Major Carter and Lieu-
tenant Jones, died. However, three other advisers, Major Warmath, 
Captain Keller, and Staff Sergeant Ward, survived, and so did the 
Huey’s gunner, Specialist 4 Charles M. Lea. On 6 May, a FAC fl y-
ing near Polei Kleng picked up a radio transmission from “Gladia-
tor 715,” and the survivors were fi nally rescued after evading enemy 
search parties during 13 days in the jungle.31
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On 8 May, after conferring with the National Security Coun-
cil and his cabinet, Nixon told the US Navy to mine Haiphong 
and six other ports and ordered resumed bombing of Hanoi and 
Haiphong. He told his advisers, “I have the will in spades,” and 
vowed he would not lose the war or repeat his mistake of not bomb-
ing when his instincts told him he should. “Those bastards are 
going to be bombed like they have never been bombed before,” 
Nixon said as he kicked off Operation Linebacker. It was one of 
the largest bombing campaigns in history and the fi rst major use 
of precision-guided “smart” bombs—as opposed to “dumb” grav-
ity bombs. Between April and the end of October, 155,548 tons of 
bombs were dropped on North Vietnam.32
During the week before Nixon left for the Moscow summit, US 
aircraft made more than 1,800 separate attacks on the North. They 
cut the only two rail lines from China, cut the pipeline carrying 
fuel to the NVA tanks in the South, and fi nally bombed down the 
Paul Doumer Bridge over the Red River outside Hanoi. Some of 
the successful bombing was attributable to the new 3,000-pound 
smart bombs.33
The US fl otilla of 60 ships offshore in the South China Sea and 
farther north in the Gulf of Tonkin included six aircraft carriers 
with almost 500 planes, cruisers, and destroyers; these ships could 
and did bomb targets ashore. Although no incoming ships were 
to be attacked on the high seas, if they attempted to move cargo 
to shore on lighters, those smaller craft would be attacked. A few 
freighters tried it, and the US Navy sank the barges.34
US Navy planes mined all of North Vietnam’s seven major har-
bors and its working rivers and canals. Estimates indicating that 75 
percent of North Vietnam’s imports from Communist countries 
arrived by sea and that 95 percent of those imports came through 
Haiphong underscored the importance of mining this port. Prac-
tically all of the North’s petroleum imports were pumped into 
Haiphong.35 Cutting off the fuel supply might leave some of the 
NVA tanks headed our way out of fuel and dead in their tracks.
To defend Kontum, Colonel Ba had the three regiments of his 
own division, two RF battalions from Kontum Province, some PF 
soldiers, four 155-mm and forty-four 105-mm howitzers, and ten 
tanks. There was also USAF and VNAF tactical air support and 
the Arc Lights, which could strike out beyond artillery range. The 
New York Times reported on 7 May, “Ten South Vietnamese battal-
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ions totaling 5,000 men at the most now face a North Vietnamese 
attacking force of at least twice that size that is equipped with tanks 
and heavy antiaircraft weapons.”36
Except for the problem that the RFs and PFs were controlled 
by the province chief, unity of command was achieved when the 
Ranger and airborne units were replaced by the 23rd Division’s 
own regiments. Mr. Vann and Colonel Truby respected and had 
confi dence in Colonel Ba, and they considered him a good com-
mander. The situation was becoming more positive; the perimeter 
was being tightened and improved. Truby thought they would be 
able to defend Kontum successfully.37
Vann started coming to Kontum several times a day. Vietnam 
was his whole life, and after fi nally achieving a high rank in the 
American effort there, he did not want to jeopardize his career. He 
had lost a great deal of credibility when Tan Canh and Dak To II 
fell, and he could not afford to lose Kontum. Vann admitted that 
if Kontum fell, it would be diffi cult to defend Pleiku. He issued 
orders that if Kontum did fall, the ammunition dump was to be 
blown up to keep it out of enemy hands.38
Although both Vann and Brigadier General Hill thought Kon-
tum should and could be defended, in early May Vann directed 
Hill to assemble all the advisers to answer individually the ques-
tion “Do we fi ght for Kontum?” The advisers were told to answer 
just “yes” or “no,” and any “yes, buts” were cut off. All of the advis-
ers said we should fi ght for the city. So Kontum rather than Pleiku 
would be the decisive battle. If Kontum was lost, the 23rd Division 
would be lost, but the Highlands would not be abandoned. The 
remaining forces would fall back to Ban Me Thuot. They would 
hold whatever they could with whatever they could pull together.39
The shock of the enemy’s aggressive attacks with armor, his easy 
defeat of strongly fortifi ed ARVN bases, and the rapid collapse of 
the 22nd Division reverberated throughout South Vietnam. The 
NVA achieved the same type of psychological impact the German 
blitzkrieg had achieved in Poland and France early in World War 
II. American advisers wondered if the South Vietnamese would 
stand and fi ght to defend their own country, and the South Viet-
namese wondered if it was possible for them to defend against mas-
sive assaults by North Vietnamese soldiers who attacked with tanks.
Those questions would be answered in Kontum.
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The II Corps advisers and their ARVN counterparts at II Corps Headquarters 
in Pleiku in February 1972. Front row, left to right: Colonel Binh (chief of staff), 
Brigadier General Wear (deputy senior adviser), Mr. Vann (senior adviser), 
Lieutenant General Dzu (commanding general), Brigadier General Lam Son 
(deputy commanding general), Colonel Pizzi (chief of staff), Colonel Tuong (as-
sistant commanding general, operations). Second row: Colonel Tho (corps artil-
lery commander), Lieutenant Colonel Fuesel (artillery senior adviser), Colonel 
Pahl (G-2 adviser), Lieutenant Colonel Khuong (G-3), Lieutenant Colonel Goff 
(deputy G-3 adviser), Lieutenant Colonel Dick (G-4 adviser). Third row: Major 
Tu (corps surgeon), Colonel Otto (surgeon adviser), Lieutenant Colonel Kha 
(provost marshal), Lieutenant Colonel Falkenstein (provost marshal adviser), 
Lieutenant Colonel Hien (inspector general), Lieutenant Colonel Bennett (in-
spector general adviser), Lieutenant Colonel Kieu (G-1), Lieutenant Colonel 
McCoy (G-1 adviser). Fourth row: Colonel Huong (signal offi cer), Major Kh-
ieu (assistant G-4), Lieutenant Colonel Bates (corps engineer), Captain Thuy 
(headquarters commandant), Major Hollingsworth (adjutant general adviser), 
Major Smith (information offi cer). Back row: Major Richardson (secretary to the 
general staff adviser), Captain Lai (secretary to the general staff), Captain Tien 
(protocol offi cer), Lieutenant Colonel Roscoe (chaplain). (Photo courtesy of the 
US Army.)
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Display of weapons captured during operation at Phu Nhon in November 1971. 
Lieutenant Colonel McKenna holding RPG warhead. (Author’s collection.)
USAF B-52 in fl ight with bombs dropping. (Photo courtesy of the USAF.)
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The Green House. The advisers’ building at An Khe in early 1972. This 1871 
French colonial mansion was at the end of the airfi eld runway. The US 1st Cav-
alry Division added the airfi eld control tower on the roof. (Author’s collection.)
This Jeep hit a mine near Mang Yang Pass on Highway 19. Although badly hurt, 
the occupant survived. (Photo by James T. Vaughan.)
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ARVN M-113 APCs on Highway 19 during fi ghting in An Khe Pass in April 1972. 
This view is just east of An Khe Pass and looking toward the east. (Author’s 
collection.)
Lieutenant Colonel Tran Quang Tien, CO of the 44th ARVN Infantry Regiment, 
at an April 1972 display of enemy weapons captured in An Khe Pass. (Author’s 
collection.)
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Colonel Le Duc Dat, commander of the 22nd ARVN Infantry Division, with his 
adviser, Colonel Phillip Kaplan, at Tan Canh. (Photo by Matt Franjola, courtesy 
of the Library of Congress, Washington, DC.)
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Two young NVA prisoners captured at Dak To II on 13 February 1972. (Photo by 
Stephen E. James.)
A large tiger killed by a mechanical ambush, probably a Claymore, on a small 
fi rebase on Highway 14 between Kontum and Pleiku. (Photo by James T. 
Vaughan.)
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Kontum airfi eld in April 1972. A Huey is parked at the lower right, and the run-
way is in the distance. (Photo by Reed C. Mulkey.)
Kontum airfi eld on 28 April 1972. This VNAF C-123 has just been hit by enemy 
fi re and is starting to burn. (Photo by Reed C. Mulkey.)
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Ben Het Border Ranger Camp under attack on 9 May 1972. View from the com-
mand bunker with Montagnard soldiers on the front line in center and smoke 
from a burning PT-76 tank knocked out by Spectre 02 in the distance. (Photo 
from Mark Truhan.)
Ben Het Border Ranger Camp after the 9 May 1972 attack. Captains Mark Tru-
han and Robert Sparks on the PT-76 tank that Truhan “scared to death.” (Photo 
from Mark Truhan.)
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The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team, Vietnam, with their helicopters. Crew chiefs 
on top of helicopters (left to right): Specialist 4 David W. Lehrschall, Specialist 
5 Wayne Evans, Specialist 5 Ronald G. Taylor. Middle row: (in light shirts) Ken-
neth Blum, James M. Faulk, Dennis J. Camp, Thomas E. Zagorski; (in uniforms) 
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick L. Feore Jr., Hugh J. McInnish Jr. (civilian), Captain 
Roy Sudeck, Sergeant First Class Boyce A. Hartsell. Bottom row: (kneeling left 
of sign) CWO2 Caroll W. Lain, CWO2 Danny G. Rowe, CWO3 Lester M. Whit-
eis; (right of sign) CWO2 Edmond C. Smith, CWO2 Scott E. Fenwick, CWO2 
Douglas R. Hixson Jr. (Photo from Hugh J. McInnish Jr.)
Three scout pilots by an LOH-6 Loach. From left to right: Captain Stephen 
James; Lieutenant Craig Smith, who was “shot down” by a tank; unknown cap-
tain from the Scalp Hunters. (Photo from Stephen James.)
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Highway 14 looking north from FSB November north of Kontum on 13 May 
1972. The Round Hill is just to the left of this point. (Photo by author.)
44th Regiment fi eld CP in the jungle on FSB November. (Photo by author.)
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An ARVN soldier and civilian engineer Hugh J. McInnish Jr. inspecting a T-54 
knocked out by a TOW missile. (Photo from Hugh J. McInnish Jr.)
T-54 tank knocked out by the 44th ARVN Regiment on 14 May on display in the 
Kontum soccer stadium. (Photo by Richard Gudat.)
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Gun camera photos from a TOW helicopter fi ring TOW missiles to destroy a 
tank disguised as an island in a river. (Video number 472.1, “XN26 Airborne 
TOW Combat Firing May 1972, Central Highlands, Republic of Vietnam.” Cour-
tesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.)
USAF C-130 number 62-1854 destroyed by incoming fi re on Kontum airfi eld on 
23 May 1972. (Photo from Stephen James.)
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Captains Raymond W. Hall and John R. Finch examining a captured Soviet 
12.7-mm (.51-caliber) heavy machine gun. (Photo from Ly Tong Ba.)
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In front of 44th ARVN Regiment’s CP bunker after 26 May attack. From left to 
right: Major Wade B. Lovings; destroyed T-54 tank; ARVN soldiers in front-line 
positions. (Photo from Wade B. Lovings.)
South Vietnamese president Nguyen Van Thieu, in dark baseball cap, congratu-
lates the victors in Kontum on 30 May 1972. Brigadier General Ly Tong Ba is 
on Thieu’s right. Major General Nguyen Van Toan is to the right behind Thieu. 
(Government of South Vietnam photo from Ly Tong Ba.)
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South Vietnamese 
president Nguyen 
Van Thieu and Major 
General Nguyen Van 
Toan, the II Corps 
commander, in 
Kontum on 30 May 
1972. (Government 
of South Vietnam 
photo.)
The battered C-130 
that pilot Lieutenant 
Colonel Reed C. 
Mulkey fl ew on the 
fateful mission into 
Kontum tells him 
it will not make 
that trip again. 
(Cartoon by SMS 
Davis published 
in Det One 
Report: Yearbook 
Supplement for the 
People Who Fly and 
Support the C-130E 
Hercules Aircraft of 
the 374th Tactical 
Airlift Wing, 4 July 
1972. Courtesy of 
Rick Ivars.)
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Chieu Hoi message, “Families are waiting for you to return to the Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam.” Leafl ets like this were air dropped in and around Kontum 
to encourage NVA soldiers to leave the NVA and come over to ARVN under the 
Chieu Hoi Program. (Leafl et from author’s collection.)
French kilometer stone 
on Highway 14 north 
to Kontum. (Author’s 
collection.)
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Cut Off and Surrounded
Men, remember, there is no retreat from here. You must die 
where you stand.
—Sir Colin Campbell to the 93rd British Highlanders,
battle of Balaclava, 25 October 1854
Mr. Vann said that after the fall of Tan Canh and Dak To II the sit-
uation in Kontum was so serious and morale there was so low that 
if the NVA had brought 50 battery-powered tape recorders to play 
recordings of tank noises—grinding and clanking and motors rev-
ving up—over loudspeakers outside the city, the entire garrison and 
population would have fl ed in panic.1
In early May, General Abrams told his commanders,
In the last few weeks, in my conversations with General Vien, 
and with the President, I’ve said it straight, and called it for 
what it was worth. Just the other day General Vien was tell-
ing me about some equipment they wanted, and I told him 
that we were doing everything we could to get this equip-
ment to them and so on. But I then went on to tell him, I 
said, “Equipment is not what you need. You need men that 
will fi ght. And you need offi cers that will fi ght, and will lead 
the men.” I said, “No amount of equipment will change the 
situation. It’s in the hands of men, and if they’ll fi ght, and 
their offi cers will lead them, you’ve got—even today—you’ve 
got all the equipment you need.” I said, “That’s the trouble.” 
I said, “I don’t think you’ve lost a tank to enemy fi re. You lost 
all the tanks in the 20th because the men abandoned them, 
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led by the offi cers. You lost most of your artillery because it 
was abandoned and people wouldn’t fi ght.”2
On 7 May, Mr. Vann reported to General Abrams that his coun-
terpart, Lieutenant General Dzu, had complained to him that he 
was being set up by President Thieu to be the scapegoat if Kon-
tum fell. Dzu was certain he would be court-martialed when that 
happened. He went on to say that the coming losses would force 
Thieu to resign and that, in fact, Thieu’s wife and children were 
already in Switzerland. He saw a cease-fi re as the only hope for 
South Vietnam. Vann punched a number of holes in Dzu’s theories 
but was unable to buck up his morale or attitude. However, after 
Polei Kleng, which was under assault at the time, held out through 
the night, Dzu became more positive and said that he would fend 
off the personal attacks by holding Kontum.3
Camp Le Khanh was a large, hilltop outpost about 22 kilome-
ters west–northwest of Kontum on Highway 511. It was on a hill 
named “Polei Kleng,” so the Americans called it by that name. 
In May 1972, the 62nd Border Ranger Battalion commanded by 
Major Buu Chuyen manned it. His advisers were Captain Geddes 
MacLaren and Lieutenant Paul McKenna.4 US Special Forces had 
built Polei Kleng in June 1966, so it was well constructed and had 
an airfi eld. Ben Het, Dak Mot, Dak Pek, and Dak Seang, all farther 
northwest near the Cambodian border, were still holding out, and 
the NVA appeared to be bypassing them. However, the NVA had to 
take Polei Kleng because it controlled Highway 511, which the NVA 
needed for its attack on Kontum. From 24 April to 5 May, attacks by 
fi re on the Ranger camps astride the NVA supply routes increased. 
The NVA moved anti-aircraft weapons close to Polei Kleng, and 
resupply or reinforcement by air became virtually impossible. 
Starting in early May the defenders were subjected to attacks by fi re 
from 82-mm and 122-mm mortars.5
At 1530 on 5 May, the airborne TOWs were launched against 
T-54 tanks in the Polei Kleng area. The TOW crews sighted two 
enemy tanks from above but could not get a clear shot at them 
because, at the slant ranges from which they needed to fi re, veg-
etation masked their view. Tactical air fi ghter-bombers were sent 
to bomb the tanks.6 At noon on 6 May, the bombardment of Polei 
Kleng increased until more than 50 rounds fell in an hour and a 
half. US tactical air strikes stopped the enemy fi re until the FAC 
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had to leave at 1515. After he departed, the bombardment resumed, 
and 500 rounds fell on the base between then and 1900. The accu-
racy of the incoming rounds and the systematic manner in which 
they were destroying the ARVN bunkers told the advisers that an 
observer was adjusting the incoming fi re. The bunker from which 
Captain MacLaren and Lieutenant McKenna were directing air 
strikes received several direct hits. At 1730 hours, another direct 
hit blew out an oak door and collapsed several walls. The advis-
ers dug out of the rubble and moved into open foxholes near the 
perimeter.7
While MacLaren and McKenna watched, the enemy artillery 
methodically destroyed all aboveground buildings, all bunkers, and 
all radio antennas. The Rangers, who had withstood so many previ-
ous attacks, were demoralized by the intensity and accuracy of this 
attack by fi re. At 1800, McKenna went looking for the battalion com-
mander and discovered that he had already fl ed the compound. As 
the lieutenant returned to his foxhole, he saw the NVA using fl ash-
ing red beacons to signal their infantry to attack. With the battalion 
commander gone, it was time for the advisers to go.8 They called 
for extraction, and at 1900 hours an OH-6 piloted by Captain Jim 
Stein landed through heavy anti-aircraft and ground fi re to pick 
up the two Americans. Stein tells how he rescued Captain Geddes 
MacLaren and Lieutenant Paul McKenna from Polei Kleng:
On May 6th we were released to return to camp Holloway 
when we were asked to extract two American Advisers from 
Polei Kleng. The base camp was involved in heavy fi ghting 
and it was looking like it would be overrun. John Paul Vann 
wanted his advisers extracted. The 361st Guns “Pink Pan-
thers” would be providing gun coverage and guns from the 
7/17th Cav “The Undertakers” would join them. Panther 
lead was running the operation and gave me a briefi ng of 
the situation. I told him we would descend to the ground and 
fl y low level into the base camp approaching from the West. 
We would fl y blacked-out except for one light on top. Gun 
lead confi rmed and when we descended to the ground he 
confi rmed his front seat had us sighted. As we approached 
Polei Kleng we could see fl ashes and explosions all over the 
camp. I noticed one of the gun ships was clearing a path in 
front of the aircraft using, I assumed, his 40mm.
McKenna Kontum book.indb   155 6/14/2011   10:17:42 AM
156 • KONTUM
As we entered the camp I could see silhouettes of soldiers, 
NVA or ARVN’s running around from the explosions. I spot-
ted a built up bunker covered with sand bags; fi guring it was 
the command bunker, I headed for it. I believe we took a few 
of their communication antennas down as we fl ew to the bun-
ker and landed on top. We could hear and feel bullets hitting 
the LOH. I told my observer to aim his M-60 at anyone coming 
our way and if the fi gure wasn’t large, shoot it. I can’t remem-
ber if I was in direct contact with the advisers, I believe I would 
have been, but can not confi rm that. My observer spotted two 
larger fi gures moving our way and we decided they were the 
advisers. They jumped into the LOH and started fi ring their 
weapons. I have no idea how many ARVN’s were wounded 
or killed by friendly fi re. I checked my gauges and made my 
call to Panther lead; we had the advisers and were coming out 
the same way we entered. Lead just said “We got you.” As we 
started to enter the perimeter of the camp low level, I again 
noticed explosions far enough out in front of our aircraft to 
clear a path. I asked the Advisers if they were in need of any 
medical care or could we go to Mr. Vann’s headquarters. We 
landed at Mr. Vann’s headquarters dropping off the advisers; 
fl ew over to Camp Holloway, took a shower, ate and again lost 
in Poker. Lucky in fl ying and a loser in Poker.9
Polei Kleng amazingly managed to hold out through three more 
days of attacks by fi re and ground assaults by the 64th NVA Regi-
ment. After the advisers were extracted, Spectre 03, an AC-130 gun-
ship, arrived overhead and was able to attack by coordinating with 
an ARVN offi cer on the ground. The gunship fi red all of its ammu-
nition—including 96 rounds from the 105-mm gun. Spectre killed 
more than 350 enemy soldiers, and the attack was repulsed. Sixteen 
Arc Lights were employed around Polei Kleng during those three 
days. A Hoi Chanh said there were 40 KIA and many more WIA 
just in his company of 100 men.10
On 7 May, the bombardment of Polei Kleng increased from 
2000 until midnight, then the enemy attacked from the east. Docu-
ments captured later revealed that 7 May had been chosen to com-
memorate the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The defenders held, 
and at 0600 the next morning the enemy withdrew to regroup. 
They left more than 300 dead behind.
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Another tactical emergency was declared at Polei Kleng at 0800 
on 8 May. VNAF tactical air responded with A-1s and A-37s. USAF 
Spectres and F-4s also responded. The weather worsened, but the 
VNAF and USAF FACs continued to work over the area as much as 
possible. However, at 0500 the next morning the enemy attacked 
again. After a heavy bombardment, the 64th NVA Regiment 
assaulted, with 20 tanks leading the way. The Rangers knocked out 
fi ve tanks with M-72s and again beat back the enemy assault. Heavy 
incoming fi re forced the defenders into bunkers and trenches. 
The soldiers’ families, 300 Montagnard women and children, were 
crowded in with them. Women carried ammo and cared for the 
wounded. Lightly wounded men returned to the fi ring line. Most 
of the radio antennas were knocked out by direct fi re from the sur-
rounding hills, and the enemy began to destroy the remaining bun-
kers systematically one by one. Early on 9 May, Major Chuyen and 
his deputy, Captain Phan Thai Binh, decided to abandon the camp 
rather than be captured. The hundreds of wives and children were 
going to make withdrawal slow and diffi cult, but they could not be 
left behind.
At 0400 on 9 May, the Rangers used a Bangalore torpedo to 
blow a gap in the defensive wire, and Lieutenant Kchong, a Mon-
tagnard, led the 1st Company out into the darkness. He was fol-
lowed by Major Chuyen and his CP group. They went east. Captain 
Binh with the remaining Rangers and the women and children 
left last and headed north. A VNAF L-19 contacted them by radio 
when it arrived over the camp, and they informed the pilot they 
were outside the camp and enemy tanks were now inside. The pilot 
managed to call in jets to bomb the camp before he was shot down 
and forced to bail out.
As Captain Binh and his group neared the Dak Poko River, they 
were almost surrounded. Firing while they retreated, they managed 
to fi ght their way to the river. The Rangers held off the enemy while 
the wounded, the women, and the children crossed the river to safety. 
The NVA then started mortaring the crossing site. One mother was 
killed, but her baby, attached to her in the typical Montagnard sling, 
continued to suckle. A Ranger cut the sling and carried the baby 
across the river, which was now running red with blood. Only 97 
people reached the safety of the far bank, from where they were 
taken into Kontum. The others were killed, captured, or lost in the 
jungle. Major Chuyen was captured and then killed.11
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Except for the camps near the border, Polei Kleng was the last 
strong point to the northwest of Kontum. Now the city was open to 
attack from that direction, and the enemy tanks could use Highway 
511 as their avenue of approach. However, while overcoming Polei 
Kleng, the NVA suffered so many casualties that it postponed its 
attack on Kontum. This delay gave the city’s defenders more time 
to prepare. John Paul Vann said, “In the brutal terminology of war, 
Polei Kleng has paid for itself in numbers of enemy dead.”12
“Ben Het and loving it” was the adviser’s sign and motto at Ben 
Het. It was a relic from the days when the US Army Special Forces 
had worked out of this camp only eight miles from the border with 
Cambodia and Laos. Highway 512 wound all the way from Bet Het 
back to Kontum. It was just a dirt track, but it was drivable—except 
for the danger of being ambushed. So Ben Het’s resupply was by 
helicopter. At the height of Special Forces involvement, there had 
been 37 border camps in II Corps alone. By February 1972, there 
were only eight camps left and only two advisers in each camp. In 
the spring of 1972, Captain Stephen M. “Mark” Truhan was the 
adviser to the 95th Border Ranger Battalion, and Captain Robert 
C. Sparks was the adviser to the 71st Border Ranger Battalion, both 
at Ben Het.
Mr. Vann visited Ben Het a few days before the impending 
attack. After Captains Truhan and Sparks briefed him, Vann looked 
around and said, “I hope you get hit with a regiment. Ben Het is a 
strong camp.” He was apparently counting on a lucrative Arc Light 
target when the NVA massed for their attack.13 On the night of 6–7 
May alone, there were 45 US tactical air sorties in the Highlands.14 
A USAF FAC crashed and burned while doing a victory roll after 
putting in successful tactical air strikes on the enemy assaulting 
Plei Mrong, a Border Ranger camp in Pleiku Province and about 
22 kilometers south of Kontum.15 In early May, Ben Het, Dak Pek, 
Dak Seang, and Plei Mrong were pounded by artillery and mortar 
fi re. On 7 May, the NVA fi red 160-mm mortar rounds into Ben Het. 
The 160-mm was a massive mortar round 6.24 inches in diameter. 
The NVA was using this weapon for the fi rst time in II Corps. Then 
NVA tanks and troops were reported moving toward Ben Het.
At 0530 on 9 May, enemy troops from the 66th NVA Regiment 
and quite possibly one other regiment, plus a company of PT-76 
tanks,16 assaulted Ben Het. Two of the tanks attacked the main 
gate but were knocked out, as described more fully later. At 0730 
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hours, fi ve PT-76 tanks attacked the eastern perimeter, and LAWs 
knocked out two of the tanks. The remainder of the tanks with-
drew after the NVA infantry breached the eastern perimeter and 
seized about one-third of the camp. When the attack started, the 
defenders had six 105-mm and two 155-mm artillery pieces. Dur-
ing the fi ghting, all but one 105 was destroyed by incoming 122-
mm or 130-mm artillery rounds. Only 3 of the 12 M-41 tanks sent 
toward Dak To II on 24 April survived the ambush en route by 
returning to Ben Het after one of them broke down. These three 
tanks were operable and should have participated in the defense 
of the camp. However, when the fi ghting started, their crews dis-
appeared without fi ring a shot, and none of the other defenders 
knew how to operate a tank.
The Rangers spent the next two days ejecting the enemy and 
restoring the eastern perimeter. They were aided by 24 air strikes 
by USAF fi ghter-bombers and 4 air strikes by VNAF. During those 
two days, one Ranger battalion commander was completely ineffec-
tive. He just sat there throwing up. The attacking NVA forces lost 
11 tanks and more than 100 KIA in their attempt to over run Ben 
Het. They continued to harass Ben Het with attacks by fi re and 
sporadic probes, but they did not make another major assault until 
fall.17
Captain Truhan later described how six different methods of 
killing a tank were employed at Ben Het—all against one enemy 
tank—and how he scared to death another PT-76 tank:
We think at least a company, about 10 tanks, were in the ini-
tial assault. When the NVA opened fi re on us that morning, 
the fi rst thing we did was get on the radio and yell for help. 
. . . When Spectre arrived overhead, he already had some 
of the tanks picked out. One burst of his 40mm fl amed a 
tank on the road to our northeast—about 200 meters outside 
the perimeter. Another burst disabled a tank about to roll 
through our main gate. . . . Even though he was disabled, the 
tank continued to roll forward and struck an anti-tank mine 
that blew off his left track. Now stationary, a Montagnard sol-
dier dashed out of a bunker and put an M-72 LAW into him. 
Hit three times already, one of our damaged 155mm howit-
zers fi red a bore-sighted HE round at him from less then 100 
meters away and he burst into fl ames.
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Hawks [sic] Claw . . . showed up about 1000, announc-
ing themselves as “Claw.” (We didn’t have a clue who these 
guys were.) They declared they had tank killing ordnance 
on board, but before we could tell them we were fresh out 
of targets for the moment, the pilot yelled out “There’s a 
tank at your main gate!” (Dead for about 4 hours, the tank 
had stopped burning by now.) Well, Claw rolled in before 
we could stop him and made a beautiful fi rst round hit on 
the tank, which politely starting burning again. Now, that’s 
the fi fth hit on that hapless tank. We tried to tell Claw the 
tank had been dead for hours, but they wouldn’t believe us 
. . . during the night of 9 May, NVA sappers snuck up to the 
dead tank at the main gate and blew its turret off. That’s 
six hits.
We also accounted for one other tank right on our north-
eastern perimeter that I like to think I scared to death. The 
tank bogged down in soft ground, with miles of barbed wire 
and engineer stakes wound in his tracks. Try as he might, he 
just kept grinding in deeper. I took a LAW, crawled up to 
one of our partially destroyed perimeter bunkers and tried to 
knock him out from about 25 ft away, but the damned rocket 
wouldn’t go off. I was desperately trying to remember my 
basic LAW misfi re training when the tank picked me up on 
his co-ax machinegun and let loose a couple of bursts, and 
I ducked back into the bunker to ponder what to do next. 
Then, sneaking a peek outside the bunker, I saw the tank’s 
hatch fl y open and out tumbled the three-man crew, who 
were immediately shot. The only thing I can fi gure is the 
crew thought I’d go fi nd a LAW that worked and try again, 
so they bailed out of the mired but undamaged tank, leaving 
the engine running. So, I scared it to death, sort of. Scratch 
three tanks. And this was by about 0530, just at fi rst light.18
About 150 NVA were KIA inside the camp, and at least that many 
were left in the wire. Countless hundreds—even thousands—were 
killed by air strikes outside Ben Het. Montagnards who reached 
Ben Het in June said the NVA took hundreds and hundreds of 
their wounded from the Ben Het fi ght to Tan Canh for treatment.19 
Ben Het’s example was encouraging to those of us expecting to 
be attacked in Kontum because it demonstrated that ARVN troops 
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could and would kill enemy tanks, counterattack enemy penetra-
tions, and successfully defend their positions.
In his “Daily Commanders Evaluation” to General Abrams for 
8–9 May 1972, Mr. Vann wrote about the attack on Ben Het: “Dur-
ing the early morning of 9 May, the enemy used dogs to detonate 
mines in the perimeter wire.” This dog tale was repeated in subse-
quent accounts. However, Captain Truhan says it did not happen, 
and it was just the advisers’ own pet Montagnard mutt that had 
nimbly found his way through their wire and mines to go outside 
the perimeter and into the jungle at night. As he was returning 
before dawn on 9 May, the NVA followed him in through the defen-
sive wire. Some of the Ben Het Montagnards saw this and started 
the dog story.
On 10 May, the NVA threw one of their own wounded soldiers 
out of a bunker they had captured and were still holding in the 
Ben Het compound. The defenders took him prisoner, and one 
of the Montagnards made the throat-slitting gesture to suggest 
how he should be handled. Fortunately, the ARVN offi cers inter-
rogated him instead, and he showed them on a map where his unit 
was assembling for another attack the next morning. It was only 
a thousand meters away, which was pushing the minimum clear-
ance needed for a B-52 strike. The advisers requested one anyway, 
and Mr. Vann radioed to ask, “How badly do you want this Arc 
Light?” Truhan and Sparks responded, “How badly do you want to 
hold Ben Het?” About 0230 the next morning, the NVA assembly 
area blew up in smoke and fi re. There was no enemy assault that 
morning.20
Maintaining an adequate level of food, ammunition, and other 
supplies in Kontum while Highway 14 was blocked by the enemy 
meant the city was completely dependent on aerial resupply. 
Attempts to reopen Highway 14 were repeatedly defeated, but John 
Paul Vann was not entirely unhappy about that. He did not really 
want the pass opened until the battle for Kontum was over and 
said, “As long as the pass is closed, we have the cork in the bottle.” 
If the pass were reopened, the ARVN forces in Kontum would have 
a clear route of retreat toward Pleiku. With the pass closed, they 
would have to stand and fi ght in Kontum.21
After the fall of Tan Canh, Lieutenant General Dzu went to 
see President Thieu in Saigon and then, in an agitated state, went 
to General Vien’s home that evening. He told Vien that Thieu 
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had ordered him to hold Kontum at all costs. Dzu said that both 
Kontum and Pleiku were indefensible and that he did not have 
the means to hold them. He wanted permission to withdraw from 
the Highlands. Vien disagreed and sent him back to Pleiku. Dzu 
started calling Thieu and Vien, even at night, and Thieu eventually 
called Vien to talk about their Dzu problem. They discussed reliev-
ing Dzu. Vien thought Dzu had lost his nerve and become a défait-
iste. They could not leave a man like this in command of a corps.22
General Vien called four or fi ve of his two- and three-star gener-
als to offer them the command, but they all had excuses for not tak-
ing the job. Their health or their astrologer’s advice or some other 
personal reason prevented them from accepting at that time. They 
obviously considered the situation in II Corps hopeless and did not 
want to risk their careers or their lives to become the commander 
of a lost cause. Vien decided he would need to fi nd a major general 
who wanted to earn a third star and who also needed to redeem 
himself from some past problem to get that promotion. By pro-
cess of elimination, he selected Major General Nguyen Van Toan, a 
two-star general who had previously been accused of corruption. A 
Hong Kong newspaper described Toan as “a large, jovial man whose 
dealing in the cinnamon business as 2nd Division commander sev-
eral years ago was the subject of a formal investigation by the South 
Vietnamese government’s anti-corruption inspectorate.”23 His repu-
tation was also tarnished by an affair with a 15-year-old girl.
On the positive side, Major General Toan came with a good rep-
utation as a fi ghting commander. He was the fi rst ARVN general to 
be awarded the US Silver Star for valor. President Thieu relieved 
Lieutenant General Dzu and replaced him with Major General 
Toan on 10 May. Dzu’s last major decision before leaving was to 
order the transfer of the entire 44th ARVN Regiment from An 
Khe to Kontum. He left his command in a happy mood, saying that 
even though he had been fi red, at least he had not lost any province 
capitals. Mr. Vann immediately pressured Major General Toan to 
obtain quality replacements for some of the corps staff, whose 
daily briefi ngs were based more on what the staff thought the com-
mander wanted to hear than on what was really happening.24
Major General Toan was a big, burly man who looked like and 
was a strong leader. Colonel Truby got to know him well, con-
sidered him effective, and thought they were better off after he 
assumed command of the corps.25
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Mr. Vann described the new corps commander at a 12 May 
MACV Commanders Briefi ng: “General Toan, 45 minutes after 
arrival, asked me to get him transporta tion and go with him to Kon-
tum. And yesterday [he] went down and spent the night in Kontum 
City. Last evening we visited combat units until nearly midnight, 
and then began again at 6:30 this morning until we had visited 
nearly every battalion . . . in the Kontum area, where he inspected 
fi eld positions and raised hell at nearly every place that he saw the 
fi eld positions. Last night he also had assembled the entire prov-
ince staff, earlier in the evening, and gave them a good pep talk 
and told them we were going to hold Kontum City.”26
General Abrams gave his opinion of the advisers during this 
same commander’s conference: “I just think that their perfor-
mance has been magnifi cent. In fact it’s probably the glue that’s 
held this whole thing together. It’s not only the heroics involved 
in it, but the real toughness and real ability. . . . And I want to tell 
you, if it wasn’t for the advisers, none of us would be sitting here in 
Saigon today. We’d either be in a [POW] enclosure, dead, or have 
managed to escape by submarine, powerboat, or some other fuck-
ing thing! To Hong Kong. That’s what advisers are!”27
Four artillery rounds hit Kontum airfi eld and destroyed a US 
Cobra gunship on 11 May.28 On 12 May alone, there were more than 
50 US and 28 VNAF sorties plus 25 Arc Light strikes in the Kon-
tum area.29 That same day, six 122-mm rockets hit Pleiku airfi eld, 
and several rounds of incoming fi re came very close to a C-130 on 
Kontum airfi eld. The 7th Air Force stopped fl ying C-130s in and 
out of Kontum during daylight hours.30
After Kontum airfi eld became too dangerous for daylight 
landings, the C-130s started landing at night. The USAF Ground 
Control Team in Kontum used radar to bring them in on a ground-
controlled approach with all lights out. Then, just before the C-130 
hit the runway, the pilot would turn on the landing lights. Except 
for fuel bladders, all the cargo was rigged on pallets so a combat 
offl oad could be done. As the C-130s rolled down the runway, the 
pallets rolled off the lowered ramp door at the rear of the aircraft. 
They did not need to shut down the engines or even come to a 
complete stop. Using that method, their record was fi ve pallets 
unloaded in 37 seconds.31
Late in the morning on 12 May, Lieutenant Craig Smith, a scout 
pilot from the “Scalp Hunters,” was fl ying his OH-6 on a recon-
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naissance mission when he noticed a pile of bamboo that did not 
look quite right in the jungle three kilometers northeast of Vo 
Dinh. Hawk’s Claw was knocking out enemy tanks left and right, so 
the enemy crews were trying to camoufl age them. Smith hovered 
around and made a pass at the bamboo to get a better look. It was 
a tank, and the crew realized they were detected. He called in a 
FAC and marked the tank with a smoke round. However, the jungle 
was so thick that the FAC lost track of the target. Smith made four 
more passes at the tank, fi ring another smoke round each time. As 
Smith made his fi fth pass in front of the tank crew, they fi red both 
their main gun and their machine gun at him. This was probably 
the only time during the Vietnam War that an enemy tank fi red its 
main gun at a helicopter in the air. If the round from that 100-mm 
gun had hit any part of the Loach, it would have destroyed it com-
pletely. By luck, it missed. However, the powerful muzzle blast blew 
the rotor blades off the helicopter, and it crashed. After escaping 
under fi re and evading the enemy, Smith and his observer were 
promptly picked up.32
The Hawk’s Claw team was sent after the tank but could 
not fi nd it under the jungle canopy. Eight sets of USAF fi ghter-
bombers were used to destroy most of the surrounding jungle 
before Hawk’s Claw was able to get a clear shot at the target. They 
fi nally hit a tank—probably that one—and it burst into fl ames. There 
was evidence of other tanks being in the area, but none could be 
located for a TOW shot.33
POW interrogations, captured documents, and radio intercepts 
gave the ARVN offi cers and their advisers at division and corps 
level a good understanding of the NVA’s battle plan. The 2nd NVA 
Infantry Division would not participate in the attack on Kontum, 
but the 320th NVA Infantry Division would attack us with two rein-
forced regiments.34 This division had defeated the French at Dien 
Bien Phu in 1954 and was probably hoping to achieve a similar 
victory at Kontum. There were estimates that the two NVA divi-
sions approaching us had already lost half their troops. Yet a news 
report said, “Few Allied commanders held much hope that the city 
of Kontum could hold against a determined enemy attack.”35
The TOW systems mounted on helicopters were proving their 
worth in combat, but the tank threat to Kontum was increasing by 
the day. Moving under secret orders, probably because the US gov-
ernment did not want any publicity about any American ground 
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troops going to Vietnam, some TOW missiles mounted on Jeeps 
were sent from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, to Vietnam. On 13 May, MACV headquarters approved 
sending three or four of the Jeep-mounted TOW teams into Kon-
tum to be under operational control of the senior adviser to the 
23rd ARVN Division.36
A Nixon aide summed up the president’s mood: “Mr. Nixon 
is not going to back up one iota from his hard line with the Com-
munists on Vietnam. He will risk the May 22 summit with the Rus-
sians, his re-election and everything else, but he won’t take defeat 
in Southeast Asia. He is going right down to the mat with Mos cow 
and Hanoi over this.”37
The mission to defend Kontum was unlike anything in the 23rd 
Division’s previous experience. This defense would be the fi rst 
time all of its units were assembled in the same place to perform 
a common mission. Years of experience in guarding government 
installations and fi ghting small battles, mostly with lightly armed 
Communist units, had not prepared this division to defend a city 
that was already surrounded and would soon be attacked by the 
heaviest artillery in the Communist arsenal, human-wave assaults 
by battle-hardened NVA soldiers, and tanks.
The collapse of the ARVN’s 22nd Division at Tan Canh and 
Dak To II, the NVA’s successes, and ARVN’s failures in other corps 
areas were in combination a severe blow to the morale of the South 
Vietnamese. The soldiers of the 23rd Division were no exception. 
They had more reason than anyone else to worry because they were 
in Kontum and next in line to be hit by the Communist juggernaut. 
The 22nd Infantry Division had operated in the Highlands for 
years, and they had frequently fought North Vietnamese soldiers. 
Yet when they were confronted with tanks, they folded. Could the 
23rd Infantry Division, which was normally based in the southern 
part of II Corps and fi ghting mostly VC, be expected to stand and 
fi ght when confronted by the NVA and their tanks?38
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Tanks Attacking!
This city [Kontum] is in danger of extinction. North 
Vietnamese tanks and troops are drawing closer from the 
north and south. Many of the city’s 30,000 residents are 
packing to leave . . . as soon as the highway to Pleiku is 
opened.
—Pacifi c Stars and Stripes, 30 April 1972
Early on 13 May, I fl ew from Pleiku to Kontum sitting on the fl oor 
of a USAF C-141 Starlifter with 490 ARVN soldiers and my Jeep, 
which the air force loadmaster had tied down. The interior of the 
airplane was rigged for cargo delivery, so there were no seats, seat-
belts, or other restraints. The number of passengers it carried 
may have set a record for C-141s. When almost 500 ARVN soldiers 
walked off the airplane, it reminded me of the circus act in which 
a dozen clowns get out of one small car. It was 0520 on Saturday, 
13 May, and I was seeing Kontum for the fi rst time. Mountains 
were visible in all directions. In the northeast and southeast, they 
were more than 3,000 feet high, and to the north Ngok Linh was 
8,524 feet high. A large mountain mass to the northwest was called 
Rocket Ridge. Even though some of those mountains were 10 to 20 
kilometers away, they seemed to loom over Kontum.
Major Wade B. Lovings, formerly the division artillery adviser, 
met me at the airfi eld. He would be my new deputy, and I was 
happy to have him with me, especially after having a series of 
deputies assigned to my team for only a few weeks each to fi nish 
their required time in Vietnam. We reclaimed our Jeep and drove 
straight to the DTOC. I reported to the new 23rd Division senior 
adviser, Colonel John O. Truby, who said, “Thank God the 44th 
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O u tp o s t N e c ta r w ith  3 rd  B a tta lio n  (-), 4 4 th  A R V N  R e g im e n t.
G e n e ra l tra ce  o f fro n tlin e  p o s itio n s  o f 4 4 th A R V N  R e g im e n t.
T h e  R o u n d  H ill w ith  C P  o f 4 4 th A R V N  R e g im e n t a n d  o n e  b a tta lio n  (-).
G e n e ra l tra ce  o f fro n tlin e  p o s itio n s  o f 4 5 th A R V N  R e g im e n t.
C P  o f 4 5 th A R V N  R e g im e n t w ith  co m p a n y  o f ta n ks  fro m  1 /8 th A rm o re d  R e g im e n t.
A tta ck  b y  4 8 th N VA R e g im e n t a n d  ta n ks  fro m  th e  2 9 7 th N VA Ta n k  B a tta lio n .
A tta ck  b y  6 4 th N VA R e g im e n t w ith  ta n ks  fro m  th e  2 9 7 th N VA Ta n k  B a tta lio n .
A tta ck  b y  th e  in d e p e n d e n t 2 8 th N VA R e g im e n t o f th e  B -3  F ro n t.
P ro b in g  a tta cks  b y  th e  1 4 1 st N VA R e g im e n t o f th e  2 n d N VA D iv is io n .
G e n e ra l tra ce  o f fro n tlin e  p o s itio n s  o f 5 3 rd A R V N  R e g t. O th e r e le m e n ts  to  th e  e a s t,
n o rth e a s t, a n d  so u th e a s t o f h e re .
C P  o f 5 3 rd A R V N  R e g im e n t.
G e n e ra l tra ce  o f fro n tlin e  p o s itio n s  o f K o n tu m  R F  a n d  P F  +  b a tta lio n  o f 4 5 th R e g t.
T h e  D TO C  w ith  4 th B a tta lio n , 4 4 th A R V N  R e g im e n t fo r se cu rity.
The attacks on Kontum, 14–16 May 1972.
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Regiment is here.” I was a bit surprised because I did not know our 
arrival meant the entire 23rd Division was now assembled in Kon-
tum. Also, I did not realize how precarious the situation was until 
Colonel Truby briefed me. Then I could see how our one regiment 
could make a signifi cant difference.
The 44th Regiment was relieving the 2nd Ranger Group, 
which included the 11th, 22nd, and 72nd Ranger Battalions on 
FSB November, about four kilometers north of Kontum. This FSB 
blocked the enemy’s main avenue of approach along Highway 14. 
The Rangers’ senior adviser was Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. 
Stanford, a friend of mine from 1962 service in the 18th Infantry 
in Manheim, Germany. He oriented me on the area and the enemy 
situation. The relief in place had started two days earlier when the 
fi rst 44th Regiment units had arrived in Kontum. The soldiers who 
arrived with me would complete the process. Our troops quickly 
moved into the prepared positions that the Rangers were leaving. 
An attack was expected at any time, so we did not have the option of 
changing the troop dispositions and preparing new defensive posi-
tions. However, we soon learned the enemy artillery knew exactly 
where the old ARVN positions were located.
There were no friendly forces between the 44th Regiment and 
the NVA juggernaut moving toward us. Farther northwest, near 
the Cambodian border, steadfast Ben Het, Dak Pek, and Plei 
Mrong were still holding out. However, it was all “Indian territory” 
between them and us.1
The initial dispositions around the perimeter placed the 44th 
Regiment on FSB November and the 53rd Regiment east of High-
way 14 about two kilometers north of the city. Most of the 45th 
Regiment was in the north, but one battalion of the 45th was in 
the south, where it was manning part of the perimeter to serve as a 
reserve, and to put backbone into the Ruff Puffs holding the south-
ern sector.2
At 0700 on 13 May, radio intercepts revealed the 320th NVA 
Division was in the fi nal stage of attack prep arations in its assembly 
area. This news confi rmed air cavalry reports of a large buildup 
of enemy troops and tanks on Highway 14 just south of Vo Dinh.3 
When seven enemy tanks were spotted near Vo Dinh, they were hit 
by US and VNAF tactical air, and one tank was reported destroyed.4 
The same morning, an NVA supply truck driver gave a ride to a 
dozen Montagnard women but told them to stay out of that area in 
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the future. Refugees from Polei Kleng said they saw a large Com-
munist force of infantry with tanks following it moving toward 
Kontum City.
Colonel Tien, his executive offi cer (XO, second in command), 
Major Lovings, and I inherited what appeared to be a good, solid 
bunker, which had probably been built by US Army engineers. It 
was dug in about fi ve feet and had two layers of large-diameter 
pine logs crossed over the top and under a couple feet of dirt. A 
bunker like this should hold up against anything but a direct hit. 
We set up our folding canvas cots inside, stashed our gear beside 
them, and then walked around to check out the troops’ dispositions 
and preparations. The dominant feature on FSB November was the 
Round Hill just west of Highway 14. The 44th Regiment CP and 
one battalion would be there. Two of our battalions and one com-
pany of our 3rd Battalion would defend the perimeter in front of 
the Round Hill. The remainder of our 3rd Battalion was on Out-
post Nectar almost two kilometers farther north on the west side of 
Highway 14. Our 4th Battalion was providing security around the 
DTOC in back in Kontum.
While we were not in our bunker, it received a direct hit, which 
destroyed it, so we moved the regimental CP to a position closer to 
the front lines and not already pinpointed by the NVA artillery. We 
were in a pine forest with some heavier jungle on the edges. The 
ARVN soldiers dug a nice, deep, two-man foxhole with overhead 
cover for us, and we set up our cots beside it and under a poncho 
tied between some trees. We kept only the necessary equipment 
and personal belongings in the fi eld, moved our bags back to the 
DTOC, and stored them in a corner there.
Throughout the afternoon and evening of 13 May, reports of 
enemy activity kept coming in, including tank sightings, light con-
tact with enemy units, and sporadic artillery and rocket fi re on 
our positions. At 1750, heavy incoming fi re started falling on FSB 
November. At 1915, Major Lovings relayed to the DTOC a report of 
two enemy tanks and two artillery pieces sighted north of us.
It was dark by the time Major Lovings and I fi nished checking 
troop positions, communications, and our own plans for doing all 
we could to ensure the regiment was ready to face an enemy attack. 
Then we talked over whether the troops would hold fast or cut and 
run if tanks attacked us. We knew this regiment was a far better 
one in a far better division than the units that had collapsed at Tan 
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Canh and Dak To II. Our regiment and division also had far better 
leaders. Nevertheless, it was prudent to make our own contingency 
plans in case we were overrun and had to E&E like Lieutenant Col-
onel Brownlee and Captain Carden. When we fi rst arrived in Kon-
tum, we were briefed on how to E&E to a helicopter pickup point 
in case Kontum was overrun. A two-part survival kit sealed in hard 
plastic containers that fi t into the M-16 clip pouches on standard 
web equipment was issued to me in Ban Me Thuot months earlier. 
On one of our trips back to the DTOC, I acquired a “transponder,” 
which would send out a signal to aircraft searching for advisers try-
ing to E&E through the jungle. So we had some good equipment. 
Following our Ranger School training, we got under a poncho and 
used a fl ashlight to study our maps. We plotted a route we would 
try to follow to the pickup point and selected some rallying points 
where we would try to meet if we were separated. Then we settled 
in and hoped for the best.
At 1900 that evening, a radio intercept revealed that the 320th 
NVA Division was going to attack as soon as possible because it 
knew it had been detected and did not want to risk being bombed 
by B-52s. At 2020 on 13 May, an excited Colonel Ba entered the 
DTOC with an intercepted message from the 320th NVA Divi-
sion artillery commander ordering his artillery units to support a 
division attack scheduled to begin at 0400 the next morning. The 
report of the message came from a US signal intercept element in 
Kontum. The element informed Mr. Vann and Colonel Ba, but 
Colonel Truby learned about it from his counterpart, Colonel Ba, 
who considered the message authentic. With so many indications 
of an impending attack, Colonel Truby was now convinced it would 
come the next morning. He immediately called Mr. Vann and the 
II Corps G-3 adviser to relay this latest information and to request 
air attacks on the enemy tanks at fi rst light. The air assets were 
normally over Kontum around 0700, but Truby wanted them over-
head at fi rst light, by 0530. Vann was still not convinced a full-scale 
attack was coming because the NVA usually preceded its big attacks 
with an especially heavy artillery preparation, which had not hap-
pened yet. Although both Vann and the G-3 were still skeptical, 
Vann believed it was better to be prepared and told Truby he would 
get the air assets to him at fi rst light.5
At 2140, the DTOC alerted the regimental advisers to “check 
with counterparts on possibility of enemy action tonight.” At 2230, 
McKenna Kontum book.indb   170 6/14/2011   10:17:46 AM
TANKS ATTACKING! • 171
the 44th Regiment’s front-line troops reported vehicle lights com-
ing toward us down Highway 14. Major Lovings and I ran to a van-
tage point to see for ourselves. We were expecting the enemy to 
attack us in the night or at dawn with infantry and tanks, but here 
were vehicles driving down the highway toward us with their head-
lights blazing. Civilian vehicles were unlikely to be moving down 
this highway in the middle of the battlefi eld. Were NVA trucks 
boldly driving toward our lines with their headlights on? We did 
not know the Communists had driven with their tank headlights 
on when they attacked the 22nd Division at Tan Canh in the early-
morning darkness, so what we were seeing seemed crazy and inex-
plicable to us. However, what we saw actually was the enemy’s tanks, 
moving forward into their attack positions. The NVA was not expe-
rienced in maneuvering its tanks at night and probably decided it 
was more important to drive with the lights on and attack us at the 
scheduled time and place than to conceal its movement by driving 
with the lights off and risk getting lost in the dark.6
At 0400 on 14 May, the DTOC log recorded, “All defenses 
manned and ready.” A Spectre gunship was ordered to expend its 
remaining ammo in support of the 44th Regiment before return-
ing to base. The defenders were alert and waiting for the impend-
ing attack, but when 0400 came, there was no attack. Then the 
23rd Division G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Tieu, brought in another 
intercepted message, which indicated a half-hour delay in the 
attack, to 0430. Tieu also pointed out that because these orders 
were coming from B-3 Front head quarters, the time given was 
probably Hanoi time—one hour earlier than the Saigon time the 
defenders used. This would mean an 0530 attack. Colonel Truby 
had just settled in for some much-needed sleep outside the DTOC 
bunker when he was awakened by the sounds of the attack com-
mencing at 0530—right on schedule. The big test was starting. We 
would soon know how the 23rd Division troops would react to a 
tank attack.7
Starting at 0430, the volume of indirect fi re on FSB Novem-
ber became increasingly heavy. The tempo of ground probes and 
attacks by fi re increased, and a Spectre gunship used its minigun to 
hose down the enemy massing in front of us. After expending all 
its ammo, the Spectre departed.
At 0530, the incoming rounds suddenly increased. Enemy artil-
lery and rocket rounds were falling on our positions every fi ve to 
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ten seconds. By 0600, we were fi ghting off a fi erce ground assault 
by enemy tanks and infantry. The division artillery was respond-
ing to our calls for fi re support, but Major Lovings told the DTOC, 
“The incoming enemy artillery fi re is twice as strong as the friendly 
supporting fi re.” Colonel Hung, the division artillery commander 
and a graduate of the US Army Artillery School, massed all his 
artillery fi re on the attacking enemy. This action separated the NVA 
infantry from their tanks and allowed our tank-killer teams to fi re 
their M-72s at the enemy tanks.8 We soon received the fi rst report 
of an enemy tank knocked out by an M-72. We were too busy fi ght-
ing for our lives to think about it at the time, but when that fi rst 
plucky ARVN soldier crawled out of his hole and used a shoulder-
fi red rocket to destroy one of the oncoming iron monsters, it was an 
important turning point in the battle. The impact of that fi rst kill 
was far greater than just one tank knocked out; it demonstrated to 
our troops—and probably to the enemy—that a single ARVN infan-
tryman could kill a tank. This knowledge gave a big boost to our 
troops’ morale and confi dence. The fi rst kill was quickly followed 
by another report of a T-54 knocked out by an M-72. (Our troops 
may have used captured RPGs rather than M-72s to kill some of the 
T-54s.) The 23rd Division operations adviser, Lieutenant Colonel 
Bricker, said, “They fought the tanks before daylight, before we 
could bring in tactical air, the Cobras, the gunships, or the TOW 
missiles.”9
The initial attack was a fast fi ght. By 0625, the enemy assault 
was stopped, and I could report to the DTOC, “Seven enemy tanks 
destroyed and another three have fl ed.” Gladiator 29 started hunt-
ing for those three fl eeing tanks, but the T-54s soon revealed them-
selves by returning to attack our front line again. The DTOC called 
for air support, and a Covey FAC and VNAF A1s were scrambled to 
come to our assistance. The VNAF FAC and A1s would not arrive 
for another 40 to 45 minutes, but the DTOC reassured us that the 
“cavalry” was on the way. The Aerial TOW Team, anticipating they 
would be needed to help us deal with the enemy tanks, had already 
taken off from Pleiku. Hawk’s Claw arrived at 0650, and we directed 
them to the three tanks attacking us. Our own artillery was now fi r-
ing furiously at the attacking infantry and tanks, but this raised so 
much dust over the battlefi eld that the TOW gunners could not see 
the tanks. I readily called off the artillery because it was important 
to kill those T-54s, which were the main threat.10
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By 0705, the tide had turned. However, incoming fi re was 
increasing again, and we braced for a second attack. The Panther 
Cobra gunships would support us, and USAF tactical air was now 
overhead.11 As other enemy tank, truck, and gun positions were 
detected during the day, Hawk’s Claw and air strikes were used to 
destroy them.
The 23rd Division claimed ten enemy tanks were destroyed dur-
ing this one day of fi ghting, and ARVN claimed that the enemy 
lost 35 percent of his men and equipment over the next seven days 
of constant combat.12 We captured two POWs, who said they were 
from the 203rd NVA Tank Regiment.13 I later described the action 
in a letter: “In the initial assault North West of the city that day at 
dawn, the NVA threw ten tanks into the battle. It was only about 
20–30 minutes before Hawk’s Claw, the TOW fi ring helicopter 
arrived from Pleiku. I directed him to the area by radio and he 
rapidly knocked out his fi rst tank. The TOW got seven of the ten 
tanks that morning. One hit a mine and two were knocked out by 
our troops using an M-72 and a captured RPG.”14
The NVA attacks on 13 and14 May came on three major axes of 
advance. The 48th NVA Regiment of the 320th NVA Infantry Divi-
sion and one company of the 297th NVA Tank Battalion attacked 
from the northwest down the west side of Highway 14 to assault 
the 44th Regiment on FSB November. The 64th NVA Regiment 
of the 320th NVA Infantry Division, also with a company from the 
297th NVA Tank Battalion, attacked from the north–northwest on 
the east side of Highway 14 to assault the 45th ARVN Regiment. 
Farther east, the independent 28th NVA Regiment of the B-3 Front 
attacked the 53rd ARVN Regiment from the north. The 141st NVA 
Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division probed against the Ruff Puffs 
who were defending the southern sector of the perimeter. When 
the 320th NVA Division’s 52nd Regiment had attacked Polei Kleng 
and seized it on 9 May, it had suffered so many casualties that it was 
held in reserve during the mid-May attacks on Kontum.15
Until the morning of 14 May, I knew virtually nothing about the 
TOW-fi ring helicopters other than seeing a photo of a US Army 
helicopter armed with antitank missiles in a publication I had read 
while on R&R in Hong Kong.16 An American helicopter that could 
destroy a tank with one missile was an unpleasant surprise for the 
NVA tank crews. When a TOW missile hit a tank, it was like a bolt 
of lightning that burned a hole through the armor, exploded any 
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ammunition in its way, and probably killed the entire crew. Most 
of the enemy tanks the Aerial TOW Team attacked did not take 
evasive action and thus were stationary when the missile hit them. 
Two T-54s attempting to cross the Dak Kuet River fi ve kilometers 
northwest of Kontum on 14 May were a good example. The Aerial 
TOW Team rolled in and knocked out the lead tank, which was in 
the middle of the river. The second tank was still on the bank, but 
the crew bailed out and ran when they saw the fate of the lead tank. 
The TOWs then destroyed the abandoned tank.17 The Aerial TOW 
Team had three big advantages over tactical air: they could operate 
in marginal weather with a low ceiling; they could fi re multiple mis-
siles on the same run toward the target if they saw the fi rst missile 
was not enough; and they produced very little collateral damage to 
friendly troops or civilian structures.18
Although intermittent incoming rounds were still a hazard, 
there appeared to be a lull in the fi ghting. Mr. Vann and Major 
General Toan took advantage of it and choppered into town for 
lunch with Colonel Ba at the 23rd Division headquarters in Kon-
tum. A Los Angeles Times reporter asked the corps commander what 
he had done since taking command, and Toan responded, “I have 
tried to raise the morale of the troops. I gave the order to fi ght in 
place—no retreat—and I let them know that if someone has some 
successes he will get recompense. I am ready with rank insignia, 
decorations, and $120 as reward for each destroyed tank.” Vann 
admitted that until we successfully repelled the initial tank attack 
on Kontum, he had thought, “The chances [are] about 50–50” that 
we could hold. Now he was confi dent: “The line would be held.” 
From 14 May on, John Paul Vann came to Kontum at least once in 
every 24-hour period.19
On 14 May, Colonel R. M. Rhotenberry arrived in Vietnam to 
become senior adviser to the 23rd ARVN Division. Vann had specif-
ically requested Rhotenberry because he thought Rhotenberry had 
more combat experience than any other offi cer in the army. Rho-
tenberry was a highly decorated combat veteran who had earned 
the Distinguished Service Cross and a battlefi eld commission in 
Korea. This tour would be his fi fth in Vietnam—possibly a record 
for the number of one-year tours served by one man who was not 
a pilot. Because he had served so many tours in Vietnam, some of 
the ARVN offi cers called him “the soldier of fortune.” Especially 
signifi cant for this assignment, he had served most of his previous 
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tours as a MACV adviser, had worked with Ly Tong Ba during his 
1962–1963 tour when Ba had been province chief of Binh Duong 
Province, and had worked closely with John Paul Vann from July 
1966 to July 1967. Rhotenberry was the right man for the job.20
When Colonel Rhotenberry arrived at Tan Son Nhut on 14 May, 
Mr. Vann had a U-21 fi xed-wing, propeller-driven airplane waiting 
to fl y him to Pleiku. Vann was fl ying over the Kontum battlefi eld in 
his own helicopter that day, but as soon as he could, he fl ew Rhoten-
berry to Kontum. During the fl ight, Vann briefed him, described 
his mission, and emphasized how important it was. Rhotenberry 
remembered exactly what Vann said: “Here’s what I want you to 
do. I want you to make sure that the 23rd Division holds Kontum. 
I don’t care what you need. Let me know and I’ll get it for you. 
You know, Rhot, this is very important to me. My credibility is at 
stake. At Tan Canh the troop disposition was mine. I said we could 
defend there if we disposed the troops the way they were disposed. 
And they didn’t hold. My career is at stake because I’ve said we can 
defend Kontum. If you don’t hold it, I no longer have any credibil-
ity or career.”21
Colonels Truby and Rhotenberry had fi rst met in 1962 when 
they were in the initial large group of advisers sent to Vietnam and 
went through adviser training together at Fort Bragg, North Caro-
lina. They agreed Rhotenberry would stay in the background and 
let Truby continue to run things for a few days before taking over 
from him. Rhotenberry wanted to learn as much as possible as soon 
as possible about how the 23rd Division, II Corps, and the Ameri-
can and ARVN staffs in the DTOC were operating. He believed 
he could not infl uence anything until he was “hooked in” with the 
Vietnamese. He had had only a few hours of sleep since arriving 
in Vietnam and would now go without any sleep for the next two 
nights, staying up all night to listen to the tactical frequency on the 
DTOC radio, observing the operation of the DTOC, and asking 
questions. During this period, he ran on coffee and Camel ciga-
rettes. Rhotenberry knew Lieutenant Colonel Bricker slightly, but 
the other members of Team 33 were strangers to him. He decided 
the Americans were running an independent TOC and needed to 
exchange information with the Vietnamese staff to compare, cross-
check, and evaluate what they were receiving from US sources. The 
enemy pressure was continuous as Rhotenberry tried to fi gure out 
the tempo of the NVA attacks.
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Colonel Rhotenberry’s main concern was the division units’ 
capabilities. Would they fi ght or fl ee? He also wanted to assess the 
advisers’ qualifi cations. Assessing the tactical situation was impor-
tant, but assessing the advisers was equally important. He thought 
the advisers in the DTOC were not sending information to II Corps, 
so he ordered them to start doing it. The air assets had been turned 
over to the regiments, and he brought them back under division 
control. He also wanted any adjustments in the air or fi re support 
relayed back to him so he could cross-check that information with 
the ARVN staff. He decided that the information from the ARVN 
chain of command was more accurate than information received 
through the advisers.22
During the remainder of 14 May, most of Kontum City was hit 
with some intermittent incoming artillery and rocket fi re. The 
perimeter defenses and the 44th Regiment’s CP were hardest hit. 
Some of the incoming was silenced when the enemy batteries were 
located from the air and then hit with tactical air strikes. Impor-
tant areas, such as the DTOC and the airfi eld, were hit in a man-
ner indicating that the impacting rounds were being adjusted by 
enemy forward observers to pinpoint where heavy barrages should 
fall in conjunction with a future attack. Fierce, hand-to-hand fi ght-
ing restored the 23rd Division’s front lines by nightfall on the 14th. 
However, Colonel Ba was concerned that the enemy would get in 
behind the 44th Regiment on FSB November and occupy the grave-
yard between FSB November and the city. If NVA forces could seize 
and hold the graveyard, they would be in a position to smash the 
44th between the “hammer” of their attacks on the front line and 
the “anvil” of their blocking position behind the regiment.23
While walking the line to check our positions after dark that 
night, I was surprised when an American sergeant from the 82nd 
Airborne Division reported to me. He was the leader of a Jeep-
mounted TOW team. Sergeant Thatcher explained what the TOW 
could do, and we worked out where it could best be employed: just 
below the nose of the hill in a lightly wooded area where he could 
fi re at any tanks guiding on Highway 14 to attack us. TOW gunner 
Private First Class Angel L. Figueroa was credited with knocking 
out a T-54 on the evening of 14 May. Firing through the woods, he 
hit several trees but then got a round through the trees and saw it 
hit the tank. Other tanks were driven back by incoming artillery 
before he could fi re at them. Figueroa was probably the fi rst Amer-
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ican soldier to destroy an enemy tank in combat by fi ring a Jeep-
mounted TOW missile at it.24
A total of 26 Jeep-mounted TOW teams from the US 82nd 
Airborne were sent to Vietnam on temporary duty. Maintenance 
contact teams, a Department of the Army missile-maintenance 
technician, and TOW instructors from the United States accom-
panied the TOW teams to Vietnam. After four days of training 
and practice fi ring at Bien Hoa, an enormous American base just 
north of Saigon, 23 TOW teams with 18 Jeep-mounted TOW sys-
tems were airlifted into Pleiku and Kontum. The other three TOW 
teams remained at Bien Hoa. In Vietnam, the TOW teams were 
assigned to the ad hoc Task Force Salvo with the mission “to pro-
vide timely anti-mechanized defense for the safety and evacuation 
of U.S. personnel.” Salvo was composed of D Company of the 1st 
Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment; a “TOW company” made up of 
selected infantrymen from the Cavalry Brigade’s maneuver battal-
ions; a Ground Surveillance Radar Section from headquarters and 
Headquarters and Service Battery of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artil-
lery; and 12 Jeep-mounted TOWs in a “brigade antitank platoon.” 
The “brigade” designation was probably a cover to give the impres-
sion that this platoon was part of the 3rd Brigade (Separate) of the 
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), which was still in Vietnam. The 
arrival of the TOW teams in Vietnam was classifi ed, and the mes-
sage from MACV headquarters to the corps advisers concerning 
the movement of these “3rd Brigade” troops to Pleiku was classi-
fi ed “Secret.”25
When John Paul Vann asked General Abrams for authority to 
send some of the Jeep-mounted TOWs to Kontum under command 
of the senior adviser to the 23rd Division, Abrams approved it, say-
ing, “Some of the people up there are very worried about tanks. 
But: my real reason is as long as those advisers are going to stay 
there, I want to—I think it improves their situation immensely. And 
that’s what it’s for. Also, they may get a chance to knock out some 
tanks, which will be also pretty good. . . . It’s also reported to me 
that’s [the TOW crews] a pretty fi ne bunch of men.”26
Colonel Truby deployed two of the three Jeep-mounted TOW 
teams on FSB November because we faced the greatest threat of 
a tank attack. The third team was held in reserve near the DTOC, 
where it could also protect that facility.
At 2000 the night of 14 May, we were hit again. The enemy 
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infantry came in hard and fast, and some tanks came with them. 
This assault was more intense than the one we had fought off in 
the early morning, and the 53rd Regiment on our right fl ank, to 
the east, was hit equally hard. In the darkness, an NVA battalion 
managed to get in between the 44th and 53rd Regiments. Major 
Lovings and I realized we were fi ghting off three separate enemy 
battalions to our front, right fl ank, and rear. We were in a peril-
ous situation, and Colonel Tien called for artillery fi re on our own 
positions. A commander does this at great risk to his own troops 
and only as a last, desperate measure to prevent being overrun. If 
all goes well, the friendly troops will be safe in bunkers or foxholes 
with adequate overhead cover, but the attacking enemy infantry 
will be mowed down by the airbursts of artillery rounds with vari-
able-time or proximity fuses (which would detonate at a set height 
above the ground). If only rounds with impact fuses are available, 
they can be used, but the risk to friendly troops is greater because 
a round that detonates only when it hits something can blow apart 
any foxhole or bunker it lands on. Colonel Tien’s request for artil-
lery fi re on our positions was cancelled when a Spectre gunship 
arrived overhead and was allocated to us because we were being 
attacked from three directions and needed immediate help. Tar-
gets received from the front lines were relayed through Colonel 
Tien to Major Lovings, who told Spectre where to fi re around our 
imperiled perimeter.27
At this point in the battle, Colonel Truby was concerned about 
the lack of an uncommitted division reserve. Colonel Ba had previ-
ously tentatively agreed to use the 45th Regiment’s battalion posi-
tioned in the south as a reserve. However, now that the battalion 
was needed to counterattack the penetration, Ba would not move it 
through town in the dark. Also, he did not want to risk leaving only 
the Ruff Puffs to defend the vulnerable southern perimeter. Some-
thing needed to be done fast, or Kontum would fall before dawn. 
Colonel Ba agreed to move the 53rd’s own reserve into position in 
front of the enemy forces’ penetration to block them from driving 
deeper into the defenses.28
Without a division reserve to counterattack and with the situa-
tion rapidly worsening, Colonel Truby recommended a B-52 strike 
at the base of the penetration. Colonel Ba and Mr. Vann concurred, 
but less than an hour later they learned it was disapproved in Sai-
gon because it was too close to a village just north of the penetra-
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tion. One of the advisers commented that on a target like the closely 
massed NVA attacking force, an Arc Light would have almost the 
shock effect of a nuclear strike. This comment reminded Truby of 
a discussion at the Command and General Staff College 15 years 
earlier about how troops in contact could be withdrawn, a low kilo-
ton tactical nuclear weapon could be used on the enemy, and then 
the friendly troops could attack to regain their position. (The army 
later realized the inadvisability of entering an area with high levels 
of radiation.) With this reminder, Truby realized the same tactic 
could be used with an Arc Light.29
Although the 53rd Regiment troops could temporarily pull back 
from the Arc Light strike box, the 44th Regiment would still be too 
close to it. Because the NVA held the streambed behind the Round 
Hill, the 44th could not be pulled back there. Colonel Truby called 
me on the landline between the DTOC and FSB November. He 
said that we were in a desperate situation and that drastic action 
was required to prevent us from being overrun that night. He 
proposed putting in an Arc Light dangerously close to our lines 
to catch the enemy in the open as they massed to attack us. He 
pointed out the danger of a B-52 strike so close to us and asked if I 
was willing to take the risk. We were already close to being overrun, 
and the worst was probably yet to come. We did need something 
extra to tip the odds in our favor. I agreed to have the Arc Light 
hit wherever the DTOC wanted to plot it. Captain John R. Finch 
plotted the nearest edge of the Arc Light box only 700 yards from 
our front-line troops. Such a close strike was a safety violation, but 
Finch thought—as I would have had I known it at the time—that tak-
ing this risk was better than being overrun.
Colonel Truby convinced Colonel Ba to pull the 53rd Regiment 
troops defending against the penetration 500 meters south so that a 
previously approved B-52 strike could be diverted 200 meters south 
into a previously used Arc Light box. Mr. Vann was hesitant to 
approve this plan because of its complexity. However, after talking 
to both Truby and Ba and with Ba’s agreement, Vann approved it 
for lack of any feasible alternative. When the Arc Light request was 
phoned in, there were objections because it would go into an Arc 
Light box used previously. Colonel Truby got on the phone and 
pointed out that the attacking NVA was probably using the bomb 
craters from the previous Arc Light as cover and so hitting exactly 
the same area was likely to produce extra casualties. The ARVN 
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troops were pulled back at the appointed time, and artillery fi re 
into the penetration was increased to hold the NVA in place. The 
Arc Light struck at 0425, and the NVA attack was broken up shortly 
after it started.30
Just behind the front lines on FSB November, Major Lovings 
and I got into a good, deep foxhole and squeezed down into the 
bottom before the scheduled Arc Light. There was time to pon-
der how accurate the air force could be from 30,000 feet above us. 
If just one bomb bumped into another bomb as they tumbled out 
of the bomb bay, it might be thrown off course enough to hit us. 
When the Arc Light struck at 0425, there was a rumbling vibration 
that seemed to start from deep down in the center of the earth. We 
heard a long series of loud, shrill whistles as the sound of the fall-
ing bombs reached us. These whistles were intermixed with the 
long drum roll of explosions as the bombs detonated. When those 
hundreds of bombs came screeching down, it sounded as if they 
were all coming straight toward our foxhole. During a BDA the 
next day, the crater of one errant 750-pound bomb was found only 
300 meters from our front lines. We may have been as close to the 
impact of an Arc Light bomb as any American soldiers ever were 
during the Vietnam War.31
After the Arc Light hit, the 53rd’s own reserve was able to coun-
terattack and eject the enemy from the penetration. Colonel Ba 
ordered limited offensives into the areas bombed the night of 14 
May. So at fi rst light the morning of 15 May, ARVN troops pushed 
out from our lines to fi nd the enemy’s new positions, develop new 
Arc Light targets, and count the carnage. Hundreds of bodies and 
many parts of bodies were found within the Arc Light box and 
half of them were in the old bomb craters. At least 200 dead NVA 
soldiers lay in front of the 44th Regiment’s lines, and Major Rich-
ard O. Perry with the 53rd Regiment reported another 189. Our 
troops also picked up a couple hundred enemy weapons. While the 
2nd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, was searching the B-52 strike area at 
1000, they found 23 enemy KIA and one WIA. The wounded NVA 
soldier said they had just started their attack when the bombs fell 
on them. He revealed that even before the strike there were only 
25 men left in his company. The air cavalry reported a big increase 
in enemy activity west, northeast, and southeast of Kontum City 
that day. The NVA buildup in the south, where the Ruff Puffs 
manned the perimeter, especially concerned the advisers. Many of 
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the troops in those territorial forces lived in Kontum and were in 
the habit of going home for the night, leaving unmanned gaps in 
our defenses.32
Just after 1500, the 1st Battalion, 44th Regiment, west of High-
way 14 on our left fl ank, received heavy mortar and machine gun 
fi re from the northeast across Highway 14. That assault continued 
through the afternoon as the incoming fi re increased all along the 
front.33 The enemy sometimes scored a lucky hit with all that inter-
mittent artillery, rocket, and mortar fi re. In the late afternoon, one 
or more of their rounds struck the JP-4 aircraft-fuel storage at Kon-
tum airfi eld and set it on fi re.34
On the night of 14–15 May, sappers cut the fence around the 
POL storage area in Pleiku and used C-4 plastic explosives to 
destroy a storage tank containing 150,000 gallons of JP-4. They 
rigged other storage tanks for destruction, but the explosives did 
not detonate. This was a major loss of aviation fuel during a period 
when the refueling point at Pleiku was using 32,000 gallons a day. 
The sappers also destroyed the pumping station. Attacks by fi re 
on the Pleiku airfi eld destroyed 330 tons of ammunition, includ-
ing 97 tons of dynamite, 90,000 feet of detonating cord, 18,000 
one-pound blocks of TNT, 90,000 fuses for the 105-mm shells, 
and various amounts of 40-mm, 57-mm, and smaller ammo. This 
explosion must have made one heck of a racket, and the sight and 
sound must have given the enemy a tremendous sense of accom-
plishment. The JP-4 operation was soon back in operation, but the 
total ammunition and POL losses were staggering, and replenish-
ing them by truck up Highway 19 would always be dangerous and 
sometimes impossible for days on end.35
Captain Giap Phuc Hai described his experience in Kontum:
Soon all the three regiments of the 23rd Division were in 
place; the fi eld command was unifi ed, and on May 13th, 
1972, my boss told me to be ready as the enemy was expected 
to launch the attack in the wee hours of next day morn-
ing. Indeed, they did. The shelling was intense; the division 
TOC was hit with delayed type 130-mm shells, [and] quite 
a few staff were killed or wounded as part of the bunker 
collapsed, especially the corner where the air force support 
section sat. The enemy also used captured 105/155 howit-
zers to shell us, and that was the fi rst time I knew what a 
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“fl eshette” meant or looked like. I faithfully wore my fl ak 
jacket and helmet since.
On the radio, the front troops reported that enemy tanks 
were hit, but they did not know who did it and how they were 
destroyed. Our little house/triage area was hit by 90-mm 
shell from T-54 tank. It also hit the place where we collected 
guns and grenades from the wounded soldiers. The smoke 
grenades exploded, and very soon most of us were painted 
in different colors: purple, yellow, orange. No one was killed; 
many of us were slightly wounded. That day we counted 
over 400 WIA. The ambulances were moving nonstop. Calls 
[were] coming from all the places, and we managed to help 
out. The seriously wounded were fl own out by choppers to 
Pleiku Military Hospital. Among them was the CO of the 
45th Regiment, with his femoral artery severed. He survived 
and returned to visit us many months later, wearing new 
rank of Colonel. He brought us Ban Me Thuot coffee as a 
token of gratitude. Another night, the call for helicopter was 
answered right away for a severe case of chest wound. The 
VNAF helicopters always came when we needed them. My boss’s 
friendship with the air force staff paid off very handsomely, 
and it was a lesson that I cherished and later applied during 
my brief military career. We parked 4 ambulances with park-
ing lights on at 4 corners, and the chopper was able to land 
straight down in that area.
One day, a major, CO of a battalion of the 44th Reg., 
was sent to me because of severe malaria. He just wanted a 
quick IV with quinine; he did not want to leave his battal-
ion. He was physically exhausted. I saw that his young wife 
accompanied him to Kontum from Song Mao. I forced him 
to stay, and I admitted him to my “quarter.” I wanted him to 
have some much needed rest as well as some time with his 
wife. He was KIA a few weeks later by a shell which landed 
right over his tent. He was a graduate of our Dalat Military 
Academy.36
A crewman from one of the enemy tanks attacking us on 14 
May was captured and told his story. Corporal Tran Van Minh said 
he was a tank gunner in the 2nd Company, 297th Tank Battalion, 
203rd NVA Tank Regiment. He had been born 9 October 1952 in 
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Van Yen Village, Dai Tu District, Ac Thai Province; had gradu-
ated from high school; and had been a candidate for the University 
of Agriculture when he was drafted in August 1970. After train-
ing and service in various places, his tank battalion started to infi l-
trate down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in December 1971. After the 
long march south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the enemy rested, 
reequipped, and trained in base areas or secret zones they con-
trolled. There were eight of those base areas within II Corps and 
another four adjacent to it across the western border with Laos and 
Cambodia.37 They arrived in the Central Highlands in March 1972 
and came down Highway 14 to attack Kontum.
On 13 May, Lieutenant Luyen (full name not known), their com-
pany commander, briefed them and said that, following an artil-
lery barrage, they would attack at 0300 the next morning. Four 
tanks from their company would attack with the 3rd Battalion of 
the 48th Infantry Regiment and the 7th Infantry Battalion of the 
64th Infantry Regiment. It would be a two-pronged attack, with 
800 meters between the prongs and two tanks leading each infantry 
battalion. They were told there was a threat from M-72 “light anti-
tank weapons,” but the ARVN soldiers would probably run rather 
than use them. After they “rolled over” FSB November, they were 
to continue south to attack Kontum City.
Minh was the fi rst POW to report that an NVA commander had 
admitted an attack might fail. He was told that if their attack did 
not succeed before dawn, they were to withdraw to the shelter of a 
banana grove, where engineers of the 14th Company of Engineers, 
which was attached to the 203rd Tank Regiment, had prepared 
positions. They were also told if the “Tay Nguyen Battlefi eld”—the 
western Highlands—was not liberated before the end of the dry 
season, the campaign must continue into the wet season to “succeed 
at any price.”
At 0300, Minh’s tank and the tank it was paired with drove onto 
Highway 14 and proceeded toward the right (western) side of their 
objective, FSB November. The other two tanks and the infantry bat-
talion behind them were proceeding toward the left (eastern) side 
of the objective. Then Lieutenant Luyen ordered the two tanks on 
the right to join those on the left. All four tanks attacked, but Minh 
could not fi re his main gun because of some mechanical diffi culty. 
As his tank reached the fi rst ARVN bunker, it was hit in rapid suc-
cession by the rounds from three LAWs and one captured RPG. All 
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four of the attacking tanks were destroyed. Minh never learned the 
fate of the other crews, but he was the only survivor in his tank.
Minh said that at the NVA tank school they had received a lec-
ture on coordinating tanks and infantry, but they did not know 
how to do it because they had never practiced. He thought a lack 
of coordination and their failure to rehearse their attack were the 
reasons they failed to overrun FSB November. This failure threw 
off the timetable for the attack on Kontum City.38
When the advisers and ARVN soldiers had inspected some of 
the tanks knocked out at An Loc, they had discovered that the 
Communist crewmen had been chained into their seats.39 We never 
saw evidence of such extreme measures in NVA tanks captured or 
knocked out in Kontum.
The US Army’s doctrine for employing tanks emphasizes 
armor’s special strengths: shock action, fi repower, and mobility. By 
the 1970s, the main guns on the major military powers’ medium 
and heavy tanks were at least 90 or 100 millimeters, and their range 
and penetrating power made them deadly to any opposing vehicles, 
including enemy tanks. They could also destroy bunkers or blast 
through the walls of buildings. The NVA often drove their tanks 
down the roads when they should have sacrifi ced speed for safety by 
moving cross-country. Other times they moved slowly and cautiously 
when they should have gone “hell bent for leather” to overrun the 
ARVN defenders. On many occasions, they employed their tanks 
almost hesitantly by attacking with only a few tanks at a time rather 
than in overwhelming mass. Also, they failed to employ their tanks 
and infantry as a team. The infantry can protect tanks against indi-
vidual enemy soldiers who can approach from the tanks’ blind spots 
to disable or destroy them with a shoulder-fi red rocket or an explo-
sive charge. The tanks can protect their infantry and advance the 
attack by knocking out enemy armored vehicles or heavy-weapons
positions in bunkers or buildings.
As the fi ghting and our bombing intensifi ed, thousands of civil-
ians were driven from their homes. The fl ow of refugees grew to 
a fl ood. Immediately after the disasters at Dak To and Tan Canh, 
about 30,000 civilians had fl ed from Kontum to the coastal regions 
and southern provinces. Between late April and mid-May, 20,000 
refugees were evacuated from Kontum, but more refugees kept 
coming. Barefooted Montagnard men wearing loincloths and bare-
breasted women carrying their babies in slings and their posses-
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sions in reed baskets streamed into Kontum, fl eeing ahead of the 
NVA. By mid-May, there were still 15,000 Yards and 10,000 other 
refugees in the city. Weapons were issued to 2,500 of the Mon-
tagnard men, and they were assigned to the militia units defend-
ing the city. On 15 May, the airlift effort was increased to evacuate 
other refugees to the relative safety of Pleiku. At the same time that 
14,000 refugees from Kontum and points north managed to reach 
Pleiku, 45,000 of Pleiku’s own population of 60,000 fl ed the city.40
At a briefi ng with his fi eld commanders, General Abrams said 
about the battle, “I doubt the fabric of this thing could have been 
held together without US air. But the thing that had to happen 
before that is the Vietnamese, some numbers of them, had to stand 
and fi ght. If they didn’t do that, ten times the air we’ve got wouldn’t 
have stopped them.”41
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Struggling to
Hold It Together
Under extended bombardment or bombing the nerve ends 
are literally beaten. The ear drums are tortured by blast and 
the eyes ache from the constant hammering.
—John Steinbeck, Once There Was a War
At 1950 on 15 May, the incoming fi re increased in caliber and vol-
ume. Our regiment’s front-line elements on the Round Hill were 
being hit with direct fi re from the NVA tanks’ 100-mm main guns. 
At 2016, four to six T-54s were spotted about a kilometer to the 
northeast on the forward slope of a hill the other side of Highway 
14. A Spectre gunship was on station and unsuccessfully attacked 
the tanks with 40-mm cannon fi re. The Jeep-mounted TOWs fi red 
at the tanks and thought they scored two hits. Both Spectre and a 
USAF FAC later reported seeing a tank burning. Hawk’s Claw was 
launched from its laager in Pleiku, and the C-130 dropped fl ares 
to illuminate the tanks for them. However, the TOW gunners were 
unable to locate the tanks in their sighting systems. After fi ring one 
missile at a suspected target, Hawk’s Claw returned to Pleiku. The 
tanks withdrew after a couple hours, but the gunship remained 
on station to provide illumination and fi re support. Our front-line 
units reported receiving tank fi re again at 0615 the next morning.1
John Paul Vann thought the enemy offensive would be stopped 
at Kontum because B-52 strikes and artillery could break the siege 
and destroy the bulk of the NVA in the Highlands. He said, “The 
enemy has suffi cient forces to be able to die for the next six to eight 
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weeks around Kontum. Whether or not Kontum is held is going to 
depend on how much steel there is in [South Vietnam’s] soldiers 
and how much air power and airborne resupply we can provide to 
them.”2
Scattered attacks continued across the Highlands over the next 
two days. At 0600 on 16 May, FSB 42 south of Kontum received 
indirect fi re and a ground attack that penetrated the perimeter 
wire. The attack was beaten off, with 47 enemy and 23 ARVN KIA. 
Elements of the 44th, 45th, and 53rd regiments made contact with 
the enemy north of Kontum. Hawk’s Claw confi rmed an enemy 
tank destroyed by a mine west of our positions, and their TOW 
missiles destroyed two APCs, an ammo truck, and a 105-mm artil-
lery piece. They also blew up an ammo dump fi ve kilometers west 
of Vo Dinh. At 0325 on 17 May, sappers got into the Pleiku air base 
ammo dump and destroyed some 105-mm and other ammo. Sap-
per attacks also destroyed 1,500 tons of ammunition at Cam Ranh 
Bay. Mr. Vann advised Major General Toan to infl ict and adver-
tise the stiffest possible disciplinary actions for all such defensive 
failures.3
Colonel Ba decided he needed to eliminate the enemy penetra-
tions, so on 16 May a battalion of the 44th Regiment attacked to 
drive the NVA out of the streambed behind our regiment’s posi-
tions on the Round Hill. The 44th was unable to clear the enemy 
out of the streambed completely before dark, when it had to return 
to FSB November to man positions there during the night. Then 
the reserve from the 53rd Regiment counterattacked the enemy in 
a graveyard on the northwest, but that attack was also unsuccessful.4
The NVA continued its harassment and interdiction fi re on Kon-
tum City and refi ned its attacks on aircraft landing at the airfi eld. 
Every time a helicopter landed to refuel, up to 12 rounds of artil-
lery or mortar fi re would be fi red at it. Enemy forward observers 
were adjusting this indirect fi re. At 1515 on 16 May, three helicopters 
were damaged and a crewman wounded by incoming fi re. Starting 
at 1740, another 50 rounds landed in 20 minutes. Two VNAF C-123s 
sitting on the parking ramp were systematically destroyed. One was 
loaded with ammunition, and when it exploded, shrapnel fl ew in 
every direction, and the runway was badly pitted. The airfi eld was 
closed until 0645 the next morning. Mr. Vann recommended to the 
corps commander that he direct the Kontum Province chief to use 
martial law authority to organize an airfi eld cleanup team of civil-
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ians to sweep the runways after future attacks by fi re. The C-123s 
destroyed at Kontum were later bulldozed aside to make offl oading 
space for other aircraft.5 The division artillery, with its incoming 
ammo supply cut off while it was fi ring almost constantly, was dan-
gerously low on some types of ammunition. A few artillery units 
were down to only 10 percent of their normal ammunition stock—
not a comfortable level in the early stages of a big battle. It would 
be necessary to increase and maintain ammunition levels by fl ying 
more USAF C-130 and VNAF C-123 missions into Kontum despite 
the danger to aircraft and crews. At 2240, an enemy assault against 
the 53rd Regiment was stopped dead in its tracks when an Arc 
Light hit the attacking enemy force.6
Major General Toan and Mr. Vann spent the night of 16–17 May 
in Kontum at the 23rd Division DTOC to iron out arrangements 
and responsibilities for controlling and monitoring the airfi eld. 
Toan appeared to have reservations about Colonel Ba’s ability to 
run the battle and was openly critical of his performance. Colonel 
Rhotenberry took over as Ba’s adviser on 16 May, and Vann sug-
gested—probably because of Rhotenberry’s previous relationship 
with Ba as his adviser in 1962—that this change might strengthen 
the division commander’s performance. After a month and a half 
in Kontum, Colonel Truby departed on the morning of 17 May and 
returned to his assignment in Nha Trang. Before he left, Colonel 
Ba assembled the American and Vietnamese staffs and presented 
Truby with the ARVN Gallantry Cross.7
Colonel Rhotenberry learned that Mr. Vann dealt directly with 
his “doers” in the fi eld and did not go through his staff. He did 
not follow a routine or operate on normal hours. His Arc Light 
briefi ng could be at 0200. There was no working telephone land-
line between the DTOC in Kontum and II Corps headquarters in 
Pleiku. Communication by FM radio required a radio relay, such 
as an aircraft overhead, and Rhotenberry quickly gave up on that. 
So his voice contact with Vann and the other II Corps advisers 
was by single-sideband radio. It was not a secure means of com-
munication, but Vann discussed everything over the radio, and he 
sometimes called three times during the night. Colonel Ba slept 
upstairs, above the DTOC, and Rhotenberry slept in the DTOC 
by the radio until around 5 June, when a small bunker was built 
next to the DTOC for him to live in. During this period, Vann wore 
slacks, a T-shirt, and a helicopter pilot’s “chicken plate” or “bullet 
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bouncer”—a carrier with front and back ceramic plates encased in 
fi berglass. Rhotenberry never wore a fl ak jacket, so he sometimes 
joked with Vann about his chicken plate.8
Brigadier General Hill thought Colonel Rhotenberry acted 
more in the capacity of a liaison offi cer than as an adviser and 
later said, “He was more Ba’s man to us than he was our man to 
Ba. Perhaps he had known Colonel Ba too long but he failed to 
prod him, as a senior adviser should, to take actions like establish-
ing outposts in front of the perimeter.”9 Hill also criticized Colo-
nel Ba for not using his tanks. Colonel Rhotenberry said that on 
one visit Hill “really chewed Ba’s ass,” and Ba was understand-
ably upset. On Vann’s next visit, Rhotenberry took him aside and 
asked him to “get Hill off our ass. We have enough trouble with 
the enemy.” From then on Hill came to Kontum only to ask if they 
needed anything.10
At a 17 May press conference in Pleiku, Mr. Vann answered ques-
tions and made a number of points on a variety of issues. He said 
that although 20,000 refugees had been evacuated from Kontum, 
they kept coming, and 30,000 more were waiting to be evacuated. 
During the rainy season, we could get air support only 50 percent 
of the time. B-52 strikes and bombing by tactical air had killed half 
the men in the 320th NVA Infantry Division. The 2nd NVA Infan-
try Division was 3 to 15 kilometers from Kontum. An NVA tank 
crewman who was captured the previous Sunday said he did not 
have a round chambered in his main gun when he entered Kontum 
because they were told the infantry had already seized the objective. 
Vann added, “The NVA are characterized by dogged determina-
tion. They will keep attacking as long as one man is left.”11 A Hoi 
Chanh from the 48th NVA Regiment said his regiment had been 
massing north of Kontum for an attack on us when they were hit by 
a B-52 strike and suffered extensive casualties.12
Artillery and mortar fi re continued to pound the airfi eld on 17 
May. At 1130, two Cobra gunships were damaged and a crewmem-
ber was wounded when a rocket landed nearby. My letter home on 
this day said, “Tonight, the U.S. Air Force will be fl ying in again all 
night. The U.S. Air Force has saved us so far. The South Vietnam-
ese would be lost without it. One of the tanks we knocked out on 14 
May was operable and it is now on display at the soccer fi eld. Kon-
tum is 90% evacuated.”
On the third consecutive day of constant attacks against the 44th 
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Regiment, 17 May, the NVA were infi ltrating around and behind us 
by using the streambed of the Dak To Dreh, which ran north–south 
behind the Round Hill where the 44th was positioned. The stream-
bed was so deep and narrow that enemy movement could not be 
seen from the Round Hill on FSB November. The enemy was also 
infi ltrating into the graveyard between the Round Hill and the city. 
This graveyard was important terrain because it had a command-
ing view of the airfi eld and the city. Securing the graveyard was the 
responsibility of the 53rd Regiment, but if the enemy were to hold 
it, they would cut off the 44th Regiment from the rest of the defen-
sive perimeter. Enemy infi ltration into the graveyard increased 
during the night of 16 May and by morning of 17 May a reinforced 
enemy battalion was holding it, and the situation was serious.
Colonel Rhotenberry did not normally eat breakfast, but this 
morning he started eating all his meals, including breakfast, with 
Colonel Ba. It gave them a chance to talk without interruption or 
staff members listening in. Rhotenberry discussed their “grave” 
problem with Colonel Ba. When Mr. Vann came, Colonel Rhoten-
berry told him we needed help and requested an Arc Light in the 
vicinity of the graveyard to hit after dark. He showed Vann where 
the Arc Light box should be positioned and admitted that some 
ARVN troops would be inside the required three-kilometer stand-
off from the strike. Colonel Ba knew how desperately we needed 
the Arc Light and said that his troops would pull back to a safe dis-
tance just before the strike. Neither Vann nor Rhotenberry said so, 
but they both knew those ARVN soldiers would not really make a 
move like that in the dark.13 The Arc Light fortunately struck with-
out any friendly casualties.
On 17 May, General Abrams briefed Vice President Spiro Agnew 
when Agnew stopped in Saigon en route to Bangkok. He told the 
vice president that the South Vietnamese needed good divisions 
rather than more divisions. When asked about weaponry, Abrams 
reassured the vice president that “the M48 tank will outdo any 
Soviet tank here” and noted that the 3rd and 22nd Divisions had 
folded from inept leadership rather than from inadequate or infe-
rior weaponry. He said the ARVN troops were good soldiers when 
properly led; although there were some South Vietnamese gener-
als who wanted to fi ght, only about ten of them were earning their 
pay. He added, “After this situation is fi nished, the Government 
of South Vietnam will know those who will fi ght and those who 
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won’t.” Abrams also praised the US advisers as heroic, smart, and 
professional in every sense of the word and gave them credit for 
holding the situation together during the most critical times. He 
said it was too early to be certain, but he was “beginning to feel that 
the thing is turning.”14
To the south of Kontum, just across the Dak Bla River, there 
were NVA forward observers who could call in artillery fi re when-
ever they saw a target on the airfi eld. The ARVN would fi re a few 
mortar rounds at the observers’ probable locations when an aircraft 
was inbound, but Kontum airfi eld remained a dangerous place to 
be caught in the open. Major Richard C. Gudat, one of our Team 
33 G-4 advisers, spent a great deal of time there supervising the 
unloading of aircraft and the disposition of cargo. At 1430 on 17 
May, a C-130E from the 776th Tactical Airlift Squadron, 374th Tac-
tical Airlift Wing, approached, and Gudat made radio contact with 
the pilot. Gudat directed, “Land and travel to the end of the fi eld 
while unhooking your load as you go. At the end, turn quickly, and 
unass your load down the ramp as you take off.” Unfortunately, 
the pilot moved too slowly. He turned around and started back 
toward takeoff with his cargo of ammo on pallets sliding down the 
open ramp as he rolled down the runway. Mortar rounds suddenly 
started falling around the C-130, and the pilot decided to take off 
immediately. The aircraft started climbing before the ramp—which 
was probably weighed down by the third and last pallet—was up, 
and sparks fl ew as it dragged on the runway. When the pilot started 
to climb and turn, the C-130’s right wing hit a brick kiln at the end 
of the runway. Part of the wing was sheared off, the fuel tank rup-
tured, and the aircraft cartwheeled into a spectacular, fi ery crash. 
The pallet of ammunition still onboard exploded.
Out on FSB November north of Kontum, we could hear the 
explosions and see a tall pillar of black smoke rising into the sky. 
Major Gudat suddenly interrupted a transmission on the adviser 
radio net to describe the destruction of the C-130. Seven crewmem-
bers died in the crash. Two were taken from the wreckage, but one 
died from second-degree burns all over his body. Only the load-
master survived, and he escaped death because the explosion blew 
him out through the open ramp door. The ammunition dump 
was nearby at the west end of the airfi eld on the south side of the 
runway. The fi res and explosions quickly spread to the POL and 
ammunition-storage areas at the airfi eld. The JP-4 pumping sta-
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tion was destroyed, and the ammunition dump caught fi re, with 
the result that 25,000 gallons of POL started burning, and more 
than 3,000 rounds of 105-mm artillery shells plus mortar rounds 
and small-arms ammunition started exploding. It was an impres-
sive sight from FSB November. As the explosions grew larger and 
louder, it was like the grand fi nale of a Fourth of July fi reworks dis-
play—with shrapnel added. At this time, it was more dangerous to 
be on the airfi eld than on the front line. The ammo dump burned 
for days. The incoming enemy rounds leading to this C-130 crash 
triggered more material destruction than any other NVA attack by 
fi re during the entire battle. More incoming rocket fi re in the eve-
ning closed the airfi eld through the night of 17–18 May. After this 
incident, fi xed-wing fl ights into Kontum were limited to the hours 
of darkness.15
After all the accidents, explosions, and incoming artillery and 
rocket fi re at Kontum airfi eld, debris—including unexploded ord-
nance—was a serious hazard to aircraft landing and taking off. 
The senior USAF offi cer in II Corps Direct Air Support Center 
(II DASC, located in Pleiku) pushed the Kontum Province chief to 
keep the runway, ramp, and taxiways clear all the time. He also sug-
gested the riverbed to the south should be prepared and secured 
as a suitable drop zone in case resupply by paradrop became nec-
essary. He was justifi ably unhappy with ARVN’s failure to take any 
offensive action to silence the NVA artillery, which obviously had 
the airfi eld under direct observation, and said, “Thus far, the favor-
ite actions that the ARVN keep falling back on is [sic] an Arc Light 
in the suspected area followed by TACAIR [tactical air support].”16
Around 2200 hours on 17 May, we were hit with another ground 
attack. The fi ghting grew more intense until our defensive lines 
were penetrated around 0500. At 0515, Colonel Tien, my counter-
part, informed the DTOC we were being overrun and called for 
variable-time artillery fi re on our own positions. As reports went 
up the chain of command all the way to MACV headquarters in 
Saigon, General Weyand was very concerned about the situation 
in Kontum. We were saved when a preplanned Arc Light hit the 
enemy at 0530. They broke off the attack and withdrew. One of our 
companies counted 50 enemy KIA in front of their position.17
The 23rd Division did not collapse, and after beating back the 
big attacks on 14 and 15 May, it developed a great deal of confi -
dence.18 Nevertheless, if it became necessary to evacuate the advis-
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ers from Kontum, John Paul Vann did not want a repetition of the 
extractions under fi re from Tan Canh and Dak To. Multiple lifts 
had been required there, and 22nd Division soldiers’ clinging to 
the skids had caused one helicopter to crash. With those events in 
mind, Vann ordered the number of advisers staying overnight in 
the 23rd Division DTOC pared down to seven. This number was 
the max load one slick could carry in addition to its crew. The 
seven who stayed were Colonel R. M. Rhotenberry (senior adviser), 
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Bricker (deputy senior adviser and G-3 
adviser), Major Edgar F. Burch (assistant G-3 adviser), Major Ken-
neth Fleisher (G-4 adviser), Major Harold D. Jones (USAF air 
liaison offi cer), Captain Raymond W. Hall (signal adviser), and 
Captain John R. Finch (G-3 air adviser).19
To separate the Americans from the ARVN soldiers who could 
hinder an emergency extraction, Vann devised a clock system and 
required each one of the overnight advisers to select a different 
direction in which they would go from the DTOC and to point out 
on Vann’s map exactly where they would be waiting for pickup. 
Only Vann knew those locations, and the advisers were ordered not 
to tell anyone else where they were going. That way, if an adviser 
were captured and tortured, he could not reveal any other extrac-
tion points. The Huey picking them up would make just one pass, 
starting on the east and working its way around the seven pickup 
points. If someone was not there when the chopper came, he would 
be on his own to E&E back to Pleiku—or some other place away 
from the enemy onslaught. Captain Finch thought going south or 
southwest would be best, so he selected a sandbar in the Dak Bla 
south of town as his pickup point. The secret signal the advisers 
selected to implement their departure from the DTOC was “Nunc 
Imos.”20
Whether the ARVN offi cers in the 23rd Division headquarters 
suspected or not that their advisers had an evacuation plan, it was 
well known that many other advisers had been extracted from col-
lapsing ARVN units while their counterparts were left behind. In 
mid-May, Lieutenant Colonel Tieu, the division G-2, pointed a nic-
otine-stained fi nger at Captain Finch and warned him, “You try to 
leave, we kill you!”21
A POW from the 64th NVA Regiment, 320th NVA Infantry Divi-
sion, captured on 13 May, indicated that his regiment had suffered 
about 1,200 casualties before its fi rst attack on Kontum. (An NVA 
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regiment’s full, authorized strength was about 2,500.) Interroga-
tion of fi ve POWs from the 52nd NVA Infantry Regiment, 320th 
NVA Infantry Division, indicated that even after the regiment 
received replacements, its strength was only 1,000 to 1,400 men. 
This same regiment had overrun Polei Kleng, where at least one of 
their battalions was rendered combat ineffective. An NVA soldier 
who rallied by deserting from the independent 28th NVA Infan-
try Regiment on 18 May described the personnel strength in his 
regiment. The regiment received 1,000 replacements in February 
and another 100 in May. However, after suffering 900 casualties 
from B-52 strikes, ARVN artillery, and combat with ARVN troops 
near Kontum, only approximately 700 men were left in the entire 
regiment.22
Because Captain Finch’s basic army branch was Military Intel-
ligence, the G-3 adviser, Major Edgar F. “Bear” Burch, called him 
“Spook.” Finch, the G-3 air adviser, worked in the DTOC, mostly at 
night, plotting where the B-52 strikes would go on a 1:50,000-scale 
map on a table. The map was covered to conceal it from visitors and 
the ARVN staff. Where the targets were plotted was a closely held 
secret among only those advisers who needed to know. The one-
by-three-kilometer Arc Light target boxes were usually at angles to 
the map grid lines. To plot targets at an angle, Finch improvised a 
template of the correct scale by cutting a rectangle out of a C-ration 
box. He kept it in his pocket, wrapped in scrap plastic so it would 
not be warped by sweat and humidity. He used the template to 
plot hundreds of B-52 strikes. Millions of pounds of bombs were 
dropped around Kontum based on coordinates plotted with Finch’s 
little piece of cardboard. American ingenuity!23
Captain Finch shackled (coded) the map coordinates of the Arc 
Lights using a “whiz wheel” or a “one-time pad” and then sent 
them in the clear to II DASC in Pleiku by single-sideband radio. 
John Paul Vann also fl ew some target requests back to Pleiku in his 
OH-58, but time was always the key factor. The directive on how to 
order Arc Light strikes was two standard-size pages stapled together 
and marked “SECRET—NOFORN”: no foreigners, including our 
ARVN allies, were allowed to see it. Finch always carried it in his 
right trousers pocket, which had two buttons. He never laid it down 
and was prepared to destroy it if necessary. Finch and USAF Major 
Harold D. Jones, the air liaison offi cer to the ARVN 23rd Infantry 
Division, learned that because what they did had such a devastating 
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effect on the enemy, the NVA placed a piaster price equal to $2,000 
each on their heads. So the NVA knew which American offi cers by 
name were involved in plotting and obtaining the B-52 strikes.24
Sergeant James N. Barker was a US Army language specialist 
who could read, write, and speak Vietnamese. In Kontum, Ser-
geant Barker had fi ve or six ARVN soldiers who worked with him 
in a CONEX, a large, steel shipping container, where they were 
intercepting, transcribing, and translating enemy radio messages. 
On some days, Barker translated as many as 15 pages of intercepts 
into English. Their CONEX was only about 50 meters from the 
23rd Division’s DTOC in an area they knew the NVA called “Spe-
cial Area 24.” He also interrogated POWs and sent his reports to 
an intelligence group in Pleiku. The captured enemy soldiers were 
hungry and often suffering from diarrhea and malaria, but they 
felt an overwhelming sense of relief they were still alive. They told 
him that when the NVA had captured Tan Canh and Dak To, the 
soldiers had raced for the rice because they were starving. They all 
were draftees and told Barker that if they deserted, their families in 
the North would be harassed—or worse. One POW tank crewman 
said their tanks rolled into the ARVN lines without accompanying 
infantry because they were told their infantry had already secured 
the area.25
Light contact and intermittent incoming fi re continued through 
18 May. Hawk’s Claw destroyed a tank at the Krong Poko River 
about 13 kilometers northwest of Kontum City. Two of the enemy’s 
long-range 130-mm guns, protected by two twin-barreled 23-mm 
anti-aircraft guns, started fi ring at us from the southern end of 
Rocket Ridge, about 18 kilometers away. Hawk’s Claw knocked out 
the anti-aircraft guns, and our gunships and tactical air had a fi eld 
day attacking enemy artillery and troops moving in the open. Seven 
US servicemen were wounded and two VNAF transport planes 
destroyed by the intermittent bombardment of Kontum airport. 
The fi eld was temporarily closed. John Paul Vann claimed the NVA 
losses, mainly due to Arc Lights, were 9,000 to 10,000 men during 
the offensive in the Central Highlands. ARVN losses were 3,000 to 
4,000 men. Elsewhere, the Communists again cut Highway 19 from 
the coast to Pleiku by blowing up two spans of a highway bridge.26
Night landings resumed at Kontum airfi eld on 18 May when 12 
dauntless C-130 crews made it through the NVA gauntlet of anti-
aircraft fi re to land and unload on a runway already pockmarked by 
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the impact of hundreds of incoming rockets and artillery rounds. 
They delivered the food, ammunition, and other vital supplies we 
so desperately needed. Those aircraft were individually cleared for 
landing only after it was determined the situation on the ground 
would permit it.27
Evaluation of all the available intelligence indicated that the 
NVA intended to launch a major attack to seize Kontum City, but 
that its timetable was being disrupted by Arc Lights and tactical 
air strikes.28 We expected a Communist attack to commemorate 
Ho Chi Minh’s birthday on 19 May. On Thursday evening, 18 May, 
a couple hundred artillery and mortar rounds hit the city as the 
enemy registered their fi res, recording the fi ring data they used 
to hit a target so they could hit exactly the same place again. The 
NVA usually did this did prior to an attack. Probing attacks started 
at 2200 and increased in intensity through the night. Early the next 
morning we were pounded by 105- and 155-mm artillery. As Major 
Lovings and I endured the intense bombardment, it was easy to 
identify the big 155-mm rounds. This artillery and probably most 
of the ammunition was made in America. Although some of the 
US-made artillery used by the NVA in Vietnam might have been 
sent to China during World War II or captured by the Chinese in 
Korea, much of it had been captured from the French or the South 
Vietnamese in Vietnam.
Following the artillery barrage, a couple thousand men from the 
48th NVA Regiment launched fi ve successive human-wave attacks 
on our northern perimeter. Six enemy tanks supported the NVA 
attacks with direct fi re but did not move against us. The fi rst wave 
of attackers suffered heavy casualties from the Claymore antiper-
sonnel mines set out in front of our troops. The NVA pressed their 
attack, and there was hand-to-hand fi ghting as the enemy got close 
enough to throw hand grenades into the ARVN trenches. With the 
help of Cobra gunships launched from Camp Holloway in Pleiku 
and USAF AC-130 gunships, we were able to beat back most of 
them again and again. At dawn, USAF F-4s joined the fray.29
Despite all the fi repower on our side, by 0500 on 19 May the 
enemy was in our forward positions. The division commander was 
close to calling for his own artillery to fi re on his own positions 
in the penetration. By a fortunate coincidence, preplanned Arc 
Lights were hitting in the vicinity of the front lines every hour. At 
0530, one of those B-52 strikes, parallel to our front and only one 
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kilometer away, hit the NVA troops assaulting to expand their pen-
etration. The NVA troops broke off their attack and withdrew. Our 
troops were able to kill many of them as they fl ed.30
Hourly Arc Lights close to our front lines, gunship support, and 
prompt action by ARVN commanders defeated all the attacks on 
19 May. Equal credit belongs to the infantry troops, who defended 
their positions and then counterattacked to regain lost positions in 
fi erce close combat, with both sides lobbing hand grenades at their 
opponents. In sharp contrast to Colonel Dat, cowering in his bun-
ker at Dak To II, ARVN offi cers such as Colonel Tien and Colonel 
Ba exercised personal leadership to lead and win the fi ght.
ARVN losses during the night of 18–19 May were reported as 16 
KIA and 61 WIA versus NVA 151 KIA. This enemy casualty count 
included bodies found while searching only about 10 percent of the 
areas hit by the hourly Arc Light bombardments. Encouraged and 
perhaps even emboldened by these results, the 23rd Division sent 
forces probing outside the perimeter to the north and northwest. At 
1100 on 19 May, VNAF helicopters lifted the 23rd Division’s 60-man 
Reconnaissance Company in an air assault on a suspected enemy 
artillery position eight kilometers to the north–northwest. The 1st 
Battalion, 45th Regiment, concurrently moved north to establish a 
blocking position. The plan was for the Reconnaissance Company 
to move south, driving any enemy troops against the blocking posi-
tion. That scenario went as planned until the NVA encountered the 
blocking position and attacked it. The 1st Battalion held its posi-
tion, but its reaction force refused to counterattack the NVA. So 
although the 23rd Division demonstrated its ability to move out-
side the Kontum perimeter to conduct a reconnaissance in force, 
the NVA was not smashed between ARVN’s “hammer and anvil.” 
The 2nd Battalion of the 45th also moved north, found 24 more 
NVA soldiers KIA by Arc Lights, and killed another fi ve while they 
were about it. The 44th and 53rd Regiments sent two battalions 
each just north of their line of contact but did not go far enough to 
do a BDA of the main Arc Light target areas.31
The afternoon of 19 May the enemy probed the position of the 
44th’s 1st Battalion, and there was a brief exchange of small-arms 
fi re. Later in the day the NVA probed us again. This time they 
used CS gas delivered by an unknown means. An Arc Light strike 
hit ten kilometers north of the city at 1555. Twenty minutes later 
the air cavalry was making a BDA of the target area when they saw 
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two guards in clean uniforms standing in front of an undamaged 
bunker. The guards appeared to be headquarters types who were 
guarding an enemy CP. The cavalry gunned down the guards, and 
an Arc Light was scheduled for early the next morning to destroy 
this bunker and some others not hit by the earlier Arc Light. Kon-
tum airfi eld reopened at 2030 on 19 May, and 17 C-130s landed 
safely during the night. Another 15 made it on 20 May.32
By that date, MACV was estimating enemy infi ltration into 
South Vietnam at 126,900 total since the start of the year. MACV 
also estimated that since the enemy’s offensive had begun on 30 
March, they had fi red at least 1,173 SA-2 “Red SAMs” at US aircraft 
and had succeeded in knocking down 13 of them.33
Flying out of Kontum, C-130 pilot Captain Brian Sweeney saw 
signal mirror fl ashes, and when he circled around for another look, 
he spotted two Americans on the ground waving at him. He radi-
oed their location back to Kontum, but before they could be res-
cued, he saw enemy soldiers grab them.34
Every night the enemy would attack us again and again. We 
would jump off our cots, put on our web equipment, fl ak jackets, 
and helmets, then grab our maps and fl ashlights and get into our 
foxhole. After a while, the attack would die down, and we would 
crawl out of our hole, unload, and try to get back to sleep. The 
whole cycle would soon start over again. Sometimes we would lie 
on our cots talking to a C-130 gunship by radio. The gunship would 
fi re at the coordinates we got from the regimental staff right next to 
us. We would ask the Vietnamese to check with the front-line troops 
to see if the gunship’s fi re was hitting the right place and then 
adjust it if necessary. We were fi ghting the war from our beds, read-
ing the map with a fl ashlight, and shouting back and forth with the 
Vietnamese. The US aircraft would eventually go back to Saigon 
for fuel or a crew change. We would tell them, “Good night, thanks 
for your help, good shooting.” We learned to recognize some of the 
pilots’ voices as the same ones from previous nights. But the man 
on the ground never met the man in the air, who went home to an 
air-conditioned room in Saigon. We were a bit envious of that but 
knew they could be blown out of the air by a Strella at any time—
just as we could be blown to bits by an incoming round at any time.
Starting at 0345 on 20 May, the 53rd ARVN Regiment’s left fl ank 
was hit with three successive assaults. The defending troops were 
worn out from weeks of heavy combat and lack of sleep. During 
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the early daylight hours, the third assault pushed the 2nd Battal-
ion of the 53rd off a company-size position. This enemy penetra-
tion between the 53rd and 44th Regiments was a serious threat to 
both regiments and could be exploited to strike into the heart of 
Kontum. It was imperative to eliminate it before dark. By 1645, the 
enemy entrenchments were within 20 meters of the nearest 53rd 
positions, which was too close to use tactical air against them, and 
Colonel Ba was reluctant to commit his armor to the counterattack. 
The 53rd repeatedly tried to eliminate the penetration, and several 
times it reported the job was done. After each of those reports, 
Colonel Rhotenberry sent an adviser up in the C&C chopper, and 
the adviser would report that the enemy still held the penetration 
and that the 53rd’s reports were false. Finally, Mr. Vann and Major 
General Toan arrived, conferred with Colonels Ba and Rhoten-
berry, and persuaded Ba to commit his reserve, including nine 
tanks. At fi rst, the tank commanders refused to attack, but Toan 
and Ba convinced them it would be in their best interest to follow 
orders. The nine M-41 tanks lined up and fi red their 76-mm main 
guns directly into the enemy positions. With this fi re support, the 
involvement of the corps commander, and Ba’s personal command 
of the counterattack, the 53rd was fi nally able to retake its former 
positions. Although Major General Toan knew the 53rd had lied to 
him twice by falsely reporting that the positions had been retaken 
earlier in the day, he took no disciplinary action against the indi-
viduals responsible.35
During a limited objective attack from our lines out to the 
north on 20 May, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 44th Regiment 
reported killing 69 enemy soldiers and capturing a 60-mm mortar. 
The airfi eld was attacked with more than a dozen 122-mm rockets 
on this day, and one destroyed a VNAF C-123 on the ramp. The 
air cavalry spotted enemy troops in the open and in bunker com-
plexes to the northeast of Kontum City. They were hit with tactical 
air strikes and gunships. It appeared that the NVA was now build-
ing up its forces in that area and that its likely avenue of approach 
would be a valley that led to Kontum City.36
The night of 20–21 May was relatively quiet until 0500 on 21 
May, when our 3rd and 4th Battalions were hit with heavy incom-
ing mortar fi re. Under this covering fi re, the 406th NVA Sapper 
Battalion and an NVA infantry battalion, probably from the 64th 
NVA Regiment, 320th NVA Infantry Division, seized a position 
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between our 4th Battalion and the 1st Battalion of the 45th Infan-
try Regiment. That drove a wedge into our lines and cut Highway 
14 three kilometers north of the city and behind us. At about the 
same time, another enemy force found a gap between the 45th’s 4th 
Battalion and the 53rd’s 2nd Battalion and recaptured the salient 
it had been ejected from just before dark the previous day. With 
our defenses penetrated in two places, the situation was serious, 
and those lost positions had to be retaken before the enemy could 
exploit them and overrun Kontum.
VNAF scrambled an AC-47 Spooky gunship from Pleiku. It 
arrived 30 minutes later, just as the enemy launched another assault 
on our forward defenses. Spooky started hosing down the attackers 
with its three 7.62-mm miniguns, and the assault was stopped and 
repulsed. Within the next two hours, the NVA launched two more 
assaults, but those attacks coincided with two of our prescheduled 
Arc Lights on their positions, and both failed.37
To deal with the enemy infantry and sappers next door, I 
requested an air strike. A USAF FAC with the call sign Covey 529 
was passed to me on our FM fi re-support radio net. I described 
where our troops were and where the enemy was located, and the 
FAC used his other radio to call for fi ghter-bombers. Then he 
called back:
COVEY 529: “OK, I have Fox Fours with CBU.” (“Fox Fours” 
referred to US Navy F-4s, probably from an aircraft carrier 
in the South China Sea and armed with CBUs.)
SNAPPER 14 [me]: “No, we can’t use CBUs. Too close.”
COVEY 529: “Wait. All right, I have a pair of F-105s with 
thousand-pound bombs. How close are the friendlies?”
SNAPPER 14: “About 400 meters east.”
COVEY 529: “That’s too close. Within the minimum safe 
distance for thousand pounders. I can’t put them in 
without somebody’s initials.”
  I asked Colonel Tien about it, and he said, “No 
problem! My troops in bunkers.” I gave the FAC my initials 
for the record, and I would be held responsible if those 
bombs killed ARVN soldiers.
SNAPPER 14: “OK. Tango, Papa, Mike. Put ’em in.”
The jets dove in from out of sight, and with every pass they 
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dropped two 1,000-pound bombs. The advisers in the DTOC were 
as impressed as I was by the size of the bombs. They recorded in 
the log, “Airstrikes in spt of LTC McKenna vic ZA230920 (1000 
lb bombs!).”38 Later that day, we watched while our 2nd Battalion 
swept through the area. They found 65 NVA bodies. There was 
too much else going on to keep track of how many air strikes I 
had called in since arriving in Kontum. So much was happening 
so fast, and we were so sleep deprived that the days and nights ran 
together. Everyone was exhausted, and tempers were short. The 
enemy shelled the same places again and again until the additional 
incoming rounds did not do much more than make the rubble 
bounce. However, the continuing bombardment did have a cumu-
lative effect on us: it kept us awake, kept us tense, and kept us on 
the alert for the human-wave assaults that usually followed a heavy 
artillery barrage. It wore us down.
Colonel Tien moved quickly to counterattack the enemy pen-
etration on Highway 14 by using his 3rd Battalion, 44th Regiment, 
to counterattack south along Highway 14 in coordination with 
an attack to the north by the 44th’s 4th Battalion and the 45th’s 
1st Battalion. They were supported by US gunships and tactical 
air. After fi erce fi ghting, the enemy was cleared out, and the two 
friendly forces linked up and secured the area. However, the NVA 
wedge driven between the 45th and 53rd Regiments remained and 
posed a serious threat. Colonel Rhotenberry was convinced that 
the 53rd Regiment had abandoned its positions shortly after dark 
and shortly after retaking them on 20 May had pulled back several 
hundred meters. He urged Colonel Ba to retake the positions, and 
a counterattack was planned.39
Starting at 1400 that afternoon, Colonel Ba personally com-
manded a well-coordinated counterattack against the enemy pen-
etration between the 45th and 53rd Regiments. First, tactical air 
pounded the enemy in the penetration, and then two ARVN battal-
ions supported by tanks attacked. The tanks were stopped by both 
direct and indirect enemy fi re, and two of the light M-41s were 
30 to 40 percent damaged. However, the enemy was driven out, 
and by 1500 the 45th and 53rd Regiments’ positions were restored. 
Casualties were 28 ARVN KIA and 76 WIA versus 147 NVA KIA. 
Mr. Vann told General Abrams that Colonel Ba’s presence at the 
front during the counterattacks was the decisive factor in the suc-
cess. The corps commander personally congratulated Colonel Ba. 
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On 21 May, ARVN reported the casualties and tank losses for our 
previous seven days of fi ghting as: friendly 106 KIA and 440 WIA; 
enemy 1,035 KIA. Tank losses were nine enemy T-54s destroyed 
and our two damaged M-41s.40
After dark on 21 May, USAF C-130s started landing at Kontum 
airfi eld to resupply us. They were the fi rst fi xed-wing aircraft to land 
here in 48 hours. Twelve C-130 sorties carry ing ammunition and 
cargo landed without incident. The two 10,000-gallon fuel blad-
ders destroyed on 17 May were replaced, and the refueling point 
was fully operational by dawn. Then in the early-morning dark-
ness, at 0115 on 22 May, Spare 622, a C-130E from the 21st Tactical 
Air Squadron, blew a tire when it made a hard landing with a heavy 
load. Except for one bladder bird, landings were suspended for the 
remainder of the night. The aircraft with a fl at tire was parked on 
the east ramp, and II DASC requested a repair crew, which arrived 
at 0615 the next morning. The air cavalry was assigned to work 
over suspected enemy fi ring positions while repairs were made, but 
at 0815 six rounds landed on the airfi eld, and the aircraft being 
repaired was hit and started burning. The ARVN soldiers were 
indifferent to the blaze, but a US Army colonel used a large fi re 
extinguisher to put it out. By that time, though, the aircraft was 
unfortunately destroyed beyond repair. With the airfi eld obviously 
under direct enemy observation and the NVA artillery able to hit it 
at will, any aircraft on it during daylight hours was a sitting duck.41
The intrepid USAF C-130 and VNAF C-123 crews earned my 
deepest respect, admiration, and thanks. They fl ew those danger-
ous missions into Kontum through heavy anti-aircraft fi re to make 
nighttime landings and takeoffs at an airport with only very basic 
navigation aids, while artillery, mortar, rocket, and sometimes even 
small-arms fi re was hitting the airfi eld. Without them, we would 
not have received enough food, ammunition, and other supplies to 
hold out, and we would have been overrun by the enemy.
Colonel Rhotenberry visited FSB November on his fi rst day in 
Kontum and could see that the Round Hill was a key piece of ter-
rain in the defense of Kontum City. If the enemy could seize and 
hold it, they could hit Kontum City with observed mortar and artil-
lery fi re and even direct fi re from their tanks. However, he did not 
like the troop dispositions he had inherited and was especially con-
cerned about the 44th Regiment on FSB November. Rhotenberry 
thought that it was too far out in front of the main defensive perim-
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eter and that defending it overextended and created gaps in the 
perimeter. Worse yet, most of the 44th’s 3rd Battalion was almost 
two kilometers farther out, defending outpost “Nectar” northwest 
of November. When asked about this, Colonel Ba said that the 
corps commander had refused him permission to abandon either 
Nectar or November.42
The 44th Regiment bore the brunt of the initial assaults on 14 
and 15 May. During our ten days on FSB November, we were under 
continuous attacks by fi re, ground probes, and repeated assaults 
by enemy infantry and tanks. The regiment suffered many casual-
ties, and our troops were physically and mentally worn out. To give 
the 44th a respite, and to adjust and tighten the defensive perime-
ter, Colonel Ba decided to move the regiment from FSB November 
back to a former hospital compound inside the northern perimeter 
in Kontum City, where it would be in reserve. The 45th Regiment 
would replace us on FSB November. He discussed this plan with 
Major General Toan and Mr. Vann when they were in Kontum on 
16 May, and they approved it.43
Starting on 22 May and over the next two days, the 45th Regi-
ment replaced us on FSB November as we moved back into reserve 
in Kontum, behind the main perimeter manned by the 45th Regi-
ment on the northwest and the 53rd Regiment north of us. Only 
two of the 44th’s four battalions and a troop of tanks would remain 
around our CP and serve as a reserve. One of our battalions would 
provide security around the DTOC, and another would be in the 
southern part of the city with the Ruff Puffs.
Our new area had once been a French hospital, then an ARVN 
hospital, and next a US Army hospital. Most of the buildings in 
the compound were single story, built by the French, and some still 
had big red crosses painted on them. Although Kontum City was 
relatively fl at, at 560 meters this area was the highest point in town. 
From on top of the earthen mound covering a bunker, we could 
look down on most of the city—including the DTOC to the south, 
the airfi eld to the southeast, and the logistics compound to the east 
where the 53rd Regiment’s CP was located.
Major Lovings and I were assigned to a small building of our 
own. We set up our cots, arranged our equipment, and then drove 
our Jeep over to the DTOC. We picked up our mail and the avail-
able Stars & Stripes and went over the situation with the staff while 
looking at their maps. Not long after we returned to our building, 
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artillery and mortar fi re started falling in the hospital area. There 
was a small sandbag bunker in our hallway, so we took cover in it. 
An ARVN soldier staggered in with his arm almost severed and 
bleeding badly. A Vietnamese captain who was talking to us chewed 
him out for bleeding all over the fl oor. Major Lovings took the 
wounded man to the medics. After he returned, he went back out-
side two more times to save other wounded men. Incoming rounds 
were falling all around him while he did that. No ARVN soldiers 
lifted a hand to help him provide aid to their own soldiers. Wade 
Lovings was one of the bravest men I ever knew.
When the incoming changed from sporadic to intense, an excited 
Sergeant Hao came running into our building and announced, 
“Regimental commander say we move to bunker!” He meant right 
now, lock, stock, and barrel, and not temporarily. We moved all our 
gear out of our nice building and down into a windowless, under-
ground, concrete bunker, which then became 44th Regiment’s CP 
and operations center. When the US 2nd Field Hospital had been 
here, the US Army engineers had built this large, concrete under-
ground surgical bunker for them. The 22nd ARVN Division later 
used it as a DTOC until the division moved to Tan Canh. The NVA 
may have assumed the 23rd Division DTOC was in the same place. 
If so, that would explain the enemy’s persistent, heavy attacks by 
fi re on this area and why it would be the main objective of so many 
enemy ground attacks.44 We set up our cots at one end of the bun-
ker. The bunker was dimly lighted and somewhat stuffy, and the 
only way out was a door at the top of a few stairs. However, it was 
much safer here than sleeping in the jungle with only a poncho 
above us. That night I slept with my boots off for the fi rst time since 
arriving in Kontum.
When we next saw our adviser building and our Jeep, which was 
parked beside it, the building was a charred ruin and the Jeep was 
a burned-out hulk of scrap metal. This sight confi rmed the wisdom 
of moving into the big bunker.
In addition to incurring heavy casualties, the NVA was already 
suffering from shortages of ammunition and food by the time it 
captured Tan Canh and Dak To II. All of the 160-mm mortars of 
the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment were damaged, and there was an 
acute shortage of ammunition. So the regiment took four 105-mm 
and three 155-mm howitzers that ARVN abandoned in usable con-
dition to form an ad hoc artillery unit. Captured ammo for those 
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guns was transported by bicycle, and this American-made artillery 
and ammunition were then used against us when the NVA attacked 
Kontum. After those guns ran out of captured ammo, they were 
withdrawn to Dak To District and hidden there.45
Either because the US radar equipment used to track incoming 
rounds and locate the enemy’s fi ring position was too complicated 
to use or because it was not properly maintained—or both—through-
out the Vietnam War, it never did what it was supposed to do. So 
we used a nontechnical method. By analyzing the crater where an 
artillery round explodes, and the spray pattern of the shrapnel it 
throws out, it is possible to determine—at least roughly—the direc-
tion and distance to the gun that fi red the round. Every American 
soldier receives some basic training in crater analysis, and because 
Major Lovings was an artillery offi cer, he was especially expert at it. 
The NVA obviously fi red one captured US 105-mm artillery piece 
at us repeatedly and very accurately. Lovings’s analysis indicated 
that the howitzer shooting at us was on Rocket Ridge. However, 
pilots trying to fi nd it could never pin down the exact location, 
so we concluded the NVA must be concealing it in a cave except 
when they rolled it out to throw a round or two our way. Hitting 
the mouth of a cave on a mountainside with counter battery fi re is 
extremely diffi cult, and even a direct hit with an aerial bomb on the 
entrance might not get the gun if it is rolled way back into the cave. 
Our side had better luck on 24 May when smoke was observed com-
ing from an enemy bunker about ten kilometers east–northeast of 
the city while artillery rounds were hitting Kontum. Midafternoon 
that day, Hawk’s Claw fi red a TOW missile right through the bun-
ker’s aperture and probably destroyed a large-caliber NVA artillery 
piece.46
Two Special Forces NCOs who were shell-reporting experts 
arrived on 24 May to analyze the craters and shell fragments to 
determine what weapons the enemy was using against us. The 
ARVN records were unfortunately not good enough for the NCOs 
to accomplish their mission, so Colonel Rhotenberry sent them 
away the next day. While they were at the chopper pad waiting to 
fl y out of Kontum, one of them was killed in a fi refi ght.47 Some-
body in Washington must have heard our pleas for help in locat-
ing the NVA artillery’s fi ring positions, though. On 21 May, the US 
Army’s Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, sent teams to 
Vietnam to offer assistance on target acquisition.48 When I made it 
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back to the DTOC bunker one day in late May, two artillery lieu-
tenant colonels from Fort Sill were there. I took the opportunity to 
complain about the lack of some type of radar or technical system 
that could pinpoint the location of an enemy gun, like the one peri-
odically fi ring at us from Rocket Ridge.
The teams from Fort Sill concluded that the ARVN Artillery 
School was teaching target acquisition, but also that the ARVN 
artillery units in the fi eld were not practicing it with any sense of 
urgency, so they recommended better command supervision by 
ARVN artillery offi cers and continuing follow-up from the advis-
ers.49 American advisers had been working on problems like this for 
the past ten years, but now they were rapidly withdrawing, and time 
was running out for ARVN to assume full responsibility for practic-
ing what they had been taught and equipped to do.
Analysis by the Fort Sill teams also provided some interesting 
insight into how the NVA artillery functioned. The artillery crews 
were extremely capable and professional, generally fi red at maxi-
mum range, and preferred to keep their tubes dispersed rather than 
concentrated as the US Army and ARVN did. Their ability to mass 
the fi re from those widely separated tubes on a single target indi-
cated that they surveyed their gun positions and had communica-
tions effi cient enough to exercise centralized control of their fi re.50 
The scattered dispersal of their tubes must have made ammunition 
resupply much more diffi cult, but it also presented less lucrative 
targets to ARVN counterbattery fi re and aerial bombing.
There was some action every day. The NVA artillery and rocket 
attacks became part of our expected daily routine. The enemy 
would probe our positions, and we would push out to probe theirs. 
The 23rd Division’s infantry companies were suffering a steady toll 
of killed and wounded that was gradually reducing our strength 
and our ability to defend our positions and retake lost ground. 
However, all available intelligence—including POW interroga-
tions—indicated that the NVA was suffering far more casualties 
than ARVN. Most of the time we could not get an accurate count 
of how many NVA were killed by air, but when our troops went into 
an area recently hit by an Arc Light or tactical air strike, they usu-
ally found dozens of enemy bodies.51
We were tired, hungry, thirsty, and running on nervous energy 
during this period. I kept rehashing in my mind, “What is the most 
effective thing we can do now?” and “What should we be prepared 
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to do next?” As a commander, I could have ordered some immedi-
ate action, but as an adviser I could only recommend action. This 
was frustrating.
On 23 May, province forces re ceived a Hoi Chanh from the 48th 
NVA Regiment who revealed the location of his regiment’s CP. He 
said nearly every company in his battalion was down to only ten 
men as a result of casualties from B-52 strikes. Those strikes also 
destroyed so much of the supplies en route to their front-line units 
that artillery ammunition, malaria-prevention pills, and even food 
were in critically short supply.52
The monsoon rains were beginning to hamper the enemy’s 
movement and resupply through the jungle, and the tactical air 
attacks and Arc Lights were taking a heavy toll on their troops and 
equipment. They needed either to seize Kontum or to withdraw, 
so they planned an all-out attack to achieve a decisive victory. The 
New York Times reported from Saigon, “In the Central Highlands 
the North Vietnamese have mounted a serious threat to the provin-
cial capital of Kontum, and the loss of the city would surprise no 
one here.”53
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“Brother, This Is Going
to Be It!”
Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If 
there is no place of refuge, they will stand fi rm. If they are 
in the heart of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn 
front. If there is no help for it, they will fi ght hard.
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War
The Washington Post reported on 27 May 1972, “Kontum, once a 
pleasant town with abundant fruit trees and gentle climate, has 
been abandoned by more than 80 percent of the 30,000 people 
who lived there before the offensive.”1 Under the headline “Kon-
tum Is Next—and It Knows It,” Stars and Stripes said:
KONTUM, Vietnam (AP)—This city in South Vietnam’s 
central highlands is living on borrowed time and a fervent 
hope that defenses which crumpled elsewhere will hold here. 
North Vietnamese forces, which have captured with ease 
almost every objective they sought in the highlands, are thus 
far content to probe at the nervous city’s outer perimeter. 
Since the initial predawn at tack on May 14, there has been 
no indication when a large-scale assault is likely against the 
city that many allied offi cials be lieve is a certain target in the 
next phase of Hanoi’s general offensive.2
A sample of entries on the nine-page DTOC log for the 24 hours 
commencing at 0001 on 23 May gives an idea of the varied friendly 
and enemy activity:
McKenna Kontum book.indb   208 6/14/2011   10:17:51 AM
“BROTHER, THIS IS GOING TO BE IT!” • 209
C-130 landed. Unloading . . . Covey 550 directing air strike 
. . . Spectre 01 orbiting “Truck Alley,” engaging targets . . .
airfi eld took 1 round . . . C-130 is burning . . . Sappers 
repelled outside of wire . . . tactical air strike requested on 
.51 position . . . VNAF A1s going in . . . 4/53 still in contact 
. . . MAJ Lovings—5 rounds incoming . . . VNAF strike going 
in . . . Arc Light detonated . . . Bladder bird due in tonight . . .
Arc Light detonated . . . Airfi eld received 5 rounds . . . Tac-
tical air strike requested . . . LTC McKenna reports his posi-
tion received 3 rounds . . . Nail 43 put in strikes . . . Spectre 
20 engaging truck . . . Spectre engaging bunkers.3
Although a few NVA tanks were detected during daylight hours 
and destroyed by the TOWs, the NVA’s typical pattern was to hide 
its tanks in the dense jungle during the day and then attack again 
in the night. If the NVA shifted its tanks to attack from a new 
direction, our air cavalry scouts were usually able to detect their 
movement and thus predict where the next nighttime attack would 
strike.4 There were about 38 tanks in every NVA tank battalion, yet 
most of their tank attacks were made with only ten or fewer tanks.5 
In addition to the enemy’s inept use of the tanks they had, the 
number of tanks available to them was declining because of main-
tenance problems and combat losses. On Wednesday, 24 May, Mr. 
Vann said that so many enemy tanks were already destroyed, there 
were only 15 to 25 left in the Kontum area.6
The 23rd ARVN Division launched some offensive operations 
to the north and east on 24 May. Starting at 1045, VNAF helicop-
ters were used to lift the 1st Battalion, 44th Regiment, for a com-
bat assault on an area four kilometers north of our positions. The 
objective was three kilometers back to the southeast. Two hours 
later our 2nd Battalion made a similar combat assault one kilometer 
east of the 1st Battalion and then attacked toward an objective three 
kilometers to the southeast. Those two battalions attacked roughly 
parallel to each other, and a blocking force was set up south of 
their objectives. About a kilometer south of that blocking force, two 
battalions of the 53rd Regiment attacked to the east toward three 
successive objectives, the last of which was a village occupied by the 
NVA on 22 May. The 45th Regiment also participated by sending 
one battalion north to operate west of Highway 14. By 1800, all of 
the objectives were under ARVN control. The 1st Battalion of the 
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45th returned to its normal defensive positions, but the other units 
remained on their fi nal objectives through the night of 24–25 May. 
Total casualties for the day were reported as 86 enemy KIA, and 
ARVN losses were at 9 KIA and 31 WIA.7
The operations north of our defensive perimeter on 24 May 
were a good way to fi nd the enemy and to keep him off balance. 
They also helped to build confi dence and improve the morale of 
the ARVN and RF troops who were able to go on the offensive after 
taking a terrible battering from enemy artillery and ground attacks 
for so long.
In this period, the C-130s supporting us fl ew out of Tan Son 
Nhut. It was just a one-hour fl ight to Kontum, but our airfi eld was 
challenging. It was only about 3,200 feet long, right at the edge of 
a C-130’s limit. To line up for landing, pilots came over the gap in a 
mountain to the south. Only two C-130s were allowed on the ground 
at the same time, so sometimes as many as 10 to 15 were stacked up, 
orbiting above at 2,000-foot intervals until it was their turn to land. 
After 12 May, when daylight landings were stopped because of 
observed enemy artillery and mortar fi re on the airfi eld and anti-
aircraft fi re from the plateau to the west, the C-130s landed at night 
by radar-assisted ground-controlled approach. They descended 
with everything, including the cockpit, blacked out. Day or night, 
there was usually intermittent enemy fi re on the airfi eld, and there 
sometimes were fi refi ghts between ARVN and the NVA right at the 
edge of the airfi eld. Landing at Kontum was tense and required an 
experienced crew. One C-130 pilot made seven attempts to land but 
fi nally gave it up and returned to Saigon.8
Despite the loss of aircraft to incoming artillery and rocket fi re 
on Kontum airfi eld, the USAF fl ew in the vital supplies necessary 
to defend Kontum. Although the C-130 pilots considered night 
landings and takeoffs under fi re at Kontum “a dicey operation,” 
they kept coming. Eight delivered their cargo on the night of 22–23 
May, and another 30 made it in and out over the next two nights. 
On the night of 23–24 May, they fl ew 13 C-130 sorties into Kontum 
to deliver the 105-mm howitzer ammunition we needed to replace 
the rounds destroyed in the ammunition dump explosion. They 
brought in 147 skids (pallets that could be quickly unloaded) with 
3,758 rounds of 105-mm HE, 26 skids with 628 illumination 105-
mm rounds, and 29 skids with 16,700 fuses for the 105-mm rounds. 
Additional sorties were scheduled but then cancelled because secu-
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rity measures slowed down the operation. The JP-4 deliveries were 
switched from bladder birds carrying two 4,500-gallon bladders—
which needed to be pumped out while the aircraft sat parked on 
the airfi eld—to 500-gallon blivets on pallets for quick offl oading. 
During the night of 24–25 May, 17 C-130 sorties landed with 136.4 
tons of ammo, 45.2 tons of rations, and one bladder of JP-4, and 
there were 3 sorties with other POL. The C-130 resupply missions 
into Kontum were accomplished with Spectre gunships fl ying 
escort. These gunships could suppress anti-aircraft fi re, and their 
presence overhead discouraged NVA artillery and rockets.9
Enemy attacks by indirect fi re escalated early and continued 
through the day of 24 May. The heaviest concentrations—around 
60 rounds an hour—hit the airfi eld, division artillery positions, 
and the DTOC. Some of it was coming from US-made 105- and 
155-mm pieces. It was extremely accurate, indicating good forward 
observation by the NVA or even adjustment by infi ltrators inside 
the city.10 Another example of the enemy’s accurate, adjusted fi re 
occurred in the 53rd Regiment’s area. After two 105-mm howit-
zers were destroyed by enemy fi re, Lieutenant Colonel Norbert J. 
Gannon, the new senior adviser to the 53rd Regiment, insisted that 
the division artillery battery in his area move to its secondary posi-
tion. However, as soon as that move was completed, the next incom-
ing round landed only fi ve meters from the new position. It was 
followed by a six-round barrage that destroyed another 105-mm 
howitzer.
Midafternoon on 24 May, heavy 105- and 155-mm artillery fi re 
started falling on our positions in the former hospital area. We 
were supposedly in reserve, but the intensity of the bombardment 
warned us that the enemy would soon make another major assault. 
We did not have long to wait.
At midnight on 24 May, the 53rd Regiment reported hearing 
tanks. The reports of increased attacks by fi re, enemy infantry 
probes, and the sound of tanks continued to pour in. By 0330 on 
the morning of 25 May, Colonel Rhotenberry said, “Brother, this 
is going to be it!” He called Vann, who asked, “What’s up?” Rho-
tenberry joked, “Oh, I was just sitting here with nothing to do, so I 
thought I’d call.” He then described the situation to Vann and said, 
“This is it. I recommend that when you come in the morning, you 
bring everything you can get.” Vann said, “Right!” and hung up.11
On this morning, our one division of three regiments was 
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O u tp o s t N e c ta r m a n n e d  b y  3 rd  B a tta lio n  (-), 4 5 th  A R V N  R e g im e n t.
G e n e ra l tra ce  o f fro n tlin e  p o s itio n s  o f tw o  b a tta lio n s  (+ ) o f 4 5 th A R V N  R e g im e n t.
C P  a n d  a  b a tta lio n  (+ ) o f 4 5 th A R V N  R e g t. o n  T h e  R o u n d  H ill a t F S B  N o ve m b e r.
C P  a n d  1 st a n d  3 rd B a tta lio n s  o f 4 4 th A R V N  R e g im e n t in  h o sp ita l a re a .
Tw o  b a tta lio n s  o f 5 3 rd A R V N  R e g im e n t.
C P  a n d  2 n d B a tta lio n  o f 5 3 rd A R V N  R e g im e n t.
W e s t e n d  o f th e  a irfie ld  ru n w a ys .
T h e  D TO C  w ith  4 th B a tta lio n , 4 4 th A R V N  R e g im e n t fo r se cu rity.
R F  &  P F  o f K o n tu m  P ro v in ce  p lu s  2 n d B a tta lio n , 4 4 th A R V N  R e g im e n t.
6 4 th N VA R e g im e n t p lu s  ta n ks .
5 2 n d N VA re g im e n t p lu s  ta n ks .
1 st N VA R e g im e n t, 2 n d N VA D iv is io n , p lu s  a  sa p p e r b a tta lio n  a n d  ta n ks .
T h e  in d e p e n d e n t 6 6 th N VA R e g im e n t o f th e  B -3  F ro n t p lu s  ta n ks .
1 4 1 st N VA R e g im e n t, 2 n d N VA D iv is io n , p lu s  3 0 4 th &  4 0 0 th N VA S a p p e r B a tta lio n s .
The attacks on Kontum, 25 and 26 May 1972.
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attacked by fi ve NVA regiments, three sapper battalions, and 
almost a battalion of tanks—and they came at us from three direc-
tions. The 64th Regiment of the 320th NVA Division attacked from 
the north–northwest along the west side of Highway 14, and the 
52nd Regiment of that same division attacked along the east side of 
Highway 14. The 1st Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division, a sapper 
battalion, and a tank company launched the main attack from the 
north into the former hospital area where our 44th Regiment CP 
and 1st and 3rd Battalions were located. The 44th’s 2nd Battalion 
was still attached to Kontum Province to reinforce the Ruff Puffs 
in the southern sector, and its 4th Battalion was providing security 
around the DTOC. The independent 66th NVA Regiment of the 
B-3 Front and a tank battalion also attacked from the north into 
the 53rd ARVN Regiment’s positions on the northeast side of the 
defensive perimeter.12
The NVA found a gap between the 45th and 53rd Regiments 
and drove a wedge into it, and the North Vietnamese troops fl ooded 
in. It continued its attack to hit the 44th Regiment, which was in 
reserve, and made major penetrations into our positions. The NVA 
also turned to hit the 45th and 53rd from the rear, and it looked as 
if those two regiments might be cut off.13
Starting at 0200 on 25th May, heavy attacks by fi re hit the air-
fi eld and the southeastern part of the city. The Ruff Puffs manning 
the defenses in the southern sector shortly afterward reported that 
the enemy was crossing the Dak Bla River south of them. At 0300 
hours, the 141st NVA Regiment, augmented by the 304th and 400th 
NVA Sapper Battalions, infi ltrated through the Ruff Puffs’ posi-
tions in the southeast portion of Kontum City and attacked from 
that direction into the city and toward the airfi eld. Prior reconnais-
sance had revealed to the NVA what the US advisers already knew: 
some of the Ruff Puffs had left gaps in the defenses at night when 
they abandoned their defensive positions to go home to their fami-
lies in Kontum City. The infi ltrating enemy force moved in small 
squad-size units. Some of these soldiers were disguised as civilian 
refugees, and others wore ARVN uniforms captured from the 22nd 
ARVN Division. Infi ltrators already inside the city aided them.14
The enemy sappers occupied the built-up area south of the air-
fi eld and soon held a Catholic compound that enclosed a cathedral, 
a nunnery, an orphanage, Lasan School, a seminary, the home of 
Monsignor Paul Seitz, and American doctor Pat Smith’s hospital 
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for Montagnards. Five hundred civilians, including about 200 Mon-
tagnard civilian patients, were captured and held there. However, 
unlike during Tet 1968 when the VC had shot women and children 
patients in the legs and threw hand grenades at them, this time the 
NVA soldiers did not harm the civilians. Doctor Smith, known to 
the Yards as “Big Grandmother of Medicine,” had already evacu-
ated to Pleiku with most of her patients.
The DTOC fi rst learned there was a major penetration in the 
south when Captain Hall radioed from the airfi eld to say he was 
pinned down there by enemy small-arms fi re from the south. This 
was the fi rst major attack from the south, and if this enemy force 
could seize the airfi eld and link up with the Communist forces 
attacking from the north, Kontum would be cut in half.15
The sappers who attacked into the southeastern part of the city 
probably had as their objective a linkup with their forces coming from 
the north or west. A combination of ARVN units—including the 53rd 
Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 44th Regiment, and the remnants 
of a battalion of the 42nd Regiment from the 22nd Division—fi nally 
stopped the enemy attack only 100 meters from the airfi eld by hold-
ing fi rm at the bunkers forming the airfi eld’s fi nal defensive line. 
Failure to hold there could result in the loss of Kontum.16
In the early-morning darkness of 25 May, a C-130 piloted by 
Captain Felix Courrington and with Rick Ivars as loadmaster was 
ready to start its ground-controlled approach into Kontum when 
the USAF controller at Kontum airfi eld radioed, “Our house is 
closed! Don’t land!” The NVA had seized the eastern end of the 
runway in a night attack, and the two-man Combat Control Team 
and the fi ve-man Aerial Port Team at the airfi eld were fi ghting off 
an NVA ground attack. The pilot could hear small-arms fi re on 
the radio, but he told the air force teams on the ground, “We are 
coming in. Be at the end of the runway in ten.” The C-130 landed, 
and the USAF ground personnel ran up the opened ramp, still fi r-
ing their individual weapons at the enemy soldiers who were pur-
suing them. Small-arms fi re from three directions was hitting the 
aircraft, and incoming artillery and rocket rounds were hitting the 
runway as they took off. The entire aircraft crew received the Dis-
tinguished Flying Cross for that daring rescue. This incident was 
the last of the night landings at Kontum airfi eld. US Army and 
VNAF Chinooks would fl y cargo into the soccer fi eld until C-130 
airdrops could be started.17
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At daylight on 25 May, the enemy surprised the defenders with a 
.51-caliber machine gun they managed to get up into a water tower 
north of the airfi eld. Those towers were heavily reinforced con-
crete, built like a pillbox on stilts. This gun could cover a wide 
area with deadly fi re, so it had to be taken out. The ARVN artil-
lery used direct fi re from 200 meters away and eventually silenced 
it. However, the enemy quickly replaced it with another .51 cali-
ber, and we had to start all over again. After other weapons were 
tried, a TOW missile fi red by Hawk’s Claw fi nally blasted into the 
tower and killed the crew. The NVA also positioned about a dozen 
anti-aircraft guns only 100 meters east of the 44th Regiment’s com-
pound and less than a kilometer from the airfi eld. Both artillery 
and tactical air strikes were required to destroy them. At 0925, a 
Ruff Puff company attacked an enemy unit southwest of the air-
fi eld, captured one sapper, and killed 20 more who were fi ring 
60-mm mortars at the airfi eld.18 A VNAF FAC reported fi ve enemy 
tanks headed for the 53rd Regiment at 0930, and Hawk’s Claw was 
sent after them.19
A US Huey C&C ship making a visual reconnaissance was hit 
by small-arms fi re coming from a bunker complex in the south-
ern sector of the city. It went down just northwest of town and 
burned. The rotor blade decapitated the pilot as he exited the air-
craft, and the other four Americans on board were injured. About 
the same time, an RPG shot down an OH-6A. The two crew mem-
bers were killed when it crashed and burned. At 1300 on 25 May, 
Brigadier General Hill declared a tactical emergency, which gave 
Kontum top priority for all available tactical air and gunship sup-
port in South Vietnam. Shortly afterward, the DTOC was hit by an 
incoming round and damaged. By 1515, the NVA’s rate of fi re had 
doubled to one round every 30 seconds. A crater analysis by Major 
Lovings confi rmed that it was big 155-mm rounds hitting us. The 
enemy bombardment pinned the division artillery crews in their 
bunkers and also destroyed their guns and ammunition. By 1900, 
only fourteen 105-mm and two 155-mm howitzers were still able to 
support us. The VNAF ground team at the airfi eld was rendered 
ineffective, the airfi eld was closed, and by 1700 all nonessential US 
personnel were evacuated from Kontum.20
The enemy consolidated their gains southeast of Kontum, and 
the ARVN troops and RFs there could barely contain the penetra-
tion. However, this area would be the NVA’s high-water mark in 
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that part of the city. The enemy was able to reinforce its positions 
in both the northern and southern penetrations. South Vietnamese 
casualties for 25 May were 42 KIA and 142 WIA.21
It was impossible to get enough sleep during this period. We 
were constantly pounded by artillery rounds and rockets, any one 
of which could kill us. We never knew when we would be hit by 
another enemy ground attack with tanks. My mind was constantly 
running over a mental checklist of things we needed to do. Was 
there anything I forgot to check on? Anything else I could do to 
strengthen our defenses? We needed to make periodic radio checks 
with the DTOC, and we constantly monitored the adviser radio 
channel. The ARVN staff had their own radios operating, and 
they were chattering and sometimes shouting. Major Lovings and 
I tried to take turns sleeping, but it was hard to turn off enough of 
the noise and stress to doze off.
C-130 night landings were still cancelled, so the 23rd Division 
was left without any resupply for 24 hours.22 With the battle at its 
height and the possibility of having to E&E to an extraction point 
increasing, the DTOC advisers ran out of M-16 ammunition. There 
was a Ruff Puff headquarters nearby with an arms room full of 
World War II–era weapons, all standard Ruff Puff armament until 
recently, so the advisers raided it and armed themselves with M-1 
rifl es, M1A2 carbines, and even old Thompson submachine guns—
all with plenty of ammo.23
On 25 May, Mr. Vann told a reporter that 304 enemy bodies 
had been found around Ben Het and that 1,150 NVA soldiers had 
been killed within a two-mile radius of Kontum during the previ-
ous week.24 SRAG published classifi ed procedures for extracting all 
US personnel from Artillery Hill in Pleiku, if it became necessary. 
The publication included instructions to destroy the artillery’s 
radar equipment and the Jeep-mounted TOWs stationed there.25
After enduring nine hours of continuous rocketing by the NVA 
on 25 May, Sergeant Barker, the Vietnamese-language specialist, 
was evacuated to Pleiku for the night. Before he left that day, he 
translated a radio intercept saying there would be “concentrations 
of heavy rocket fi re on Special Area 24 [the DTOC area] in Kon-
tum.” He would be back in Kontum the next morning for what he 
would remember as his longest day.26
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“You Are Going to Be 
Overrun!”
Here lie the bones of Lieutenant Jones,
A graduate of this institution.
He died last night in a fi refi ght,
Victim of the approved solution.
—Graffi to at the Infantry School,
Fort Benning, Georgia, 1953
Kontum was surrounded by around 5,000 enemy troops with 
tanks.1 We were being constantly pounded by intermittent artillery 
and rocket fi re, and at 0100 on 26 May the tempo picked up. As 
we lay on our cots in the CP bunker, Major Lovings looked at his 
watch and started counting. An enemy artillery round was hitting 
us every 30 seconds. Nearly a thousand artillery and rocket rounds 
hit Kontum that night.2
At 0300 hours, the enemy launched human-wave attacks from 
the north against the positions of the 44th and 53rd Regiments. 
The enemy artillery continued pounding us, while their infantry 
and tanks broke through our front-line positions. The 44th Regi-
ment was hit with an enemy infantry regiment and about 20 tanks.3 
Possibly because the NVA thought the division CP was there—or 
because this position was the highest point in the city—its main 
attack was against the 44th Regiment, and it assaulted directly 
toward our regimental CP. With only two of our four battalions 
with us in the hospital area, we were hard pressed to hold off the 
much stronger assaulting force. The NVA’s secondary attack was 
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against the 53rd Regiment to the northeast of the 44th. It also 
assaulted our forces in other areas of the city.4 Our troops endured 
a terrible battering even before dawn. The area around our CP was 
mostly rubble and burned-out buildings. The intensity of the fi ght-
ing outside the bunker increased. We could hear the knuck, knuck, 
knuck of enemy AK-47s fi ring just outside and knew a sapper could 
toss a big satchel charge into our bunker at any minute.
Then Major Lovings and I heard something neither of us had 
ever heard before, but we knew instantly what it was: the extra loud, 
sharp CRACK! of an enemy tank fi ring its main gun directly at us. 
Major Lovings ran to the bunker entrance to see for himself. An 
enemy tank with a battle streamer fl ying from its turret was only 50 
yards away. From one of the nearby bunkers, an ARVN offi cer fi red 
an M-72 at the tank, and the sound of its impact could be heard 
above the other battle noise. It made a hole in the turret, and the 
tank engine stopped. Seeing the lead tank destroyed, the next T-54 
turned to move away. Another ARVN soldier took advantage of the 
broadside shot and knocked it out with an M-72.5
Colonel Tien was standing near the bunker door, surrounded 
by his staff, and shouting rapidly into his radio. Our situation was 
critical, and his voice and manner conveyed a sense of urgency. I 
stood nearby with Sergeant Hao and told him to translate what the 
CO was saying. Hao frequently gave only the briefest summary: “He 
ask battalion commander what is situation.” It was like the old for-
eign movies with subtitles where an Italian would talk for fi ve min-
utes and the English subtitle would summarize it all as, “Somebody 
stole my bicycle.”
Our 3rd Battalion was the main element defending our own 
positions. So many soldiers were coming down into the bunker that 
we began to wonder how many were still manning the perimeter. 
We got word that the 3rd Battalion had broken and run. Then their 
battalion commander himself came into our bunker.
Major Lovings slung our radio onto his back, picked up his rifl e, 
and said, “We’re in deep shit, Colonel.” I nodded my agreement 
and slammed a magazine into my M-16. Colonel Tien looked my 
way, said, “We go,” and headed for the door, followed by his entou-
rage. As we started after him, I radioed the DTOC with a last mes-
sage, “My counterpart is leaving the bunker!” Colonel Rhotenberry 
asked, “What are you going to do?” I said, “We’re going with him.” 
He responded, “We’ll try to get you out of there.” Lovings and I 
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exchanged a quick glance. We knew there was no way for anyone to 
extract us from the middle of such an intense fi refi ght. We would 
have to fend for ourselves. We would come out shooting, but this 
gunfi ght would probably end like the climax of Butch Cassidy and the 
Sundance Kid. Nevertheless, we would rather die that way than be 
blown to bits by a satchel charge tossed into our bunker.
Colonel Tien continued shouting into his radio as he moved 
slowly toward the bunker door. He suddenly stopped. Perhaps he 
realized we would not get far outside the bunker, or perhaps this 
was when he learned that only one company of the 3rd Battalion 
had cut and run while the other two companies were holding fi rm. 
But we were still in bad trouble. In the old cowboy movies, just 
when things looked hopeless for the pioneers, the US cavalry would 
save them by galloping in with fl ags fl apping and bugles blowing 
the charge. This morning the “bugle” was Brigadier General Hill 
calling on our radio. The “cavalry” coming to save us was a pair of 
Cobra gunships and the TOW helicopters he brought with him. 
General Hill saved our lives that day.
Brigadier General Hill had been certain there would be another 
enemy attack on the morning of 26 May, so he had alerted the 
crews of the TOW helicopters and their Cobra escorts to be ready 
to take off at 0515. The old UH-1B Hueys with the TOWs could 
not keep up with the new, fast Cobras, which arrived over Kon-
tum just before daylight. By then, the 53rd Regiment, the front-
line regiment, had already been overrun, and our 44th Regiment, 
the reserve regiment, was partially overrun. Brigadier General Hill 
radioed that he could see six enemy tanks driving toward us across 
the open area at the north of our compound and enemy infantry 
advancing through the buildings in our compound. Major Lovings 
told him that our northern line of defensive bunkers ran along map 
grid line 90 and that anything north of there was a free-fi re zone. 
The Cobras immediately made a strafi ng run, fi ring their rockets 
and machine guns to separate the NVA tanks and troops. After a 
loud, fast radio conversation, my counterpart told me—with much 
agitation—that the fi re from the Cobras was too close. Some of it 
was hitting his troops and causing casualties. I relayed this informa-
tion to Brigadier General Hill. From his vantage point in the air, he 
could see that the situation was worse than we realized and told me 
we had to make a choice: “If we hold fi re, you are going to be over-
run in about three minutes.” I told him to let the Cobras continue 
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attacking. As the strafi ng Cobras separated the NVA infantry from 
their tanks, two of the T-54s tried to hide by driving into deserted 
buildings. This effectively removed them from the fi ght for the 
time being as Hawk’s Claw destroyed the other attacking tanks.6
Brigadier General Hill described the action:
In the attack on Kontum at the end of May, the NVA 
launched its attack at approximately 0400, penetrated an 
infantry regiment’s position, and with tank-infantry teams 
started overrunning the reserve regiment. We responded 
from the airfi elds at Pleiku and at fi rst light, 0600, had a 
command and control aircraft and a set of guns in the area. 
The guns engaged the tank-infantry force. Our people on 
the ground complained that the fi re from the rockets was too 
close and hitting among them. But when it was pointed out 
that the alternative was to be overrun, they agreed to succes-
sive runs. On these runs fi re was held to the turret so it could 
be more accurately placed. This fi re, however, was suffi cient 
to drive to cover the infantry elements of the tank-infantry 
teams. The tankers, in turn, being concerned about pene-
trating built-up areas in the city without infantry support, 
stopped to regroup. Successive runs by the Cobras delayed 
the regrouping and suppressed 12.7 machine guns that were 
accompanying the force. The TOWs, lumbering up on the 
B models, arrived approximately 0625 and in the next hour 
destroyed the tanks of the entire attacking force. By 0730 
the battle had been decided, although there was consider-
able mopping up remaining to be done by the infantry on 
the ground, and this took days.7
Hawk’s Claw turned the tide in this early morning battle, but 
the 44th Regiment’s troops got some of the T-54s with M-72s. One 
ARVN soldier fi red an M-72 at a tank and knocked off its left track. 
The tank could still turn to the left using just its right track, but it 
could not move in a straight line. Other ARVN soldiers moved in 
on the crippled tank and knocked it out with M-72s.8 The enemy 
forces seized two-thirds of our compound and were only minutes 
away from overrunning us completely. We fi nally stopped them, 
but the two enemy tanks knocked out only a stone’s throw from our 
bunker door showed how close we came to being overrun.9 Tacti-
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cal air strikes started at 0730, and they smashed the enemy attacks. 
Spectre killed one tank with its 105-mm gun, and either a mine or 
an M-72 killed another one. Hawk’s Claw reported destroying six 
NVA tanks and three abandoned ARVN M-41s.10
The T-54 burns about a gallon of fuel per mile, and as the Brit-
ish counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson said, “You 
cannot refuel T-54 tanks with gasoline out of water bottles carried 
on bicycles. It has got to come down in trucks, and trucks in quite 
large numbers.”11 Thompson was partially wrong on that last point. 
The North Vietnamese had built a pipeline all the way from North 
Vietnam to send fuel down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But from the 
end of the pipeline, the fuel still needed to be trucked to their tanks 
in the fi eld. After the fi ring died down, Major Lovings climbed up 
on an enemy tank standing motionless not far from our bunker. 
The crew compartment was empty, so he lowered himself into the 
driver’s seat for a look at the interior. After experimenting with 
the various switches and gauges, he discovered that the fuel tank 
was empty. This is what had stopped it dead in its tracks. President 
Nixon’s orders to mine the ports in North Vietnam and to bomb 
fuel-storage facilities and transportation networks paid off in the 
battle for Kontum when this tank ran out of fuel just short of our 
bunker. Thank you, President Richard Milhous Nixon!
Over Kontum, the TOW Team fl ew and fi red through smoke 
and dust while threatened by anti-aircraft fi re. Their ability to 
hit pinpoint targets saved many civilian structures and prevented 
friendly casualties, which would have occurred in tactical air strikes 
on the same targets. Their fi nest hours were in the early morning 
of 26 May. When the TOW Team arrived, they fi red 21 missiles and 
destroyed fi ve T-54 tanks, fi ve PT-76 tanks, a truck, a bunker, and 
two successive machine guns in a water tower. The two TOW heli-
copters relieved each other on station and fl ew three sorties each 
that morning. CWOs Edmond C. Smith and Danny G. Rowe were 
one crew, and CWOs Douglas R. Hixson and Lester F. Whiteis were 
the other crew. They returned the next morning to kill two more 
tanks. All the tanks were knocked out while they were stationary. 
None of them took evasive action or fi red on the TOW aircraft.12
In the afternoon of 26 May, Colonel Ba ordered the division 
reserve, a battalion of the 44th Regiment reinforced by eight of his 
M-41 tanks, to counterattack the penetration between the 44th and 
53rd Regiments. This attack did stop and contain the penetration 
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but did not retake the lost ground. It was the same story in all parts 
of the city: our forces were able to limit the NVA gains but were 
unable to eject the enemy and restore the defensive perimeter. The 
tactical situation remained stabilized for the remainder of the day, 
but the air cavalry sighted large enemy forces moving to reinforce 
their penetrations.13 Brigadier General Hill thought the situation 
was so bad because Colonel Ba had allowed the enemy to get in on 
top of him rather than detecting them and breaking up their attacks 
by using outposts 500 meters or more in front of the perimeter.14
The airfi eld was still closed to fi xed-wing air craft, so all resup-
ply missions were fl own by Chinook helicopters landing on the soc-
cer fi eld. These helicopters also evacuated refugees and seriously 
wounded ARVN soldiers. However, many lightly wounded ARVN 
soldiers tried to use these fl ights to escape the beleaguered city. 
Armed American security guards were placed on the Chinooks to 
stop them from boarding.15 By afternoon, even helicopter fl ights 
into the soccer fi eld were curtailed because of the tactical situa-
tion. The G-4 staff started planning airdrops of critical supplies. In 
Pleiku, Colonel Joseph J. Pizzi, the II Corps chief of staff adviser, 
signed the “Daily Commanders Evaluation” to General Abrams on 
26 May. He noted, “Mr. Vann, BG Hill, and the corps commander 
are in the Kontum battle area.”16
After dark on 26 May, indirect fi re on the 45th and 53rd Regi-
ments’ CPs increased. Three battalions of the 64th NVA Regiment, 
320th NVA Infantry Division, then assaulted the 45th Regiment, 
penetrated between the 45th and 53rd, and cut off the 45th. All 
available air support was diverted to the embattled regiment. Lieu-
tenant Colonel John C. Grant, the senior adviser to the 45th Regi-
ment, conferred with Colonel Rhotenberry, who agreed to divert 
two sched uled B-52 strikes to hit the NVA troops assaulting the 45th. 
The Arc Light struck at 0230 on 27 May and broke up the enemy 
attack. Spectre gunships fi red in support of the 53rd through the 
night as Grant relayed targets from the front lines.17
UPI reporter Arthur Higbee reported that Kontum “is a con-
stant explosion” from the bombs, rockets, mortars, and artillery of 
both sides.18
The Chicago Tribune summed up the action of 26 May:
The defenders of Kontum fought off a second day of North 
Vietnamese attacks to day, claiming a dozen tanks knocked 
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out and 1,000 enemy troops killed or pushed back. . . . It was 
feared that if the enemy could hold out until dark it could 
bring in reinforce ments for a renewed assault on the provin-
cial capital.
American military advisers in Kontum described the 
situa tion as under control and said the enemy had been con-
tained. . . . The North Vietnamese fi rst pene trated the city 
early yester day, pounded it with some 800 rounds of rockets 
and artil lery. They strengthened their at tack force today. Two 
battalions of North Vietnamese, many of them in South Viet-
namese uniforms, were reported to have infi ltrated the city 
and to have attacked at dawn with tank fi re backing them up.
South Vietnamese headquar ters in Pleiku claimed 157 
ene my killed in and around Kon tum today but gave nO 
report on its own casualties. American sources said 12 enemy 
tanks were destroyed by United States wire-guided missiles, 
government artillery, and hand-carried, single-shot light 
antitank weapons. The sources said three of the tanks were 
U.S.-built M-41s captured from South Vietnamese troops by 
the North Viet namese earlier in the day.
U.S. forces are using spe cial helicopters and Jeeps armed 
with armor-piercing mis siles to combat the recent in fl ux of 
tanks for use in the North Vietnamese offensive. The cor-
respondent said the Kontum province chief and his U.S. 
adviser, Col. Stephen Bachinski, were shot down in a helicop-
ter yesterday but es caped unhurt. They were back in the air 
today to direct U.S. Cobra helicopter gunships fi r ing rockets 
into Montagnard huts near the Kontum airstrip. North Viet-
namese troops were believed holed up in the area.19
Although NVA accounts are generally overblown, one of them is 
partially accurate:
On the nights of 24 and 25 April [the correct dates are 25 and 
27 May, the writer possibly confusing this action with the fall 
of Tan Canh and Dak To II in April] the 2nd Division and 
the 209th Companies of the Cong Tum City unit together 
with a tank unit, made power thrusts at the city where enemy 
defenses showed weak spots. They seized the southern sec-
tion of the provincial administrative center, the airfi eld area, 
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the 44th Regiment headquarters, Supply Depots 40 and 41, 
the fi eld hospital, and two-thirds of Special Zone 24.20
In his “Daily Commanders Evaluation” sent to General Abrams 
on 27 May, John Paul Vann was realistic and somber but also confi -
dent about eventual victory:
The overall situation in Kontum City is critical but not at all 
hopeless. However, it is extremely doubtful that the former 
perimeter will be restored or that the present penetration will 
be eliminated in the near future. I expect that Col Ba will con-
solidate his forces within that area of the city still under his 
control and that future fi ghting will closely resemble that which 
has taken place in An Loc. U.S. air support will continue to 
be vital to a sustained defense of the city, and the increasingly 
bad weather conditions will dictate making maximum use of 
sky spots and Loran controlled drops. In this connection, my 
7th AF liaison offi cer states that this support cannot be brought 
closer than 700 meters to friendlies although the corps com-
mander has stated that they want the support into 500 meters 
and will assume responsibility for the consequences.21
At dawn on 27 May, the situation was still critical. The NVA 
penetrations from the north and the southeast were close to link-
ing up and splitting the defending forces.22 The action started early 
that day when NVA infantry and tanks attacked all three of the 
23rd Division’s regiments. The enemy was consolidating positions 
already seized and attacking from all sides, pushing hard to expand 
their penetrations. Two NVA tanks were destroyed by M-72s, and 
at 0730 Hawk’s Claw attacked two more tanks just north of the 
city. The Claw fi red only one missile at each vehicle, and the T-54s 
exploded. USAF and VNAF air strikes, gunships, and the air cav-
alry also supported us. With all that air support and the front-line 
soldiers’ continuing efforts, by 1000 the defenders were able to stop 
the enemy’s attempts to advance. However, they were still unable 
to restore the original perimeter by ejecting the Communists from 
positions they already held.23
At 0715 on 27 May, an enemy mortar round hit the main ammo 
dump one kilometer north of the airfi eld. The ammo started explod-
ing and ignited a fi re in a large POL dump. The burning POL emit-
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ted a big cloud of black smoke, which limited visibility for the aircraft 
overhead. Sixty percent of the ammunition in the dump, including 
10,000 rounds of artillery ammunition—brought in at great risk to 
the cargo aircraft carrying it—was destroyed. The division artillery 
was down to only 3,500 rounds before it was resupplied.24
The enemy continued to push us throughout the day, and by 
noon they held scattered areas behind the ARVN positions all across 
the city’s northern front.25 In the afternoon, a VNAF FAC located a 
large enemy troop concentration and requested a VNAF air strike 
on it. No aircraft were immediately available, so he contacted the 
ARVN ground commander, who requested and received a US air 
strike. It killed 60 of the enemy. Near the embattled 53rd Regiment 
positions north of the airfi eld, two NVA .51-caliber machine guns 
were fi ring at every aircraft within range, especially the fi ghter-
bombers. Two daring VNAF A-1E pilots made pass after pass in the 
face of a deadly crossfi re and fi nally took out those two weapons. 
They also destroyed a 23-mm anti-aircraft gun when it revealed 
itself by fi ring at them.26
The airfi eld was still closed, and supplies could not be para-
chuted in until a drop zone could be secured, so our only source 
of resupply was by US Army CH-47s landing on the soccer fi eld. 
During one 24-hour period, those valiant Chinook crews brought 
in 100 tons of supplies and took out more than 200 wounded on the 
return trip to Pleiku. At 1800, VNAF helicopters began shuttling 
supplies from the soccer fi eld to the regiments. To avoid landing 
at each regiment’s CP, the VNAF crews kicked the supplies out the 
door as their helicopters made low passes over the CPs. In the 53rd 
Regiment’s area, Lieutenant Colonel Gannon, the senior adviser 
to the 53rd, organized ARVN troops into teams to retrieve supplies 
from the drop zone. The enemy artil lery was fi ring constantly on 
the teams while they worked. As Gannon was moving back to his 
bunker, he was wounded in the upper leg. He was evacuated but 
returned to duty after a few days.27
The attacks on the 25th and 26th emphasized the urgency of 
changing our troop dispositions. The NVA could have cut off the 
45th on FSB November and then cut off the 53rd. The situation 
continued to deteriorate as the NVA reinforced its attack near the 
airfi eld. The night of 25–26 May Colonel Rhotenberry and Briga-
dier General Ba had a heart-to-heart talk about the troop disposi-
tions. Rhotenberry pushed Ba to withdraw from outpost Nectar, 
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but Ba again said that the corps commander had ordered him to 
hold it. Rhotenberry considered the situation at Nectar to be seri-
ous but not critical. When Major General Toan and Mr. Vann 
arrived on 27 May, Colonel Ba briefed them and showed them the 
penetrations. In regard to tightening the perimeter, Toan said, “No 
withdrawal! If you do withdraw, you demoralize the troops.”28
Colonel Rhotenberry had a 1:12,500-scale map of the city cov-
ered with acetate, and he used grease pencils to draw our troop 
dispositions on it in black and the enemy penetrations in red. He 
marked the 45th Regiment’s position on the Round Hill in the 
northwest, just west of Highway 14. The 44th Regiment’s positions 
in the hospital area were marked with an A, and between them he 
drew a big enemy penetration and wrote “Regt” to indicate an NVA 
regiment was there. East of the 44th, he labeled the 53rd Regi-
ment’s areas B and C and wrote “Regt” to indicate another NVA 
regiment attacking them. In the southeast, Rhotenberry wrote 
“Regt” again where the reserve and the Ruff Puffs were pushed up 
against the southern edge of the airfi eld by another enemy regi-
ment. The DTOC location was shown with a fl ag symbol in the 
middle of the city. This picture was a startling depiction of how bad 
our situation was. The enemy held almost half of Kontum City. 
Worse yet, the penetrations in the northeast and southeast were 
close to seizing the airfi eld and linking up to split our defenses 
in two. The only thing preventing those penetrations from joining 
was ARVN’s stubborn defense of the airfi eld’s fi nal defensive line 
of bunkers. Those bunkers were only 100 meters from the runway, 
and they ran parallel to it on both the north and south sides.29
Colonel Rhotenberry used this map to brief Mr. Vann on the 
situation and recommended contracting to reduce the perimeter, 
“or we may lose the city,” he warned. Vann took the map and went 
upstairs where Toan and Ba were talking. Vann showed Toan the 
map and said, “This is where we stand right now. A two-battalion 
force, a regiment, has penetrated here, a regiment has penetrated 
here, and a regiment coming from the south has almost seized the 
airfi eld and linked up with the force coming from the north. They 
have the ability to reinforce these penetrations. If we don’t estab-
lish a concentrated defensive position, we could lose the city.”
Major General Toan asked Colonel Ba, “What do you think 
about this plan?” Ba agreed it was a good plan. Toan ordered that 
it be implemented. Rhotenberry thought Toan’s asking Ba for 
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his opinion was Toan’s attempt to cover his own posterior if the 
changes he approved did not save the city. Rhotenberry did not 
consider Toan professionally competent, and Vann once told Rho-
tenberry, “Toan was the only man I could get.”30
With the airfi eld closed and the NVA still controlling most of 
the eastern half of Kontum, airdrops would be vital to our defense. 
C-130E(I)s with all-weather airdrop capabilities were rushed to 
Thailand from Pope AFB, North Carolina, and Little Rock AFB, 
Arkansas, to supplement the C-130s of the 374th Tactical Airlift 
Squadron of the Tactical Airlift Wings. These special operations 
C-130E(I)s were equipped with the All Weather Airdrop System that 
used an onboard computer rather than visual references to deter-
mine the release point. They could drop bundles without slowing 
down and without outside guidance.31 A drop zone was established 
near the river in the southwest corner of the city, and airdrops 
started on 27 May. The next day 64 bundles were dropped, and 
50 were recovered. Over the next four days, C-130s parachuted 19 
loads into the drop zone. The ground-radar, high-velocity method 
was used for all these drops.32
The NVA still controlled the graveyard between the 45th Regi-
ment troops on FSB November and the 44th Regiment in the hos-
pital area. ARVN attacks would grind the enemy down, but the 
enemy would then send in a fresh battalion. Troops from the 23rd 
Division must have counterattacked this graveyard eight to ten 
times. Air strikes, ground attacks, and counterattacks destroyed all 
the tombstones.33
At one point, the NVA captured an ARVN M-113 APC. When 
the TOW helicopters were attacking targets in Kontum, this vehicle 
was pointed out to them, and it was knocked out with a broadside 
shot. The TOW missile left a big hole in the side, destroying the 
vehicle and the enemy inside.34 During this one day, 27 May, a total 
of 137 air strikes by US and VNAF fi ghter-bombers hit enemy posi-
tions on the north and northwest sides of the city. After dark, we 
could see fi res burning in the enemy-occupied areas.35
The NVA infantry and sappers remained fi rmly entrenched 
in the hospital compound where the 44th Regiment was located. 
They were only 40 meters from our forward positions. We received 
the usual small-arms fi re and a few incoming mortar rounds, but 
the evening passed without major incidents. Spectre, Spooky, and 
Stinger gunships supported us that night.36
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Kontum on the morning of 27 May 1972.
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The outpost on Nectar was fi nally pulled in and positioned to 
guard the streambed behind the Round Hill.37 South of Kontum, 
the effort to open Highway 14 slowly ground on with close combat 
and casualties on a daily basis. The corps commander questioned 
the wisdom of continuing that road-clearing operation, and Presi-
dent Thieu suggested that the forces tied down there might be bet-
ter used to reinforce Kontum.38
The 250-pound bombs dropped by the B-52s were sometimes so 
close to Kontum that they broke windows and knocked the advisers’ 
coffee cups off their worktables in the DTOC bunker.39 John Paul 
Vann once remarked, “Anytime the wind is blowing from the north 
where B-52 strikes are turning the terrain into moonscape, you can 
tell from the battlefi eld stench that the strikes are effective.”40
UPI reporter Matt Franjola said the situation “looks pretty 
grim,” but he reported that 19 waves of B-52s plus tactical air strikes 
were causing heavy Communist casualties. On 27 May, gunships, 
TOW helicopters, and ARVN infantrymen knocked out 8 more 
enemy tanks for a total of 18 tanks destroyed in two days.41
We were now in worse danger than ever before. The airfi eld 
was still closed, so the only resupply or medical evacuation was by 
helicopter, and enemy anti-aircraft fi re threatened every aircraft 
fl ying over, into, or out of Kontum. Most of the ammo dumps had 
been blown up by enemy artillery or mortar fi re. Each of the 23rd 
Division’s infantry battalions was supposed to have 826 men, but 
because of combat losses and desertions, they were hard pressed 
to put more than 300 each in the fi eld. One of the battalions in 
the 44th Regiment was down to 200 men. Some of the ARVN sol-
diers could not take it any longer. During the heaviest fi ghting, 
Major Burch, whose job was working in the DTOC as assistant G-3 
adviser, went out with an interpreter to stop ARVN soldiers who 
were trying to fl ee to the rear. The American captain in charge of 
the helicopter resupply operation at the soccer fi eld sent refugees 
out on the helicopters bringing ammo in. He said that the only way 
he could hold off ARVN soldiers who were trying to escape Kon-
tum with the refugees was to threaten to shoot them.
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The Dirty Job of Killing
Sometimes it just gets down to the dirty job of killing until 
one side or the other cracks. 
—General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Before dawn on 28 May, we were hit with around 400 rounds of 
mortar fi re but the attacks by fi re tapered off and there was no 
major ground attack against the 44th Regiment. During the day, 
about 100 large-caliber rounds hit inside the city. They were appar-
ently fi red indiscriminately rather than aimed at the airfi eld and 
other military targets. One round hit the Highway 14 bridge over 
the Dak Bla River south of the city and slightly wounded an Ameri-
can adviser.1
The II Corps advisers knew air support would be needed in 
Kontum before dawn on 28 May. However, early-morning dark-
ness was certain, and bad weather was predicted, so tactical air 
strikes would not be available to hit pinpoint targets. The defend-
ers turned to Combat Sky Spots, a type of air support that could 
bomb even in the dark by using “smart bombs” guided to the target 
with laser beams. It was similar to the system used for Arc Lights. A 
series of Combat Sky Spots on preplanned targets along the battle-
front were scheduled for every 20 minutes between 0350 and 1230. 
The USAF radar station in Pleiku would control the Sky Spots, and 
the radar in Danang would take over the Arc Lights scheduled for 
that period.
At 0500, sappers attacked elements of the 53rd Regiment 
defending the former 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment compound 
on the northern perimeter. Positions of the 44th Regiment to the 
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west were attacked shortly afterward. Elements of the 44th and 
53rd Regiments, supported by tanks from the 8th Armored Cavalry 
Regiment, later attempted to dislodge the enemy from the north-
ern compounds. When the weather improved, VNAF A-37s and 
US Cobra gunships supporting the 53rd troops reduced the com-
pounds to rubble. In hand-to-hand combat throughout the day, the 
enemy attempted to link up their penetrations near the airfi eld. At 
the same time, the Ruff Puffs were engaged in heavy fi ghting in the 
southern area of Kontum, where the NVA was still holding a school 
and some houses at the southern edge of the airfi eld.2
Under pressure from Mr. Vann, Major General Toan fi nally 
agreed to withdraw what Vann called “the rather useless FSB 
November,” thus permitting better utilization of Arc Lights north 
of the city. On 28 May, Toan also agreed to pull the 45th and 53rd 
Regiments back enough to tighten the perimeter. Withdrawing 
even a short distance while in contact with the enemy without hav-
ing it turn into a rout is an extremely diffi cult military maneuver. 
Vann acknowledged, “It is going to be ticklish.”3 At 1100 on 28 May, 
45th Regiment forces started their withdrawal from FSB November 
by attacking to the southeast to eliminate pockets of enemy resis-
tance and to move into their new positions within the new, smaller 
defense perimeter. They encountered an entrenched NVA battal-
ion, and it was not until the next day that the entire regiment was 
able to close into the city’s defensive ring.
Colonel Rhotenberry wanted to put in an Arc Light northwest of 
FSB November late that day. The minimum clearance from the edge 
of the target box to friendly forces had to be 1,000 meters, but the 
clearance for this one was only 700 meters from the nearest friendly 
forces. ARVN commanders would probably approve the reduced 
clearance, but 18 Americans were included in those friendly forces: 
two Jeep-mounted TOW squads who were positioned to cover a gap 
in the perimeter with their antitank missiles and soldiers from the 
US Army’s Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, who 
were providing close-in security for the TOWs.
When Mr. Vann visited Kontum late in the day, he said he could 
not approve a strike so close to friendly troops. Rhotenberry told 
him the ARVN and TOW troops would be pulled back to the 45th 
Regiment’s CP on FSB November before the Arc Light hit. This 
strategy seemed to satisfy Vann. However, by the time Rhotenberry 
talked to the adviser on FSB November, the adviser told him that 
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because it was already dark and the mechanical ambushes were 
already set out, the friendly troops could not be moved.
Rhotenberry really wanted that strike, and he wanted it right 
where he had plotted it, so he told the adviser on November, “Mon-
itor the radio, and when I say ‘Duck!’ they [the troops] need to 
duck.” An assistant G-3 adviser at II Corps called to question the 
safety limits. He acknowledged that Mr. Vann had approved the 
strike but cautioned Rhotenberry, “If anything happens to those 
Americans, it will be your personal responsibility.” Rhotenberry 
thought the G-3 was trying to cover Vann’s posterior without 
Vann’s knowing about it. The Arc Light went in when and where 
Rhotenberry wanted it, and there were no friendly casualties. It did 
not hurt the NVA as much as Rhotenberry was hoping, but at least 
the 45th Regiment was able to withdraw from FSB November with-
out being attacked.4
Units of the 23rd Division launched limited attacks to eject the 
enemy from the northern compounds and around the airfi eld, 
but no signifi cant progress was made despite support from tacti-
cal air and Cobra gunships. The increased combat activity meant 
increased use of ammunition. US and VNAF gunships fi red more 
than 3,000 rockets on 28 and 29 May. The weather was good 
enough for 53 tactical air sorties around the city. Some of them 
were used, along with Cobra gunships, to attack an estimated 100 
enemy troops the air cavalry had found one kilometer northwest 
of town. Troops from the 53rd Regiment swept the area afterward 
and found 70 NVA bodies. Two NVA trucks were knocked out just 
north of FSB November after the 45th Regiment pulled back from 
there. Taking their trucks so close to the front lines may have been 
just the truckers’ mistake. However, it might also have indicated 
that the Communist commanders were confi dent that they would 
soon take Kontum.5
In the 28 May Stars and Stripes, an article about knocking out 
enemy tanks with TOW missiles revealed that some were fi red from 
Jeeps and that “jeeps and American personnel from Ft. Bragg, NC” 
had come to Vietnam.6 On Sunday, May 28, 50 B-52s dropped 1,250 
tons of bombs around Kontum. Some of the strikes were within 
two miles of the city. Troops from the 23rd Division recaptured 
the school and orphanage in the south, but NVA forces remained 
entrenched in other parts of both the northern and the southern 
sectors of Kontum.7
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Late on 28 May, the Kontum District headquarters completed 
an orderly withdrawal, bringing all their vehicles, 105s, ammo, and 
500 troops into the new defensive perimeter. During the afternoon, 
the 3rd Battalion, 47th Regiment, arrived at the soccer fi eld in US 
Chinooks. They came from Camp Inari south of Pleiku, where 
they had been reorganized, retrained, and reequipped after their 
ignominious defeat at Dak To II in April.8
The two TOW-fi ring Hueys were an important part of our US 
Army air support, but they were only part of it. During the heavy 
fi ghting in April and May, the normal daily aircraft commitment for 
the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) was to provide 41 Hueys (including 
the C&C ship our Team 33 received every day), 8 Hooks, 7 OH-58 
Kiowa scouts, and a separate gun company of 14 Cobra gunships. 
In addition, there was an air cavalry troop working around Kontum 
every day, and another troop could be diverted to Kontum when 
needed. H Troop of the 17th Air Cavalry Squadron worked for the 
II Corps G-2 air but was sometimes placed under the 23rd Division 
senior adviser for operational control. Their daily commitment was 
four Hueys, four Cobras, and four Loachs. The air cavalry located 
enemy supply dumps and infi ltration routes and provided most of 
the intelligence we used for planning tactical air or Arc Light strikes.9
Correspondent Matt Franjola reported from Kontum on Sun-
day, 28 May:
VIETS TAKE MOST OF KONTUM
AS REDS APPEAR IN RETREAT
KONTUM (UPI)—We felt a lot more secure walking around 
Kontum Sunday, even though we were pinned down for 
about 20 minutes by machine gun fi re.
Last week half the town was in North Vietnamese hands. 
Now most of those areas are secure. The South Vietnam-
ese sol diers and a U.S. senior province adviser said the NVA 
appear to be pulling out of Kontum to the northeast.
A group of South Vietnamese soldiers, some of them 
Regional Forces militiamen, others ARVN regulars from the 
23rd Div.’s 44th Regt., told UPI pho tographer Jeff Taylor 
and me:
“As we move up, we see NVA running away. NVA afraid of 
us. We come, they run away.”
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Taylor and I fl ew to Kontum aboard a US Army CH47 
Chi nook helicopter airlifting supplies into the city. As we 
ap proached, we saw fi res burning in the former 22nd ARVN 
Div. headquarters compound.
We landed at the soccer fi eld in the center of town, where 
60 South Vietnamese soldiers with minor wounds were 
awaiting helicopter evacuation.
We walked down to the La San School which was held by 
the NVA last week. It was clear now, but an orphanage 500 
yards to the south was still in Commu nist hands.
South Vietnamese M-41 tanks were fi ring cannon and 
machine guns into the NVA positions. The Communists 
were fi ring back with AK47 rifl es and light ma chine guns.
The NVA opened up with rifl es and a light machine gun 
at us, and we dived into a ditch. They kept us pinned down 
for 20 min utes. Finally we made a break for it and ran for 
shelter behind a stone wall a few yards away.
The ARVN soldiers said they think there is an NVA bat-
talion headquarters in a house in a bamboo grove just east of 
the La San School. The soldiers said they had it surrounded 
on three sides.
In the center of town civilians were milling about, selling 
or buying food and soft drinks. A few girls were selling cans 
of ra tions. There didn’t seem to be any food shortage.
Despite the fi ghting, 95 per cent of the business district 
seems to be intact.
The NVA still are holding an area just north of the air-
fi eld but Taylor and I made it to with in 150 yards of the run-
way and 300 yards from the Air Vietnam terminal.
We watched South Vietnamese A1 Skyraiders making 
strikes but we couldn’t tell whether they were hitting the 
Communist tar gets. The airfi eld remained closed.10
Mr. Vann gave the VNAF bomber pilots a well-deserved compli-
ment. Major Gordon E. Bloom, a USAF adviser to VNAF, recalled,
John Paul Vann came in just elated at the VNAF perfor-
mance. They were getting right down on the deck and put-
ting their butt right on the line. There was murderous fi re 
there, because the NVA had brought down numerous 51 cal 
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quad 50’s: they had even 23mm AAA guns up there and 
those guys were going right down the barrel . . . John Paul 
Vann came in so excited and said: That’s the best damn 
bombing I’ve seen in my 11 years over here! That was his 
estimation of the VNAF. I don’t think you need any more 
testimony than that. In the defense of Kontum the VNAF 
has been magnifi cent, absolutely magnifi cent.11
All the advisers held the VNAF fi ghter-bomber pilots in high 
esteem. Unfortunately, the VNAF helicopter pilots seldom earned 
similar praise.
Captain Roy Sudeck was fl ying his Huey low over the muddy 
water of a twisting, turning river in Kontum Province when he saw 
an island he did not remember from previous reconnaissance mis-
sions. It was a small island about 20 feet out from the riverbank. He 
turned around and came back for a better look. On either bank, 
there was a trail leading to a ford, and the new island was in the 
shallow water of the ford. His suspicions were confi rmed by fresh 
tank tracks on one of the trails leading into the water. Another 
closer look revealed that the “island” was a T-54 tank covered with 
sand bags and well camoufl aged. He reported this target, and the 
Aerial TOW Team was launched. When the TOW Hueys arrived, 
Sudeck marked the target with smoke, and the TOW pilot, CWO2 
Douglas R. Hixson Jr. made an initial pass over the target so his 
gunner, CWO3 Lester Whiteis, could get a good fi x on it. Hixson 
then made an attack run, and Whiteis guided a missile into the 
target’s center of mass. The missile blew away all the sand bags 
and camoufl age but did not destroy the tank. They made another 
pass and fi red a second missile. It hit the tank turret dead on and 
started a fi re. The tank exploded moments later. Whether the NVA 
was testing a new method of hiding tanks or this tank broke down 
in four feet of water while fording the river is immaterial. The 
result was, “Scratch one enemy tank!”12
After fi ring accurately on only military targets for weeks, the 
enemy artillery switched to an indiscriminate pattern late on 28 May, 
which soon caused more than 100 civilian casualties. By that night, 
the situation re mained critical; the NVA still held the same areas it 
had held at the beginning of the day. Again, the 23rd Division’s only 
accomplishment during a day of hard fi ghting was to contain the 
penetrations in the northern compounds and the southern area.13
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Every NVA soldier had started the battle with three belts fi lled 
with cooked rice. Transportation units were supposed to keep them 
resupplied with food and ammunition. However, continuing air 
strikes had forced the NVA to stockpile their supplies far from the 
front lines. Our bombing also disrupted their telephone communi-
cations and hindered the movement of their transportation units. 
Unable to resupply their front-line troops adequately—especially 
those who were holding the penetrations in Kontum—the enemy 
was forced either to seize Kontum soon or to withdraw to resupply, 
rearm, and reorganize their exhausted troops. The defenders were 
also feeling the pinch of inadequate resupply. However, they had 
resources the enemy did not. On one day, American C-130s had air-
dropped a total of 64 tons of ammunition, and three-quarters of it 
was recovered.14
As the fi ghting continued day after day and on through the 
nights, and as the artillery and rocket bombardment became more 
intense, my counterpart, Colonel Tien, became more and more 
bunker bound. When there was a lull in the fi ghting, I would sug-
gest that we should go out to check on the troops. Just showing he 
was there and interested in how they were doing would improve 
their morale and increase their resolve to hold out. It would also 
give us a chance to see if their positions needed to be rebuilt or 
improved and if they had adequate food and ammo as well as to 
thank them for the fi ghting they had done and the courage they 
had demonstrated. Colonel Tien would agree that it would be a 
good idea to leave the bunker to visit his troops, but he would not 
follow through to do it. He was certainly one of the best ARVN reg-
imental commanders and basically a “hands on” offi cer who would 
go check on things himself rather than just relying on reports, so 
now it was discouraging to see him physically and mentally with-
drawing into the bunker. We all have our breaking point, and he 
had been fi ghting this war many years before I arrived.
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All Over but the Shooting?
If Kontum City holds, the North Vietnamese will be defeated 
in II Corps.
—John Paul Vann, May 1972
Enemy activity tapered off on 29 May. The previous night was the 
fi rst one since arriving in Kontum that we were not bombarded 
and then hit with major ground assaults supported by tanks. How-
ever, the front line was still only 100 meters from our bunker door. 
The perimeter was being pulled in so it would be easier to defend 
and to prevent enemy infi ltration. It seemed to be the smart thing 
to do, but it could also be viewed as a tightening of the NVA noose 
around us. The relief force pushing up Highway 14 was not mak-
ing much progress, and the airfi eld was still closed. All our sup-
plies were coming in by Hook or by parachute. Pockets of enemy 
soldiers were holding out all over town, and just driving back to the 
DTOC was an adventure. Some days we could not get there at all. 
That meant no mail, Stars and Stripes, or personal contact with the 
other advisers. We were lucky to have food and water. Major Lov-
ings and I had two cases of beer, and we heard the local ice plant 
was still operating, so we might even have cold beer someday. How-
ever, as we watched VNAF bombers striking an area right in front 
of us, I tried to think of ways we were better off than Dien Bien 
Phu.1
There were only sporadic sniper shots, and only 30 artillery, 
mortar, or rocket rounds landed in the city on this day. A Loach 
from B Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, was shot down seven 
kilometers north of the city. There were no survivors. Almost an 
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entire NVA regiment was in the streambed behind FSB November. 
Pulling the 45th Regiment off FSB November had probably saved 
it from being cut off. Moving back into the city, the 45th Regiment 
linked up with the 53rd Regiment. Both regiments then withdrew 
into the new, tighter perimeter to strengthen our defenses. The 45th 
Regiment would be available as a reserve to counterattack penetra-
tions.2 By 1000, approximately 60 tactical air sorties had hit targets 
in and around Kontum. Fourteen of them struck in the northeast, 
where they destroyed 39 bunkers and other structures. The 44th 
Regiment attacked enemy positions in the hospital compound but 
made little progress despite heavy fi ghting. Those entrenched 
NVA soldiers were fi ghting for their lives. Also, the VNAF tacti-
cal air support for our attacks was 90 minutes late arriving, alleg-
edly because of a weather hold in Pleiku. This excuse did not sit 
well with Major General Toan because the US fi ghter-bombers
and helicopters were on station continually starting at 0600. At the 
end of the day, the enemy still held his positions in the north and 
southeast of Kontum. What we had was essentially a stalemate.3
In his “Daily Commanders Evaluation” written 29 May, Mr. 
Vann told General Abrams, “The consensus is that Arc Light results 
greatly exceed kills by all other means. My personal synthesis of 
all available information indicates that most enemy infantry units 
are at 50 percent or less of their entry strength in early 72. Nearly 
all PW and Hoi Chanh reports indicate average company strength 
of around 20–25. An exception to this was a report from a PW 
from the 28th NVA Regiment, who stated the recent arrival of 200 
replacements for the regiment had raised the company strength up 
to 60 men.”4
The American advisers at higher levels said that if we could hold 
out another seven days, the NVA would give up and go home. I was 
dubious. From my previous trips to Pleiku and passing through 
Saigon to go on R&R, I knew the Americans’ optimism about the 
war increased in direct proportion to their distance from the front 
lines. Being on the front lines, I was mostly pessimistic and slightly 
hopeful at best.5
The enemy attacked the 44th Regiment through the night of 
29–30 May. At 0100 on 30 May, the 44th and 53rd Regi mental CPs 
were hit with heavy mortar fi re, which continued until dawn. One 
Stinger and two Spectre gunships were on station and fi red on the 
suspected mortar locations. The NVA then launched a ground attack 
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against the 53rd Regiment. At dawn, we found two NVA battalions 
across the street to the east of our compound. We hit them with 
everything we had all day long. The 23rd Division again launched 
attacks to push the enemy out of the city. In the hospital area, the 
44th Regiment attacked the enemy strongholds, including heavily 
constructed underground bunkers. We killed 103 of the enemy and 
took 3 POWs against our own losses of 13 KIA and 41 WIA but did 
not take our objective. The 3rd Battalion of the 47th Regiment and 
the 14th ARVN Cavalry moved to eject the enemy from the former 
14th Cavalry compound near the northeastern perimeter but were 
stopped at 0725 when a stray mortar round hit the remains of the 
ammunition dump between the ARVN and NVA forces. The result-
ing fi re and explosions caught the enemy in the open and may have 
killed or wounded many of them. Despite this unexpected assis-
tance, the ARVN troops were not able to seize all their objectives. 
In the southeast, the 2nd Battalion of the 44th and the Ruff Puffs 
attacked the area south of the airfi eld and after fi ve hours of fi ghting 
managed to seize their objective by 1530. The ground TOW team was 
credited with destroying a .51-caliber position in a bunker.6
When Colonel Ba obtained the concurrence of the II Corps com-
mander to tighten the perimeter by pulling the 45th Regiment back 
from FSB November, that maneuver also allowed tactical air and Arc 
Light strikes closer to the new, tightened perimeter. The effective-
ness of our air strikes was thus increased, and the NVA forces besieg-
ing Kontum and those already inside the city were deprived of vital 
supplies. By the morning of 30 May, the enemy troops’ performance 
was suffering from their lack of food, ammunition, and other sup-
plies. The 23rd Division’s soldiers were now fi ghting bunker by bun-
ker and building to building, using tear gas and hand grenades to 
dislodge the enemy. The fi ghting was bloody, brutal, and often hand 
to hand. In the rubble of the hospital area, bunkers were gradually 
destroyed or captured, and two T-54 tanks were destroyed by M-72s. 
By noon, the NVA held only a few scattered positions. As the 44th 
Regiment troops moved forward, they saw large groups of enemy 
soldiers moving away toward the northeast. FACs and the US air cav-
alry confi rmed that the NVA was withdrawing from the battlefi eld.7
Across the street from our compound, the enemy held an area 
with rows of one-story buildings. Our artillery was pounding 
them, and most of the buildings were on fi re. “Sage Street,” the 
“air boss,” called me on the tactical radio net. I keyed the hand-
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set and answered, “Snapper 14, over.” He said, “I’ve got a pair of 
snakes here with rockets, but they have only 12 minutes left on sta-
tion. If you don’t have a target right now, I’ll have to send them 
home.” Looking through my fi eld glasses, I saw eight or ten enemy 
soldiers—about a squad—run out from between two of the burn-
ing buildings. They wore brown uniforms, and some of them were 
bareheaded. One was carrying a machine gun, and the others had 
AK-47s. They were darting back and forth like scared rabbits, try-
ing to fi nd a way to escape. I told “Sage Street,” “OK, I have a tar-
get for you,” and identifi ed it for him. The Cobras rolled in, one 
after the other, and the entire enemy squad disappeared in explod-
ing rockets, smoke, and fi re. I vividly remember that scene. When 
the division reconnaissance company pushed in there late in the 
day, they found 122 enemy bodies in and around those buildings.8 
The stench of rotting corpses was almost overwhelming. In posi-
tions where the smell was the worst, some of our troops were wear-
ing their gas masks.9 Mr. Vann said at least one-fi fth of all the NVA 
soldiers whose bodies were found in Kontum Province had tattoos 
saying “Born in the North to die in the South.”10
The G-3 adviser, Lieutenant Colonel Bricker, later described 
the use of the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program, which encour-
aged the enemy soldiers to desert and rally (switch over) to the 
South Vietnamese side:
We found early on the enemy was very young, just kids, and 
led by an experienced Communist offi cer who controlled 
the rice and the location of his force. The troops obviously 
did not want to fi ght, but were forced to. They had been 
brainwashed and believed they were going to fi ght Ameri-
cans and free their country from our control. Knowing this, 
we put a max Chieu Hoi program into operation. A leafl et 
was quickly produced which told them . . . with a map . . . 
how to reach Chieu Hoi locations and that we had plenty of 
chow. The entire area of operations . . . was covered with 
leafl ets. It worked so well we had to call in more MPs to con-
trol them. The info obtained from these [Hoi Chanh] helped 
us direct more bombs and artillery on their lines.11
The 23rd Division lost its chance to gain more Hoi Chanhs 
when some were slain while attempting to come into the ARVN 
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lines.12 In a letter home, I described what happened on the morn-
ing of 30 May:
Bad incident this morning. We were attacked again and again 
through the night (and we are supposed to be behind the 
lines in reserve!). At daybreak there was a good-sized NVA 
force opposite the gate to our compound. Wade went out to 
look and said the ARVN troops were calling to them to sur-
render and then shooting them down when they tried [to sur-
render]. Wade took off his equipment, stepped out in front 
of the lines, and had the interpreter tell them through a loud 
speaker that they should surrender and that he, the Ameri-
can adviser, would guarantee their safety. Five NVA came for-
ward with their hands up and the ARVNs shot them down.
Wade said . . . not only the front line troops but all the 
cooks, clerks, and the colonel’s houseboy were all out there 
shooting. If they [the enemy] had been allowed to surrender, 
their whole outfi t might have followed them and we would 
not have to go dig them out.
Wade came back in the bunker completely disgusted 
and said, “I’ve had it! I want out!” Col. Tien and the other 
Vietnamese offi cers came up with all sorts of excuses; the 
NVA leaders were shooting at their own men to keep them 
from surrendering, the NVA were shooting at our lines & 
we needed to return fi re, and a previously ordered artillery 
round landed nearby. All of which is true but none of those 
things killed the men trying to surrender.
I went out to see what was happening and two more NVA 
came forward with their hands up. They made it across to 
friendly lines, but we think it was only because Wade and I 
were watching.
We told them [the Vietnamese] to get one of the two pris-
oners to talk to his NVA friends with the loudspeaker, tell 
them he had received medical treatment & food, and encour-
age them to surrender too. Instead they put in a VNAF air 
strike before trying any psywar [psychological warfare]. After 
one big pass by the bombers, suddenly the front line opened 
up. Probably some more NVA were trying to surrender. Part 
of the VNAF strike fell short and napalm & cluster bomb 
units fell on our lines. They are still counting casualties.
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President Thieu, accompanied by an entourage of South Viet-
namese military and congressional leaders, visited II Corps from 
1130 to 1600 that day. John Paul Vann described the president’s trip 
to Kontum:
The president responded to a suggestion at lunch that he fl y 
to Kontum City for a briefi ng and to promote several offi -
cers. He agreed, and at General Toan’s request, the presi-
dent’s fl ight in and out was handled with U.S. helicopters 
and gunships to maximize safety. Other personnel in the 
party fl ew in a VNAF chopper. We rounded up all available 
press, got them to Kontum City ahead of the president, and 
then fl ew him in. An enemy shelling attack occurred dur-
ing his visit, with three 122-mm rockets landing within 300 
meters of the president. Additionally, long range sniper fi re 
whistled overhead as the president walked throughout the 
area, shaking hands and chatting leisurely with the soldiers. 
Subsequently he received a briefi ng from the division com-
mander and then promoted the following offi cers:
A. Col Ly Tong Ba, 23rd division commander, to BG.
B. LTC Tran Van Cha, 45th regimental commander, to COL.
C. CPT Tran Van Le, Kontum district chief, to major.
Throughout the visit, the president was in high spirits, talk-
ing freely to newsmen, posing for TV shots and interviews, 
and repeatedly expressing confi dence that the enemy drive 
would be defeated. . . . Overall, it was an extremely impres-
sive performance and a great morale boost to the forces in 
Kontum City.13
A later South Vietnamese government publication about the 
battle and President Thieu’s visit published a photo of my coun-
terpart and the corps commander with the caption, “A prize of 
50,000 piasters [approximately $100] is presented to the com-
mander of the 44th Infantry Regiment for the destruction of 
each enemy tank. The money will be divided among the troops 
in recognition of their gallant efforts.”14 We will never know how 
much of the money got down to the individual ARVN soldiers 
who bravely stood their ground and fi red the missiles to knock 
out those tanks.
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Every day I burned the previous day’s codes and put the new 
ones in my code wheel. As I went through the days of May—14, 15 
. . . 25, 26 . . . 29, 30—I was just glad to have lived through another 
one. The night of 30 May was relatively quiet. It was good not to be 
attacked again and again all through the night.15
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Finishing the Job
You will kill ten of our men and we will kill one of yours, and 
in the end it will be you who tire of it.
—Ho Chi Minh
John Paul Vann was elated. He was vindicated. His plan had 
worked. The Arc Lights and tactical air killed tens of thousands 
of the enemy, destroyed their supplies, and broke up their attacks. 
The USAF, VNAF, and the Hooks brought in our necessary sup-
plies. Colonel Rhotenberry and the other advisers did their jobs, 
and Brigadier General Ba and his 23rd Infantry Division had held. 
Kontum was saved. Although some pockets of enemy resistance 
remained, around noon on Wednesday, 31 May, Mr. Vann declared 
that the main battle for Kontum was over. At a press conference in 
the Team 21 mess hall in Pleiku, Vann said the big test had been 
on 14 May, when the fi rst NVA tanks were destroyed in Kontum. He 
said the battle was “characterized by the failure of the North Viet-
namese to achieve any objectives.” The NVA needed replacements 
and resupply for its battered forces, and those forces were now 
retreating from Kontum City, leaving nearly 4,000 of their dead 
behind on the battlefi eld. Most had been killed by air strikes and 
artillery. In clearing out the last of the NVA in the city, 23rd Divi-
sion troops killed 237 enemy soldiers and found another 128 bodies 
in a mass grave on the northern outskirts of Kontum.1 In the eve-
ning, the 3rd Battalion of the 53rd was on a search mission three 
kilometers northeast of Kontum when it found approximately 100 
NVA bodies in destroyed bunkers and foxholes.2
As of 31 May, the Communists physically controlled all but 
McKenna Kontum book.indb   245 6/14/2011   10:18:00 AM
246 • KONTUM
four hamlets in Kontum Province, and government control over 
those four was either marginal or inadequate.3 The main supply 
route from Pleiku to Kontum, Highway 14, remained closed. Kon-
tum airfi eld was also closed, so the only resupply was by Hook or 
parachute. As for the enemy, the province senior adviser recorded: 
“Reports from Hoi Chanh, POWs, and line crossers confi rm that 
the enemy is critically short of ammunition and food; malaria and 
infected wounds are serious problems; death of many small unit 
leaders is resulting in aimless wanderings; after having been told 
that they were coming into Kontum as an occupying force, they 
expressed great surprise at the ferocious reception they received.”4
When the monsoon season started, ground combat slowed 
down. As the enemy activity to our front slackened, the 23rd Divi-
sion concentrated on eliminating the last strongpoints of enemy 
resistance within the city. The last day of May was the seventh day 
of intense, close-in fi ghting in Kontum. Reopening the airfi eld—at 
least to night operations—was a top priority, but we fi rst needed to 
clear out all the NVA holdouts. The enemy-held areas in the south-
eastern part of the city were reduced to about four square blocks. 
However, the fi ghting between the 44th Regiment and the enemy 
in the hospital area was hard, bunker-to-bunker, house-to-house, 
and often hand-to-hand combat with a tough enemy who was 
determined to hold the buildings and bunkers he occupied. Our 
progress was slow and costly. There was heavy cloud cover most of 
the day, but when there were breaks in the ceiling, we used tactical 
air strikes a few hundred meters in front of our attacking troops.5
By the end of May, after two months of fi ghting, the Commu-
nists controlled enough territory to rule over half a million South 
Vietnamese, but that was 3 percent of the entire population of 18.9 
million.6 The enemy paid a terrible price in casualties for the terri-
tory and population seized. The NVA troops surrounding Kontum 
were in especially bad shape. Their repeated attacks against our 
defenses and our air attacks against them infl icted heavy casualties. 
Captured message logs revealed that the C6, C7, and C8 Compa-
nies of the 5th Battalion, 141st Regiment, 2nd NVA Division, were 
down to 20, 12, and 60 men, respectively. The 60 men in C8 Com-
pany included battalion headquarters and mess personnel. This 
battalion, with a normal strength of about 600, was now down to 
only 92 men. It was also short of ammo and radio batteries and had 
diffi culty evacuating its wounded.7
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An American journalist reported that ARVN soldiers monitor-
ing NVA radio nets heard Communist units requesting permis-
sion to withdraw to the north because of severe casualties and the 
need to refi t. Those requests were always refused—with threats of 
punishment. The journalist suggested that the NVA was using the 
Prussian model for discipline in combat: “The soldiers obey orders 
because they know that death is possible from up front but abso-
lutely certain from behind.”8
Although the NVA ended the battle for Kontum on a defi ant 
“We’ll be back!” note, its own offi cial history admitted it was not 
able to take Kontum City: “On 14 and 25 May, we launched two 
assaults into Kontum city, but our forces were unsuccessful and suf-
fered losses. Our units were ordered to pull back to regroup and 
prepare for a new assault.”9
On 31 May, 102 tons of supplies were parachuted into Kontum, 
and 92 tons were quickly recovered. US CH-47s fl ew another 78 
tons, including 20 tons of rice for refugees, into the soccer fi eld. 
The stocks of ammo, POL, and other supplies expended during the 
battle and lost through destruction of the ammo and POL dumps 
were still low. Rebuilding them with airdrops and helicopters was 
much slower than using C-130s landing at the airfi eld would have 
been. Even delivery by C-130s and C-123s resulted in less volume 
at a much higher cost than delivery by trucks up Highway 14 from 
Pleiku. However, for the time being, delivery by air was the only 
option available. The operation to clear Highway 14 south of us was 
still moving forward, but at a very slow pace.10
A strange thing happened early on 31 May and played out over 
the course of the day. Our 44th Regiment’s XO was talking on the 
ARVN radio net when a faint voice broke in and said, “We want 
to surrender.” The XO asked who was speaking and where they 
were, and he was told there were 100 NVA soldiers with weapons 
who wanted to give up. The NVA soldier gave his location and said 
they were trapped behind our 45th Regiment’s lines and wanted to 
surrender. Colonel Tien passed the message to the commander of 
the 45th Regiment, who started negotiations with the caller. Artil-
lery fi re and air strikes on that area were stopped while negotia-
tions were conducted. Radio communication was lost around 1000 
when the enemy soldier said he was afraid he was being monitored 
by one of his higher headquarters. Four men subsequently came 
toward our lines with their hands up but stopped about 300 meters 
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away. Brigadier General Ba maintained a cease-fi re in that area 
while he broadcast to them with a loudspeaker, but the surrender 
never happened. An ARVN offi cer said it was probably just a trick 
to allow this group of NVA soldiers to escape after being caught 
behind our lines.11
Wednesday, 31 May, turned into a beautiful day. It felt like Sun-
day or a holiday back home. The sun broke through the overcast 
for a while, there was virtually no incoming fi re, and we had beaten 
back the enemy’s best efforts to take Kontum. The 44th Regiment 
was preparing to attack some buildings still held by the invaders. 
Major Lovings and I decided it would be a good chance to visit 
the DTOC bunker. We drove our replacement Jeep and got our 
fi rst look in days at the destruction caused by the recent fi ghting. 
Some buildings were still smoldering, and we had to weave past 
shell holes in the streets. A naked doll lying face up in the street 
caused me to wonder what happened to its little owner. At the 
DTOC, we talked to the other advisers, discussed what was happen-
ing and what was planned, and picked up our mail and some copies 
of Stars and Stripes. One of the advisers working in the DTOC told 
us that the Kontum Province advisers compound southwest of the 
airfi eld was relatively undamaged and that the showers there were 
still working. We looked at each other and at our own fi lthy fatigues 
and fl ak jackets and decided the other adviser was trying to tell 
us something. We got our toilet kits, towels, and clean underwear, 
socks, and fatigues out of our B-4 bags stored in the DTOC bunker 
and headed for the showers.
The compound’s former occupants must have evacuated in a 
hurry, and Vietnamese scavengers had probably hit the place imme-
diately afterward. The screen door was banging in the breeze. Old 
correspondence and other papers were scattered around the fl oor, 
and there was a heavy layer of dust over everything. It was a shock 
to see evidence that the Americans had been forced to fl ee in such 
disorder. At least the showers were working, though, and we took 
our time enjoying them. After I put on clean clothes and laced up 
my boots, I started to put on my fl ak jacket but stopped because it 
was so fi lthy. This did not seem like a dangerous day, so I decided 
to toss it into our Jeep rather than wear it.
We then drove back to the hospital compound. As we reached 
the gate, Mr. Vann came out, driving a Jeep with a civilian sitting 
beside him. He chided me, “Well, McKenna, I bring a famous war 
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correspondent to see some real soldiers, and you are out sightsee-
ing!” Vann introduced us to the correspondent, who climbed into 
our Jeep. We drove back to our bunker, parked the Jeep, and took 
him on a walking tour of the front. After describing the recent 
fi ghting and showing him a few dead NVA tanks—some intact, but 
most charred hulks—we reached the place where our troops were 
starting to assault some buildings held by the NVA. The side of 
one building was blasted away, so we could see the ARVN troops 
moving through it. They were wearing gas masks and using tear 
gas grenades to fl ush out the enemy. Suddenly there was the heavy 
CRUMP! CRUMP! CRUMP! of mortar rounds landing around us. 
The enemy was responding to our ground attack. Major Lovings 
and the correspondent ran in one direction, and I ran in another. 
I was looking for a building, a bunker, or a foxhole—any place for 
cover from what was becoming an intense mortar barrage. My fl ak 
vest was still in the Jeep back near our bunker.
WHAMP! A giant fi st slammed me to the ground. Mortar 
rounds were falling all around me. When I tried to stand up and 
run, something was wrong inside my chest, and there was blood on 
the front of my fatigues. I had a bad pain in my chest and diffi culty 
breathing. I was hit and did not feel like moving but knew it was 
necessary to get out of the mortar fi re and to do it fast. With great 
diffi culty, I stood up and started walking—staggering—to get away 
from the mortars. I passed a few ARVN soldiers in individual fox-
holes too small for me to fi t into beside them. None of them moved 
to help me even though they could see I was wounded. Once out 
of the mortar impact area, I had only another 100 meters or so to 
go to our bunker, where there would be help. I fi nally reached the 
bunker, made it down the steps, and collapsed on my cot. Sergeant 
Hao was shocked by my appearance. He used our radio, set on the 
adviser’s radio net, to call the DTOC for help.
Major Richard C. Gudat was in our area and heard the radio 
message. He came to our bunker, helped me up the stairs to his 
Jeep, and drove to a place where a helicopter could land. A Huey, 
Gladiator 51 from the 57th Assault Helicopter Company, came in 
to pick me up. Its crew got me into one of the seats and fastened 
my seat belt. Lying down on the deck was what I wanted to do, but 
leaning way back eased the pain. We lifted off and up, up, up out 
of Kontum, out of the war, and into the cool air. It was impossible 
for me to tell how serious my wound was, but I knew a chest wound 
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could be fatal. What mattered most right then was trying to fi nd a 
less painful position for sitting while strapped into the canvas heli-
copter seat.12 Half an hour later I was in the emergency room of the 
67th Evacuation Hospital in Pleiku. The helicopter medevac sys-
tem and the excellent medical care available close to the front saved 
many lives in Vietnam—including mine.
At the hospital, the medical staff cut off my bloody fatigue 
jacket, X-rayed my torso, and then sat me on an examination table. 
A corpsman on each side held me in the upright sitting position. 
The lead doctor was a short, muscular major, a surgeon. He didn’t 
explain what he was going to do, which was probably just as well. 
After giving me a numbing shot between the ribs on my right side, 
but before it took effect, he used a scalpel to slice a hole between 
my ribs. Another doctor and another medic joined the corpsmen 
on either side to hold me down. The surgeon took a long, stainless 
steel tube with holes in it—sort of like a piccolo—and worked it in 
between my ribs, around various organs, and deep into my chest. 
It was probably only six to eight inches long, but it felt like more 
than a foot long to me. Now I understood why four men were hold-
ing me down. They attached a rubber hose to the “piccolo” and 
attached a vacuum machine to the hose. My chest was full of air, 
blood, and other unwanted fl uids, and the machine was going to 
suck them out.
The surgeon later stood beside my bed with the X-ray and my 
records. He told me there were multiple shrapnel wounds in my 
upper torso, and one piece had punched a hole in my lung, which 
had then collapsed and was probably the main source of my pain. 
He said, “That piece of shrapnel is still embedded in the wall of 
your lung. I thought about removing it but have decided to leave it 
there. You can live with it.” Remembering a magazine article by a 
man whose sternum was cut in half with a circular saw before his 
ribs were spread apart for an open chest operation, I assured the 
doctor his decision was just fi ne with me. He also told me I would 
be sent home for recuperation. For the fi rst time in weeks, it looked 
like I might not die in Vietnam. At least the odds were now in my 
favor. In total, 61 lieutenant colonels from all services were killed 
in Vietnam.13
The patient ward was a long room in a one-story building. A 
chest-high partition ran down the middle, and on either side of it 
was a row of beds with their heads against it. The head of my bed 
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was against that partition. Rows of beds also stood against each of 
the outside walls. In the night, I could hear a loud, eerie, spine-
tingling wailing. It combined pain and extreme anguish and came 
from just the other side of the partition, but the source was out of 
my sight. The corpsman told me it was an old Montagnard woman 
whose stomach had been sliced open by artillery shrapnel up near 
Kontum. She had walked all the way to Pleiku, carrying her intes-
tines in her hands, and came to the 67th Evac. The US Army hos-
pitals were not supposed to accept Vietnamese patients—not even 
ARVN or VNAF military patients—but the hospital commander 
decided he could not turn her away, in part because she was going 
to die soon.
A couple times a day one of the corpsman removed the dress-
ings and cleaned her wound. He wore a nose mask while doing it 
because the smell was so bad. The patients just held their noses 
until the procedure was over. Every night we heard her weird wail-
ing. She must have been calling on all the ancient Montagnard 
gods of the mountains to save her—or to put her out of her misery. 
She died a few days later.
I was able to make a Military Affi liate Radio Station (MARS) 
telephone call home to my wife. Of course, she wanted to know how 
seriously I was wounded, so I told her what I knew. The US Army 
MARS operator in Vietnam was listening and broke in to rebuke 
me for giving those details over an insecure radio transmission. He 
threatened to cut us off.14 The corpsman who retrieved the phone 
heard my conversation with the MARS operator and told me about 
a recent patient whose legs had been amputated above the knee. 
Talking to his family during a MARS call, he had told them, “They 
had to cut off about four feet of my legs.”
The evening of 31 May, Mr. Vann and Brigadier General Hill 
came to see me. Although I had talked to Brigadier General Hill 
on the radio many times, this was the fi rst and only time I ever saw 
him. After thanking him for bringing the gunships and TOW heli-
copters that saved us from being overrun on the morning of 26 
May, I said, “You saved our lives.” He responded, “Just doing my 
job.”
In a spot report of all the day’s activities sent to General Abrams, 
Mr. Vann said, “Fighting north of the airfi eld is still heavy, how-
ever, and my 44th RCAT adviser, LTC McKenna was wounded with 
shrapnel thru the lung about 1300 hours, and will be evacuated to 
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the U.S. This is the second regimental adviser to be wounded and 
evacuated this past week from the 23rd.”15
By 2 June, I was propped up on a couple pillows but still had 
the piccolo in my chest, was on a drip, and was breathing with a 
machine to pump up and exercise my lung. All those connections 
prevented me from walking around or even sitting up on the edge 
of the bed, so my view was restricted to a few beds on either side of 
mine and a few opposite me across the aisle.
In the afternoon, four new patients were moved from the emer-
gency room into the ward. They were the crew and passengers of 
Gladiator 12, a Huey from the 57th Assault Helicopter Company, 
fl own by CWO2 Bruce E. Delau. It had been shot down by heavy 
anti-aircraft fi re just before 1000 as it had taken off after picking 
up passengers near the Rock Pile south of Kontum. It went down in 
fl ames, crashed, and burned. The copilot, Captain Joe W. Eubanks, 
died in the fi re, and two of the US passengers and all three of the 
ARVN passengers were mangled and badly burned.16
The two worst burn victims were wrapped with bandages so 
that they looked like mummies and were unrecognizable. Seeing 
them made me feel very lucky. My own wounds were light com-
pared to theirs. One was placed in the bed to my right. When a 
corpsman said the wounded man’s name, I realized it was Captain 
Ray Hall, our Team 33 signal adviser. He had second- and third-
degree burns over 50 percent of his body and was heavily sedated. 
Only a few days earlier Hall had been showing his friend Captain 
Finch a piece of shrapnel that had hit him in the chest but did not 
penetrate his fl ak jacket. He told Finch, “Well, Jack, they’ve had 
their chance. I’m gonna make it.” Although he did make it, he was 
severely burned. Finch had the sad duty of gathering up Hall’s 
belongings to ship home and writing “the Letter” to his wife.17
The other badly burned casualty was placed in a bed across the 
aisle from me. It was USAF major Harold D. Jones, our air liaison 
offi cer. He had second- and third-degree burns over 60 percent 
of his body and a traumatic amputation of his right leg. Jones had 
arrived in Vietnam at the end of February, and I had met him for 
the fi rst time in Kontum. He was a muscular man with short hair. 
The last time I had seen him we were outside the DTOC, and he 
was standing by his Jeep talking on the big air force radio mounted 
in it, coordinating the air support so vital to our survival. I was 
standing nearby talking with other advisers and looking at maps. 
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Almost continuous artillery and rocket fi re had been falling near 
us. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the army advisers were 
completely cool, calm, and collected, but we were more accustomed 
to so much incoming fi re. Major Jones was obviously out of his ele-
ment, though, and visibly shaking. It had occurred to me at the 
time that if I were riding in his jet fi ghter-bomber during a bomb 
run through heavy anti-aircraft fi re, I would be doing more than 
shaking. He was a courageous man for continuing to do his duty 
while obviously worried about being killed by fl ying shrapnel.
A special evacuation fl ight was scheduled to come as soon as 
possible to take the burn victims directly to Brooke Army Medical 
Center at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, the burn center for all the US 
Armed Forces. Captain Hall left on that fl ight, but Major Jones 
died in the 67th Evacuation Hospital the day after the crash.
The other two casualties were the pilot of the helicopter, CW2 
Bruce E. Delau, and the crew chief, Sergeant David M. Millard. 
Both were seriously injured and burned. They were in beds out 
of my sight, and I never talked to either of them. Millard had only 
ten days left in Vietnam when he had taken off on that fatal fl ight. 
They had expected the mission to be a routine “ash and trash” run 
from Camp Holloway in Pleiku, north to the Kontum area of oper-
ations, where they would make pickups and deliveries of personnel 
and munitions. Late in the morning they had landed near High-
way 14 in the vicinity of the Rock Pile, where they picked up Major 
Jones, Captain Hall, and three ARVN soldiers to take them back 
into Kontum.
Later that night in the hospital, when the lights were low and 
the ward was quiet, Sergeant Millard told someone near him what 
had happened after they took off from the Rock Pile. He was out 
of my sight, but I heard every word he said. His voice was full of 
anguish, and he was suffering as much from his inability to save 
Captain Eubanks as he was from his own injuries. Here is Dave Mil-
lard’s unforgettable story:
After loading, we took off to the south and sucked for alti-
tude. Banking hard right to set course for K-town, we were 
ripped open by 51 fi re and God knows what else. We lost 
antitorque [and cyclic] and went in on fi re; nose down, on 
the starboard [right] side, from perhaps 150 to 200 feet. I was 
ejected from the aircraft to the right somehow. My Nomex 
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trousers were soaked in JP4 and on fi re, and my back was 
broken at T12. My gunner, [Specialist Fourth Class] William 
(Billy) Chlebowski of Reading, Pa., also survived the crash 
and somehow appeared around the rear of the wreckage and 
threw himself on me to smother the fl ames on my legs. He 
then dragged me toward the front of the chopper and away 
from the growing fi re aboard. At this point I saw our aircraft 
commander, Bruce Delau, stagger from around the port 
[left] side of the chopper and toward myself and Billy. At 
this juncture Billy heard the screams of Major Jones and ran 
to assist him, doing all he could to put out the fi re that was 
consuming his jungle fatigues and his fl esh. After doing all 
he could, he left the still smoldering and screaming Major 
Jones to assist the ARVN soldiers as they attempted to extract 
themselves from the crash and growing confl agration.
At or about this same time it became apparent to me that 
Captain Eubanks was trapped in the chopper and was in imme-
diate danger of burning also. The chin bubble on [his] side . . .
was broken out and driven deep enough into the earth that 
there was no access to the cockpit thru it . . . the bird had col-
lapsed enough to effectively pin Joe into place in his seat. . . .
[His] armored seat had broken loose and pinned him very 
close to the windscreen. I remember picking up something, 
possibly a chunk of wreckage or something off the ground, 
and repeatedly trying to break the Plexiglas windscreen to 
help free Joe. As the fl ames grew hotter and higher and Joe’s 
pleas grew into screams of agony, out of sheer frustration I 
repeatedly threw myself bodily at the windscreen trying to 
dive or crash thru it if possible to get to Joe and pull him 
out. At this time Billy came back around the front of the bird 
and saw what I was doing and had the sensibility to recog-
nize the impending fl ashover and explosion of the wreckage, 
grabbed me and forced me back away from my vain attempts 
to save Joe moments before the whole aircraft blew up. He 
once again helped put out the JP4 fi res on my Nomex that 
had reignited during my struggle to save Captain Eubanks, 
and we sat down together in shock, forced to watch as Joe 
died in the fl ames.
I remember looking at Billy and seeing him with his 
fl ight suit covered with burnt human fl esh and melted jun-
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gle fatigue. His Nomex gloves all covered with dirt, caked 
blood, and strips of skin. His eyebrows and eyelashes were 
gone, burned away, and his face bright red and fi lthy. I have 
no idea how long it was, and we heard the muttering sound 
of another inbound chopper then the Thump, Thump, 
Thump of heavy MG [machine gun] fi re and small arms. 
Neither Billy nor I was in possession of a weapon, [so] we 
just became very small, fi guring our troubles had just begun. 
The approaching chopper veered away. Unknown to us at 
the time, its pilot, Captain Fredric Suttle of H 1/10 Cav, was 
killed in the fusillade of 51 fi re that reached out for his chop-
per as he lined up to come in and extract us from a very 
bad situation. Eventually an ARVN patrol made it to us and 
secured the crash site. We were moved out to QL 14 and laid 
out next to a Jeep and a deuce-and-a-half [two-and-a-half-
ton truck] and waited there while the ARVN cleaned out 
the area and silenced that heavy gun, allowing a Dustoff to 
come in and pull us out. I remember one of the ARVN that 
helped drag me out brought Billy and I a pan full of water 
and a couple of old green army towels as we sat so we could 
clean the dirt out of the burns. As I looked down into the 
pan of water to wring out the towel, I remember seeing my 
refl ection and not knowing who it was. I looked over at Billy 
and told him to be careful not to look into the water at his 
refl ection because the person he probably expected to see 
there was gone forever.
My pilot, and friend, was trapped in the wreckage and 
despite everything we tried and did, he was lost to the fi re as 
I wept. The date was 2 June 1972. My pilot was Captain Joe 
Eubanks. After 35 years I still can close my eyes and see Joe 
like he just handed me the logbook and walked away down 
the apron. Some great men are immortalized in print or art. 
The greatest are held forever in the hearts of their friends 
and Brothers-in-Arms.18
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The End of the Fight
Television brought the brutality of war into the comfort 
of the living room. Vietnam was lost in the living rooms of 
America—not on the battlefi elds of Vietnam.
—Marshall McLuhan, Montreal Gazette, 16 May 1975
Mr. Vann came to Kontum every day in early June, and every day 
he would complain to Colonel Rhotenberry about the NVA troops 
still in the city, “Hey, Rhot, haven’t you gotten this goddamned city 
cleared yet?” Starting around 2 June, the weather was bad enough 
to ground tactical air support. So the ARVN soldiers had to clear 
out the remaining enemy with more days of bunker-to-bunker 
fi ghting. Finally, the last NVA holdout in the city was killed on 5 
June 1972, and the next day Brigadier General Ba declared the city 
free of enemy soldiers. When Vann came to visit on 6 June, Rho-
tenberry again showed him his 1:12,500-scale Kontum City map on 
which he used colored grease pencils to draw the defensive perim-
eter, the attacks, and the penetrations. He told Vann the last pen-
etrations had been cleared out that morning. This news was a high 
point for Vann because then he knew for certain that the Battle of 
Kontum was over and we had won. After Tan Canh and Dak To 
had fallen, Vann had thought his entire career in Vietnam and his 
reputation were on the line, so he was subdued and working under 
a great deal of pressure to succeed. Now he was vindicated and 
triumphant.
After the enemy was fi nally ejected from the city, a better drop 
zone became available in northwest Kontum. Sixty-eight airdrop 
missions were fl own during the fi rst week of June. The USAF 
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recorded, “A prolonged airlift to battered Kontum rivaled in signif-
icance and drama the An Loc resupply. Demanding night-landing
techniques, airdrop methods lately worked out at An Loc, and 
adverse-weather aerial delivery system equipment were all used 
at Kontum.” Finally, night landings at Kontum airfi eld—with only 
one plane at a time on the ground—were resumed on the night of 
8–9 June. The fi rst C-130 touched down at 2337. Five more sor-
ties followed it. During the landings, ARVN artillery shot into the 
NVA lines to suppress anti-aircraft fi re and fi red fl ares to attract 
any Strella missiles launched at the landing planes. On 13 June a 
C-130 avoided a Strella in the only recorded Strella attack around 
Kontum.1 In all of South Vietnam, by the end of May 1972 Strella 
missiles had knocked down seven Allied aircraft, including one fast 
mover, a US Marine Corps A4 Skyhawk hit on 26 May.2
After the battle, at least eight destroyed aircraft lay on Kontum 
airfi eld: a VNAF A-1 Skyraider that had made an emergency land-
ing and was then destroyed by incoming fi re; two USAF C-130s; 
three VNAF C-123s; a Cobra gunship; a VNAF Hook; and a VNAF 
Huey hit by the Hook when the Hook had a mechanical failure.3 
Kontum was littered with artillery shell casings, ammo boxes, and 
all the other trash combat generates. There were great heaps of 
garbage. In places, it looked like a city dump. Most of the fi ghting 
and thus most of the destruction were around the defensive perim-
eter and in the military areas of Kontum City. There was much less 
damage to the civilian areas. However, the province chief’s house 
and the post offi ce had been destroyed.4
During the Easter Offensive, the number of Arc Light sor-
ties authorized per month was increased from 1,000 in January to 
3,150 in June. The latter number was the peak for the entire war.5 
Arc Light missions in II Corps paralleled the tempo of the overall 
Easter Offensive. There were 136 in March, 229 in April, 334 in 
May, and 175 in June for a total of 874 during those four months. 
Between 14 May and 8 June alone, there were 300 Arc Lights in II 
Corps, most of them in support of Kontum’s defenders. At about 
100,000 tons of bombs per three-plane mission, 300 missions, and 
2,000 pounds per ton, B-52 bombers alone dropped around 60 mil-
lion pounds of bombs around Kontum during those 25 days.6 Tac-
tical air fi ghter-bombers dropped additional millions of pounds of 
bombs both inside and outside the city.
Brigadier General John Hill was going home. On 9 June, he 
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and Mr. Vann fl ew to Saigon, where General Abrams awarded Hill 
the Legion of Merit. Colonel Robert C. Kingston, who was on the 
promotion list to brigadier general, would be Hill’s replacement, 
and he accompanied them back to Pleiku. Vann bragged that since 
the battle had started on 14 May, he had visited Kontum every day. 
He did not want to break that record. After a farewell dinner for 
Brigadier General Hill, Vann left around 2100 to fl y into Kontum 
to spend the night. He gathered up an unopened bottle of wine 
and some fresh fruit and rolls to take to Colonel Rhotenberry and 
Brigadier General Ba.7
Mr. Vann’s regular pilot was CWO Robert Richards, a skilled 
and brave pilot. But Vann literally wore him out by taking so many 
risks. Richards needed a rest. Vann’s new pilot, First Lieutenant 
Ronald Doughtie, would fl y that night, and there was room in the 
little OH-58 for one more passenger—anyone who wanted to go 
along for the ride. Doughtie asked Lieutenant Bart Engram, who 
worked in G-2 Targeting, if he wanted to go, but Engram still had 
work to do. He needed to brief Vann on potential Arc Light targets 
before he left and then pass the decisions to the G-3 air. Captain 
John P. Robertson, the offi cer responsible for the Team 21 com-
pound, was known for being cautious. For the fi rst few months after 
he arrived, he would not go into Pleiku at all, and he still would not 
go there without wearing his fl ak jacket. But Robertson was inter-
ested in becoming a pilot, and when Doughtie asked if he wanted 
to take the night fl ight into Kontum with him and Vann, Robertson 
accepted his offer. They never made it to Kontum. Everyone on 
board was killed when Vann’s helicopter crashed near the Kontum 
Pass between Pleiku and Kontum.8
Although the Communists claimed credit for shooting down 
John Paul Vann, there was no evidence to support their claim. 
Vann radioed Rhotenberry for a weather report when they were 
15 minutes from Kontum, but it was not possible from this call to 
determine if he was fl ying. Colonel Rhotenberry said they fl ew into 
the only patch of tall trees for 1,000 meters in any direction. ARVN 
soldiers reached the crash site before any Americans did, and they 
stole Vann’s wallet, watch, and Rutgers class ring.9
Vann died at the peak of his career, just after destroying two 
North Vietnamese divisions and winning the Battle of Kontum. He 
did not know everything he accomplished in Vietnam was being 
given away in Paris. If he had lived to see South Vietnam defeated 
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by the Communists and America’s ignominious, forced withdrawal, 
he might have become a depressed and bitter man who thought all 
his effort and all his years in Vietnam were wasted. Referring to 
the timing of Vann’s death, his biographer Neil Sheehan wrote, 
“He did not miss his exit. He died believing he had won his war.”10 
John Paul Vann posthumously received the Medal of Freedom, the 
highest civilian award our nation can bestow, and the US Army’s 
Distinguished Service Cross, second only to the Medal of Honor.11
Between 30 April 1972 and 11 January 1973, the two UH-1B 
TOW helicopters fi red 162 missiles in combat. Of that total, 151 
were reliable, and 124 hit the target.
Various sources differ on how many tanks, trucks, APCs, and 
other targets the aerial TOW Tam destroyed. There may be some 
double counting in all of these sources, but the records of the TOW 
Team’s parent unit, the 17th Aviation Group (Combat), probably 
contain the most reliable count for the period covered. From 2 
through 28 May, the team’s results were recorded as: 11 T-54s, 7 
PT 76s, 7 M-41s, 6 trucks, 3 APCs, and 3 artillery pieces or rocket 
launchers destroyed. The team also made hits on bunkers, build-
ings, ammo and POL dumps, machine guns in water towers, and 
suspected tank locations.12
The 1st Combat Aerial TOW Team, Vietnam, was engaged in 
combat until 20 June 1972.13 Its deployment to Vietnam was always 
intended to be temporary and not the beginning of a normal one-
year tour. By 22 June, the team was gone—but certainly not forgot-
ten. Of the fi rst 85 TOW missiles fi red, 71 were hits. Twenty-one of 
the tanks destroyed were knocked out by two men: CWO Danny G. 
Rowe, with 12, and CWO2 Hixson, with 9. CWO3 Lester Whiteis, 
also a tank “ace” with the Aerial TOW Team, said, “My defi nition 
of a confi rmed kill is when you leave the tank in fl ames.”14 Before 
departing, team members trained replacement crews from the 17th 
Aviation Group’s Cobra gunship units and turned the TOW air-
craft over to them. Those TOW-armed helicopters remained in 
Vietnam until January 1973.15
The Aerial TOW Team never went out without a pair of snakes 
for gun cover and support.16 We did not want the enemy to capture 
the crews and the technology and did not want to lose even one of 
the TOW helicopters because we desperately needed these tank kill-
ers. Although the NVA had a vast array of the most sophisticated 
anti-aircraft weapons, the TOW helicopters never took a single hit 
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from ground fi re—mainly because they did not have to fl y nap-of-
the-earth, where they would be more vulnerable, but could fi re 
from an altitude of 3,000 feet and a slant range of 3,000 feet from 
the target. Equally important to their survivability, the team devel-
oped good operating procedures and teamwork with the crews in 
the other aircraft they worked with on every mission; the 7th Air 
Cavalry Squadron’s dedicated UH-1 C&C aircraft and the 361st 
Aerial Weapons Company’s Cobra gunships. Those other aircraft 
and the Loachs, FACs, and fi ghter-bombers worked closer to the 
targets and drew most of the enemy’s fi re. Fortunately, the NVA did 
not use the Strella heat-seeking, ground-to-air, anti-aircraft missile 
against the old UH-1B TOW helicopters.17
Who should receive credit for knocking out any specifi c enemy 
tank was often diffi cult or even impossible to determine, especially 
when the battle was intense and visibility was poor. When an enemy 
tank was spotted, everybody with an antitank weapon tried to kill 
it, so there was some double counting. The NVA’s tanks could be 
destroyed if they ran over a mine laid by ARVN soldiers or were 
hit by an M-72 or RPG fi red by an ARVN soldier. They could be 
knocked out by direct fi re from ARVN artillery fi ring HEAT rounds 
or by 106-mm recoilless rifl e fi re. However, there is no record of 
any tank kills by recoilless rifl es in Kontum Province during the 
Easter Offensive. Three 106-mm recoilless rifl es allegedly fi red at 
oncoming T-54s during the fi nal assaults on Polei Kleng but did 
not stop the oncoming tanks.
It would be unlikely for a tank destroyed by a TOW missile to be 
hit again from the ground. However, unless there was major dam-
age visible from the air, a tank hit fi rst from the ground might be hit 
again from the air. Hawk’s Claw, a tactical air strike, or an AC-130 
fi ring HEAT rounds would probably assume that any enemy tank 
that didn’t look damaged was still operational even if it was not 
moving. So an already “dead” tank might be hit again and again 
from the air and counted as a new kill every time. If an enemy 
tank beyond the range of ARVN’s shoulder-fi red weapons and still 
moving was hit from the air, the kill should defi nitely be credited 
to that aircraft. Enemy tanks hit in an Arc Light strike could be 
destroyed by the bombs, but an accurate count of tanks destroyed 
in this manner would have to be made by a BDA immediately after 
the Arc Light. The NVA captured and used a few ARVN M-41s, 
so, depending on the circumstances, an M-41 could be counted as 
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an enemy tank. Many permanently dead-lined (inoperable) ARVN 
M-41s were parked on the northern edge of Kontum City to be used 
as pillboxes (bunkers from which to fi re), so some of the “enemy” 
tanks reported destroyed in the city and from the air may have been 
a case of mistaken identity.18
The NVA forces in the Central Highlands probably had the 
ability to retrieve and repair their own tanks. So even a tank we 
“destroyed,” its entire crew killed, might be repaired to fi ght again 
another day—and perhaps be killed again and counted again as 
another enemy tank destroyed.
The enemy had a numerical advantage in almost every fi ght in 
Kontum Province, but they often wasted their infantry in repeated 
human-wave attacks that were defeated by Arc Lights, gunships, 
or tactical air strikes with heavy losses. The NVA also had numeri-
cal superiority in tanks, and their tanks had the ARVN tanks out-
gunned. ARVN’s light M-41s armed with a 76-mm main gun were 
no match for the thick armor plate and 100-mm main guns of the 
T-54s. More important, although a few of the smaller Communist 
PT-76 tanks were used in earlier attacks, the Easter Offensive was 
the fi rst time ARVN soldiers had ever faced battalions of the big 
T-54s, so the NVA had a big psychological advantage. The surprise 
and shock the Communists could achieve with a tank attack was 
demonstrated by their victories at Tan Canh and Dak To II. How-
ever, they failed to exploit the tanks’ advantages of shock action, 
fi repower, and mobility and thus failed to achieve optimum results. 
One of the most effective ways a commander can use his tanks is to 
support the infantry attack by direct fi re and then attack with his 
reserves and massed tanks to exploit a breakthrough. If that suc-
ceeds, he can then make an armored thrust deep into the enemy’s 
rear area to destroy artillery, headquarters, and support installa-
tions and to spread panic. However, the NVA commanders often 
committed their tanks piecemeal and employed them timidly 
rather than massing them to strike aggressively and deeply into the 
ARVN defenses.
Interrogation of NVA prisoners revealed that at least 3,000 of 
the NVA’s tank crewmen fi ghting in the Easter Offensive had grad-
uated from the Russian tank school in Odessa only four or fi ve 
months earlier.19 The NVA tank offi cers must have also received 
training from the Soviets. The enemy’s inept use of tanks may have 
resulted from the fact that the NVA tank units were operating under 
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the control of infantry commanders who did not understand—or at 
least had not practiced—how to coordinate their infantry and tanks 
so that they attacked in a mutually supporting manner. Even when 
the NVA infantry forces were not driven away from their tanks by 
gunships or ARVN artillery, their tanks often attacked alone—or 
ended up alone—without infantry to protect them from individual 
ARVN soldiers with shoulder-fi red rockets.20
Stopping and in some places pushing back the NVA invasion 
deprived the North Vietnamese of complete victory in 1972 and 
left them in a weaker negotiating position because their army had 
suffered so many defeats in the fi eld. However, in Washington the 
defeat of the Communists’ Easter Offensive seemed to be viewed 
mainly as an opportunity to get an acceptable peace agreement 
in Paris while the North Vietnamese needed time to rebuild their 
army in the South and to recover from our bombing of the North.
Approximately 63,500 American ground troops were still in 
Vietnam during the Easter Offensive, but only about 6,000 were 
in US Army ground combat units, and virtually none of those 
units were involved in the fi ghting. Only 2,480 of the 63,500 were 
US Army advisers. Ninety-four Americans were killed in Vietnam 
between 1 January and 30 May 1972.21
In Kontum Province and in all of South Vietnam during the 
Easter Offensive, both sides suffered staggering losses of men and 
materiel. The surviving troops were exhausted, and many were 
wounded or sick—or both.
During 1972, the 23rd ARVN Division suffered heavy casual-
ties, both KIA and WIA, about half of them in Kontum.22 Between 
1 April and 10 June 1972, the South Vietnamese regular forces 
nationwide suffered 23,059 total casualties: 4,400 KIA, 16,750 WIA, 
and 1,909 MIA. The Ruff Puffs reported almost 15,000 total casu-
alties: 3,668 KIA, 9,622 WIA, and 1,573 MIA. Ammunition and 
other supplies were depleted, and equipment was suffering from 
overuse and lack of maintenance.23 In II Corps, ARVN’s admitted 
losses were 382 KIA, 1,621 WIA, 32 MIA, 3 tanks destroyed, 4 tanks 
one-third damaged, 4 crew-served and 47 small-arms weapons lost, 
and 6 radios lost.24
Through June, the South Vietnamese nationwide lost massive 
amounts of weapons and equipment, including $28 million worth 
of tanks, $8.5 million worth of artillery pieces, 25,196 M-16s, plus 
trucks, APCs, and more than 4,000 radios. The total replacement 
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cost would be about $28 million.25 In II Corps alone, the ARVN 
lost more than 100 artillery pieces, mostly in Binh Dinh Province. 
By the fall of 1972, all lost equipment and weapons were replaced.26
The advisers could not completely verify the number of NVA 
casualties, but the ARVN II Corps claimed that from 14 May to 6 
June the Battle of Kontum cost the enemy 5,688 KIA, 34 POWs, 
8 Hoi Chanhs, 38 tanks destroyed, 353 crew-served and 862 small-
arms weapons captured, and 29 radios captured.27 A much higher 
number of NVA casualties was given at a 23 October 1972 MACV 
command briefi ng when it was estimated the NVA suffered 16,000 
casualties, killed and wounded, during the Battle of Kontum.28
ARVN claims regarding the number of NVA soldiers captured 
and the number who defected to ARVN are probably accurate. How 
many NVA soldiers were wounded was impossible to know, and how 
many NVA were killed is an estimate at best because the number 
probably includes double counting and possibly was infl ated for 
propaganda purposes. The number of ARVN soldiers wounded is 
probably accurate, but the actual number killed is probably higher 
than what was offi cially admitted because a higher number would 
be bad for morale and would reveal their remaining strength to the 
enemy.
Some NVA units fought on until there were only 400 or 500 men 
left in regiments that had entered combat 2,500 strong and that 
may have received replacements during the battle.29 During just 
three months, from the start of the Easter Offensive on 30 March 
through the end of June, the NVA suffered more than 100,000 
casualties—probably 40,000 of them killed—out of their 200,000-
man invasion force. Most of their tanks and half of their heavy 
artillery pieces were destroyed. Because the Easter Offensive fell so 
far short of the North’s expectations, and the losses were so great, 
General Giap was eased out of his position as North Vietnam’s 
defense minister. It took the Communists three years to recover 
enough to mount their fi nal offensive in 1975.30
The North Vietnamese launched the Easter Offensive in the 
spring of 1972 because they thought Vietnamization was succeed-
ing, because Nixon and Kissinger were forging agreements with 
Russia and China that might curtail the support North Vietnam 
received from its Communist patrons, and because 1972 was an 
election year for the American president. The 1968 Tet attacks had 
been a major factor in Lyndon Johnson’s decision not to run again, 
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and the North Vietnamese hoped an even stronger conventional 
attack would mean the end of Richard Nixon’s presidency.31 How-
ever, they underestimated his will to win. They also underestimated 
the ARVN troops’ willingness to fi ght when surrounded and when 
supported by American advisers and air power. Nixon was willing 
to give the South Vietnamese whatever moral and material support 
they needed, and he sent enough US air assets back to Southeast 
Asia to defeat the NVA in the fi eld. The NVA gambled that US air-
power would not return, and when it did return with a vengeance, 
the NVA was probably surprised at the intensity and persistence of 
the American bombing of North Vietnam, the mining of its ports, 
and the impact on its troops and tanks in the fi eld. USAF B-52s, 
fi ghter-bombers, and gunships fl ew 18,000 combat sorties against 
the attacking NVA during May and June 1972.32 This support was 
crucial to blocking the North Vietnamese invasion.
The NVA made a major blunder by attacking in the spring of 
1972 rather than waiting even one year. By then, virtually all Amer-
ican troops and advisers would have departed, and it probably 
would have been politically impossible for the American president 
to send American forces—even aircraft—back to Southeast Asia to 
counter a Communist invasion.
The NVA made another big mistake when it split its effort and 
attacked on three fronts. Its thrusts across the DMZ and from the 
west into I Corps, into the Central Highlands toward Kontum and 
in Binh Dinh Province on the coast in II Corps, and toward An 
Loc in III Corps were so widely separated that they were not mutu-
ally supporting. If the NVA had not split its forces, it would have 
had reserves adequate to exploit its successes. Also, the Commu-
nist command and control and logistics were badly stretched by 
that dispersion of their forces. The Saigon government had to deal 
with three different thrusts, but it had the advantage of operating 
on interior lines. The South also had airlift to move its forces, as 
when the airborne units and the Ranger groups were fl own out of 
Kontum to reconstitute a national reserve and when the 44th Regi-
ment was fl own into Kontum. Launching a single, major thrust to 
cut South Vietnam in half during the Easter Offensive might have 
achieved in 1972 what that same tactic did achieve in 1975.
After the swift and easy victories at Tan Canh and Dak To II, 
the NVA probably could have seized Kontum with equal ease by 
immediately charging down Highway 14 General Patton style. Or 
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if it had bypassed Tan Canh, Dak To II, and the other bases to 
attack Kontum as fast as possible, it might have been able to seize 
Kontum, push on to Pleiku, and then drive down Highway 19 to 
the coast to win the war in the spring of 1972. Instead, it spent 
nearly three weeks reorganizing, replenishing, and capturing—or 
trying to capture—all the scattered ARVN bases between the tribor-
der area and Kontum.33 The enemy apparently decided it was bet-
ter to try seizing Tan Canh, Dak To II, the Border Ranger camps, 
and the FSBs on Rocket Ridge than to bypass them and have its 
rear area and main supply route threatened while it attacked Kon-
tum. However, as the NVA troops massed to attack those ARVN 
forward positions, they became good targets for Arc Lights. Our 
bombs killed thousands of enemy soldiers and destroyed tanks 
and other weapons they could have used against Kontum. Equally 
important, the three-week break between the attacks on Tan Can 
and Kontum gave the defenders of Kontum time to assemble the 
entire 23rd Division in a unifi ed command, establish a coordinated 
defense, and plan fi re support for the battle. It also allowed the 
USAF to redeploy additional aircraft back to Southeast Asia, which 
enabled the air force to infl ict heavy casualties on the Communists 
as they approached and fi nally attacked Kontum. All these actions 
strengthened Kontum’s defenses enough to defeat the attack when 
it fi nally came.
One of the reasons the NVA failed to follow up with an attack on 
Kontum immediately after Tan Canh fell was that its logistics “tail” 
was inadequate to support its attacking “teeth.” The Easter Offen-
sive was North Vietnam’s fi rst big, mechanized war. It employed 
hundreds of thousands of troops and required that vast quantities 
of food, fuel, and other supplies be constantly moved forward to 
supply the attacking forces. The North Vietnamese logistics system 
had been adequate for their infantry and some vehicles in the South 
before 1972, but it was not up to the job of supporting 13 divisions—
virtually the entire army—serving in the fi eld in South Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia during months of almost continuous action.
The US mining of ports and destruction of bridges and rail 
lines in the North contributed to the critical shortages at the end 
of the NVA’s supply line. Chinese overland shipments were reduced 
from 160,000 to 30,000 tons a month. Virtually all of the North’s 
POL storage facilities were destroyed.34 Many of the supplies that 
did reach the Communist army in the fi eld were then destroyed 
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by tactical air operations and Arc Lights. During the offensive, the 
NVA committed thousands of tanks and other vehicles, all burn-
ing up fuel at a rate their army’s logistics system could not sustain. 
The T-54 required about a gallon of diesel per mile, and when it 
ran dry, it was a sitting duck. In the attack on An Loc, the NVA 
tanks attacked without external fuel drums, and some ran out of 
gas before they ran out of ammunition.35 The T-54 that ran out of 
gas just before it reached our bunker is my favorite example of how 
our bombing in the North produced results on the front lines.
The Communists made an all-out effort to achieve total, fi nal 
victory in the spring of 1972, but they failed. If we consider their 
terrible losses during their attempts to take Kontum and An Loc, it 
is obvious that seizing those cities was one of their primary objec-
tives. However, they were unable to take Kontum or An Loc or to 
hold major cities in I Corps. They did gain and retain control of 
millions of South Vietnam’s citizens and some of its territory. They 
effectively eliminated the 17th parallel as the border between North 
and South Vietnam, and they pushed ARVN back from the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail and its bases on Vietnam’s western border.
Speaking about the 23rd ARVN Division, General Abrams said, 
“They have been victorious. They know it. And they beat the best.”36
Lieutenant General David R. Palmer later observed about the 
Easter Offensive:
Although American troops did not participate in the ground 
combat, advisers fought with their units. The confl ict had 
come full circle—it was an advisory war again. Actually, it 
had never stopped being an advisory war. Ever since the fi rst 
combat death in January 1961, Americans had been fi ghting 
and dying with South Vietnamese units. Their sacrifi ces and 
achievements had simply been monumentally overshadowed 
by the more newsworthy operations of US combat units after 
they entered in 1965. Advisors [sic] fought a largely ignored 
war. But they had always been there, the steel reinforcing 
rods keeping the concrete from crumbling. . . . Somehow it 
seemed almost nostalgic that, although America fi ghting ele-
ments had departed, advisers were still at work.37
During a briefi ng at MACV headquarters in Saigon, a senior 
American offi cer was asked what would have happened if US air 
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support had not been available during the Easter Offensive. He 
responded, “We would be meeting in some other place today.”38
We won the Battle of Kontum. Some might say we won by not 
losing. However, we also won by killing so many enemy soldiers and 
destroying so many of their tanks, weapons, and supplies that the 
NVA was forced to withdraw from the battlefi eld.
The American advisers; the US Army, Air Force, Navy, and 
Marine aviators; the VNAF aviators; and the helicopter and Jeep-
mounted TOWs were essential to our victory at Kontum. However, 
in the end everything depended on the individual ARVN soldiers, 
their offi cers, and their NCOs. It was those men on the ground who 
withstood almost continuous artillery, rocket, and mortar fi re and 
repeated assaults by enemy infantry and tanks. They also counter-
attacked again and again to regain lost ground. Another key fac-
tor in our victory was the personal leadership of men such as John 
Paul Vann and Brigadier General Ly Tong Ba. Unlike Colonel Le 
Duc Dat at Tan Canh, Brigadier General Ba took an active role 
in the fi ghting and provided his troops with the leadership they 
needed to win the battle. The 23rd ARVN Division took a terrible 
battering at Kontum, but they held against all the bombardments, 
the human-wave assaults, and the enemy tanks—and that is why 
they were victorious.
In 1975, US Army colonel Harry G. Summers said to an NVA 
colonel, “You know you never defeated us on the battlefi eld.”
To which the Communist colonel responded, “That may be so, 
but it is also irrelevant.”39
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Glossary
Abbreviations and
Military Jargon
AFB   air force base
AFN   Armed Forces Network, which broadcast 
   American music, news, and features to the 
   Americans in Vietnam
air liaison offi cer USAF offi cer, usually a fi ghter-bomber 
   pilot, attached to an army unit to coordi-
   nate air support
AK-47   Soviet-designed assault rifl e used by most 
   Communist armies and many other armies 
   or irregular forces 
APC   armored personnel carrier; the US M-113 in
   the case of US and ARVN forces in Vietnam
Arc Light  a three-aircraft B-52 strike in South Vietnam
armor   the steel protecting tanks and/or  APCs; also 
   those vehicles themselves and the military units
   that have them
ARVN   Army of the Republic of Vietnam; also used 
   like “GI,” as in “An ARVN was killed” or 
   “The ARVNs attacked.”
ASCH   Assault Support Helicopter Company
attack by fi re  an attack by artillery, rocket, or mortar 
   rounds or direct tank fi re
AWOL   absent without leave
BDA   bomb damage assessment; an inspection by air
   or preferably on the ground after a bombing to 
   determine the results achieved
blivet   a rubberized bladder, in this case holding 500 
   gallons or more, used to transport or store JP-4 
   jet fuel
C-4   composition 4, relatively stable, plastic 
   explosive with a consistency similar to 
   modeling clay
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C&C   command and control; in Vietnam, usually
   meaning airborne operations centers in 
   helicopters
caliber   the largest diameter of the round fi red, 
   expressed either in millimeters, as in “12.7-mm 
   round,” or in hundredths of an inch, as in “.51 
   caliber”
CBU   cluster bomb unit; antipersonnel munitions 
   dropped by air
Chieu Hoi Program an effort to induce enemy soldiers to desert and 
   switch sides
Chinook  CH-47, also known as “a Hook”; large twin-
   rotor US Army helicopter used to move troops 
   and supplies
chopper  any helicopter, but in Vietnam most often a 
   UH-1 Huey
chopper pad   a landing area designated for helicopter use
CIA   US Central Intelligence Agency
CO   commanding offi cer
Cobra   AH-1G US Army helicopter gunship; also 
   called a “snake”
CORDS   Civil Operations and Revolutionary 
   Development Support; the US organization for 
   “nation building” in Vietnam
corps   multidivision-size army unit; in Vietnam, also 
   the four South Vietnamese military and civil 
   regions, which were, from north to south: I 
   Corps, II Corps, III Corps, and IV Corps
corpsman  an enlisted man in the Medical Corps
CP   command post; where the unit’s headquarters 
   is located and established by units of any size
CWO   chief warrant offi cer
dak   “river” in Vietnamese
DASC   Direct Air Support Center, as in “II DASC” for 
   the one in II Corps
direct fi re  when the projectile—for example, a rifl e bullet 
   or artillery round—follows a line-of-sight path 
   to the target; see indirect fi re
district   political and military subdivision within 
   Vietnamese provinces
DMZ   Demilitarized Zone; a supposedly neutral area 
   delineating the border between North Vietnam 
   and South Vietnam
DTOC   Division Tactical Operations Center
dustoff   US Army helicopter medical evacuation mission
E&E   escape and evade; to escape from or avoid 
   capture and to evade enemy attempts to (re)capture
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FAC   forward air controller; a pilot, often an   
   experienced fi ghter pilot, in a small aircraft who
    coordinates air strikes and other air  support
fatigues   US Army’s green fi eld uniform; the special 
   design for Vietnam sometimes called “Jungle 
   Jims”
fi xed-wing aircraft propeller or jet-propelled aircraft, as opposed 
   to rotary-wing (helicopter) aircraft
fl ak vest   an armored vest. The word fl ak is a contraction 
   of Fliegerabwehrkanone, for World War II   
   German anti-aircraft guns, and used to describe 
   anti-aircraft fi re or the shrapnel from any 
   exploding munitions.
FM radio net  The PRC-25 radios used by both ARVN and 
   the American advisers for tactical 
   communications were FM, “frequency 
   modulated.” Within a “net” used for a specifi ed 
   purpose, such as fi re control, all stations (users) 
   were talking on the same frequency. The AFN 
   in Vietnam used FM to broadcast news and 
   entertainment.
forward CP  a command post with only the personnel and 
   equipment necessary to direct combat operations
friendlies  Americans, South Vietnamese, and other allied
   forces
FSB   fi re-support base; a fortifi cation, usually on a 
   hilltop and manned by troops with artillery, 
   from which observers could see the surrounding
   area and control it with artillery fi re or air 
   strikes they called in
G-3   operations and training offi cer at division, 
   corps, or higher level
gunship   helicopter armed with machine guns or 
   missiles or both; a USAF AC-130 with miniguns 
   and sometimes a 105-mm howitzer or a VNAF 
   AC-47
HE   high explosive, as in “HE artillery rounds”
HEAT   high-explosive antitank ammunition that could 
   penetrate a tank’s armor and could be fi red by 
   artillery pieces, tanks, or recoilless rifl es
Hoi Chanh  VC or NVA soldier who switched sides and 
   joined the South Vietnamese under the Chieu 
   Hoi Program
Ho Chi Minh Trail a tangle of 12,000 miles of foot trails, vehicle 
   roads, and bypasses that was the NVA’s infi ltration 
   route into and through Laos, Cambodia, and 
   South Vietnam
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Hook   See Chinook.
Huey   UH-1 utility helicopter. See slick.
indirect fi re  when the projectile—for example, an artillery
   round—is fi red high and drops onto the target
JP-4   jet propulsion fuel used by US military aircraft 
   in the 1970s
KIA   killed in action
LAW   light antitank weapon, specifi cally the US M-72
Loach   light observation helicopter (LOH); in Vietnam, 
   usually the LOH-6 Cayuse
LOH   See Loach.
MACV    Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MARS   Military Affi liate Radio Station
medevac  medical evacuation, usually by helicopter in 
   Vietnam
MIA   missing in action
MiG   Russian-designed jet fi ghter-bomber used by 
   North Vietnam
military regions  regions coinciding with the four South 
   Vietnamese corps boundaries
minigun  multibarreled 7.62-mm machine gun
Montagnard  member of one of the various ethnic groups—
   such as Bahnar, Jarai, Koho, Manong, and 
   Rhade—inhabiting the Central Highlands
NCO   noncommissioned offi cer; sergeants, corporals, 
   or specialists
NLF   National Liberation Front
NVA    North Vietnamese army
PFs    Popular Forces or “Puffs”; local village militias
POL   petroleum, oil, and lubricants
POW   prisoner of war
PRC-25   US Army FM fi eld radio used by both ARVN 
   and the advisors in 1972
R&R   rest and recreation; usually a one-week vacation 
   outside Vietnam in a place such as Hawaii or 
   Thailand
RCAT    Regimental Combat Assistance Team; the 
   advisers assigned to assist ARVN combat arms 
   regiments
recoilless rifl e  antitank weapon with a dangerous back blast to 
   prevent recoil; US models used by ARVN were 
   75 mm and 106 mm
RFs    Regional Forces, or “Ruffs”; province troops 
   that seldom left their home province
RF/PFs   Regional and Popular Forces together; the 
   “Ruff Puffs”
ROK   Republic of Korea, whose troops and divisions 
   in Vietnam were called “ROKs” (Rocks)
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rotary-wing aircraft A helicopter is a rotary-wing aircraft, as 
   opposed to a fi xed-wing jet or propeller-driven 
   aircraft.
round   one shot from an artillery piece, mortar, rifl e, 
   or machine gun, as in “ten rounds fi red”
RPG   rocket-propelled grenade; a Soviet or Chinese 
   shoulder-fi red weapon used against vehicles, 
   bunkers, or personnel; several versions used by 
   the NVA in Kontum Province—for example, the 
   RPG2/Type 56/B-40
SA-7   See Strella.
SAC   Strategic Air Command. SAC B-52s fl ew the Arc 
   Light missions in South Vietnam and bombed 
   North Vietnam.
SAM   surface-to-air missile used by the North 
   Vietnamese
skids   rigid supports below a helicopter that the 
   helicopter sits on when it lands; also wooden 
   pallets loaded with cargo to be dropped by 
   parachute or unloaded out the rear ramp of a 
   cargo aircraft
slick   Huey helicopter with door guns but no 
   weapons mounted on the exterior
small arms   rifl es, machine guns, or other small-caliber 
   weapons one or two men can carry (Whether a 
   .50- or .51-caliber machine gun is “small arms” 
   depends on whether it is shooting at you.)
snake   Cobra AH-1G helicopter gunship
SOG    MACV’s Studies and Operations Group, which 
   ran secret missions into Laos and Cambodia
sortie   one mission by one aircraft whether alone or 
   with other aircraft
Spectre   USAF AC-130 gunship with two 20-mm Vulcan 
   machine guns, a 40-mm Bofors machine gun, 
   and a 105-mm gun fi ring HE or HEAT rounds
Spooky   call sign of VNAF AC-47 gunships armed with 
   three 7.62-mm miniguns
SRAG   Second Regional Assistance Group; so 
   designated under John Paul Vann, a civilian 
   rather than a military commander, as opposed 
   to the Second Regional Assistance Command, 
   under a military offi cer
strategic bombing bombing an enemy’s homeland to destroy his 
   infrastructure, factories, and war-making ability
Strella   Soviet-made, hand-held, heat-seeking, SAM 
   missile that could destroy aircraft fl ying up to 
   10,000 feet high
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T-54   Soviet medium tank used by many Communist 
   armies
T-59   also “Type 59”; an unlicensed, slightly modifi ed 
   Chinese copy of the T-54
tactical air  fi ghter-bombers of any US service or VNAF 
   and their bombing missions
Tet   Vietnamese lunar New Year celebration lasting 
   three days starting at the fi rst full moon after 
   20 January; also the Communist offensive 
   launched at this time in 1968
TOC   tactical operations center
TOW   tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided 
   missile
triborder area   where the borders of Vietnam, Laos, and 
   Cambodia meet northwest of Kontum City in II 
   Corps
tube   barrel of a mortar or artillery piece but often 
   used to mean the entire piece, as in “six 155-
   mm tubes captured”
USAF   United States Air Force
VC    Vietcong, the indigenous Communist 
   insurgents in South Vietnam
VNAF   South Vietnamese Air Force
white phosphorus also “WP” or “Willie Peter”; packed in bombs, 
   artillery shells, and hand grenades; burns when 
   exposed to the air and so used to mark targets, 
   start fi res, or destroy equipment
WIA   wounded in action
WO   warrant offi cer; a specialist rank above 
   noncommissioned and below commissioned 
   offi cers
XO   executive offi cer; the second in command who 
   takes command in the absence of the 
   commander
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